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Searching for an alliance: Habsburgs, Rurikids, and the Third Ottoman-Safavid War (1578–1590)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2025

Lukas Rybar Open the ORCID record for Lukas Rybar [Opens in a new window]
Lukas Rybar*
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Department of General History, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia
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Email: lukas.rybar@uniba.sk
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Abstract

This study explores diplomatic negotiations that took place between the Safavids, Rurikids, and Habsburgs during the last years of the Ottoman-Safavid War (1578–1590). The primary objective of these negotiations was to establish an anti-Ottoman alliance, with each participating party pursuing its own foreign policy interests. Drawing on various documents, it can be argued that the initiative for this new round of Safavid-Rurikids-Habsburg diplomacy originated from Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda. In 1586, the shah dispatched envoy Hādī Beg to Moscow, seeking Russia’s assistance in countering the Ottomans. Subsequently, diplomatic negotiations between the three parties ensued. Through a comprehensive analysis of both archival and published documents, this article aims to uncover and examine the goals and attitudes of all negotiating parties around the formation of an anti-Ottoman alliance by the late 1580s.

Keywords

anti-Ottoman alliancediplomacyHabsburgsRurikidsSafavidssixteenth century

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Article
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Iranian Studies , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , January 2026 , pp. 209 - 226
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Iranian Studies.

Introduction

During the sixteenth century, several European states were consistently involved in attempts to form an anti-Ottoman alliance, aiming to eliminate Ottoman power and its expansion in Europe. In doing so, some of these states (including the Austrian Habsburg monarchy) counted on the help of Eastern empires such as the Russian tsardom and Safavid Iran, and sought to maintain diplomatic contact with these countries. After the outbreak of the Third Ottoman-Safavid War (1578–1590), the issue of the anti-Ottoman alliance once more became relevant. The impetus for renewed contacts was provided by Safavid Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda (1578–1587), who sent envoy Hādī Beg to Moscow in 1587 with a request to Russian Tsar Fiodor I Ivanovich (1584–1598) for military help against the Ottomans. Several Russian and Habsburg documents further indicate that the Safavid envoy suggested involving the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolph II (1576–1612) in this matter. Hādī Beg’s mission to Moscow subsequently launched a new round of Safavid-Russian-Habsburg diplomatic negotiations aimed at forging an alliance against the Ottomans. Based on analysis of archival and published documents, this article aims to reveal and examine the goals and attitudes of all the negotiating parties (Safavids, Rurikids, and Habsburgs) around the constitution of an anti-Ottoman alliance at the end of the 1580s.

Information pertaining to this issue is recorded in several archived and edited documents from Austrian and Russian collections. Unfortunately, no evidence on this topic has been preserved in Iran. All historical works by Iranian historians on Russian-Iranian relations in the sixteenth century have been primarily based on Russian sources or the research of historians writing in Russian.Footnote 1 Russian archived documents are primarily stored in Moscow at the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents.Footnote 2 Of particular importance are the archival funds concerning Russian relations with the Holy Roman Empire (Fund 32) and Persia (Fund 77). The majority of archived documents from the relevant period have already been published in several editions. Notably, the collections of documents published by Russian historians N.I. Veselovskiĭ and S.A. Belokurov, and the 1851 edition of the sources,Footnote 3 are of significant importance.Footnote 4 Additionally, there are other valuable sources in the Austrian state archives, the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna (hereafter HHStA), particularly the reports of the imperial envoys Nicholas von Warkotsch and Lucas Pauli, stored in the Russland I Fund.Footnote 5 As for Warkotsch’s report, a Spanish translation was made for King Philip II of Spain by his envoy to the court of Rudolph II, Don Guillen de Sant Clemente.Footnote 6 This was likely based on a report by Warkotsch himself, written in German.Footnote 7

