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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
Metaphysics as Rhetoric is a challenging book for all the right reasons. It is skillfully and philosophically argued. It revisits the politics of Plato and al-Farabi, challenges received interpretations, and offers a new thought-provoking reading. It proposes that al-Farabi held a more sophisticated understanding of Plato's political writings than commonly believed. And, finally, it contextualizes al-Farabi's politics within the Muslim umma of his time.
Parens argues that the traditional Platonist metaphysical reading of Plato (from the later Neoplatonic and Christian [Augustinian] traditions to Heidegger) is responsible for making metaphysics the foundation of politics, which in turn has been used by Medievalists, Arabists, and Islamicists to read al-Farabi's political works. With his close reading of Plato's Laws and Republic and of al-Farabi's works—most notably, his Summary of Plato's Laws, but also his Political Regime, Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City, Enumeration of the Sciences, and the Book of Religion—Parens shows that, for these two authors, politics does not rest on metaphysics. Politics rests on more pragmatic psychological considerations that belong to the realm of the rhetorical (convincing the people that it is the best regime). These considerations provide greater insight into the recognition by al-Farabi that politics fall short of the ideals of the virtuous city (on the model of Plato's Republic) and can be ascribed only to the second-best city. Politics must yield to pragmatic considerations and consequently is distinct from and does not rest on the metaphysical.
The work is divided into three major parts. Parens sets out first to show that neither Plato nor al-Farabi is a “metaphysical dogmatist” (p. 143) by rejecting the claim that laws have metaphysical foundations (against Heidegger). The psychological realm provides these foundations (p. xxxv) and serves to support a rhetorical defense of laws. In the second part, he shows the divergences that exist between the city governed by reason (Republic) and the city ruled by the written law (Laws). In the later work, these laws need to be defended by “subrational” arguments, or what Parens identifies as al-Farabi's “kalām” (p. xxxv). The need for rhetorical arguments, and thus the need for religion and the art of kalām (p. 143), illustrates the gap between the best city—the virtuous city—and the second-best city. In the last part, Parens shows that laws can provide individual access to a rational way of life by means of the passage from the rule of written law to the rule of reason (p. xxxv) via the work of the “poetic art of persuasion” (p. 75), such that the rhetorical art (of kalām) serves as a prelude to the life of reason and the prelude to the law.
In addition to his willingness to critically analyze Plato and al-Farabi's work, Parens skillfully develops and defends arguments. The strength of this study rests in his argumentative approach and close reading of Plato's Laws and al-Farabi's Summary. Parens analyzes al-Farabi's omissions, silences, and departures from Plato's Laws with his non-metaphysical reading of al-Farabi's Summary (as well as Plato's Laws) and introduces a new “rhetorical” reading of their politics. Parens demonstrates admirably what constitutes a serious reading of philosophical texts. His insight into al-Farabi's politics is enriched by his critical evaluation of contemporary readings of Plato's politics (Heidegger and 19th-century German scholarship). Paying heed to the work of earlier scholars of Plato, he deconstructs the “metaphysical” Plato, a central element of his argument, before doing the same with al-Farabi's work. In so doing, he reviews (even questions) the interpretations of those who have inspired him, people such as Strauss (p. 159, n. 25) or Mahdi (p. 168, n. 26; p. 171, n. 9) and others like Heidegger (cf. 178, n. 2), Walzer (pp. 22–24), Galston (p. 25), Watt (p. xxv), Gabrieli (p. xxxi, 168, n. 26), Stern (p. xxv), Gutas (p. xxxi), and so on. Equally important is the fact that Parens is able to demonstrate al-Farabi's familiarity with the Laws of Plato and the way in which the new cultural and religious context, and not merely philosophical considerations, account for al-Farabi's choices of interpretation (e.g., the second-best city and the Muslim umma).
Parens understands “discussion” (kalām) (found in al-Farabi's texts) as belonging to two different types of discourse: one within the traditional theological mutakallim tradition and another within the philosophic mutakallim tradition (p. 12). In this, he appears to follow Straus’ “philosophical kalâm.” Although Parens does have a point in arguing for the importance of a rhetorical defense of law, his use of kalām may not be as felicitous. Parens appears to conflate the semantic field of the term to subsume the field of rhetoric. However, “kalām” consists of discussions taken to be rhetorical—at times theological; at others via arguments from a “subrational” level (pp. xxxv, 15). Are both philosophical and theological arguments subsumed under this “subrational” level? Parens clearly has in mind the “rhetorical defense” of laws (passim), but at times the term kalām appears to allude to the theological justifications that underpin the rhetorical defense of laws—for example, “theology is a rhetorical defense of his politics” (pp. xiv–xv). It is unclear what constitutes the demarcation between demonstrative theology and the rhetorical art of kalām, especially in view of the “subrational” nature of kalām arguments, which include poetry but eventually also dialectics (p. 143). And finally, Parens's claim that “Plato is not the founder of metaphysics,” which he upholds against Heidegger, can merely be inferred (and only for the realms of politics) from his analysis, as he only set out to show, albeit quite eloquently, that politics is grounded not in metaphysical presuppositions but rather in “political psychology” (p. 144).
On the whole, Islamicists, Islamists, theologians, and theorists in comparative religion, as well as students of al-Farabi's political philosophy and those interested in Arabic or Islamic political thought, will all be interested in this work, along with those interested in al-Farabi's “phenomenological” analysis or contemporary philosophy (Heidegger and post-modernism) (p. xxxvii). A last note: the addition of Arabic and Greek terms would have increased the usefulness of the index.