The Role of Communication in Catalyzing Foreign Policy Change

According to Sylvan and Thorson, politics is founded on language.^{Footnote 10} Language provides the medium through which politics is constituted, transformed, and enacted. The authors’ claim refutes the idea that objects can be understood detached from their structures of representation and interpretation. On the contrary, any knowledge structure results from the interaction and communication established between and among individuals.^{Footnote 11} Language is a vital instrument for constructing reality since it is the means of communication and social interaction. It does more than represent; it enables and limits the scope of human action.^{Footnote 12} Through the combination of words, phrases, sentences, and other linguistic symbols that we describe report, explain, and interpret our political environment.^{Footnote 13} Thus, language defines and consequently confines our understandings.

Just as communication is responsible for creating our shared representations of reality, it is also accountable for changing them.^{Footnote 14} As Kennedy and McComb have stated, “Communication is the mechanism that provides the information necessary to update and modify individual mental models.”^{Footnote 15} As individuals exchange their personal cognitive representations with others, new meanings and interpretations are shared, thus contributing to transforming existing mental models in order to adjust to the new social context. A new organizational reality is created when a sufficient number of people share its definition and accept the action consequences resulting from the new reality.^{Footnote 16}

Accordingly, communication allows for more than the sheer transmission of information between individuals. Rather, it is the means by which groups and organizations come to create and re-create shared meanings and beliefs. As Barrett et al. have suggested, “meaning making is a shared and public activity” since language is only meaningful within a particular social context.^{Footnote 17} For that reason, language should be understood as a tool that allows “members of a culture to coordinate ongoing relations with one another.”^{Footnote 18} The more individuals communicate, the greater the possibility that new narratives, representations, and mental models are constructed since opportunities for discussing new interpretations arise.^{Footnote 19}

While Lewis has confirmed that communication is not the only factor responsible for change, she does acknowledge its importance.^{Footnote 20} It is through the communicative process that other change variables—physical, financial, emotional, and political—are mediated. Without communication, new information is not considered and existing representations are not evaluated and vetted against inconsistencies. Communication can add new information and refocus people’s attention to new situations and issues.^{Footnote 21} Moreover, all decision-making units are susceptible to external influences, no matter how self-contained they are.^{Footnote 22} Thus, communicative interaction is an intrinsic condition to the decision-making process.

Moreover, communication as it is embraced in this article is specifically that of transformative communication. In other words, it refers to the multiple communicative interactions that contribute to transforming the relationships between individuals and groups possessing distinct and sometimes antagonistic beliefs in order to construct shared mental models and policy practices.^{Footnote 23} Therefore, transformative communication requires embracing a process-oriented, that is, a “performative” approach, to change that assumes that human agency is critical to understanding how mental models are altered.^{Footnote 24} From this perspective, “meaning” does not exist outside of social practices. Language per se has no significance detached from human praxis. Rather, it is through “speech acts” that language becomes performative. These actions in language “bring into existence a social reality that did not exist before their utterance.”^{Footnote 25} Thus, communicative acts are more than mere utterances; they are actions that orient individuals and groups.^{Footnote 26} As a result, it is through performative communication that we can transform reality and ultimately change our actions.

Generally, the performative nature of speech acts has been attributed only to verbal communication. However, we must contemplate the performativity of the nonverbal linguistic tools involved in foreign policy decision-making. In fact, in recent years several authors have demonstrated and stressed the performative nature of other communicative acts.^{Footnote 27} Cooren, for instance, has demonstrated how different forms of nonverbal communication also exhibit textual agency: “Signs, memos, and contracts display a form of agency by doing things that humans alone could not do. Created by human beings, these texts participate in the channeling of behaviors, constitute and stabilize organizational pathways, and broadcast information/orders.”^{Footnote 28}

As the reference to the Carter administration in the following sections confirms, communication in foreign policy has to take into consideration the multiple nonverbal linguistic tools decision makers use in the decision-making process, namely edicts, memoranda, reports, studies, and other official sources.^{Footnote 29} Yet, official documents are not the only means of interaction between decision makers. Bloodgood’s research has revealed that due to the growing influence of information technologies and globalization, foreign policy decision makers are increasingly dependent on personal and material sources of information from outside their organizations.^{Footnote 30} In fact, her study confirmed that decision makers are routinely turning to nongovernmental sources of information such as the media, organizational representatives, and NGOs.

In this sense, governments should be understood as networks of communication.^{Footnote 31} They do not have one monolithic communicative interaction. On the contrary, governments have numerous sequential interactions acting simultaneously and that are all contributing to the construction of their reality. Consider, for instance, the multiple communicative interactions at work in a government, such as communication on foreign policy, defense policy, budget policy, economic policy, domestic policy, environmental policy, and so forth. Despite treating different issues and subject matters, governments have a shared mental model that helps guide general policy. Nevertheless, since change naturally occurs within the context of social interactions, communicative interactions are constantly reconstructing individual, group, and government realities. In other words, “change is a recursive process of social construction in which new realities are created, sustained, and modified in the process of communication.”^{Footnote 32}

Decision-Making Structures and Processes in the Carter Administration

The decision-making structure is understood as the form that defines the organizational relationships between the senior presidential advisers (including Cabinet heads) and the president.^{Footnote 33} We must first understand who was involved in foreign policy decision-making and how the decision process was formally organized in order to evaluate the dynamics involved in creating those communicative interactions.

