Professor E. Ike Udogu neatly explores the diplomatic struggle over Namibia by SWAPO and the United Nations against South Africa in the context of existing theories and practices of conflict resolutions, and suggests that the Namibian case can be a very good basis to develop a conflict resolution model for Africa. In a historical overview of the Namibian conflict, Udogu introduces the main subjects; describes the beginning, development, and nature of colonialism in Namibia; and argues that Namibia's natural resources and colonialist's lasting desire to control them were at the root of the eruption of conflict. As colonial agents (missionaries, hunters, and traders) interacted with Namibians in the central and southern regions, contestations over land increased, and Namibians attacked each other for cattle to sell to European merchants. The takeover of Namibia by Germany and later the South African colonialists then led to the ‘dispossession of Namibians’ resources; they were subsequently forced into an exploitative labor economy that they eventually contested.
The book offers a clear illustration of how personal and national interests of parties involved in a conflict resolution process can complicate that process. South Africa, driven by colonial economic interests in exploiting the resources, for instance, insisted that the United Nations (UN) had no legal rights to compel it to place Namibia under the UN trusteeship system. The UN, driven by its principle of declaring and granting independence to colonized people, pressurized South Africa to let go of Namibia. Attempts by the UN to resolve conflict over Namibia through its committees on South West Africa (Namibia) were thwarted by the interests of some UN negotiating countries, by South Africa's unwillingness to negotiate on terms that were not beneficial to the future of whites in Namibia, and also by the UN's apparent inability to compel South Africa to carry out its recommendations for Namibia.
Udogu insists on the significance of diplomatic choices in conflict resolution projects but also shows that since all parties may not be persuaded to act by mere talks, a mixture of military and diplomatic measures are chosen by some parties (as was the case when SWAPO finally chose to engage in the military struggle against South Africa while in continued diplomatic talks). This book shows that conciliatory efforts in conflict resolution projects require the involvement of and support of countries that cherish the goal of peace and international security. Such was the case when countries such as Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Western Five, etc., acting under the UN agenda for peace, worked to make South Africa and SWAPO find a lasting solution to peace and self-rule for Namibia. The final resolution to the Namibian conflict was possible when the main subjects involved considered and addressed the interests of all parties and settled for ‘a give and take’ settlement, which is a good example for other conflict resolution projects.
The book would have benefitted from reference to recent work by other scholars (Hage Geingob, Christiaan William, Martha Akawa, Vilho Shiwedha, Napandulwe Shiwedha, and Michael Akuupa). The author's question ‘who are Namibians?’ (p. 16) is essential but he, like other authors, unfortunately neglects the Kavango and Caprivi regions. An exploration of these areas would have expanded an understanding of SWAPO's struggle against South Africa from a wider Namibian spectrum. Furthermore, little is said of the implications of the final conflict resolution agreement for curing the social and economic problems in postcolonial Namibia. Namibians are still faced with economic and social hardships that can be better understood when placed in their full historical context of colonialism and negotiated conflict resolution settlement. Nevertheless, conflict resolution models based on African countries' transition to independence require further development; Udogu's book will serve as a useful resource for that endeavor, making this a book that should be widely read.
