In his intervention, “Overall and Larmer on Miracles as Evidence for the Existence of God,” Frank Jankunis argues that “neither Larmer nor Overall has got what the occurrence of a miracle would mean for the existence of God quite right,” and attempts to forge a middle path between Overall’s and my respective accounts of the issue. I am grateful to be given the opportunity to comment on his paper. There are a number of points where I find myself in disagreement with him, but also a number of points of agreement.
Jankunis correctly takes me to be responding to Christine Overall’s ambitious claim that if the events traditionally and paradigmatically viewed as miracles actually occurred then they constitute evidence against the existence of God, understood as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving. He is also correct in suggesting that my criticisms of Overall’s arguments in support of this claim fall into two broad categories, namely the definition of miracle that Overall employs, and her insistence that miracles constitute ontic, cognitive, and moral evils.Footnote 1
The Issue of Definition
I argue that Overall, in proposing to define a miracle as simply a break in the sequence of natural causes, fails to recognize how the term is actually used. In established usage, the term “miracle” includes a judgment of the cause of the event being referred to. It will not do, I claim, for Overall to insist on framing the argument in terms of her own stipulative definition of what it is for an event to be a miracle.
Jankunis suggests that in raising the issue of definition I have introduced a red herring into the debate. He raises two objections: the first being that I fail to recognize that there is no established homogeneous use of the term ‘miracle.’ In support of this claim, he cites “R.F. Holland’s famous distinction between the contingency concept and the violation concept of a miracle.” On Holland’s contingency account, a miracle can be simply an unusual and religiously significant event, “the kind of thing that, outside religion, we call luck.”Footnote 2 Jankunis asserts that this undermines my criticism of Overall’s definition of miracle, since it calls into question my claim that an essential part of the concept of a miracle is that it be an event that is supernaturally caused.
Jankunis is on shaky ground in making this argument, appearing unaware that Holland’s contingency concept of miracle as coincidence has been widely rejected in the literature.Footnote 3 Thus Christopher Hughes rejects Holland’s contingency account of miracle, on the basis that, if in the face of coming to understand that no supernatural intervention was required for an event to occur, a person nevertheless insists it was a miracle, then she “could be rightly accused of having an unacceptably loose concept of a miracle,”Footnote 4 going on to assert that “if you see from the start how an event could be explained without appeal to divine intervention, you’re unlikely to believe that that event is miraculous, because you’re unlikely to believe an explanation which involves more causes than seem explanatorily necessary.”Footnote 5 Similarly, Mark Corner argues that “the coincidence view of miracle does not … let us off the hook of explaining what a ‘special act of God’ is.”Footnote 6
Jankunis’s second criticism of my raising the issue of definition is that “even if Larmer could demonstrate that the use of the term includes divine or supernatural causation, objecting to Overall’s argument on definitional grounds is still problematic.” He asserts this on the basis that, since “the evidentiary connection between miracles and God needs to be critically assessed, it cannot be settled by definitional considerations.”
I agree that the real issue is the evidentiary connection between the events believers view as miracles and God. Indeed, I have insisted on this throughout my debate with Overall; a point that Jankunis acknowledges later in his paper when he writes, “It is the evidence we can muster to the conclusions that the event occurred and was supernaturally caused that does the work in Larmer’s argument, not his definition of a miracle.”