Notwithstanding the increased role that Congress played following the Vietnam War, foreign policymaking continues to remain primarily a domain of presidential endeavor and responsibility. As Carter has acknowledged, most critical decisions are always solitary: “My most vivid impression of the Presidency remains the loneliness in which the most difficult decisions had to be made.”^{Footnote 34} Nevertheless, in the United States, foreign policy decision-making has traditionally been a collective endeavor involving the president and his closest advisers. While there is no question as to the president’s dominance over the decision-making process, the responsibilities and issues the modern presidency must deal with are, as Kessel has pointed out, “far too much for one person to do.”^{Footnote 35} Collective decision-making increases the resources available to the decision-making process, namely, by providing more information, knowledge, and perspectives.^{Footnote 36} Therefore, Carter’s organization of his advisory system was critical to his policy choices since “the type and quality of information and advice a president receives are a direct reflection of those he surrounds himself with.”^{Footnote 37}

Coming into office, Carter sought to rebalance foreign policymaking, particularly by breaking with the Kissinger-dominated approach and ending the dominance of the NSC in defining policy.^{Footnote 38} In particular, Carter sought a more collegially oriented approach in which he would involve his Cabinet in the decision-making process.^{Footnote 39} As Carter acknowledged, “I found through experience that a collegial model—with a group discussing the issue as equals—is good, provided the gathering includes primarily those who will be directly involved in carrying out the decision or explaining it to the public.”^{Footnote 40} At this initial stage, Carter wanted to have a pluralistic and open decision-making system that could benefit from diversified inputs brought into the decision process. To allow advisers to have greater access to him, Carter initially refrained from appointing a chief of staff. In this way Carter hoped to avoid hierarchical mechanisms that might hinder or regulate the necessary interaction between the White House and the rest of the administration.

Carter had recognized the importance of foreign policy since his gubernatorial days. He had long pressed for governors to organize themselves in order to have a greater influence on America’s foreign policy.^{Footnote 41} He also immersed himself in the study of international affairs, namely through his participation in the Trilateral Commission. Therefore, his cabinet appointments reflected his desire for an experienced group of foreign policy professionals. For that reason, Carter chose a group of seasoned policymakers to serve as his key foreign policy advisers: Walter Mondale for vice president, Cyrus Vance for secretary of state, Harold Brown for the Department of Defense, Zbigniew Brzezinski as the assistant to the president for National Security Affairs (APNSA), and Stansfield Turner for director of Central Intelligence.

True to his desire to implement a more collegial model of decision-making, Carter welcomed and encouraged competition among his advisers. Nonetheless, Carter wanted to weigh in the varied perspectives and options available to him. However, while Carter was open to evaluating all the different points of view, the final decision belonged to him alone. Carter was adamant in guaranteeing that “the final decisions on basic foreign policy would be made by me in the Oval office.”^{Footnote 42} Therefore, diplomatic and security-related issues were allocated to the National Security Council (NSC), which provided the basic formal interagency structure for foreign policy and national security decision-making.^{Footnote 43}

In fact, the first Presidential Directives (PD) issued by Carter codified the restructuring of the National Security Council configuration and its functioning. PD-2 reorganized the NSC with the intent of “placing more responsibility in the departments and agencies while insuring that the NSC, with my Assistant for National Security Affairs, continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.”^{Footnote 44} PD-2 reduced the number of standing NSC committees to merely two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC).

The PRC was established to deal with department-specific issues that had repercussions for other departments or agencies. The PRC was chaired in accordance with the subject under consideration, as was the attendance of nonstatutory members. The most pressing issues to be dealt with by the PRC were:

• • foreign policy issues that contain significant military or other interagency aspects;

• • defense policy issues having international implications and the coordination of the annual Defense budget with foreign policy objectives;

• • the preparation of a consolidated national intelligence budget and resource allocation for the Intelligence Community (thus assuming under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence the functions and responsibilities of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence); and

• • those international economic issues pertinent to U.S. foreign policy and security, with staffing of the underlying economic issues through the Economic Policy Group. (PD-2)

The SCC, for its part, dealt with “cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential Decision” (PD-2). In order to coordinate the interorganizational decision-making process, the APNSA was appointed as the chairman of the SCC. Thus, PD-2 attributed the following issues to the SCC: “oversight of sensitive intelligence activities; for instance, covert operations authorized by the president; arms control evaluation; and crisis management.”

