The landscape of transnational marriages in Asia has undergone significant transformation in recent decades, expanding beyond the conventional South–North paradigm to encompass increasingly diverse and multidirectional migration flows. Traditionally, marriage migration in East Asia followed a predominantly South–North trajectory, with women from less economically developed countries, such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and mainland China, marrying men in more affluent societies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.Footnote 1 This pattern has commonly been interpreted through theories of global hypergamy, which posit that socio-economically marginalized men in wealthier societies seek foreign wives to fulfil familial and reproductive roles, while women from developing countries pursue marriage migration as a pathway to financial security and upward mobility.Footnote 2
More recently, however, transnational marriage in Asia has become increasingly diverse. Marriage migration now runs not only from the Global South to the Global North but also in the reverse direction and, importantly, within the Global South itself, including between developing countries marked by relatively narrow economic disparities and similar structural vulnerabilities.Footnote 3 These emerging configurations signal a broader shift in regional and global marriage markets and complicate conventional theories premised on sharp North–South economic divides and hierarchical exchange.Footnote 4
The diversification also exposes the limits of existing scholarship. Macro-level analyses of global hypergamy have been central to identifying the structural inequalities embedded in such marriages.Footnote 5 Ethnographic studies, however, have shown that migration does not automatically secure upward mobility and that power relations within transnational families are negotiated through everyday interactions rather than mechanically determined by national hierarchies.Footnote 6 Even so, much of the literature remains organized around a “domination–resistance” framework centred on migrant women’s experiences in South–North contexts.Footnote 7 Although recent research has begun to incorporate husbands and receiving families into analyses of marital dynamics,Footnote 8 these discussions remain largely grounded in settings characterized by substantial economic asymmetry. Comparatively less attention has been paid to how receiving families navigate South–South marriages, where economic hierarchies are less pronounced and vulnerabilities may be shared.
This study addresses these gaps by examining transnational marriages between Vietnamese women and Chinese men in North-East China (dongbei 东北), a region that has shifted from supplying brides to more affluent East Asian societies to becoming a destination for foreign brides.Footnote 9 Unlike the intra-ethnic cross-border marriages common in southern Chinese provinces such as Guangxi and Yunnan, which are often facilitated by shared language and ethnic ties, Sino-Vietnamese unions in North-East China are typically arranged and commodified marriages between individuals from comparably disadvantaged backgrounds.Footnote 10 These marriages represent a distinct form of South–South transnational union and provide an empirical site for examining how marital stability is sustained when marriage migration offers limited material gain. The relatively narrow economic gap between sending and receiving regions raises important questions about family dynamics and marital stability: how do transnational families maintain marital cohesion when prospects for upward mobility are weak or absent? And what strategies do receiving families adopt to navigate the uncertainties and risks inherent in such arrangements?
To investigate these questions, the study draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of family strategy, which conceptualizes marriage as a collective practice through which families seek to safeguard or enhance their welfare under structural constraints.Footnote 11 Based on in-depth interviews with 26 transnational households, the study proposes a “departure-restraint” (taoli-qianzhi 逃离-牵制) model to analyse marital instability and family responses. Compared with South–North marriages, in which pronounced power asymmetries often marginalize foreign brides, Vietnamese brides in North-East China frequently contemplate leaving their arranged marriages because of limited economic prospects, generating ongoing uncertainty for their husbands’ families. In response, these families adopt strategies that combine selective accommodation with retained authority: they grant brides some autonomy in everyday life while maintaining control over critical household resources in order to preserve family cohesion. By foregrounding the agency of receiving families in South–South unions, this study advances a relational account of power and marital stability beyond models of hierarchical exchange.