Nevertheless, the issue of definition is important. If one disputes the claim that a series of corpses found under certain conditions is evidence of a serial killer, one does not redefine the concept of murder such that it makes no reference to the actions of an agent. What one does is examine the evidence in order to ascertain whether the corpses are best explained as the result of a serial killer. Similarly, if one wishes to dispute the claim that some events traditionally viewed as miracles by religious believers count as evidence for God, one does not redefine the concept of miracle such that it makes no reference to divine agency, but instead asks the question of whether such events are best explained on the theistic hypothesis. Rather than propose, as does Overall, a private stipulative definition of the term ‘miracle,’ one should pose the evidentiary question in terms of whether, if the events viewed as miracles by religious believers actually occurred, such events can plausibly be seen as furthering what we would take to be the purposes of an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving God. If they can, then they count as evidence for God and can legitimately be understood to be miracles. If they cannot, then believers are not entitled to claim that such events are in fact miracles.Footnote 7
Miracles as Evils
I have criticized Overall’s insistence that the events standardly viewed as miracles by religious believers would constitute instances of evil. Jankunis argues that my criticisms fail. He seems to acknowledge, or at least be open to the possibility, that the “the examples of biblical miracles upon which Overall’s and Larmer’s debate has focused … are not persuasive examples of [ontic, cognitive, or moral] evil” but claims “there are many more events described in the Bible which meet both Larmer’s as well as Overall’s definition of a miracle and would be more clearly instances of evil, if they indeed occurred.” As an example, he cites the account in Numbers 16:31-35 of the divine execution of Korah, Dathan, Abiram, and their 250 supporters, writing that, “One may be able to contextualize turning water into wine for the sake of a good party, or turning loaves to fishes to feed 10,000 lest millions die of hunger, but it is a good deal harder to contextualize spontaneous mass murder of religious adherents.”Footnote 8
For several reasons, this again seems too quick a dismissal of my arguments. First, having mentioned my appeal to broader contextual considerations, Jankunis ignores such considerations in discussing his own example. The deaths of Korah, Dathan, Abiram, and their followers occurs in the context of a serious rebellion against Moses and Aaron, understood to be God’s divinely appointed leaders of Israel, charged with following God’s plan to bring Israel out of slavery and into a new land. Given the historical situation of the Exodus, in fostering insurrection against Moses and Aaron, these rebels were in fact committing treason. If at a human level it can be argued that it is morally justifiable to execute traitors, it does not seem a stretch to think that God might likewise be justified. It begs the question, therefore, for Jankunis, without supporting argument or discussion of the situation in which the event took place, simply to insist that it was an instance of mass murder.
Second, Jankunis takes no notice of the fact that the class of events in Christian Scriptures understood by believers as miracles contains many more instances of bringing about what are clearly morally desirable results than results we may find hard to accept as good. There are many more instances of healing than of striking dead.Footnote 9 Thus John Henry Newman comments that there
are by themselves [i.e., events viewed as miracles] more or less improbable, being unequal in dignity to the rest. They are then supported by the system in which they are found, as being a few out of a multitude, and therefore but exceptions (and, as we suppose, but apparent exceptions) to the general rule. In some of them, too, a further purpose is discernible, which of itself reconciles us to the strangeness of their first appearance, and suggests the possibility of similar reasons, though unknown, being assigned in explanation of the rest.Footnote 10
Third, even if one were to agree with Jankunis that certain events traditionally regarded by believers as miracles should not count as evidence for God, this in no way implies that other events recorded in Christian Scripture and understood as miracles by believers should not count as evidence for God.Footnote 11 The fact that believers might be mistaken in thinking some extraordinary events count as evidence for God—and thus mistaken in viewing them as miracles—can scarcely be taken as implying that they are of necessity mistaken in thinking other extraordinary events are the result of special divine action, and thus legitimately viewed as miracles. The fact that a particular corpse is not best explained as a murder victim can scarcely be taken as justification for saying no corpses should be so explained. It has been well said that the existence of twilight should not convince us that there is not night and day. Thus the existence of non-paradigmatic examples of a concept’s presumed instantiation scarcely implies that there are not paradigmatic examples of such instantiation. Whether extraordinary events are ever properly deemed miracles, that is to say, the result of special divine action, is not to be decided on the basis of focussing on borderline cases to the exclusion of instances where it is clear that such action constitutes the best explanation of the event in question.
Some Points of Agreement
Before discussing a further disagreement, it is appropriate to note some points upon which Jankunis and I agree and on which he has defended me. First, he and I agree that miracles do not imply violation of the laws of nature, thus constituting cognitive and ontic evils. The laws of nature are always formulated with a ceteris paribus clause, that is to say, they cannot be expected to account for what will take place if a supernatural intervention occurs.Footnote 12 Miracles, if they occur and are recognized, deepen our understanding of reality inasmuch as they reveal that the physical universe is not all that exists.
Second, Jankunis and I agree that one can entertain a concept without presupposing instantiations of that concept. Thus, for example, the Higgs Boson particle was initially theorized in 1964, but only confirmed (tentatively) to exist on March 14, 2013. It is simply not the case, despite Overall’s insistence to the contrary, that a definition of ‘miracle’ which incorporates the idea of supernatural causation “short-circuits the whole debate by begging the question.”Footnote 13 Jankunis puts the point nicely when he writes, “to define a miracle is, of course, logically distinct from asserting that a miracle exists, and also from asserting that the sorts of things implied by the occurrence of a miracle exist.”