This organizational arrangement was structured to allow for the formal foreign policy decisions to be made in the NSC’s standing committees (SCC rectly on issues of foreign policy and national security. Carter wanted his Secretaries to participate in a teamlike style in the NSC decision-making process. According to Brzezinski, Carter wanted to “accustom Cabinet members to working as a team under each other’s chairmanship and that of the president’s Assistant for National Security Affairs.”^{Footnote 45} Nevertheless, coordination of the NSC was centralized in the presidency. The APNSA was designated to manage the normal functioning of the NSC, namely, by determining the agenda and guaranteeing that the necessary documentation was prepared and made available to the council.

To enable NSC policymaking activities, PD-1 established the working instruments of the NSC: the Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) and the Presidential Directives.^{Footnote 46} The PRM served as the main platform for exchanging ideas and suggestions for foreign policymaking within the NSC and the broader presidential advisory system. The documental interaction was structured in three distinct stages.^{Footnote 47} The first stage involved the requisition of a PRM/NSC or a commissioned option paper prior to a PRC or SCC meeting. Depending on the committee hosting the meeting, the documents would be prepared by the NSC staff (when it was a SCC meeting) or by the department chairing the meeting (in the case of the PRC). The second stage involved the development of a unanimous recommendation for the president to decide on or a report on alternative policy recommendations for presidential consideration. Whichever the case, the documents were generally composed of a brief meeting summary (sometimes with the minutes of the discussion) and a proposal for approval or request for a decision. Occasionally, a PRC or SCC could give rise to option papers to be discussed in a more formal NSC meeting. The third stage involved the communication of the president’s decision to the appropriate departments. The announcement of the decision took the form of either a PD, particularly in the cases of important issues, or a decision memo that reflected the president’s response to the report prepared for him.

The Dynamic Nature of the Carter Administration’s Decision-Making Structures and Processes

Since government organizations resemble open systems, one of their essential qualities is their susceptibility to change.^{Footnote 48} As political actors interact over time, they tend to adjust their decision-making structures and processes to best deal with the demands perceived and encountered.

Accordingly, the initial formal decision-making structure presented in the preceding section was short-lived. Despite his desire for a collegial decision-making model, Carter quickly came to understand that his ideal system did not satisfy his personal needs and objectives. In order to solve the persistent problem of “keeping people out of the Cabinet Room,” Carter acknowledged that he “had to intervene personally and use my full authority to hold the group down to a reasonable size.”^{Footnote 49} Therefore, the original formal structure established by Carter was soon abandoned. According to Warshaw, by mid-1979 Carter had dismantled his original organizational structure by appointing a chief of staff to control access to the president, expanded the domestic policy staff in order to initiate domestic-policy proposals, and increased his personnel staff to approve departmental personnel selection.^{Footnote 50}

As a result, the number of Cabinet meetings was curtailed as the years progressed. Carter considered that “Cabinet meetings became less necessary” and, as a result, full Cabinet sessions declined from thirty-six in 1977 to only six in 1980.^{Footnote 51} The reduction of the role of Carter’s Cabinet paralleled the decline of formal NSC meetings. Although PD-2 intended to implement a collegial decision-making model in the NSC, the fact was that formal NSC meetings during the Carter presidency were infrequent.^{Footnote 52} When compared to other administrations, the Carter administration did not exploit the NSC as a decision-making body to any great extent. While the PRC did encompass a broader range of issues, the SCC assumed greater initiative throughout the Carter presidency because Brzezinski’s influence increased and crisis management acquired an overwhelming importance during this period.^{Footnote 53}

According to research carried out by Newmann, all presidential administrations tend to reveal similar dynamics.^{Footnote 54} Internal pressures lead all presidents to move from an initial formal NSC-based interagency process to more informal and confidence structures outside the standard interagency process. The original decision-making structure implementation corresponds to an administration’s theoretical administrative model.^{Footnote 55} However, as time moves on, all administrations tend to develop more informal decision-making structures and processes.^{Footnote 56} These informal structures and processes can take on a range of different patterns of interaction, such as specific committees, unofficial gatherings, lunches, telephone conversations, and one-on-one meetings. They emerge largely due to the belief that the formal structures are “too large, too slow, too leaky, or too impersonal a forum for serious consideration of crucial policy issues.”^{Footnote 57} Accordingly, informal processes are deemed more productive and efficient since the standard interagency process with all its constraints and impediments is circumvented.

In line with this reasoning, Carter also came to privilege informal decision-making structures and processes. As Link’s research has demonstrated, Carter spent “more than 50 percent of his time in such forums, while spending approximately one-fourth of his time in one-on-one meetings.” As a result, there was a noticeable reduction in Carter’s interaction with his closest advisers as time passed, revealing a clear preference for more informal structures:

Accordingly, Carter increasingly came to rely on a small group of personal advisers to help him arrive at major foreign policy decisions.^{Footnote 59} The inner circle was composed of formal advisers (from the Cabinet and WHO) and was divided into two distinct groups. The first group was focused primarily on domestic policy and was composed of Carter’s oldest political associates: Hamilton Jordan, Jody Powell, Stansfield Turner, Frank Moore, Stuart Eizenstadt, James McIntyre, and Michael Blumenthal. While these individuals were mainly involved in domestic policy, they did on occasion counsel the president on international issues and participate in the decision-making process.^{Footnote 60} The second group was directly responsible for foreign policy and was comprised of Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, and Mondale. These four foreign policy advisers were at the core of the decision-making process, and the interaction among them and between them and the president was crucial to the development of the administration’s foreign policy.