As far as historiography on the topic is concerned, it is important to note that this study draws on a range of publications from different historiographical traditions. In particular, the works of J.P. Niederkorn and I.V. Magilina have been especially influential, alongside other historians who at least partially addressed the subject. These historians approach the issue from the broader perspective of the diplomatic history of the Habsburg and Muscovite realms. J.P. Niederkorn analyses the wider context of Habsburg-European diplomacy under Emperor Rudolph II, particularly efforts to establish a military alliance against the Ottomans.Footnote 8 In contrast, I.V. Magilina focuses more narrowly on Muscovite diplomacy vis-à-vis the anti-Ottoman alliance of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.Footnote 9 This article seeks to bridge these two diplomatic traditions, exploring their interconnections and placing particular emphasis on the role of the Safavid Empire in the anti-Ottoman diplomacy of both powers.

In contrast to the aforementioned publications, the Anglo-American historiographical tradition—an essential perspective that cannot be overlooked—offers a number of rigorous contributions on the broader context of Safavid diplomacy with the Russian tsardom, (Austrian) Habsburg monarchy, and Ottoman Empire in the early modern period. For the purposes of this article, however, the focus is limited to historiography concerning primarily the sixteenth century. Several significant works address this period. Of particular importance are the studies of R. Matthee that examine both Ottoman-Iranian and Russian-Iranian relations.Footnote 10 Matthee’s research provides valuable insight into various dimensions of Safavid diplomacy, including anti-Ottoman strategies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Matthee adopts a broad scope while consistently analyzing diplomacy from several perspectives. Another noteworthy contribution is an earlier article by C.M. Kortepeter exploring the broader international political ambitions of the Ottomans, Persians, and Muscovites in the Caucasus during the period in question.Footnote 11 Regarding Russian-Safavid relations, a relatively recent study by Turkish historian M. Yașar deserves mention. Although the primary focus of this study is Russian-Ottoman rivalry along the Caucasian frontier in the second half of the sixteenth century, Yașar does not overlook the Safavids’ role, highlighting their influence on Russian-Ottoman interactions.Footnote 12 Concerning Safavid-Ottoman diplomacy, several relevant works have been published in recent years, most notably by S. Güngörürler and S.A. Casale.Footnote 13 While Güngörürler concentrates on Safavid-Ottoman relations primarily after the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, Casale focuses on the cultural dimensions of these relations between 1500–1639. The period and topic addressed in the present study, by contrast, have received little to no attention in existing literature.

Of particular relevance to Habsburg-Safavid relations is an as-yet unpublished doctoral dissertation by D.R. Stokes that offers a comprehensive analysis of Habsburg-Safavid diplomacy from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.Footnote 14 Despite the thoroughness of Stokes’s research, the dissertation largely overlooks the period at the conclusion of the Ottoman-Safavid War (1578–1590) and the associated diplomatic activity. This omission is primarily due to the author’s limited access to Russian archival and published sources. In contrast to this and the aforementioned works, the present study focuses on a more narrowly defined chronological window—specifically, the final four years of the Ottoman-Safavid War. During this time, for a variety of reasons outlined below, a veritable “diplomatic merry-go-round” began to revolve between the three sovereigns: the shah, the tsar, and the emperor. Although the timeframe is limited, the developments within it proved indicative for the future course of Safavid diplomacy with both the Russian and Habsburg courts and reopened the broader question of the formation of an anti-Ottoman alliance. This study thus contributes to the study of this period not only by filling in significant gaps in existing historiography on Habsburg-Russian-Safavid relations, but also by offering a reinterpretation of the revival of alliance negotiations in the late 1580s.