The Emergence of South–South Transnational Marriages in North-East China
The rise of South–South transnational marriages in North-East China reflects a broader shift in Asia’s marriage migration patterns. This shift has been driven by the convergence of economic restructuring, demographic change and evolving dynamics within local and regional marriage markets.Footnote 12
The transformation can be traced to China’s market-oriented reforms in the 1990s, which led to the collapse of state-owned enterprises that had previously anchored North-East China’s industrial economy. The resulting industrial decline triggered widespread unemployment and persistent socio-economic instability.Footnote 13 In response, some local women sought transnational marriages as a strategy for socio-economic advancement. Japan and South Korea became the preferred destinations owing to their geographical proximity, perceived cultural similarities, historical connections and significantly higher levels of economic development. Census data and empirical studies confirm that North-East China was a major source of foreign brides in both Japan and South Korea throughout the 1990s and 2000s.Footnote 14
Despite ongoing policy efforts to revitalize the regional economy, North-East China experienced only limited recovery during the 2010s. The region’s share of national GDP declined significantly, from 8.39 per cent in 2010 to 4.80 per cent in 2023, reinforcing its increasingly marginal position within China’s broader economic landscape.Footnote 15 At the same time, substantial population outflows reshaped the region’s demographic structure. Young, educated women, in particular, migrated to more prosperous coastal and urban centres in search of better employment and marital prospects. According to China’s Seventh National Census, the combined population of the three north-eastern provinces declined, from 109.52 million in 2010 to 98.51 million in 2020, with a net loss of over 11 million people during this period.Footnote 16 This demographic decline further exacerbated local economic challenges, producing a compounding cycle of economic stagnation and depopulation. As a result, retaining local women and attracting female migrants from more developed regions became increasingly difficult, further exacerbating gender imbalances within local marriage markets.Footnote 17
The convergence of economic decline, female out-migration and persistent gendered marriage norms has reshaped the marriage landscape in North-East China. Hypergamous expectations remain influential in Chinese society and continue to be reinforced by bridewealth practices.Footnote 18 As a result, the bargaining power of women who remain locally has increased, while men from lower socio-economic backgrounds face growing difficulties in attracting local spouses.Footnote 19 This intensifying marriage squeeze has prompted growing numbers of marginalized men to seek brides from Vietnam and other South-East Asian countries. For instance, in one county of Heilongjiang province, the number of Vietnamese brides reportedly increased from approximately 100 in 2010 to more than 1,100 by 2011, illustrating how transnational marriage has emerged as a coping strategy for men excluded from local marriage markets.Footnote 20
Despite a rising demand for foreign brides, the economic conditions in North-East China offer limited prospects for these women and their natal families. Unlike core receiving economies such as Japan and South Korea, North-East China occupies a peripheral position within both the national and global economy. As a result, Vietnamese brides are not simply migrating to a developing context but settling in one of China’s most marginalized regions. This context produces family dynamics that differ from those found in marriages between Vietnamese women and men in more developed economies. Marriages between Vietnamese women and men from North-East China are frequently marked by economic precarity, social marginalization and the commodification of intimate relationships, making them particularly vulnerable to instability and breakdown.Footnote 21 Under these conditions, receiving families must navigate the dual challenges of economic hardship and relational fragility to sustain these transnational marriages.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The domination–resistance binary in South–North marriages
Scholarship on transnational marriages in Asia has traditionally centred on South–North unions, with particular emphasis on the experiences of female migrants who marry men in more affluent societies, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.Footnote 22 Much of the literature is organized around a “domination–resistance” binary, which frames migrant women either as constrained by patriarchal household relations and wider structural inequalities or as active agents who strategically resist these constraints within transnational households.Footnote 23
At the macro level, structural analyses informed by global hypergamy have conceptualized marriage migration as a form of hierarchical exchange embedded in uneven development.Footnote 24 This perspective has been important in identifying how socio-economic inequality, gender norms, restrictive migration regimes and commodified matchmaking reproduce unequal relations within transnational households.Footnote 25 Yet ethnographic scholarship has complicated purely structural accounts by showing that household relations cannot be inferred directly from macro-level hierarchies. Nicole Constable demonstrates that migration does not necessarily lead to upward mobility, while Nicole Newendorp’s study of mainland–Hong Kong marriages shows how migration and residency regimes, family practices and intimate expectations intersect in ways that exceed purely economic explanation.Footnote 26 These studies suggest that although structural inequality shapes transnational marriage, power within the household remains relational, contingent and negotiated.Footnote 27
This tension is especially evident in East Asian marital families, where foreign brides from South-East Asia are often depicted as occupying subordinate positions, especially in relation to husbands and parents-in-law. They are commonly expected to embody traditional gender roles by assuming primary responsibility for domestic labour, childcare and eldercare.Footnote 28 For instance, in Japan, foreign brides are often required to fulfil the role of a “traditional daughter-in-law,” a role which emphasizes obedience, self-sacrifice and devotion to the husband’s family.Footnote 29 Language barriers, cultural unfamiliarity and limited access to employment or social networks further constrain women’s autonomy and entrench their marginalization.Footnote 30 At the same time, ethnographic research shows that migrant wives are not simply passive subjects of these conditions. Many actively renegotiate their domestic roles by seeking paid work, asserting influence over childcare and language transmission, and mobilizing transnational networks and cultural knowledge to negotiate power within the household.Footnote 31
Research on marital exit further complicates the “domination–resistance” framework. In Taiwan, migrant wives have often been stigmatized as “runaway brides,” with media and public discourse portraying them as morally suspect.Footnote 32 Ethnographic and socio-legal studies show, however, that women’s departure more often reflects unequal household power, immigration-related legal insecurity, economic deprivation, restricted employment opportunities and, in some cases, domestic violence.Footnote 33 Marital dissolution should, therefore, be understood not as individual opportunism or an impulsive act, but as a response shaped by structural constraint.