As the president and his top advisers became increasingly unsatisfied with the formal interagency process, informal interactions and processes became dominant in defining policy. By mid-1977, several informal structures and processes were developed in the administration that became consolidated over the years as the decision forums par excellence.^{Footnote 61}

Two informal structures were particularly important: the Friday foreign affairs breakfast and the weekly Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski (V-B-B) luncheon. These informal meetings were endorsed by Carter and allowed for the discussion and resolution of many foreign policy issues without the hindrance of the Cabinet or bureaucratic apparatus. Carter found the foreign affairs breakfast particularly efficient and productive: “For about an hour and a half, we covered the range of questions involving international and defense matters, to allow me to reach decisions and to minimize any misunderstanding among this high-level group.”^{Footnote 62} The presidential breakfasts grew into important executive sessions of close, intimate, and confidential discussions, which provided many of the key decision makers an opportunity to interact directly with the president.^{Footnote 63} Although the presidential breakfasts were informal and Carter resisted having any official agenda, Brzezinski was able to influence the issues discussed by indirectly suggesting them during his formal morning briefing. Carter eventually authorized Brzezinski to summarize the meetings’ conclusions and distribute them to the participants.^{Footnote 64}

Equally important were the V-B-B luncheons, where the participants were able to freely exchange perspectives on topics of foreign policy and national security. The luncheons allowed for the top three foreign and security policy advisers to resolve issues that they felt did not need to involve a formal PRC or SCC. According to Vance, the V-B-B luncheons had the advantage of overcoming many of the constraints inherent in formal venues, since “if the secretaries of state and defense and the national security adviser came to an interagency meeting in agreement on a particular course of action, it would be extremely difficult for another point of view to prevail.”^{Footnote 65} While the V-B-B luncheons were informal forums for policy debate, they did ensure some level of formality, namely involving the departmental staffs’ provision of the agenda and necessary briefing books related to the topics under consideration. In the manner of the presidential breakfast, the V-B-B luncheons would result in a memorandum drafted by Brzezinski that was sent to the president and participants highlighting the decisions reached.

As all presidential advisers, both Brzezinski and Vance jockeyed for influence in the decision-making process to try to stamp their unique perspective on U.S. foreign policy. Ultimately, the power to influence the president came from who had greater access to Carter. Brzezinski was quite aware that his power came from his relationship with the president. Therefore, Brzezinski sought to maintain as much direct access to the president as possible, knowing full well that “only then could I assert my own authority in a manner consistent with his views.”^{Footnote 66}

Particularly important was Brzezinski’s control over the information channels and access to the president. As noted above, documental interaction was particularly important in the Carter decision-making process. In fact, Carter favored written memos rather than face-to-face interaction for developing policy, and he preferred to receive questions and advice in writing, which he would usually answer in short texts in the margins (or longer messages on more important issues).^{Footnote 67}

PD-1 set up a decision-making process highly centered on documental sources and interactions. While PRM were the main platforms for exchanging ideas and policy recommendations, there were several other important formal and informal documents for transmitting information and advice. The daily briefings and the weekly reports the president received from his closest foreign policy advisers were particularly important. These interactions with the president served as a means for the different advisers to try “planting basic ideas.”^{Footnote 68} For instance, Vance would submit a nightly report to the president that described and analyzed policy issues that the secretary of state considered important. This informal report allowed Vance to circumvent the NSC’s standard “cover memos” summarizing and interpreting the information and “raise policy issues directly and quickly.”^{Footnote 69}

Brzezinski also presented his personal views and ideas to the president on a regular basis, and he met formally every day to discuss the Presidential Daily Briefing.^{Footnote 70} While these daily briefings dealt primarily with intelligence issues, Brzezinski was able to outmaneuver the administration’s official senior intelligence adviser and monopolize the briefing process throughout the presidency. Brzezinski also developed a weekly NSC report in which he would provide more comprehensive reflections and considerations on the most important foreign policy issues. The NSC weekly reports allowed Brzezinski to freely present his assessments on the major challenges confronting the administration as well as evaluating their performance.