Habsburgs, Rurikids, and the Ottoman-Safavid War

The Austrian Habsburgs, particularly Emperor Rudolph in Prague and his court, were well informed about the progress of the Ottoman-Safavid War of 1578–1590. The Habsburgs received numerous reports from both permanent envoys to the Ottoman court and spies, who gathered valuable information about Safavid-Ottoman diplomatic relations and military operations in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus region. The Habsburg diplomats serving in Constantinople at the time included David Ungnad (1573–1578), Joachim von Sinzendorf (1578–1580), Friedrich Preyner (1580–1584), and Bartholomeus Pezzen (1587–1592).Footnote 15 These diplomats regularly dispatched encrypted reports to the imperial court. Additionally, secret agents also operated in the city, including Franz Jurković, a merchant from Dubrovnik, who was a crucial informant on Safavid affairs, providing regular updates during the Ottoman-Safavid War of 1578–1590.Footnote 16 Based on this information, the imperial court could react more promptly and effectively to Ottoman diplomatic or military intentions. However, it is important to note that a war between two Muslim states was potentially advantageous for the Habsburgs, as it could bring a relatively stable peace in Central Europe.Footnote 17

As far as Russia is concerned, unfortunately no surviving archival documents provide evidence of regular diplomatic relations with Iran before 1586. Therefore, the extent of Russian officials’ awareness of the development of the Ottoman-Safavid War remains unclear. However, unlike the Habsburgs, the Rurikids were not immediately confronted with the same Ottoman military threat. While the allies of the sultan—the Crimean Tatars—often organized plundering raids on Russian territory, these did not reach the scale of Ottoman military expeditions in Hungary and the Balkans. Moreover, following the annexation of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates in the mid-sixteenth century, Russia demonstrated a keen strategic interest in the Caucasus region, which was within both the Safavid and Ottoman spheres of influence. As a result, the tsarist court maintained relatively friendly diplomatic contacts with the sultan, intending to keep an “open back door” to the international relationship.Footnote 18

Safavid envoy Hādī Beg in Moscow

The situation changed after 1586, when Safavid Shāh Moḥammad Khodābanda, faced with a difficult and unresolved situation, sought a potential military ally to assist in expelling the Ottomans from the occupied territories of the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus. To this end, he dispatched his envoy, Hādī Beg (referred to as “Andi Bek” in Russian documents), to the court of the Russian tsar in the summer or autumn of 1586. Hādī Beg arrived in Moscow via the Caspian Sea, Astrakhan, and the Volga River, approximately towards the end of 1587. According to Russian historian P.P. Bushev, the specific date of Hādī Beg’s arrival in Astrakhan and Moscow remains unknown.Footnote 19 However, other documents related to Russian-Austrian relations provide evidence that an envoy from Iran arrived in Moscow in December 1587, most likely referring to the arrival of Hādī Beg.Footnote 20 Unfortunately, no documents directly addressing his visit to Moscow or the details of negotiations at the tsar’s court have been preserved in the Russian archives. Some references, however, can be found in later archival records.Footnote 21 Further information about this mission can be found in the work of Russian historian N.M. Karamzin, who analyzed archival documents that no longer exist.Footnote 22 These documents were probably destroyed in the 1812 fire in Moscow during Napoleon’s Russian campaign.Footnote 23 Based on these documents, Karamzin noted that Hādī Beg came to Moscow to request direct military assistance from Tsar Fiodor Ivanovich against the Ottomans, with the intention of expelling them from the Caspian and Caucasus territories. In return, the shah promised to cede two strategically important cities on the Caspian coast, Baku and Darband, to the tsar.Footnote 24 Similar information is also found in other archival documents, published by Russian historians N.I. Veselovskiĭ and S.A. Belokurov. According to these reports, the Safavid shah sought to maintain a bond of “friendship, brotherhood, love, union, agreement, and alliance” with the Russian tsar, in opposition to their common enemy, the Ottoman sultan.Footnote 25

However, the aforementioned documents are not the sole sources of information about Hādī Beg’s mission. Further sources provide additional insights. Tsarist letters directed to Emperor Rudolph and sent to Prague by several envoys, including Afanasiĭ Rezanov and Lucas Pauli, reveal that an envoy from the shah visited the Russian court, beseeching the tsar to establish an anti-Ottoman coalition. Moreover, this envoy proposed to “strengthen the agreement and alliance” also with Emperor Rudolph, the king of Spain, and the king of France.Footnote 26 Drawing on these documents, it is evident that the shah was suggesting the establishment of a significant anti-Ottoman alliance encompassing several European Christian rulers. Subsequent events indicate that Hādī Beg’s mission to Moscow served as a catalyst for a fresh series of Safavid-Russian-Habsburg diplomatic negotiations to establish a joint alliance against the Ottomans.

