Block is concerned with the question of whether there are cases of phenomenology in the absence of cognitive access. I assume that, more precisely, the question is whether there are cases in which a subject S has a phenomenological experience E to which S does not have direct cognitive access? (S might have indirect cognitive access to E through scientific reasoning. I take it that this is not the sort of cognitive access in question.)
It is somewhat unclear – in at least two ways – what Block means by “cognitive access.” First, it is unclear what cognitive access is supposed to be access to. Second, it is unclear what makes access cognitive.
Let me begin my discussion with the first question, about what cognitive access is supposed to be access to. Suppose first that E is not an experience of or awareness of a phenomenal or intentional object X. Then it would seem that the relevant cognitive access can only be to E itself, that is to S's having E. On the other hand, suppose that the relevant phenomenological experience E involves being aware of something X, the phenomenal or intentional object of E, what S is aware of in having experience E. In that case, would the relevant cognitive access be access to X or to E?
It may be that S's experience of X is compatible with and perhaps even sufficient for S to cognitively access X, although S's trying cognitively to access E is incompatible with S's having the experience E. In such a case it would seem that S does not have (direct) cognitive access to E. For example, S's being completely engaged in what S is doing – as in optimal “flow” experience (Csikszentmihalyi Reference Csikszentmihalyi1990) – is compatible with (and even sufficient for) S's cognitively accessing what S is doing while at the same time at least sometimes being incompatible with S's being aware of being so engaged. In such cases it would seem that S does not have direct cognitive access to having such flow experiences.
So, if the relevant cognitive access is access to E, there seem to be clear cases of phenomenology without cognitive access, and no need for the sort of investigation Block describes.
Alternatively, the relevant cognitive access might be to the (intentional or phenomenal) object X of S's experience E. This seems to be the sort of cognitive access Block has in mind. Consider his discussion of the subjects in Sperling's (Reference Sperling1960) experiment who reported being aware of all the items in a briefly displayed grid even though they could identify only some of the items. The items in question are the objects of the subject's perceptual experiences.
But can one have a phenomenal experience of X without having cognitive access to X? Indeed, can one have a phenomenal experience of X without that phenomenal experience of X being a cognitive experience of X that constitutes cognitive access to X? Or, to put the question the other way, can there be a phenomenal experience of X that is not itself a cognitive experience of X? What could possibly distinguish a cognitive experience of X from a noncognitive experience of X? Clearly, it depends on what is meant by “cognitive” experience.
Suppose that a necessary condition of E's being a “cognitive” experience of X is that E should have a certain sort of “intentional content” – an experience of X's being F, for some relevant F. Given this supposition, if S's having E is a cognitive experience, E consists at least in part in X's seeming (appearing, looking, etc.) to S to be F for some relevant F. Furthermore, it might be suggested that, S's having a phenomenal experience E of X need not (and maybe never does) consist even in part in X's seeming to S to be F. If so, then given the aforementioned supposition, it would seem that there could be a phenomenal experience E that is not cognitively accessible.
So it may seem highly relevant whether some S could have phenomenal experiences of X that did not consist at least in part in X's seeming to S to be F for some relevant F. In Harman (Reference Harman1990) I argue (in effect) that the answer is “No, this is not possible.” In fact, I argue that phenomenal content is the same thing as intentional content, a conclusion that is widely (but not universally) accepted in recent philosophical discussion.
In this (controversial) view, S must have cognitive access to the object of a phenomenal experience E because any phenomenal experience of X is itself a cognitive experience of X. Not only are the objects of phenomenal experience cognitive accessible, they are ipso facto cognitively accessed. If Block assumes that phenomenal content is not always intentional content, so that the phenomenal content of experience is not always cognitively accessed, this assumption by itself appears to guarantee a negative answer to Block's question without any appeal to the scientific considerations he mentions.