Brzezinski’s reports and memoranda differed from many of the documents produced by his colleagues. Many advisers, such as Vance and Brown, did interact frequently with the president. For instance, Vance submitted a nightly report to the president that described and analyzed policy issues that the secretary of state considered important. This informal report allowed Vance to circumvent the NSC’s standard “cover memos” summarizing and interpreting the information and “raise policy issues directly and quickly.”^{Footnote 71} However, the documents Vance and other key advisers submitted contained fewer recommendations than Brzezinski, whose texts were usually replete with advice and suggestions on how to proceed and which policy to implement.^{Footnote 72}

Carter came to rely increasingly on a few key advisers whom he trusted more than others. According to George, advisory groups tend to reveal “power-prestige orderings” that develop with time.^{Footnote 73} In the realm of foreign policy, Brzezinski and Vance became Carter’s two most trusted advisers. Their sway over the president fluctuated at different periods of Carter’s term in office. However, Brzezinski ultimately acted as a “gate-keeper” by controlling the access and transmission of many of the documents directed to the president. Shortly after the NSC formal structure was instituted, Brzezinski obtained the president’s approval for preparing the PRMs that directed the NSC to study certain issues and recording PRC and SCC views and recommendations. The authority to write and deliver the documentation directly to the president gave Brzezinski the power to mediate the interaction process and frame the policy recommendations discussed.^{Footnote 74}

Therefore, while Vance continued to be a trusted adviser to Carter, over time Brzezinski came to exert greater control over the decision-making process.^{Footnote 75} In fact, Brzezinski’s power grew as he increasingly assumed greater control over the interpretation of interagency meetings and denied alternative perspectives from reaching the president. In addition, the APNSA’s capacity to coordinate and draft the conclusions and proposals from many of the formal and informal policy meetings reinforced his influence over the decision-making process. As a result, the secretary of state was sidetracked as the principal foreign policymaking figure after the president. This trend was reinforced by Brown’s gradual shift in policy perspectives during the course of the Carter presidency and that contributed to a change in the power structure in the foreign policy team. As Brown increasingly assumed a more assertive U.S. stance on international issues, he strengthened Brzezinski’s position.

Communicative Interactions and the Transformation of the Carter Administration’s Foreign Policy

The Carter Doctrine represented a critical turning point in American policy for the Middle East. The policy transformation resulted from the continued communicative interactions among the Carter administration’s key foreign policy decision makers. The communication process among the decision makers allowed for the redefinition of the dominant problem representation within the Administration and, consequently, the wholesale change in U.S. policy.

The Carter administration arrived in Washington seeking to implement significant transformations in U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, the administration sought to maintain the general framework of détente.^{Footnote 76} In particular, U.S.-Soviet cooperation was deemed desirable and possible within an assortment of key issues such as the conclusion of SALT, a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, a renewed effort to move forward on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and the promotion of peace in many Third World regions.^{Footnote 77} For instance, in the early months of the presidency, the Soviet Union was considered a key partner in achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in Middle East.^{Footnote 78} Thus, on October 1, 1977, a joint U.S.-Soviet statement was issued calling for the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference in order to achieve a just and lasting comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.^{Footnote 79}

However, while cooperation with the Soviets was considered a desirable objective, the interactions among the administration’s key decision makers over U.S. global strategy emphasized the threat that the USSR continued to present to American interests. More precisely, on February 18, 1977, Carter signed PRM-10 with the purpose of initiating a comprehensive assessment of the overall American national strategy and U.S. capabilities.^{Footnote 80} In June 1977, the secretary of defense submitted the final report of the Military Force Posture Review. ^{Footnote 81} The report was founded on an assortment of deep-seated assumptions. Among others, it was believed that in the near future the Soviets would continue to pose the main threat to U.S. interests and American security at home and abroad. Another major postulate was that European security would continue to be vital to the United States and America would maintain its commitment to actively defend NATO against aggression by the Warsaw Pact. In assessing the capabilities of the American force structure, the report also revealed several interesting assumptions about U.S.-Soviet competition and U.S. military capabilities, particularly regarding the need to project power in the Middle East.^{Footnote 82}

As a result of the interagency debate over PRM-10, Carter signed PD-18 on August 24, 1977, which codified the Carter administration’s U.S. National Strategy.^{Footnote 83} The directive called for the U.S. to harness its economic, technological, and political assets in order to counterbalance Soviet military power and influence in key regions, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. While PD-18 emphasized the notion of maintaining a relationship with the Soviets based on competition and cooperation, the APNSA and the NSC had been successful in placing the Soviet threat to the Middle East at the center of the interagency debate and planting the seeds for a more assertive policy toward the USSR in the future.