The strong focus on migrant women has meant that husbands and receiving families have received comparatively less sustained attention and are often portrayed primarily as embodiments of patriarchal authority.Footnote 34 Recent work has begun to broaden this focus. Hyun Mee Kim shows how remittances function as material bases of intimacy while also reshaping patriarchal relations within South Korean transnational families.Footnote 35 Lara Momesso demonstrates that Taiwanese husbands may strategically align with, or distance themselves from, patriarchal norms in response to broader social and political circumstances; her more recent work suggests that in-law households may also provide affective and practical support in migrants’ adaptation.Footnote 36 These studies broaden the analytical lens beyond women’s subordination. Even so, they remain grounded largely in South–North contexts characterized by substantial economic differentials.
South–South marriages remain comparatively underexamined. The prevailing “domination–resistance” paradigm often assumes substantial economic disparities between sending and receiving countries. In such contexts, foreign brides are usually understood to gain at least some opportunity for upward mobility, including the capacity to support natal families through currency differentials. By contrast, South–South transnational marriages, such as those between Vietnamese women and Chinese men in economically disadvantaged regions, are shaped by shared structural vulnerabilities. Both foreign brides and receiving families often face limited economic prospects, social exclusion and precarious livelihoods. Under these conditions, marital stability cannot be adequately interpreted through hypergamy-based models or binary oppositions between domination and resistance.
Theoretical framework: Bourdieusian family strategies
To address these conceptual and empirical gaps, this study draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of family strategies to examine the role of receiving families in sustaining Sino-Vietnamese unions in North-East China. Rather than viewing families as passive recipients of structural forces, Bourdieu conceptualizes them as strategic actors engaged in social reproduction and dedicated to preserving their social status and collective well-being. Family strategies encompass marriage arrangements, inheritance practices, child-rearing choices and investments in education, all of which represent responses to evolving social, economic and cultural contexts.Footnote 37 Building on Bourdieu’s insights, Tabuchi Rokuro emphasizes that familial agency is always situated within specific structural contexts, indicating that the subjectivity of family members is shaped not merely by personal preferences but also by their embeddedness in broader social hierarchies and institutional arrangements.Footnote 38 The family thus emerges as a complex site in which constraint and agency coexist.
Bourdieu’s framework is particularly useful for studying Sino-Vietnamese marriages in North-East China. First, it conceptualizes the family as a cohesive unit oriented around the interests of the husband’s family. Members of the unit actively exercise agency to safeguard and promote those interests. Second, it links familial practices to broader social structures by contextualizing family strategies within local socio-economic circumstances, thereby illustrating how families in disadvantaged regions develop strategies to retain foreign brides. Third, it allows for the analysis of the evolution of familial practices in response to shifting regional and global migration dynamics. By linking structural conditions to relational strategies, this approach provides a basis for examining how marital stability is actively produced in contexts of shared precarity rather than assumed to derive from hierarchical advantage.
Methods and Fieldwork
This study employs a qualitative approach, drawing on in-depth interviews conducted in F county, north-eastern China, between 2015 and 2024. F county was selected because our earlier studies had identified it as a key point of origin for Chinese brides in transnational marriages to rural Japan. These women from F county served as important cultural intermediaries and facilitated the researchers’ entry into their home communities.
As a predominantly agricultural and lower-middle-income area, F county provides a representative setting for examining South–South transnational marriages, which are characterized by limited economic disparities between sending and receiving regions. In 2020, the county reported a GDP of approximately US\$4.27 billion and a population of about 1.17 million, of whom nearly 83 per cent lived in rural areas. Its per capita GDP was around US$3,640, which is only slightly higher than Vietnam’s per capita GDP of US\$3,303 for that year.Footnote 39 This limited economic gap makes F county a useful setting for exploring how shared socio-economic precarity shapes the dynamics of transnational intimate relationships.
Participants were recruited using purposive and snowball sampling to ensure diversity in marriage duration, parental status, socio-economic background and geographic location within the county. Semi-structured interviews, lasting between one and three hours, were conducted with members of transnational families, including Chinese husbands, their parents and, where possible, Vietnamese brides. Interview topics included marriage formation, household decision-making, economic arrangements and strategies for managing marital tensions. All interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, with translation assistance provided where necessary for Vietnamese brides with limited Chinese proficiency. Ethical considerations guided all stages of the research. Participants were fully briefed on the study’s aims and procedures, provided informed consent, and were assured of their right to withdraw at any time.
