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Languages as evolving organisms – The solution to the logical problem of language evolution?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2008

Christina Behme
Christina Behme
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, B3H 4P9, CanadaChristina.Behme@dal.ca
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Abstract

Christiansen & Chater (C&C) argue persuasively that Universal Grammar (UG) could not have arisen through evolutionary processes. I provide additional suggestions to strengthen the argument against UG evolution. Further, I suggest that C&C's solution to the logical problem of language evolution faces several problems. Widening the focus to mechanisms of general cognition and inclusion of animal communication research might overcome these problems.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 5 , October 2008 , pp. 512 - 513
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Christiansen & Chater's (C&C's) arguments against sudden de novo evolution of a highly complex domain-specific structure (Chomskian Universal Grammar or UG) could be strengthened by the following suggestions. C&C underemphasize the fact that evolutionary change (e.g., mutations) occurs at the level of individual organisms. Therefore, we need to deal with more than the problem of the extremely low likelihood of non-adaptationist “arrival” of UG. In order to spread through the population, this language acquisition device (which would require language as input) would need to be passed on to the next generations; and it is difficult to imagine what selective advantage would occur. While a hypothetical lone organism who somehow macro-mutated an eye would have an advantage over her eyeless peers, a lone UG would be of questionable use in a community of non-linguistic creatures.Footnote 1 Furthermore, evolution never plans ahead towards some future goal. Evolving a large, metabolically expensive brain because it could be “tweaked” into future UG (as proposed by Chomsky Reference Chomsky1986; Reference Chomsky2002) is almost certainly out of the question. Because evolutionary processes are restricted by existing structures and recruit not infrequently structures that originally evolved for some other purpose (excaptations; cf., Gould & Vrba Reference Gould and Vrba1982), we would expect UG to be similar to and not substantially different from other biological structures. These considerations strengthen C&C's arguments against the sudden occurrence of a monolithic Universal Grammar module (e.g., the “instantaneous Great Leap” defended by Chomsky as recently as 2006).

Concerning the problem of an adaptationist account of UG evolution, I suggest that C&C's arguments demonstrate convincingly why a monolithic UG with fundamentally arbitrarily (as opposed to functionally) determined constraints could not have evolved through natural selection. However, C&C have not shown that “specialized brain mechanisms specific to language acquisition” (sect. 1, para. 2) necessarily need to have the structure of UG. The exact nature of UG is controversial even among its proponents (e.g., Chomsky Reference Chomsky1995; Reference Chomsky2005b; Reference Chomsky2006; Crain & Pietroski Reference Crain and Pietroski2001; Fitch et al. Reference Fitch, Hauser and Chomsky2005; Hauser et al. Reference Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch2002; Jackendoff Reference Jackendoff2002; Reference Jackendoff2007; Lightfoot Reference Lightfoot1999) and critics point at the inadequacy of UG definitions (e.g., Cowie Reference Cowie1999; Deacon Reference Deacon1997; Pullum & Scholz Reference Pullum and Scholz2002; Tomasello Reference Tomasello2003). C&C repeatedly stress that their account is compatible with language-specific brain mechanisms that differ from UG, and it would be desirable to specify these mechanisms in some detail.

Having shown that a genetically determined brain structure like UG could not have evolved, C&C propose to shift the focus from brains to language itself. On their view (similar to proposals by Atkinson et al. Reference Atkinson, Meade, Venditti, Greenhill and Pagel2008; Bichakjian Reference Bichakjian2002; Clark Reference Clark1996; Deacon Reference Deacon1997; Kortlandt Reference Kortlandt, Bauer and Pinault2003; Ritt Reference Ritt2004; van Driem Reference van Driem, Minett and Wang2005), languages can be understood analogous to organisms that are shaped by brains and have evolved “to be easy to learn to produce and understand” (sect. 1, para. 3). This elegant solution to the logical problem of language evolution is not entirely unproblematic, and the following issues need to be addressed.

