This important study addresses the connection that obtained in antiquity between philosophical asceticism and social justice, including gender equality, by focusing on the debate concerning the legitimacy of slavery as an institution and the relationship between ascetic practice and the rejection of social inequity. R. ambitiously but successfully ranges over pagan philosophy from Socrates and the Sophists to Proclus; ancient Judaism; the New Testament; and Greek, Latin and Syriac patristic writers. In the case of Greek and Latin writers, key terms are included in the original language.
The introduction notes the study's starting point in O. Patterson's ‘depiction of slavery in antiquity as “social death” and “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons”’ (p. 1) and acknowledges the difficulty posed for an investigation of this kind by the practical and ideological ubiquity of slavery in the ancient world, which made it difficult for those writing at the time to envisage it as an institution distinct from the wider social, political, cultural and religious milieu in which they lived. R. notes that social justice is not necessarily a modern category, and defines social injustice as ‘essentially the heavy inequalities leading to, and involving, the (often dire) poverty of many and the (often inordinate) wealth of few’ (p. 5). A discussion of the Sentences of Sextus highlights the influence of Greek philosophical asceticism upon Christian thinkers.
Chapter 1 introduces the themes of asceticism, slavery and socio-economic injustice as they feature in Greek philosophy and ancient Judaism. It surveys the Sophists; the debates as reflected in tragedy and comedy; Socrates and Plato; Aristotle and Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean responses to him; Scepticism, Middle and Neoplatonism; and the contrast between the acceptance of institutional slavery in non-ascetic Judaism and its rejection by the Essenes and the Therapeutae.
Chapter 2 turns to the New Testament with particular attention to Paul, who tells the Galatians that in Christ there is ‘neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, neither man nor woman’. This effectively reverses Aristotle's theorisation of racial, juridical and gender ‘superiority by nature’ point by point, but was probably inspired by Jesus and may have been intended to counter similar ideas in the rabbinic morning prayer, Tefillat Shahrit. Paul does not, however, call for the abolition of slavery, describing himself as a slave of God and regarding Christ's assumption of slavery as a model of humility. Jesus himself strongly advocated voluntary poverty and gave his followers a powerful message of service by washing his disciples' feet, a slave's task.
Chapter 3 surveys patristic attitudes. We learn, for example, that while Ignatius of Antioch does not question the institution of slavery, Cyprian of Carthage does. Clement of Alexandria is interested in moral slavery rather than its juridical counterpart since whether a person is a slave or free has no bearing on their capacity for virtue. His ‘gnostic’ will give alms out of love rather than the hope of reward, but Clement does not ask whether love can or should lead them to divestment of property and thus of slaves. Origen is less lenient, regarding wealth as tantamount to iniquity. Bardaisan of Edessa considers both legal slavery and poverty resulting from social injustice as a matter of fate, but Syriac Christian writers including the author of the Acts of Thomas, Aphrahat and Jacob of Sarugh adopt a more critical stance. In the Latin West, Lactantius affirms that no one is a slave before God but does not denounce legal slavery, while Ambrose focuses exclusively on moral slavery, declaring that whoever is wise is free.
Chapter 4 explores conflicting positions in four representative patristic thinkers: Augustine, Theodoret, Basil and John Chrysostom. For Augustine, slavery is not simply a general consequence of original sin but just punishment for individual sins (a slave is being punished for their own sins), and because it is just, it cannot be an evil. Only at the end of time, when God is all in all, will it be abolished. Thus Augustine, like Aristotle, strongly endorses the social status quo. So too does Theodoret, who defends slavery as proper to the ordered arrangement of a fallen world on the basis that God divided the human race into rulers and ruled, so that the latter, in whom passions prevail over reason, will be constrained by fear not to sin. Basil insists on the equal dignity of all humans, including male and female, and strongly advocates asceticism, but while he denounces the possession of many slaves, he does not condemn slave ownership tout court as incompatible with being a Christian. John Chrysostom advises buying slaves, teaching them a job or a trade, and then emancipating them on the grounds that keeping slaves is not consistent with love for humanity. Nonetheless he considers it acceptable for anyone, even a priest, to own one slave, arguing that this should not be counted as wealth.
Chapter 5 explores Gregory of Nyssa's theological arguments against the institution of slavery. Gregory argues that, as God's image, a human being cannot be bought for any price. Unlike other patristic thinkers, he links legal slavery, which he thinks should be abolished, to spiritual slavery. While God's image was blurred by the Fall and human freedom partially lost, both can be recovered through attaining apatheia. The ultimate telos of human life is ethically normative in this life: slavery did not exist in the beginning and will not exist in the end, therefore it should not exist now. Gregory exhorts all slave owners to manumit all slaves and presents Easter as a time for liberating prisoners, debtors and above all slaves.
In Chapter 6 we see how these precepts found reflection in Gregory's own life and that of his family. Following the death of their father and at the behest of his sister Macrina, their household was converted into a proto-monastery with all distinctions between family and slaves abolished. All shared the same table and sleeping conditions, and the family renounced being served by their ex-slaves. This contrasts with the approach of Jerome's friend Paula, who organised a house monastery for herself and her daughter Eustochium, but divided the virgins into three classes, who worked and ate separately. Gregory's radical commitment to social justice is echoed by the Cappadocians' protégé, the desert monk Evagrius, who teaches that to keep excessive wealth is to steal the food and clothing of the poor and infirm and that love/charity and wealth cannot possibly coexist in a person. The final section discusses Origen's influence on Gregory.
Chapter 7 focuses on Gregory of Nazianzus along with other late-antique ascetics including the Roman aristocrat Melania the Elder and Antony of Egypt. Gregory stops short of advocating the abolition of slavery. He proposes different degrees of asceticism, of which only the most radical entails the total renunciation of possessions and thus of slave ownership. The misfortunes of the poor and the sick do not mean that they are abandoned by God, but are an invitation to the Christian community to help them. Melania gave up her vast wealth, including her slaves, when she was widowed in her early twenties. She moved from Rome to Egypt and then to Jerusalem, where she founded a monastery and devoted her life to charitable works. Antony's ascetic career began when he renounced all his wealth in response to Jesus' exhortation to sell all possessions and follow him.
The book includes a clear and comprehensive summary of its conclusions. It is beautifully produced: well laid out, with particularly good paper, easily legible text and an attractive cover featuring a painting by the author. But it is for the quality of its scholarship, the range of material it surveys (more than could be mentioned in this review) and its spotlight on the ease with which we contrive to normalise and justify the indefensible that it should be widely read.
