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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2005
This fascinating book explains why the first President Bush's great and speedy victory over Iraq in 1991 so unexpectedly turned into an electoral defeat for him in 1992, an undermining of his sanctions regime throughout the 1990s, and an unexpectedly difficult war in Iraq launched by his son in 2003. Jerry Long argues in his book that Saddam approached this conflict in a comprehensive way, looking not only at the nuts and bolts of men and weapons but also seeking allegiance at home and among Arabs and Muslims abroad to shore up the legitimacy of his position. Thus, Saddam's war was rhetorical as much as it was material. Long's analysis parallels an underappreciated 1992 work by Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War, which follows the twists and turns of White House words and actions from the invasion of Kuwait to the U.S.-led coalition's attack on Iraq. Smith's work was easier. The U.S. president essentially made up his mind to fight Iraq the day after the invasion of Kuwait. While he avoided telling the truth about his plans, the image of the conflict he projected throughout was consistent, summed up in his often repeated phrase, “This [the seizure of Kuwait] will not stand.”
Saddam's reasons for invading Kuwait were probably more complicated than Bush's reasons for opposing him. It is not entirely clear that Saddam even intended to remain in Kuwait before he was personally challenged by Bush the day after the invasion, eliciting the hostile response that King Hussein and others had predicted and had hoped to avoid when they got Bush to agree to give them forty-eight hours to arrive at an “Arab solution.” But Bush went back on his word, shamed into taking a tougher stand by Margaret Thatcher's insistent trumpeting for firmness at their meeting in Aspen, Colorado, on 3 August. After that, opinions hardened rapidly in foreign ministries across the globe—not least in Washington and Baghdad.
It is how the attitudes hardened in the Arab world that is the focal point of Long's book. Despite support for Saddam's move on the “Arab street” in Jordan, Palestine, Yemen, and most of North Africa, average citizens in Egypt and other Gulf states tended to oppose the Iraqi invasion, as did the leaders of a majority of Arab states. They disagreed with Iraq not just because of all the diplomatic pressure exerted by United States but because they saw Saddam's move as dishonorable and as inviting external intervention into their region (pp. 24–25). The split was reflected on 3 August in fourteen “yes” votes on an Arab League resolution condemning the Iraqi aggression (out of the remaining seven members, five abstained, one walked out, and the last—Iraq—not surprisingly, rejected it). But the Arab League's resolution carried a second message. It “categorically rejected any foreign intervention” (p. 25). This reflected Arab anxieties that the Iraqi invasion had shattered Arab unity, and that U.S. intervention in a now fragmented region would marginalize Arab states individually and collectively.
Saddam responded by initiating a discourse that tapped into common tropes. He compared his situation to that of Palestine, both attacked by outsiders. He presented himself as the only Arab leader with the courage to “confront the Israelis on behalf of the Palestinians” (p. 30). He also mobilized popular resentment of Kuwaiti wealth and revulsion at the thought of foreign desecration of the sanctity of Islam's holiest places. And as the forces amassed against him grew larger, his “rhetoric found an increasingly receptive audience” (p. 31).
Long argues that Saddam's war of words was designed to evoke deep cultural beliefs that he had called on during his long war with Iran, as well. It combined tropes from Islam with images from Muslim history and evocations of Arab nationalism. In doing so, it tapped into the deepest feelings of Arabs across the political spectrum, joining the languages of religion and nationalism that, as Long demonstrates, have important rhetorical similarities. As a result, “people in the region had two ways of rendering the same events.… The arrival of Western forces could be narrated as the arrival of either the imperialists or the kafirun” (p. 167). Saddam was “bilingual” (p. 169). He could speak to multiple constituencies using words that moved even those who opposed his actions because he appealed to their deepest fears.
Although so many opposed Saddam at the start—including Palestinians such as Hanan Ashrawi, who remarked, “We do not condemn occupation in one area and condone it in another.…We do not have…double standards” (p. 175)—by the end of the shooting war, Saddam's moral position had risen. Despite his massive defeat on the battlefield, Long argues, Saddam won the war to shape popular understanding of its meaning. This was the result not only of his rhetoric but also of what actually happened: Western military forces did stay; the Iraqi people were bombed and starved for years afterward as the result of a poorly thought out and implemented sanctions regime; and populations were alienated from their leaders by the evidence of their senses, that isti

amār, imperialism, had returned to the Middle East.