In total, 42 participants were interviewed in-depth, including members of 26 transnational families, three marriage brokers and eight local residents. Among the 26 transnational families, 21 resided in rural villages and five in suburban townships. All families followed a stem-family structure, with parents and adult children co-residing in extended households. Most Chinese husbands were engaged in agricultural labour, while five held precarious jobs in non-agricultural sectors such as local services or the timber industry. Employment among Vietnamese brides varied: 15 worked in a village wood-processing factory on a piecework basis, five were not employed because of recent childbirth, one worked in a small convenience store and five were employed in assembly-line factories.
Regarding marital history, 20 Chinese husbands were in their first marriage, while six had previously divorced. All Vietnamese brides were in their first marriage. Husbands had an average age of 30, compared with 23 for brides, indicating a consistent age gap. In terms of education, 23 Chinese husbands had completed junior secondary school, two had left school before completion and one had finished senior high school. Among the Vietnamese brides, 15 had completed primary school, eight had finished junior secondary school and the educational backgrounds of three remained unclear.
To illustrate recurring patterns and key dynamics across these families, the article presents four detailed case studies, selected for their representativeness and their ability to illuminate the lived experiences and family dynamics within Sino-Vietnamese marriages. Table 1 presents the characteristics of these families.
Profile of Selected Case Study Households
Table 1 Long description
Profiles compare four case-study households (TF, MC, LF, and M) by member role, age, occupation, first-marriage status, education level, and years married. In all four households, the Vietnamese bride is in her early to mid twenties (23 to 25) and is listed as part-time or unemployed; education is unknown in three cases and primary in one. Husbands are in their late twenties to mid thirties (29 to 35), work part-time, self-employed, or as an employee, and all report junior education. Years married match within each couple: TF and MC are 4 years, LF is 6 years, and M is 1 year. Parents-in-law are older (about 50 to mid sixties) and commonly unemployed; two fathers-in-law are deceased, and one father-in-law is noted as farming. Each household includes one young child aged 3 or 5, with one child’s age unknown and most child fields not available. Some entries are marked as not applicable or not available, and key informants are identified for certain household members.
Notes: “/” indicates not applicable or not available. “◎” denotes key interview informants in each household.
The “Departure-restraint” Dynamics in South–South Transnational Unions
The union between Vietnamese women and Chinese men in North-East China represents a distinct form of South–South transnational marriage. Unlike South–North unions, in which pronounced power asymmetries often render brides highly vulnerable and position receiving families as dominant, Sino-Vietnamese marriages unfold in a context of shared economic marginality. Receiving families in North-East China possess far less structural advantage than those in more affluent receiving settings such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Aware of this precarious position, husbands’ families, particularly parents-in-law, frequently exercise conscious restraint in asserting authority to maintain marital stability.
This section introduces the “departure-restraint” (taoli-qianzhi) model to capture the relational dynamics unique to these households. This model describes a recurring pattern in which Vietnamese brides, faced with limited opportunities for upward mobility, frequently leave their marital homes. In response, Chinese husbands and their families adopt adaptive strategies aimed at retaining brides and preserving household cohesion.
Causes and consequences of Vietnamese brides’ departures
Field research indicates that a considerable proportion of Vietnamese women who enter into arranged marriages in North-East China eventually leave, making such departures a widely recognized social phenomenon throughout rural communities in F county. Notably, these departures are not limited to newly married brides but also involve women who have lived in China for many years, including some who have had children with their Chinese husbands. In some cases, Vietnamese brides have left after more than a decade in China. As one local resident recounted:
About ten years ago, many Vietnamese brides were brought to our village through arranged marriages. Now, quite a few have left. Most left shortly after marriage, but some stayed for a few years before leaving. Even those who had children left without hesitation. Some said they were going back to Vietnam to visit their families, but they never returned. Others remarried and moved elsewhere … In most cases, this happened because of poverty, and in a few cases, due to family conflicts.Footnote 40
As research on so-called “runaway brides” in Taiwan has shown, departure should not be understood simply as a matter of personal dissatisfaction or failed adaptation, but rather as a patterned response to accumulated marital and structural constraints. In North-East China, the possibility of departure arises from intersecting vulnerabilities: the peripheral position of both sending and receiving regions, the economic stagnation of North-East China, limited employment opportunities and the constraints of rural life. For many Vietnamese brides, marriage offers only limited prospects for social and economic mobility. As one local mother-in-law explained:
The families who marry them [Vietnamese brides] are families like ours, with poor conditions; families who are better off would not … Living standards here are far below those in China’s eastern coastal regions. There are no decent factories and no proper ways to earn money … After they arrive, there is nowhere for them to work, so they cannot earn an income of their own … Rural life here is nothing like life in the big cities. Apart from farming, there is nothing else to do, nowhere to go and nothing new or interesting. My daughter-in-law said that this place was not as good as she had expected; in some respects, it was not much better than life in Vietnam’s major cities … The Vietnamese women who come are very young, usually around 20. At first, they can adapt, but after some time, many find it hard to remain.Footnote 41
Informational asymmetries may also contribute to the departure of some brides. Studies of South–North marriage migration show that commercial brokerage systems often mediate, filter or distort information about prospective spouses, thereby widening the gap between premarital expectations and postmarital realities.Footnote 42 Vietnamese women often enter into marriage with men from North-East China with limited knowledge of their prospective husbands’ financial circumstances and living conditions. When expectations formed before migration prove difficult to reconcile with everyday reality, disillusionment may lead either to immediate departure or to the gradual erosion of marital commitment. In this sense, misleading information matters not only because it produces disappointment but also because it exposes the limited material mobility that these marriages often offer in North-East China.