Between 1588–1590, four missions took place that involved discussions on various matters, including the potential formation of an anti-Ottoman alliance. Two of these missions involved the tsar and the emperor. The first was the mission of Lucas Pauli to Prague in 1588, and the second was the mission of Nicholas von Warkotsch to Moscow in 1589. The two other missions involved the tsar and the shah, the first being Grigoriĭ Borisovich Vasilchikov’s trip to Iran in 1588–1589 and the second was the mission of Hādī Beg and Būdāq Beg to Moscow in 1589–1590. Shortly after negotiations with Hādī Beg, the Russian court, led by the tsarist advisor Boris Godunov, decided to dispatch its own envoy, G.B. Vasilchikov, to Iran. Vasilchikov accompanied Hādī Beg on his return journey to Iran. In addition to this mission, Boris Godunov also dispatched several messengers to the imperial court in Prague.

Before delving into the details of these missions, it is important to note that historians of Russian-Austrian relations have predominantly focused on only one of these missions’ objective: resolution of the issue of succession to the Polish throne, in collaboration with Emperor Rudolph II and his brother Maximilian III, archduke of Austria.Footnote 27 However, these envoys were also tasked with another objective—informing the emperor of the shah’s proposal, as conveyed by Hādī Beg to the tsar. While historians have not attributed as much significance to this secondary objective, resulting in limited scholarly attention, a reassessment of historical documents suggests that this aspect proved significant to subsequent diplomatic negotiations.Footnote 28

Lucas Pauli’s mission to Prague

Boris Godunov dispatched several messengers to the emperor in Prague, including Afanasiĭ Rezanov, Timoteĭ Vykhodets, Vasiliĭ Zagriaznoĭ, the Lübeck merchant Zacharias Meyer (Zakhariĭ Meger), and a German, Lucas Pauli.Footnote 29 The primary objectives of these missions, as previously mentioned, were to address the issue of succession to the Polish throne and inform the emperor of the proposal presented by the shah’s envoy. However, the messengers faced the daunting task of traversing the hostile territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which presented significant dangers.Footnote 30 As a result, only one messenger, Lucas Pauli, successfully arrived in Prague.Footnote 31 The emperor granted him an audience on April 12, 1588, during which Lucas Pauli presented the tsar’s letter (gramota).Footnote 32 The document informed the emperor of Hādī Beg’s visit to Moscow (although his name was not mentioned in the document). Hādī Beg sought the tsar’s commitment to maintaining a strong friendship with the shah and facing the Ottoman sultan together. Furthermore, Hādī Beg urged the participation of Emperor Rudolph II, King Philip II of Spain, and King Henry III of France in this proposed alliance. In response, the tsar decided to dispatch his own envoy, G.B. Vasilchikov, to the Safavid court. Additionally, the tsar stated that the shah should send his messengers to Moscow again the following summer in order to “successfully conclude the matter.”Footnote 33 However, the inclusion of the statement about the shah’s future reaction to the Russian embassy in Iran is misleading. At that particular moment, neither the tsar nor Boris Godunov could have known how the shah would respond to the Russian embassy. On the other hand, the Russians were aware of the constant threat the emperor faced from the Ottomans. With that in mind, they strategically sought to capture the emperor’s attention and encourage his involvement in order to address their shared concern.