The emerging conflicts in Africa provided another opportunity to initiate the interagency debate and offered the APNSA a chance to persuade the administration of the need for a more active policy toward the Soviets.^{Footnote 84} Events led Carter to request a review of U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa on March 17, 1977—PRM-21.^{Footnote 85} The resulting study was rather optimistic as to the U.S. opportunities to promote American influence in the region, but it also stressed that the Soviets were trying to displace the United States as the dominant foreign power in Ethiopia.^{Footnote 86} The situation in the Horn of Africa deteriorated in July 1977 as Somali forces crossed the border into the Ethiopia’s Ogaden region.^{Footnote 87} At the outset, and in accordance with the previous policy debates pertaining to the region, Carter did not want to involve the United States too deeply in the conflict. Rather, Carter wanted a regionally negotiated settlement to the conflict, preferably framed within the boundaries of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Carter was gradually becoming concerned with Soviet involvement in the region. He was particularly worried that increasing Soviet (or one of its proxies) involvement in the Ogaden would prolong and exacerbate the war and destabilize the entire region. Therefore, on September 12, 1977, the administration sanctioned the OAU’s position that “outside powers should not be ‘fuelling’ African territorial disputes.”^{Footnote 88} As Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia continued to increase in the fall of 1977, the Carter administration continued to protest and warn the different parties of the potential adverse outcomes such behavior could generate.^{Footnote 89} Despite growing concerns, the interagency debate within the SCC decided to continue to downplay the confrontation with the Soviets in the region in order to avoid encouraging “a sense of crisis or confrontation with the Soviets or that would commit us prematurely to positions that could limit our flexibility.”^{Footnote 90}

However, as the United States weighed its options, Soviet and Cuban support for the Ethiopian counteroffensive intensified the interagency debate. Accordingly, in early 1978, the first serious disagreements within the administration over the policy for the Horn of Africa came to the fore. The real issue was not the importance of the Horn of Africa. The most pressing differences were on how best to safeguard U.S. interests in the region. The main contention within the Carter administration was whether to link U.S.-USSR relations involving other issues to Soviet behavior in Africa. Brzezinski and the NSC staff favored linkage because it was a central principle of détente.^{Footnote 91} However, Vance rejected any idea that Soviet actions in Africa were part of any grand design. On the contrary, Vance viewed Soviet behavior simply as the exploitation of emerging opportunities. In view of that, Vance rejected linking Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa on the grounds that it would harm larger American interests, such as the SALT negotiations, and have little or no effect on Soviet behavior in Africa.^{Footnote 92}

The interagency debate led President Carter to issue PD-32 in February 1978, setting the guidelines for U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa.^{Footnote 93} The directive appeared to corroborate the more accommodating attitude advocated by Vance and the State Department and supported by Brown and the Defense Department. In effect, it confirmed a regionally oriented resolution to the conflict in the Horn of Africa, namely, through the initiatives of the OAU. It also reiterated the American policy of not authorizing allies to supply weapons of U.S. origin to third parties, particularly to Somalia. Furthermore, President Carter did not approve the APNSA’s recommendation to deploy a U.S. carrier task force in the Red Sea.

However, PD-32 envisioned considerable leeway in implementing a more assertive policy in case the need arose. For instance, while a Navy carrier was not authorized in the Red Sea, the directive did indicate Carter’s willingness to move a carrier into the vicinity, namely, to Diego Garcia. What’s more, the directive established that in the case of a Soviet- and Cuban-aided invasion of Somalia, the United States would consider authorizing its allies to transfer weapons to Somalia even in the absence of its commitment to withdraw from the Ogaden. More significantly, PD-32 acknowledged that if Somalia was invaded, the United States would be prepared to counterbalance Soviet threats or actions in the region.^{Footnote 94}

Moreover, notwithstanding the recommendation resulting from the interagency debates against binding wider U.S.-USSR relations to the Soviets’ actions in the Horn of Africa, one day after Brzezinski had stated to the press that Soviet military involvement in the Ogaden War could complicate efforts to achieve a new strategic-arms accord, Carter linked the issues at his March 2, 1978, news conference. According to the president, Soviet infringement of U.S. principles regarding the conflict would “lessen the confidence of the American people in the world and peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union, would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement or comprehensive test ban agreement if concluded, and therefore, the two are linked because of actions by the Soviets.”^{Footnote 95} While Vance and Brown agreed that it was wrong to establish a linkage between the two issues, Brzezinski used public channels to promote his views and policy options, being well aware that the use of public channels would increase the likelihood that top decision makers would be pressured to pay greater attention to an issue.^{Footnote 96}

The president’s pubic statement linking U.S.-Soviet cooperation to Soviet involvement in the Third World reopened the debate within the administration regarding the appropriate policy for dealing with the situation in the Horn of Africa. As the discussion continued within the SCC, Brzezinski persisted in pushing the idea that the “Soviets are demonstrating a predisposition to exploit a local conflict for larger purposes.”^{Footnote 97} The United States needed to act more assertively in order impress on the Soviets the cost of their actions, otherwise “this is going to be a continuation of our pattern of behavior of the last few months: noise but no follow-through.”^{Footnote 98} While Vance remained adamant in not jeopardizing U.S.-Soviet relations any further, Brown suggested an overture to the Chinese to try to pressure Moscow. The majority of the group favored a closer relationship with China and Vance ultimately agreed that conversations on science and technology could proceed.