Moreover, the relatively narrow economic gap between Vietnam and North-East China weakens the socio-economic incentives that typically sustain transnational unions. Whereas South-East Asian women who marry abroad may have expectations of improving their socio-economic status and sending remittances to natal families,Footnote 43 Vietnamese brides in North-East China commonly encounter persistent economic insecurity. Their husbands often occupy disadvantaged socio-economic positions and are unable to meet expectations of economic improvement.
Comparison with South–North marriages, such as unions between Vietnamese women and rural Japanese men, highlights how economic disparity can serve as a critical stabilizing force in transnational marriages. In Japanese–Vietnamese unions, the substantial economic gap enables brides to achieve upward mobility and send meaningful remittances to their natal families, thereby fostering marital commitment despite rural living conditions.Footnote 44 In contrast, the absence of such an economic buffer in North-East China compounds existing social and financial disadvantages and increases the likelihood of marital instability.
The departure of Vietnamese brides has profound socio-economic consequences for their Chinese husbands and families. For men already marginalized within the domestic marriage market, the dissolution of a transnational marriage brings not only emotional hardship but also the loss of future opportunity for family formation. As one interviewee described:
Our neighbour’s son was nearly 30 years old and could not find a Chinese wife because of their poor financial situation. He married a Vietnamese woman through brokers, but after two years, she left – probably because they were too poor … After she left, their son stopped farming and moved to Harbin to find work. He is still unmarried to this day because he simply cannot afford to marry again.Footnote 45
Marrying a Vietnamese bride, therefore, does not resolve the structural constraints surrounding marriage formation; instead, it introduces new vulnerabilities associated with the instability of transnational unions. The frequent departure of foreign wives has generated widespread awareness of marital instability, prompting receiving families to adopt various strategies aimed at retaining brides and sustaining these marriages.
Restraint strategies adopted by husbands’ families
In rural China, it is customary for sons to live with or near their parents after marriage. This tradition is particularly adhered to in F county, where most Sino-Vietnamese marriage households are organized as stem families, with three generations co-residing. In this context, “husband’s family” refers not only to the Chinese husband but also to his parents. This broader definition makes it possible to analyse both horizontal spousal relations and vertical intergenerational dynamics, especially those between the bride and her mother-in-law.
Challenging narratives that portray husbands’ families as uniformly patriarchal or oppressive, our fieldwork in North-East China reveals a more differentiated pattern of strategic adaptation. Faced with limited marriage prospects for their sons and a persistent risk of marital dissolution, these families adopt pragmatic strategies to retain their Vietnamese brides. This finding resonates with Momesso’s analysis of cross-border marriages in Taiwan, which shows that husbands’ families may be experienced not only as sites of domination but also as sources of emotional and practical support in the migrant bride’s adaptation and homemaking.Footnote 46 A similar dynamic is evident in North-East China, where relations with in-laws are negotiable rather than reducible to a simple model of patriarchal imposition. Such support, however, forms part of a broader logic of restraint, as receiving families selectively moderate traditional expectations to reduce the likelihood of departure. In this study, restraint operates in three principal domains: accommodating the bride’s obligations to her natal family, reordering the priorities of family roles, and moderating parental authority within the household.
