Faedah Totah's book is a rich and sensitive account of the Old City of Damascus and the discourses surrounding its preservation. Examining the gentrification of the Old City between 2001 and 2008 in six chapters, Totah asks several pertinent questions: Who are the main agents of gentrification and preservation? “How are social hierarchies and categories informed by the urban setting? Why did the bayt ʿarabi [courtyard house] emerge at this moment in time as the embodiment of an idealized Shami [Damascene] identity? [W]hose Shami identity is it?” (p. 9) What do the heritage industry and discourses around the Damascene courtyard house reveal about wider social and political changes? To answer these questions, she introduces readers to her interlocutors and sources, which include activists, government employees, investors, residents, and returnees, as well as official documents. She sheds light on her informants' disagreements over the meaning, method, and purpose of preservation.
Totah helps readers orient themselves by providing a legible map right in the beginning and dedicating the first chapter to walking readers through the intramural Old City and beyond. Ever since the Old City of Damascus was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979, preservation has become a salient matter not only for residents, but also for investors and the government. What is being preserved includes ancient architectural remains, such as the Roman arches by the Western entrance of the Umayyad mosque, and late Ottoman courtyard houses.
Until the 1940s, courtyard houses, which are usually two-story structures built around a central uncovered courtyard that often boasts a fountain and trees, were predominantly inhabited by Damascenes (or “Shuwam,” as Totah calls them), especially wealthy merchants. Totah elucidates that since the 1990s such houses have been frequently romanticized by Syrians as little pieces of heaven, which provide privacy and tranquil respite from the dusty alleys of the Old City. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, many of the wealthier residents left their courtyard houses in order to live in modern apartments outside the Old City. They considered these apartments to be more appropriate for contemporary living, since they were accessible by car and had new amenities. When Palestinian refugees began arriving in the late 1940s, owners rented out their courtyard houses to multiple families. For refugees and rural migrants who shared courtyard houses and their limited amenities with other families, these houses provided neither privacy nor tranquility. In other words, renters did not experience the courtyard house the same way owners did.
Totah explains that the Old City came to be considered dirty and “backward” because poor rural migrants and refugees lived there (see Chapters 2 and 3). This association of the Old City with rural migrants and refugees which was contrasted with newer housing developments gave rise to a rural–urban dichotomy. Once preservation and gentrification became fashionable in the 1990s, the rural–urban dichotomy was recast as a backward-civilized binary. The Old City, which had once been home to “civilized Shuwam,” was now inhabited by “backward” tenants of rural origins from whom it needed to be rescued so it could once again symbolize “civilization.”
Investors and returnees were the main driving force behind gentrification. Several wealthy Syrian returnees from abroad began to buy properties to restore and to live in (see Chapter 4). The returnees, according to Totah, were often motivated first by a desire to “save” courtyard houses from the “backward” long-term residents who the returnees felt did not properly value their historic significance and ruined them, and second by a longing to return to an idealized past and to (re)claim their shāmī identity. Ironically, neither the returnees nor the investors had grown up in the Old City and hence their “return” to the Old City and their claim to shāmī identity was often an abstract notion or a desire, rather than a concrete reclamation of land from rural and migrant tenants. Further, returnees often disrupted and undermined the community they idealized and the imagined moral civility they valued because they frequently used courtyard homes only seasonally, flaunted their wealth, and snubbed their poorer neighbors. Nevertheless, an area considered “backward” in the 1960s and 1970s became the symbol for “civilization,” which only needed to be recaptured and restored.
When investors initially began turning courtyard houses into restaurants, art galleries, and hotels, residents welcomed them because they brought people and money to the Old City (see Chapter 5). Investors contributed to improvements in services and appearances, because they tipped trash collectors to clean the area, installed lights in nearby alleys, and offered to paint the façades of adjacent, seamlessly connected courtyard houses. However, once restaurants began to mushroom all over the Old City, many local residents became weary of noise pollution, unceasing cooking fumes, and tobacco smoke from hookahs. Conservative residents became concerned about restaurants serving alcohol in their neighborhoods. According to the plan of the Committee for the Preservation of the Old City, restaurant licenses were supposed to be granted only along major streets and alleyways. However, investors with political connections or enough money to bribe relevant officials have been able to circumvent such constraints as well as other restrictions pertaining to preservation guidelines.
Government involvement varies from ministry to ministry and from one case to another (see Chapter 6). For instance, the government permitted the leveling of several courtyard houses in order to expand a Shiʿi mausoleum just north of the Umayyad mosque. However, it did not allow one resident to build a staircase to his rooftop because it constituted an addition to the original design of his home. The author reports her informants' critique of the CPOC that it lacks a clear plan for how to proceed with preservation. Meanwhile, investors continue to renovate, and activists and residents contest the purpose, meaning, and effects of preservation. Overall, Totah explains that what is at stake is “civilizational anxiety” regarding the influence of globalization, neoliberal market practices, heritage tourism, and the nostalgia for a pristine past as well as the desire for an idealized shāmī identity.
Related questions that are beyond the scope of this book and therefore await future research include the role of Iraqi refugees in the flourishing real estate market. When it became legal for non-Syrians to buy land in 2004 and for landlords to evict long-term tenants, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing the war that broke out following the American invasion of 2003 benefited. Damascenes often blamed the rise in rents on Iraqis. Moreover, the laws changed in 2008 restricting foreigners once again from buying real estate in Syria. How did these changes affect the Old City, its preservation, and the heritage industry? By opening up new questions, as well as addressing previous works, especially A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria by Christa Salamandra (Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004) and Among the Jasmine Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria by Jonathan Shannon (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2006), the book participates in a wider conversation about the construction of cultural identity in Syria under the Baʿth. While Totah's heavy use of anthropological jargon may make the book difficult for undergraduates, her detailed, complex, and comparative approach will fascinate graduate students and scholars interested in Syria as well urban planning and renewal more broadly.