Alongside the tsar’s letter, additional documents provide further information on the matter. In a letter addressed to the emperor, Magnus Pauli wrote of the tsar’s willingness to support the shah in reclaiming cities occupied by the Ottomans in the Caspian Sea region, including Shamakhi, Darband, and Baku.Footnote 34 As such, the tsar wanted to make an agreement and form an alliance with the shah (“v dokonchanʹe i v soedinenʹe”), as well as other participants—namely, other Christian rulers.Footnote 35 In his report, Lucas Pauli also briefly mentioned the shah’s proposal to establish a “General Liga” against the Turks in order to defeat them.Footnote 36 This proposal aimed to establish both bilateral and multilateral agreements that served the “interests of the entire Christian world” and Safavid Iran.Footnote 37

Emperor Rudolph reacted swiftly to the news from Moscow. According to Nicholas von Warkotsch’s report, Rudolph expressed dissatisfaction with the content of Lucas Pauli’s messages.Footnote 38 Although Warkotsch did not specify the exact reason for the emperor’s dissatisfaction, other documents suggest that it may have been due to the brief nature of the reports and the emperor’s desire for more detailed information on the proposal to form an anti-Ottoman league and the tsar’s support in the struggle for the Polish-Lithuanian crown.Footnote 39 However, the emperor’s dissatisfaction alone was not the sole motive behind the decision to send a mission to Moscow. The situation on the Ottoman-Hungarian border also played a significant role. By 1583, the armistice signed in 1576 had expired and, although the emperor managed to renew it from January 1, 1584, military skirmishes continued to occur along the border.Footnote 40 Consequently, the emperor’s lands constantly faced potential Ottoman attacks. The positive news from Moscow presented an opportune moment. Additionally, the emperor’s uncle, Archduke Ferdinand II of Tyrol (1529–1595), supported this idea. Ferdinand considered the offer to form an anti-Ottoman league with Iran to be highly advantageous and believed that accepting the proposal was “a sacred duty for the emperor, as he was one of the prominent figures in the Christian world at that time.”Footnote 41 Furthermore, the ongoing dispute over the Polish-Lithuanian crown, in which Rudolph’s brother Maximilian was involved, added to the context. Support from Russia would have strengthened their position. Consequently, the emperor had even more reason to send his own envoy to Moscow.

Nicholas von Warkotsch’s mission to Moscow

The imperial court appointed the aforementioned Nicholas von Warkotsch, a nobleman from Silesia, to lead the mission to Moscow, with Lucas Pauli chosen as Warkotsch’s companion due to his knowledge of diplomatic matters and familiarity with the tsarist court. They, along with their entourage, arrived in Moscow at the end of March 1589.Footnote 42 The composition of this mission was indeed modest, which could suggest a perception of the mission as relatively unimportant. Due to the ongoing dispute between the Habsburgs and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, an imperial mission passing through Polish territory raised suspicions among Polish authorities. As mentioned in Warkotsch’s report, the situation in Poland had become increasingly serious.Footnote 43 In such circumstances, the emperor deemed it inadvisable to send a mission of corresponding gravity. To maintain secrecy, the entire process and contents of the mission were kept confidential. Official letters addressed to the emperor did not contain specific information about the concrete steps taken regarding the formation of the anti-Ottoman league and involvement of Safavid Iran. Instead, these details were relayed orally by the envoys to prevent leaks. The emperor understood the threat posed by the Ottoman sultan and potential allies, such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, France, and England, who exploited the Ottoman question for their own rivalries with the Habsburgs and shared information with the Ottomans, should they become aware of the mission’s objectives. To mitigate this risk, the emperor sought to prevent the Ottoman sultan from making peace with the shah, as such a development could potentially undermine Habsburg interests.Footnote 44