Accommodating Natal Family Obligations
For many Vietnamese women, marriage migration is closely linked to expectations of supporting their natal families through remittances. Sending money home is both a practice of filial obligation and a means of sustaining transnational kinship ties.Footnote 47 Although remittances are often a source of tension in transnational marriages elsewhere,Footnote 48 conflicts over remittances are relatively uncommon in North-East China. Despite their own financial hardship, most husbands’ families accept, and sometimes actively facilitate, these responsibilities. As one father-in-law explained:
We live frugally so that we can set aside some money for her [the Vietnamese daughter-in-law]. Every autumn, when selling rice, we give her some of the money. Last year, we gave her 5,000 yuan. In China, adult children are expected to give money or gifts to their parents during festivals, and we think sending money back to her parents in Vietnam follows the same logic. It is common practice that women who marry abroad send remittances back home … Other families marrying Vietnamese brides also provide financial support to their daughters-in-law, but not as much as we do at one time. We treat her this way, and if she still wants to leave, we cannot stop her. If she truly leaves in the future, we have done what we should and will not have regrets.Footnote 49
Filial responsibility has long been embedded in Chinese family values. Adult children are widely expected to support ageing parents, and when direct care cannot be provided in person, financial transfers are commonly regarded as an appropriate fulfilment of filial obligation.Footnote 50 In this context, the remittances of foreign brides to their natal families align closely with established Chinese understandings of filial duty. Rather than provoking resistance, such efforts to maintain cross-border intergenerational ties often carry cultural legitimacy among Chinese husbands’ families. Moreover, from the perspective of the husband’s family, the bride’s natal family, even if located abroad, forms part of their extended kinship network; consequently, offering support to in-laws is regarded as appropriate.
Beyond cultural alignment, remittance facilitation also reflects strategic awareness of marital instability. As the above comments suggest, many families recognize that foreign brides may leave if prevented from supporting their natal families. Given that North-East China has a long history as both an emigration and immigration region, local families are generally aware that many foreign brides marry into Chinese households with the primary aim of improving their natal families’ circumstances. Consequently, remittances are not merely tolerated; they are regarded as a means of reducing the risk of departure and reinforcing marital commitment. In this sense, remittances function not only as a moral obligation but also as a form of risk management.
However, field research also shows that while husbands’ families generally accept and understand these financial obligations, they also experience them as a significant economic burden. In order to sustain remittance payments, some families adopt extremely frugal lifestyles or even incur debt. This form of “excessive accommodation” goes beyond routine financial assistance, representing a strategic and costly investment in marital stability. As one mother-in-law described:
After my daughter-in-law came to our family, we hoped she would settle down. However, she always has reasons to ask for money: today, she says her grandfather is sick; tomorrow her father; and the day after, her brother. My husband is also ill and requires medical treatment, and we really cannot provide extra money. The money for my daughter-in-law to send back to Vietnam and for gifts is borrowed … If our financial situation were better, we would not mind supporting her family, but we have our own difficulties, too. Since she arrived, we have been consistently sending money to her natal home without interruption. Our neighbour also has a Vietnamese bride, and their family situation is not good either, but they must give money whenever the bride asks. I heard they give 400–500 yuan each time, borrowing money to send to the bride’s natal home.Footnote 51
Reordering Priorities of Family Roles
Within China’s patrilocal family system, women who marry into their husband’s family have traditionally been required to fulfil multiple, overlapping roles: as daughters-in-law, wives and mothers. These roles have long been subordinated to the identity of “member of the husband’s family,” with the obligations of daughter-in-law often taking priority.Footnote 52 Under Confucian family norms, a daughter-in-law is expected to show deference, compliance and commitment to the husband’s family through domestic labour and everyday care. Failure to meet these expectations, including reluctance to undertake household work, could be construed as a lapse in filial duty and invite criticism from mothers-in-law and other family members.Footnote 53
In rural China, however, expectations surrounding the role of daughter-in-law have been reshaped by the post-reform social and economic transformation, including the retreat of collective welfare provision, marketization and a broader process of individualization.Footnote 54 This shift is particularly visible in relations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. In some households, daughters-in-law now have greater scope to negotiate domestic responsibilities and to exercise influence over everyday family arrangements.Footnote 55 Where formal systems of old-age support remain limited, older parents often continue to depend heavily on their adult children, which has further altered what can reasonably be expected from a daughter-in-law in practice.
Similar changes in role expectations are evident in Sino-Vietnamese households, but they are intensified by the heightened risk of marital dissolution. Fieldwork shows that many mothers-in-law are actively recalibrating these traditional expectations. Rather than insisting on strict adherence to conventional role norms, they distinguish between the bride’s roles as daughter-in-law, wife and mother, and consciously reorder these priorities. In practice, mothers-in-law often privilege the bride’s role as wife to their son over the conventional duties attached to being a dutiful daughter-in-law.
