The UK constitution is going through a period of rapid change, some would even argue constant crises. Constitutional scholarship has become more reactive than proactive; illuminating and evaluating change rather than turning its gaze to long-standing principles. Sir Jack Beatson's book provides a welcome reflection on two such principles, the rule of law and the separation of powers. In doing so, it not only manages to achieve its aim of providing a clear introductory exegesis, but also provides ample food for thought for constitutional scholars.

The book begins with an overview of the UK constitution. Chapter 1 draws attention to its uncodified nature, its array of sources and the importance of parliamentary sovereignty. Having established this context, the book focuses first on an exegesis of the rule of law before turning to the separation of powers. After first providing an account, and an evaluation, of formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law (Chapter 2), a further critical evaluation is made of Dicey's theory, culminating in an assessment of Tom Bingham's magisterial account (Chapter 3). These characteristics are used as a lens through which to assess the UK constitution, with chapters evaluating the accessibility of the law (Chapter 4), the extent to which the UK constitution checks arbitrary executive decision-making (Chapter 5), access to justice (Chapter 6), and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary (Chapter 7).

The book then turns to the separation of powers. Beatson recognises the difficulty of applying this principle to the UK constitution, particularly given the fusion between the executive and the legislature. Consequently, he prefers to refer to and assess the balance of powers in the UK constitution (Chapter 8). The final chapter turns to provisions that enable majorities and protect minorities, examining the right to vote and parliamentary sovereignty, before assessing the extent to which the Human Rights Act 1998, the principle of legality, dicta regarding the exceptional circumstances where courts may refuse to recognise or enforce Acts of Parliament and the role of ouster clauses (Chapter 9). All of these are examined in order to evaluate the extent to which the UK constitution balances the protection of minorities against the protection of democracy through enabling majority rule.

As part of the key ideas series, the book is designed to give a short overview. The book is a model of percipience. To produce a book that is so clear, detailed and current is an outstanding achievement. There is no dumbing-down for the constitutional novice and no obfuscatory short cuts in order to avoid contestable issues. Any newcomer to the UK constitution is richly rewarded with a broad knowledge and understanding of these key constitutional concepts. The book also has much to offer those who are more well-versed in the UK constitution and constitutional theory. This review will focus on four such examples, three of which can best be understood as the important need for scholars to engage in reality checking, and the fourth encourages us to rethink what we mean by constitutional balance.

It is all too easy when discussing the rule of law to focus purely on case law. This is perhaps understandable in the current constitutional climate, in the light of televised Supreme Court cases, strongly-worded criticisms of the judiciary, and the ensuing promise of constitutional change in the 2019 manifesto of the current Conservative Government. The Independent Review of Administrative law, the further government consultation on its conclusions, and the Judicial Review and Courts Act have kept this aspect of the rule of law firmly in the minds of academic commentators. Beatson's book gently shifts our gaze, reminding us that the rule of law is both richer and more demanding.

In his chapter on accessibility of the law, Beatson delves deeper into the requirements of publication of the law, legal certainty and predictability. Despite the best efforts of websites and the now abandoned good law initiative, it is no easy task for citizens to find the specific rules that regulate their everyday activities. Statutory provisions tread a delicate line between “realism” and “romanticism”. Too much realist technical detail and the law can become convoluted. Too much romantic use of principles, and it becomes too unpredictable. This is before we consider long, complex judgments interpreting these statutory provisions, delegated legislation and guidelines – the latter two having proliferated through Brexit and the legal response to COVID-19.

The chapter also draws attention to specific examples of problematic legislation, including the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, the classic example of problems arising from speedily enacted legislation as knee-jerk response. Beatson also draws our attention to aspirational provisions, specifically section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 and the Social Action and Heroism Act 2005. Beatson's gentle redirection is a timely reminder that constitutional lawyers ignore a study of legislation at their peril. If the values of the rule of law are to be upheld, more needs to be done to ensure law is enacted in a manner that achieves this objective.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from Beatson's analysis of access to justice. Alongside the reference to the legal importance of access to courts referred to in Magna Carta and strongly reaffirmed in R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, Beatson draws our attention to ways in which access to justice can be limited. Background constitutional principles may help to regulate time limits, permission stages and other barriers to bringing a legal action, both through ensuring that access to justice is not restricted by general words and that specific legislative provisions provide a proportionate restriction on this right. Nevertheless, high fees and restrictions on legal aid may still make access to justice practically impossible. UNISON can only go so far. As recently pointed out by the Supreme Court, it does not extend to requiring access to rights more generally and could not be used to ensure it was practically possible to afford administration fees to register as a British citizen (R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (The Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3). This is not to argue that it is the role of the courts to ensure access to rights more generally and not just access to courts – nor would Beatson make this argument. Rather, it is to suggest that if we are to take access to the law seriously, then its importance needs to be drawn to the attention of legislators and policy-makers, particularly in times of austerity.