In May 1978, conflict erupted once again in the Shaba province of Zaire. The Carter administration hastily denounced the situation. At a news conference on May 25, Carter chastised the Angolan regime and its Cuban associates for instigating the conflict. Brzezinski used public channels once again to corroborate the president’s claims on the NBC program Meet the Press. According to Brzezinski, the invasion “could not have taken place without the invading parties having been armed and trained by the Cubans and, indeed, perhaps also the East Germans, and we have sufficient evidence to be quite confident in our conclusion that Cuba shares the political and the moral responsibility for the invasion.”^{Footnote 99} The public denunciation of Cuban involvement continued for weeks and eventually the administration began implicating the Soviets for their responsibility in the crisis.^{Footnote 100}

Regardless of the actual intentions concerning Cuban and Soviet involvement in the Shaba region, the interagency debate led the administration to transform a Third World conflict into an East-West conflict. The issue died down as French and Belgian military intervention helped end the conflict.^{Footnote 101} Nevertheless, by mid-1978, U.S. policy was increasingly exhibiting a more assertive character. Above all, these conflicts also hardened the administration’s attitude toward the Soviet Union and catalyzed the U.S.-Sino rapprochement, impairing the already strained relationship between the two superpowers.

After the crises in Africa, Brzezinski increasingly became less receptive to Soviet actions in the Third World. He repeatedly interacted with Carter alerting him to the detrimental effects of not standing up to Soviet expansionism. According to Brzezinski, the United States could no longer afford to acquiesce to the Soviets.^{Footnote 102} The APNSA used his access to the president, particularly his regular meetings and memorandum and weekly reports, to continuously impress on Carter and his colleagues the ominous threat posed by Soviet activity in the Third World and the need for a more assertive U.S. response.^{Footnote 103}

The Iranian Revolution provided the APNSA and the NSC staff another opportunity to promote their policy agenda. There was very little agreement within the administration on how deal with the crisis, and the dynamics on the ground left decision makers constantly grappling to find adequate policy responses. Positions were continually changing and varied from supporting the Shah, promoting a military coup and establishing a military government, to supporting a moderate government and reaching out to Khomeini.^{Footnote 104}

Whereas the interagency debate continued on how to deal with the Iranian Revolution, Brzezinski kept pressing Carter on the need to face the growing international challenges, particularly those posed by the Soviet Union. In his December 2, 1978, weekly report to the president, Brzezinski alerted Carter to the imminent threat of a major political destabilization of a large part of the Third World. An “arc of crisis” had emerged that could have serious consequences for U.S. international security interests:

The APNSA again used his direct access to the president to recommend that the United States deny the Soviets any guarantees regarding future Chinese-American relations unless they demonstrated greater restraint in the Third World and proposed the creation of a Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East.^{Footnote 106} Rather than a formal alliance or bilateral security cooperation, the concept envisaged a “consultative relationship on regional security issues between a cluster of states that share common security concerns.”^{Footnote 107}

Brzezinski reinforced his views by submitting Comprehensive Net Assessment-1978 (CNA-78) to the president. The report was the result of the president’s earlier request for a review of the U.S.-USSR relationship (PRM-10) completed in June 1977. The assessment Brzezinski provided was an updated version completed by the NCS staff in the fall of 1978. The study presented several proposals for enhancing America’s position in the arena of global competition. In particular, rapid and coordinated action was necessary to develop the strategic mobility and quick reaction forces envisioned in PD-18. Also, in order to offset the fall of the Pahlavi regime in Iran and reduce the likelihood of further regional instability, CNA-78 suggested a series of initiatives, particularly: (1) continued efforts to secure access to the regimes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan (as well as Iraq and South Yemen); (2) assertion of U.S. interests in the region and admonition of Soviet expansion in pro-Western countries; (3) technological assistance and political support for pro-Western regimes in the region; (4) rapid implementation of the Rapid Deployment Force; (5) increasing U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf; and (6) reinstatement of CIA covert capabilities in the region.^{Footnote 108}

Brzezinski’s initiatives set off a renewed interagency debate regarding American global strategy, particularly regarding the Middle East. Vance was particularly critical of Brzezinski’s cover memo and the content of CNA-78, arguing that the United States did not require a standing military force projection capability for the Middle East.^{Footnote 109} In contrast, Brown and the Department of Defense responded positively to Brzezinski’s memo. The NCS staff’s assessment was attuned to the mounting security concerns within the Pentagon.^{Footnote 110} Moreover, Carter was increasingly receptive to the APNSA’s views and recommendations. The policy debacle regarding Iran had left the president unsatisfied with the quality of advice and intelligence he was receiving from many departments and agencies.^{Footnote 111} In contrast, Carter viewed Brzezinski’s proposals as more innovative and provocative and tended to agree with them.^{Footnote 112}

As the internal debate continued throughout the summer, international events provided the APNSA with an opportunity to successfully overcome any resistance to a more assertive U.S. policy.^{Footnote 113} While the administration tried to deal with the Iranian hostage crisis by balancing diplomatic initiatives with punitive measures, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 seemed to vindicate the NSC staff’s assessments. The day following the invasion, in a memo submitted to the president, Brzezinski restated his thesis that Soviet success in Afghanistan would fulfill “the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean.”^{Footnote 114} The subject was now particularly pertinent since the “Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs.”^{Footnote 115}