Third, Jankunis and I agree that the methodology I propose for identifying an event as a miracle, that is to say considering whether it is best explained on the hypothesis that it was the action of a supernatural agent, is not circular. To claim, as has Overall, that this method can be dismissed on the basis that, simply by virtue of being a Christian, I approach certain events described in Christian Scripture already convinced that they are best understood as miracles,Footnote 14 is decidedly ad hominem. In addition to being logically fallacious, this ignores the fact that I have, in both print and public debate, made clear that I am an adult convert who, in large part, became a Christian theist on the basis of coming to believe that certain events described in the New Testament actually occurred and are best understood as the result of supernatural agency. Put bluntly, I do not believe those events occurred and are miracles because I am a Christian, rather I am a Christian because I believe those events occurred and that they are miracles.
Miracles as Evidence for God?
Despite his agreement that neither my definition of miracle, nor my methodology, is question-begging, and despite his agreement that certain events if they occurred would be best explained as the result of supernatural agency and thus legitimately termed miracles, Jankunis takes me to task on the basis that “even if an event occurs which is best explained as a miracle, this does not provide evidence that God, specifically the God of Christianity, exists.” He argues that I move too easily from the idea of a supernatural agent exerting causal influence over the world to the idea of God exerting causal influence over the world. He asserts,
in the places where God stands in for supernatural agent without argument, Larmer is reflecting his Western bias of equating supernatural agents with the Christian God … this is indefensible given the definition of miracle’ with which he has seen fit to operate.
Thus, even supposing we are willing to identify an event as a miracle, “we have no better reason to think it’s the work of the God of Christianity than we do to think it’s the work of a less capable or less good god.”
Two relatively minor points need to be made before considering what I take to be a more substantive issue. First, the definition of God employed in the debate was that God is to be conceived as an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving Being. Such a definition of God is not exclusively Christian, but is also the definition held by the other Abrahamic religions of Judaism and Islam. Although the examples discussed were derived from Christian Scripture, the focus of the debate was on whether such events could be taken as evidence for theism in general. Whether events understood to be miracles actually occur, and whether, if they occur, they are best interpreted as supporting Christianity rather than some other form of theism, are important questions, but they were not the primary questions addressed in the debate.
Second, in my writing on the subject, I have been explicit in recognizing that my definition of miracle is consistent with agents other than God performing miracles.Footnote 15 It seems unfair, therefore, to suggest that I am guilty of uncritically equating supernatural agency with God. What was at issue between Overall and me was not whether supernatural agents other than God might perform miracles, but whether it can coherently be thought that an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving being might act to produce such events. The discussion centred not on whether God must be thought to directly cause all miracles, but rather whether miracles must be thought of as instances of evil and therefore never attributable to God. I presume, therefore, that I may be forgiven if, in the course of the debate, it seemed at times that I take for granted that it is God who performs all miracles.
Jankunis’s more substantive objection appears to be that for any given miracle it is a logical possibility that it was caused by a less capable entity than theism’s omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving God. I have some sympathy for this objection. I have argued elsewhere that the ‘argument from miracle’ is best understood as a special form of the teleological argument.Footnote 16 One of the commonest objections raised against the teleological argument is that, at best, it only concludes to a designer not a creator, and therefore does not in any way establish the God of theism, who ex nihilo brought the universe into existence. Nevertheless, I think Jankunis’s objection fails to undermine my claim that events best understood as miracles count as evidence for the existence of God, defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving.
First, it bears emphasis that in my exchanges with Overall I only claimed that miracles are evidence for the God of theism, not that they, entirely by themselves, constitute a full-blown proof of theism. I see no reason why they cannot be regarded as an important part of a cumulative case for theism.