Third, Beatson's focus on reality and practicality, as opposed to abstract principles, provides a subtle and effective response to Lord Sumption's Reith lecture in the final chapter of the book. Beatson sets outs Lord Sumption's criticisms of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights. Beatson concentrates on three arguments made by Lord Sumption: that the Strasbourg court has developed rights beyond those suited to legal enforcement; that the “living tree” interpretation of Convention rights goes too far; and that the Strasbourg court's application of proportionality results in courts making political decisions. Sumption argues that there are only two categories of rights suitable for legal enforcement in a human rights document – those which make social existence possible and those required for a fully functioning democracy. Beatson notes that, even on his own terms, Sumption's specific list of rights is under-inclusive, failing to include, for example, a right to a minimum level of education. Beatson also points out the uncertainty in Sumption's reasoning, asking whether Sumption's specific list of rights are meant to be beyond political debate? If so, this may be hard to reconcile with the qualified nature of some of the rights Sumption would include in his list – such as the right to life – which Sumption argues should not be beyond political debate.

Beatson does accept that there has been “mission creep” by the Strasbourg court, most notably as concerns the Convention's extra-territorial application. However, he does not agree with Sumption's conclusion that Article 8 – the protection of private and family life – suffers from the same problem. Whilst agreeing that the Strasbourg court does adopt a “living tree” approach, Beatson reminds us that this approach is also prevalent in the common law. Beatson also recognises the extent to which proportionality has been synthesised into the common law, both in terms of its specific application through the Human Rights Act 1998 and the application of the principle of legality in cases such as UNISON. In an area where debate is often dominated by abstract principles, Beatson's focus on real examples is refreshing. However, as both sides of the debate tend to pick and choose cases to illustrate their argument, a focus on case law alone may be insufficient to resolve tensions arising from the Government's response to the Independent Human Rights Act Review. We can but hope that Beatson's reality check is applied to temper the rhetoric found on both sides.

Beatson's concerns about the protection of minority rights stem from a further reality check. He notes that governments with large majorities, of whatever political persuasion, rarely have more than 50 per cent of the vote of the electorate. This “provides support for the view that it is legitimate for there to be a legal or political brake on the power of the party that is in power for the time being” (p. 137). This final reality check brings me to my final topic – that of the constitutional balance between Parliament, the courts and the Government.

This reviewer agrees with Beatson's assessment that the constitutional reforms initiated in 2017 have not seen the UK transform into a constitution where the separation of powers is more important than parliamentary sovereignty (p. 120). As Beatson recognises, there are legal checks, including the emergence of constitutional statutes. But courts are also deferential when reviewing acts of the executive and especially of the legislature.

Beatson's main criticism of constitutional statutes is their lack of certainty, which he illustrates both as regards the criteria used by Sir John Laws in Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) and those provided in academic commentary. This reviewer agrees that the lack of certainty is unsatisfactory, but it need not be a weakness. To understand this, we need to focus on a further aspect of constitutional balance. In a flexible, ad hoc constitution dominated by parliamentary sovereignty, the definition of what is and is not constitutional legislation, or a fundamental common law right, may benefit from an element of constructive ambiguity, its provisions refined through case law and, ultimately, parliamentary acceptance.

It is here that the deeper problems with the definition of constitutional statutes emerge. Whilst accepted in case law and judicial commentary, it is not so clear that Parliament and the Government have equally accepted their existence and their immunity from implied repeal. This is perhaps most starkly illustrated by the Early Parliamentary General Elections Act 2019, which whilst being capable of being interpreted as an addition to as opposed to a specific overturning of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, the mention of the 2011 Act's potential constitutional status was notable by its absence from political debate. Constitutional statutes appear to be regarded as a judicial creation against which the executive must push back, rather than the opportunity to agree principles that should act as political or legal brakes on governments with strong parliamentary majorities that do not enjoy the support of the majority of the electorate.

If the need for a reality check is all readers take away from reading this excellent book, then they will be enriched indeed. We can but hope it also influences those currently contemplating constitutional reform.