Louis Fisher draws on his unsurpassed familiarity with the special role Congress plays in constitutional development to offer a view of constitutional history through a congressional rather than a judicial lens. Instead of celebrating Supreme Court decisions vindicating basic rights against majority oppression, Fisher points out how often Congress has promoted such rights (and how often the Court has thwarted their realization). Fisher's history is in the service of a thesis: Members of Congress have a duty flowing from their oath of office—and their place in the constitutional scheme—to consider constitutional questions on their own. Often the constitutional questions are unlikely to come before the courts, and whatever light judicial comments on related adjudicated issues might be thought to cast is likely to be quite inadequate. Fisher goes further. Members of Congress need not defer to judicial interpretations even when they know that the courts are prepared to hold their actions unconstitutional. “Lawmakers owe … the American people … their independent and informed judgments, including warnings not to move the country in a direction that is … unconstitutional” (272).
Fisher's argument contrasts with what probably is the prevailing view among legal scholars and perhaps political scientists and members of Congress as well. On that view the courts have the final word in constitutional interpretation, either because of their asserted expert knowledge or because of an asserted need for finality in interpretation. Fisher is not alone in challenging the prevailing view, which is probably held more widely among legal scholars than among political scientists. Legal scholars have adopted the political scientists' term “departmentalism” for Fisher's view. Departmentalism comes in at least two forms. The narrower holds that each department (or branch) has the authority and right to interpret the Constitution when its own prerogatives and interests are at stake. Fisher argues for a broader form, in which each branch has the authority and right to interpret every constitutional provision when such an interpretation is relevant to the branch's exercise of its uncontested authority.
Fisher's experience at the Congressional Research Service makes his comments on the constitutional aspects of the congressional budget process especially valuable. He explains why statutory provisions for legislative vetoes have continued to be inserted into budget-related legislation even after the Supreme Court held such vetoes unconstitutional, and how Congress continues to exercise effective vetoes of budgeting decisions as executive officials pay attention to congressional desires as they “reprogram” money from one account to another. Readers might have benefited from a bit more theorizing here. Including a legislative veto in a statute can signal to executive officials that members of Congress are going to pay attention to what they do. This signal can affect executive behavior even when everyone acknowledges that the veto provision is unconstitutional according to the Supreme Court. That in turn raises questions about what we mean when we say that a statute is unconstitutional when the Supreme Court says it is. Effective unconstitutionality appears to require support from the political branches.
The example of the legislative veto suggests another way of thinking about departmentalism. The Supreme Court offered its interpretation of the Constitution, but the Constitution's effective meaning has been worked out through political interactions between Congress and the president. Constitutional language plays its part in those interactions, and the Court's views may provide one or the other side with some rhetorical weapons (in the case of the legislative veto, the president's side). Our focus in the first instance, though, should be on the political interactions, with the Court's words in a secondary role. The point can be seen when we consider constitutional domains in which the Court has said that it would defer almost completely to what it usually characterizes as legislative choices. Sometimes the best way to understand outcomes in such domains is that the political branches' (mere) policy preferences prevail. Sometimes, though, the best way to understand the outcomes is that the political branches have determined—at least for the moment—the Constitution's meaning.
Of course political accommodations can change. And that suggests how Fisher's Congress-oriented perspective can fit into even more general accounts of the institutions of constitutional interpretation. The time dimension has become a central feature in recent theorizing about judicial constitutional interpretation. Inspired in large part by the development of “dialogic” or “weak-form” systems of constitutional review outside the United States, scholars of the US Constitution have come to see that dialogue occurs here as well, although perhaps over a more extended period than in other nations. Even in the United States, constitutional meaning is determined by interactions between the courts and the political branches. On this view, something like Fisher's broad departmentalism may be a prerequisite for making constitutionalism normatively acceptable.
Fisher includes a depressing account of the subservience of the CRS to the Bush administration, which led to Fisher's preretirement transfer to the law division of the Library of Congress, and his book is laced with quotations from members of Congress denying that they must—or even should—speak with an independent voice about the Constitution. These statements raise a question that deserves more sustained attention. In work by Mark Graber and Keith Whittington we have begun to get some understanding of the political conditions that support judicial supremacy. They have shown why politicians sometimes find it valuable politically to allow or even require that the courts resolve some constitutional questions. Fisher's quotations should open up a parallel inquiry into the political conditions that support congressional independence in constitutional interpretation. Undoubtedly that inquiry will connect with the themes in work on American political development. One such theme is that contests over judicial supremacy may be especially acute in times of transition from one to another political regime. It may be that those are also times when congressional independence in constitutional interpretation is particularly salient politically.
As these suggestions indicate, Fisher's book is valuable not only for the Congress-oriented perspective it brings to constitutional history, but also because it helps identify research paths that others can profitably pursue.