Second, it will not do to insist that every occurrence of a miracle be considered in isolation from other occurrences of miracles. Put differently, the possibility that miracles form a pattern that is best explained on the hypothesis of theism must be recognized. The claim that a miraculous event, to use Jankunis’s words, “admits of multiple interpretations,” might be considerably undermined if that miracle were to be considered in conjunction with other events of the same type. Jankunis does not put much stock in this possibility, but one wonders how seriously he has considered the evidence. I do not wish to nitpick, but the fact that he mistakenly describes the New Testament’s account of Jesus’s multiplication of the loaves and fishes as Jesus feeding 10,000 rather than 5,000, and turning loaves into fishes rather than multiplying loaves and fishes, does not inspire confidence when he assures us that, in his (considered?) judgment, it is difficult to see how the biblical miracles could be seen as fitting with a divine plan. His mistake is easily accounted for if he does not take seriously that such events actually occurred, but then, if he does not believe that such events actually occurred, he is hardly likely to take seriously the possibility that they are best explained on the hypothesis of theism.Footnote 17
Third, Jankunis takes no note of the fact that there are accounts in Christian Scripture of supernatural agents, that is to say angels, who attest to the fact that they are operating under the directions of a supreme being (Lk 1:11-38). Similarly, there are accounts of supernatural agents, that is to say demons, who act in opposition to a supreme being, yet acknowledge the existence of a supreme being (Mk.5:1-20). Further, there are accounts in which the hypothesis of one God having power over other presumed supernatural entities is put to the test (1 Kings 18:1-40). This is again to emphasize that, if the reality of supernatural interventions in the course of nature is taken seriously, one must acknowledge not simply the bare implications of such events occurring but also the context in which they occur, and the arguably teleological pattern that links them together. There is also of course the possibility that the agent producing the miracle provides an explicit revelation of the miracle’s purpose.Footnote 18
Fourth, it bears emphasis that not just any metaphysic is capable of accommodating the concept of miracle. Fundamental to the concept of miracle is the idea of agency. It is far from clear, however, that there are comprehensive developed metaphysical positions that allow agency to be a fundamental ontological category. As regards physicalism, it is generally agreed that it leaves no room for agent causality.Footnote 19 Apart from physicalism, theism’s main competitors as a comprehensive account of reality are pantheism and panentheism. Neither, however, ultimately leaves room for the reality of agent causality, that is to say, the ability of agents to initiate causal chains by freely choosing either to act or refrain from acting.
In pantheism, ultimate reality is understood to be fundamentally impersonal.Footnote 20 Persons, on the pantheist view, are not viewed as agents capable by their choices of initiating new causal chains. Rather, their choices are understood to be inevitable, whether that inevitability be conceived as fixed, as in Spinoza’s presentation of the view, or unfolding, as in Hegel’s. One searches in vain in developed and comprehensive expressions of pantheism for any acknowledgement of the possibility of miracle.Footnote 21
Likewise, panentheism does not allow agency to be a fundamental aspect of reality. When talking of ‘God’, panentheists are prepared to talk of ‘Creativity’ or ‘unordered possibilities,’ but not of a personal agent capable of intervening in the world. They insist that God’s actuality must be understood as dependent upon the world, which entails that God, as conceived by panentheists, cannot possibly act as an agent in the world, since his primordial or abstract nature has no personal actuality except as ‘it’ passively receives concrete actuality from the world.Footnote 22 Further, as regards human beings, panentheists typically embrace a monistic account of the person that is identical with that proposed by non-reductive materialists. Thus, despite placing great rhetorical emphasis upon freedom, they are in no better position than physicalists to give a convincing account of the possibility of genuine agency. Given their insistence that the God/world relation be considered as analogous to the mind/body relation, this constitutes a further reason to hold that panentheism does not provide a metaphysic capable of accommodating the concept of miracle. It is thus no accident that panentheist Phillip Clayton’s massive work, The Problem of God in Modern Thought Footnote 23, has no entry in its index for ‘miracle’.
I have recently argued that any defense of the existence of finite agents will, in the long run, involve a defense of the existence of an infinite agent, namely God.Footnote 24 This being the case, whether an event correctly understood to be a miracle is performed by God or by some finite created supernatural agent, say an angel, it constitutes, either directly or indirectly, evidence for God. Jankunis is mistaken, therefore, in his claim that, on my definition of a miracle, events correctly understood as miracles need not be taken as evidence for God.
In conclusion, I appreciate Jankunis’s defence of my position on several points. I remain unconvinced, however, that his criticisms undermine my claim that events best explained as miracles constitute evidence for the God of theism.