This strategic shift is evident in everyday household practice. When Vietnamese brides work outside the home, mothers-in-law often take on more of the domestic workload to support the bride’s employment. Even when brides stay at home because of language barriers or childcare responsibilities, many mothers-in-law continue to shoulder a substantial share of the household chores that would conventionally be undertaken by the daughter-in-law. In some cases, even when a bride declines to help with housework, mothers-in-law rarely insist or criticize; instead, they quietly complete the tasks themselves. This adaptive redistribution of domestic labour not only helps to defuse potential tensions but also subtly reshapes established gender and generational roles within these transnational families. As one mother-in-law (LF) described:
My daughter-in-law came to our family when she was only 20. Back then, she really was like a child, just wanting to have fun, and even now, she still acts like a child. She only does housework when she feels like it. When she is in a good mood, she cooks and tidies up, but otherwise she does not do much. Except during the Spring Festival, she almost never does the laundry. Every day, I mop the floors, and she does very little. Sometimes I ask her, “Could you water the flowers in the yard?” and she replies, “Why do you always do such pointless things?” … But I do not scold her harshly. If I push her too much and she leaves, my son will blame me.Footnote 56
LF’s family illustrates this evolving dynamic. Although the Vietnamese bride resists established expectations regarding housework, her mother-in-law neither criticizes nor insists on conformity. Instead, she responds with patience, deliberately prioritizing the stability of her son’s marriage over the rigid enforcement of traditional domestic roles.
Unlike the adjustments observed in many rural households, which often stem primarily from older parents’ dependence on support in later life, those in Sino-Vietnamese marriages are directed above all towards preserving the stability of the son’s marriage. Within South–South unions, mothers-in-law are acutely aware that excessive demands or criticism directed towards daughters-in-law may threaten marital stability and increase the risk of the bride’s departure. Under these conditions, preserving the marriage may take precedence over enforcing conventional domestic expectations. Such a recalibration of priorities not only facilitates household stability but also reflects a broader reworking of gender and generational roles under the particular pressures of transnational family life.
Moderating Parental Authority
Studies of transnational marriages frequently emphasize the subordinate position of foreign brides within household power structures, particularly in relation to their mothers-in-law.Footnote 57 However, evidence from North-East China complicates this conventional narrative. In many Sino-Vietnamese transnational families, parents-in-law not only consider their Vietnamese daughters-in-law’s perspectives but also respect their autonomy in everyday life. As one father-in-law described:
We never interfere with my daughter-in-law’s personal spending or control over her own income. She keeps her income independently, and we never request any of it … When she wanted to work outside the home, we did not object; it was entirely her choice … She enjoys socializing with fellow Vietnamese, which we respect as her personal freedom, and we do not intervene.Footnote 58
Contrary to the conventional expectations of elder authority, parents-in-law do not impose strict control over their daughters-in-law. In addition to allowing Vietnamese daughters-in-law a degree of financial and social autonomy, they deliberately temper the exercise of traditional parental authority. Rather than enforcing rigid dominance, they consciously moderate their control. This tendency is especially apparent among mothers-in-law. As another father-in-law explained:
My wife [the mother-in-law] is truly kind to our daughter-in-law, and she agrees with everything our daughter-in-law says. I understand her concerns – she is afraid that our daughter-in-law might leave. My wife always tells me I speak too loudly and advises me to talk less. I avoid showing any displeasure and just endure it all, even over trivial matters … Six months ago, my daughter-in-law proposed that we all live together, but on the condition that she and my son keep their incomes separate. If we agreed, we would have to cover all the household expenses so they would not have to spend their own money … She made it clear that if we refused, she would divorce my son. In the end, we acquiesced.Footnote 59
Such cases do not simply indicate a passive decline in parental authority but an intentional recalibration of traditional power structures within Sino-Vietnamese transnational marriages. Parents-in-law recognize their vulnerable economic position and fear their Vietnamese daughters-in-law may leave. Just as they invest considerable effort in arranging marriages for their sons, they are equally committed to maintaining family stability and preventing divorce. Accordingly, they prioritize the emotional well-being of their daughters-in-law and make various accommodations to sustain the marriage, which they regard as essential to family stability.