To claim that the invasion caught the Carter administration “off guard” is an overstatement. In fact, since mid-1979, Brzezinski had been alerting Carter to the growing Soviet involvement in the Afghanistan. In late July, Brzezinski informed Carter that he believed the Soviets were aiming to oust Idi Amin. As a result, in early September, the president requested that the NSC prepare contingency options for a potential direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.^{Footnote 116} The president also called for the State Department and the NSC emphasize growing Soviet involvement in Southwest Asia. Additionally, in early July 1979, Carter authorized the CIA to begin providing covert aid to the Afghan rebels, namely, by providing $500,000.^{Footnote 117}

In addition, the United States had been monitoring the increasing Soviet military buildup on the borders of Afghanistan for some time. In fact, in an SCC meeting in mid-December, Admiral Turner reviewed the buildup of the preceding months.^{Footnote 118} As the Soviets augmented the number of military forces, the Carter administration became increasingly aware that the Soviets would become more actively engaged in the civil war in Afghanistan. However, in the fall of 1979, it was still widely accepted that Soviet involvement would merely imply an increase in military assistance and training of the Afghan army and greater operational control of the conflict.^{Footnote 119} As the mobilization increased, the administration began weighing the possibility of direct involvement of Soviet forces in the war. According to the CIA, the buildup resulted from a plan to assist the Afghan military in trying to maintain control of the situation.^{Footnote 120}

Despite the different assessments regarding Soviet motivations for a full invasion, the ensuing interagency debate within the SCC produced a consensus within the administration that the United States had to respond boldly.^{Footnote 121} The need for an assertive reaction resulted from the shared conviction in the administration that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a serious threat to U.S. security interests, particularly in the Middle East. Even whereas Vance and the State Department argued that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was essentially local and limited and directly associated to perceived threats to its national security, the invasion and occupation of a sovereign state was not acceptable as part of the East-West competition.^{Footnote 122}

The outcome of the ongoing discussions was summarized in a memo that Brzezinski submitted to the State Department on January 2 and that identified the president’s decisions:

1. 1. Our ultimate goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Even if this is not attainable, we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible and should use the events in Afghanistan as a rallying point for our policies in the area.

2. 2. We should push these objectives vigorously, going to the United Nations if necessary. It would be preferable, however, for other countries to take the lead in the UN.

3. 3. Messages should be sent to our NATO Allies, China and key leaders in the UN and Non-Aligned Movement, drawing their attention to the events in Afghanistan and calling for appropriate responses.

4. 4. We will not link the Soviet action in Afghanistan to SALT. At the same time, we will not permit our interest in SALT to deter us from speaking and acting forcefully.

5. 5. We will send public and private messages to the Soviets, citing the unacceptability of their behavior, the threat to the peace posed by their actions, and their violation of the principles of behavior we agreed to in 1972.^{Footnote 123}

As a result, the president addressed the nation on January 4, 1980, and presented the administration’s policy in light of the recent events in Southwest Asia. Carter presented the threat of the Soviet invasion to the maintenance of the peace in Southwest Asia and to the security of the United States and its allies and stated that the “United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.”^{Footnote 124} Accordingly, Carter proceeded to present the punitive measures resulting from the interagency debate.

The administration continued to analyze its options and worked to build a strong international coalition that would enforce similar measures against the Soviets. The measures generated an animated debate within the administration’s senior decision-making group. While several issues were highly contentious, the majority of the principals agreed to the overall strategy of assuming a more assertive role toward the Soviets, particularly in challenging its expansion into the Middle East.

This outlook was evident in the January 14 SCC meeting on the U.S. Strategy for Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf.^{Footnote 125} All of the members accepted that the United States must bolster Pakistan’s capacity to resist further Soviet encroachment in the region. A shared interagency consensus emerged supporting a new regional security framework. Moreover, the SCC also approved the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for reducing the time for deployment of U.S. capabilities in the region by projecting tactical air power into Egypt and Jordan, requesting Saudi assistance in supporting U.S. fighter formations, and prepositioning heavy equipment and supplies in the region.

Consequently, on January 23, 1980, Carter delivered his State of the Union Address, putting forward the principles of the Carter Doctrine. Besides his commitment to defend the Persian Gulf against any external assault, Carter committed the United States to increased defense obligations, improve U.S. rapid force deployment, and modernize U.S. and NATO strategic forces.^{Footnote 126} Issues previously emphasized by the administration, such as nonproliferation, demilitarization of strategic regions, curtailment of conventional arms transfers to Third World countries, and the promotion of human rights, were forsaken in favor of a substantial military buildup, increased military supply to Third World nations, and an increased U.S. global military presence.^{Footnote 127}