C&C claim that selection pressures working on language to adapt to humans are significantly stronger than pressures in the other direction because language can only survive if it is learnable, whereas humans can survive without language (sect. 5, para. 3). Survival is undoubtedly a necessary condition for natural selection, but it is not sufficient. Organisms need to reproduce to pass their traits on to the next generation. By analogy, a male peacock presumably can survive without a tail, but would he be able to attract a mate and reproduce? If language plays a role in mate selection (Burling Reference Burling2005; Deacon Reference Deacon1997; Dunbar Reference Dunbar, Levinson and Jaisson2005; Franks & Rigby Reference Franks, Rigby and Tallerman2005; Johansson Reference Johansson2005; Miller Reference Miller2000), then the selective pressures for language skills may be stronger than C&C allow.

C&C's suggestion that learnability is a constraint on languages sounds compelling for our modern, highly complex languages. But, assuming that the first (proto) languages were much simpler, the question arises why language did not remain much simpler. Further, as the example of language-specific performance differences in young Turkish, English, Italian, and Serbo-Croatian children (sect. 7.3, para. 6) shows, we find considerable differences in ease of learning and processing among existing languages. C&C's claim that languages are passed on as collection of interdependent features (sect. 5.2, para. 1) might explain why these differences continue to persist. But why and how did learnability differences arise in the first place? C&C suggest that “individual constructions consisting of words or combinations thereof are among the basic units of selection” (sect. 5.2, para. 2). Again, this already presupposes a fairly sophisticated language to be in place and sidesteps the important question of how more fundamental components of language evolved.

Finally, the intriguing computer simulations do not necessarily show that the algorithms used are not language-specific. It seems that in the examples cited, the problem space is limited by the initial conditions of the simulation; and therefore the results are compatible with UG (Bickerton Reference Bickerton, Christiansen and Kirby2003; Marcus Reference Marcus2001; Russell Reference Russell2004). Further, the models seem to be restricted to some pre-specified aspect of language, and it is not clear whether a complete language would require some domain-specific scaffolding (Marcus Reference Marcus1998; Russell Reference Russell2004; Yang Reference Yang2004).

Possibly some of these concerns can be addressed when we consider language evolution in the broader context of the evolution of other cognitive capacities. One interesting line of thought is the proposal that language comprehension, rather than production, was the driving force behind language evolution (Bickerton, Reference Bickerton, Christiansen and Kirby2003; Burling Reference Burling, Knight, Studdert-Kennedy and Hurford2000; Reference Burling2005; Origgi & Sperber Reference Origgi, Sperber, Carruthers and Chamberlain2000). Burling (Reference Burling2005) suggests that communication does not begin with a meaningful vocalization or gesture but with the interpretation of the behavior of another individual. An individual who can understand another's action even when no communication has been attempted gains an evolutionary significant advantage. This suggestion might direct us back at brain structures. Which structures underlie cognition in general and language specifically? It appears plausible that language is handled by several subsystems, which presumably also have non-linguistic functions (Deacon Reference Deacon1997; Fitch et al. Reference Fitch, Hauser and Chomsky2005; Johansson Reference Johansson2005). It might be illuminating to include details emerging from research on animal communication (e.g., Arnold & Zuberbühler Reference Arnold and Zuberbühler2006; Doupe & Kuhl Reference Doupe and Kuhl1999; Fitch Reference Fitch2005; Gentner et al. Reference Gentner, Fenn, Margoliash and Nusbaum2006; Hauser et al. Reference Hauser, Newport and Aslin2001; Orlov et al. Reference Orlov, Yakolev, Hochstein and Zohary2000; Pepperberg Reference Pepperberg2000; Perruchet & Rey Reference Perruchet and Rey2005; Ramus et al. Reference Ramus, Hauser, Miller, Morris and Mehler2000; Terrace Reference Terrace and Cook2001; Zuberbühler Reference Zuberbühler and Tallerman2005) in an account of language evolution.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was supported by the Killam Trust.

Footnotes

1. Chomsky (Reference Chomsky2002) claims that language could have “enormous reproductive advantages” even if only possessed by a single person in the universe. Considering that this first language user would not have lived in a community of mute twentieth century intellectuals (but among hunter-gathers), this theory appears somewhat implausible.

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