However, these adaptations occur within clear boundaries. Reduced parental authority in everyday matters should not be mistaken for a complete reversal of familial hierarchies or full dominance by the daughter-in-law. Even where foreign daughters-in-law are granted considerable autonomy, parents-in-law often retain decisive authority over essential household matters, particularly those related to finances and major family affairs. A mother-in-law articulated this balance:
The income from our family-run barbershop is divided equally between my son and daughter, but I keep control of my son’s share and do not give it to my daughter-in-law. Normally, my daughter-in-law helps in the barbershop, and we pay her a monthly salary; I do not interfere with how she spends her own earnings. Although the house and family property will eventually belong to my son, as long as I am alive, I will manage them … In daily life, my daughter-in-law is free to do as she wishes – she decides what to eat and how to spend her time – but when it comes to major decisions, my son takes the lead. She doesn’t understand these matters, so we do not take her opinion into account.Footnote 60
Overall, although husbands’ families have adopted accommodating approaches and have granted Vietnamese brides greater personal autonomy in everyday matters, this moderation of parental authority remains partial and conditional. Parents-in-law may reduce their control over everyday matters, but they tend to retain decisive authority over finances and major household decisions. In this sense, Sino-Vietnamese transnational marriages do not dismantle traditional family hierarchies. Rather, they demonstrate a deliberately limited form of power-sharing that seeks to reconcile cultural norms with the pragmatic need to sustain marital stability.
Conclusion and Discussion
The emergence of South–South transnational marriages in North-East China marks a significant transformation within East Asia’s transnational marriage system.Footnote 61 Having “lost” substantial numbers of local women to international marriage migration while simultaneously gaining brides from Vietnam, the north-east of China has shifted from being primarily a source of marriage migrants to wealthier economies to becoming a destination for Vietnamese brides.Footnote 62 This dual position as both sender and receiver of marriage migrants reflects the growing complexity and diversification of East Asian marriage markets, complicates South–North-centred frameworks, and calls for more differentiated analytical approaches.
This study examines Sino-Vietnamese marriages in one county in North-East China as a case of South–South unions. The findings suggest that family dynamics in these marriages differ from those found in South–North contexts. Whereas South–North transnational marriages often arise from stark economic disparities that provide migrant brides with at least some prospect of upward mobility, Sino-Vietnamese marriages in North-East China typically occur under conditions of shared marginality. Chinese husbands themselves often occupy marginal positions within both the domestic and the international marriage markets, while Vietnamese brides encounter only modest prospects for social and economic advancement. When expectations of advancement are unmet, the risk of a bride’s departure increases. Receiving families, in turn, mobilize their agency to sustain the marriage under structural constraints. These dynamics largely stem from the relatively narrow economic gap between sending and receiving regions, illustrating how broader structural forces shape household dynamics.
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of family strategies, this study proposes a “departure-restraint” model to explain how receiving families in South–South transnational marriages seek to maintain marital stability amid the ongoing risk of a bride’s departure. Unlike the more coercive forms of control often observed in South–North unions, restraint in South–South marriages involves a calibrated combination of limited accommodation and selective authority. Receiving families allow brides a degree of autonomy in everyday matters while retaining ultimate authority over major household decisions and financial resources. Hierarchical relations, therefore, remain in place, but authority is exercised in a more negotiated and accommodating manner. This calibrated strategy allows families to preserve hierarchical family relations while responding pragmatically to marital instability.
By framing Sino-Vietnamese unions in North-East China as a distinct form of South–South marriage rather than merely a variation of the South–North model, this study makes three contributions. First, the “departure-restraint” model provides a more nuanced framework for understanding the vulnerability of South–South unions and the necessity for compromise within these marriages, highlighting both the structural disadvantages faced by receiving families and their strategic agency. Second, the concept of restraint extends Bourdieu’s theory of family strategies to economically marginalized receiving families, showing how authority is exercised selectively under conditions of marital instability. Third, the analysis demonstrates how macro-level transformations in regional political economies, including the relatively narrow economic differential between Vietnam and North-East China, reshape the relational dynamics and sustainability of transnational marriages.
More broadly, this study contributes to debates in migration, family and gender studies by demonstrating how intimate relationships are shaped by, and embedded within, shifting regional and global political economies. As economic gradients between sending and receiving regions continue to evolve, new patterns of family dynamics and authority are likely to emerge. Continued attention to the interaction between structural change and everyday family practice remains essential.
Data availability statement
The data supporting the findings of this study are not publicly available because they contain information that could compromise the privacy of research participants.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank all those who participated in this study for generously sharing their experiences.
Funding statement
This research was funded by the National Social Science Fund of China, General Project: Marriage Intentions Among Generation Z in Contemporary China (24BSH088).
Competing interests
None.
Yuanyuan HU is an associate professor at the School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University. Her research focuses on transnational marriage and rural families in East Asia.
Zhonglu LI is a professor in the School of Philosophy and Social Development at Shandong University. His work examines institutions, public attitudes and well-being in reform-era China, with particular attention to marriage formation, education and social attitudes.
