Thomas Wheatland's The Frankfurt School in Exile provides a thoroughly researched and richly detailed account of the years that the members of the Frankfurt School spent in the United States. The product of detailed archival research as well as interviews, Wheatland's study is of interest because it adds depth to our understanding of the Frankfurt School, and of the development of social science as an intellectual and political project.
Escaping from the Fascist threat in Europe in the mid-1930s, this group of mainly Jewish leftist intellectuals spent a significant amount of time in the United States, moving the Institute for Social Research from its Frankfurt home to New York City in 1934, where it was operative until 1949. Wheatland's study differs from previous histories of the Frankfurt School—most notably Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination and Rolf Wiggershaus's The Frankfurt School—in its methodological focus on the “institutional relations” (xviii) that shaped the development of the Frankfurt School's ideas and in its geographic focus on America.
To dispense with the criticism first: the geographic focus is the only cause for dissatisfaction I had with the book. Apart from the concluding section on the 1960s New Left, the geographic focus here is almost entirely on New York. There is little discussion of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's time in California, an absence that is particularly significant, since Dialectic of Enlightenment, which was largely written there, stands as perhaps the seminal Frankfurt School text. The absence may be explicable methodologically—their time in California was outside of the institutional ambit on which Wheatland focuses—but it is nevertheless striking. Apart from this lacuna, however, the book provides a compelling and rich account of the relations between the Frankfurt School and American social science.
In the early twentieth century, students of human society in continental Europe and the United States were worlds apart (a division similar to that between political theory and more empirically oriented fields of political science that persists to this day, at least in North America). Europeans remained firmly rooted in hermeneutic theorizing that sought to explain social cohesion (194); Americans used natural-scientific methods to solve specific social problems. Even the social scientists themselves were very different: members of the Frankfurt School had the typical background of Continental sociologists: more or less secularized Jews, urbane, bourgeois. By contrast, “the typical American sociologist came from a rural, Midwestern background and grew up in a religious [Christian] environment” (197). While Institute director Horkheimer recognized that “New York City was not a typical American college town” (!) (97), members of the Frankfurt School nevertheless predicted “terrible isolation and homesickness” outside of continental Europe (43). Moreover, Horkheimer's fear of persecution led him to insist that his colleagues remain highly circumspect about their politics, so opportunities to connect with “an enormous number of potential allies” on the New York Left went largely unrealized (99).
The typical view of the Frankfurt School is that their time in America was one of “splendid isolation,” wherein the critical theorists observed, but were untouched by and had no impact on, American intellectual and social life (a view, it should be said, that reading Dialectic of Enlightenment on its own enables). Wheatland complicates this view, showing that the Frankfurt School did leave a trace on American intellectual life, and that the trajectory of their thought was affected by their time in the United States. Moreover, Wheatland argues that the Frankfurt School's time in the United States can be seen as part of a broader “intellectual migration” that not only brought previously distant intellectual worlds into communication with each other, but out of this encounter produced a common “academic Atlantic culture” (xv), with broader implications for postwar geopolitics (199).
Wheatland notes early on: “political exile required entry into and immersion in American ideas and social networks” (1). Even social theorists have to eat, and as the Horkheimer Circle's financial situation became increasingly precarious by the late 1930s, an intellectual life located physically in America, but that did not engage American intellectuals, became more difficult to sustain, even if it was desired. Although to some extent “held apart … by circumstances and cultural difference” (187), the Institute's formal affiliation with Columbia University's sociology department put members into contact with such seminal figures in postwar American social science as Daniel Bell, Harold Lasswell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Dwight MacDonald, and Irving Kristol (on the left during this period, though he would later become a founding father of neoconservatism). Culminating in the publication of the very well-received five-volume Studies in Prejudice in 1950, the Frankfurt School, Wheatland argues, deserves to be seen as one of the main “contributors to a unified postwar sociology, which overcame the intellectual divide that had once separated sociology's two trajectories” (255).
Not only did the Frankfurt School leave its mark on American sociology, but immersion in American social science also had its influence on the Frankfurt School. Regular engagement with their American colleagues was a dialogical exploration; Wheatland argues that encounters with American Pragmatists such as Sydney Hook provided some of the impetus for such programmatic articulations of Frankfurt School critical theory as Horkheimer's essay “Traditional and Critical Theory” (121). And the political economy of American social science, with large grants available for detailed empirical studies, drove the Institute's scholars to such empirically grounded work as The Authoritarian Personality. While European sociology “was beset by internecine theoretical feuds, which retarded attempts to professionalize” (199), the Frankfurt School's (at least partial) incorporation of the “scientific rigor” and empirical innovations of American sociological methods meant that when Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany shortly after the war, they did so as “ambassadors of American social science” (203).
Of course this is not the whole story, and Wheatland is careful enough to note that such integration is subject to its own dialectical reversals: “their efforts at grantsmanship simultaneously fueled the Frankfurt School's critiques of Positivism and the ‘culture industry,’ suggesting that the experiences of intellectual entrepreneurialism were necessary steps in the emerging critique of the ‘totally administered society’” (3). While at times suggesting a more organic development of the critique, one driven as much by the Institute's financial exigencies as anything else, Wheatland elsewhere suggests that it may have been a more conscious strategic plan: “the Horkheimer Circle sought recognition within American sociology to help finance the critique of this worldview and the society that financed it” (215).
While Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany, other members of the Frankfurt School, most notably Herbert Marcuse, remained in the United States for the rest of their lives. And if Wheatland suggests that the members of the Frankfurt School played a more active part in mid-twentieth-century American intellectual life than is commonly thought, he equally argues against the view that the Frankfurt School's “message in a bottle” was dramatically uncorked by the New Left in the 1960s, with Marcuse as the “guru” of the movement. Rather, while sales of Marcuse's texts in the 1960s may have been impressive, “the archival record suggests that Marcuse had far less resonance and impact than is generally assumed” (269).
Wheatland's views of both the Frankfurt School collectively and its individual members seem contrarian challenges to the conventional wisdom. Certainly the description of Adorno attending seminars “unable to contain his excitement—flitt[ing] about the room like a hummingbird” (80) is difficult to reconcile with a view of Adorno as a purveyor of relentlessly pessimistic aphorisms and impenetrably dense philosophical prose. But if this is so, it is perhaps because conventional views of the Frankfurt School are, ironically, rather one-dimensional. Individually and collectively, there was a process of intellectual development over time (a process Wheatland is particularly attentive to in the case of Marcuse). And in spite of their studied withdrawal and isolation, members of the Frankfurt School did conceive of their work as a form of political engagement, particularly suited to their contemporary conjuncture—a point that may not be irrelevant when the most serious economic crisis in a half century provokes virtually no challenge to the hegemony of capitalism.