Nicholas von Warkotsch’s interest in the relationship between the Russian tsar, Safavid shah, and Ottoman sultan was evident prior to his arrival in Moscow and his audience at the tsar’s court. Warkotsch diligently sought out any available information. During a conversation with Voivode Grigoriĭ Nikitich Rzhevskiĭ in Pskov, Warkotsch learned that the shah had expressed respect for and placed himself under the protection of the tsar. This act aimed to demonstrate a mutual “eternal alliance against all enemies.” Rzhevskiĭ told Warkotsch that a tsarist envoy had been sent to Iran to conclude a common alliance against the Ottomans. In addition, the tsar was to send his soldiers to help the shah.Footnote 45 With this formulation, Rzhevskiĭ emphasized to Warkotsch that the tsar had great influence in the “Eastern countries.” Regarding the Ottoman sultan, during a meeting with Fiodor Andreevich Pisemskiĭ, Warkotsch discovered that the tsar also maintained diplomatic ties with the sultan. It was at that time that the sultan sent Çavuş Ibrahim to Moscow, asking the tsar to maintain a peaceful and friendly relationship. Simultaneously, Ibrahim requested that the tsar send an envoy to Constantinople as a gesture of goodwill towards the sultan. According to Pisemskiĭ, the Russian government refused on the grounds that the Ottomans were enemies of the shah.Footnote 46 However, as later revealed, Pisemskĭi’s information misled Warkotsch.

Two weeks after his arrival, Nicholas von Warkotsch was granted his first audience with the tsar. Following a ceremonial welcome and exchange of gifts, Warkotsch commenced negotiations with the Secret Boyar Council, consisting of Ivan Vasilievich Godunov (Iwan Basiliowitz Godonaw), the brothers Andreĭ and Vasiliĭ Shchelkalov (Andre und Basilius Czolkan), Prince Ivan Vasilievich Sitskiĭ-Iaroslavskiĭ (Sitzkii), and Chancellor Ielizar Vyluzgin (Eleazar Bilozgin).Footnote 47 The primary focus of the meeting was twofold: resolving the matter of Moscow’s assistance to the Habsburgs in their pursuit of the Polish-Lithuanian throne and discussing the secret issue of forming an alliance against the Ottomans. While the immediate urgency lay in the Habsburg claim to the Polish-Lithuanian crown, the long-term concern revolved around the establishment of an anti-Ottoman alliance and Iran’s involvement, which posed a more serious challenge. According to Warkotsch’s account, Emperor Rudolph sought further instructions from the tsar, desiring detailed information on the prospective participants in the planned alliance against the Ottomans. The emperor also inquired about the specifics and outcomes of the tsar’s negotiations with Iranian envoy Hādī Beg as well as other pertinent details, such as the potential military force involved and the locations for launching offensive operations against the Ottomans.Footnote 48 Warkotsch appealed to the Secret Boyar Council to provide instructions concerning the formation of an anti-Ottoman league. In terms of potential league members, Warkotsch cautioned the council that neither the king of France nor the queen of England could be relied upon, as they maintained amicable relations with the Ottoman sultan.Footnote 49 Similarly, Venice’s participation was also not guaranteed. In fact, Venice had proven to be an unreliable ally during the Holy League war against the Ottomans (1570–1573), as the Venetians eventually reached an agreement with the sultan.Footnote 50 Only the pope and the Habsburgs were dependable members.Footnote 51

The day after the meeting with the Boyar Council, the tsar’s secretary approached Warkotsch with information on the ongoing conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids. The secretary mentioned the recent overthrow of Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda and the accession of his young son, ʿAbbās (named in the report as Casulbas or Kusiltas).Footnote 52 The secretary, emphasizing that ʿAbbās was the “great enemy of the Turks,” informed the tsar of the decision to dispatch an envoy carrying a letter urging the shah to persist in the war against the Ottomans, because the emperor and king of Spain also wished to establish an anti-Ottoman league.Footnote 53 G.B. Vasilchikov had initially been dispatched to Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda, but learned of the shah’s overthrow and ʿAbbās’s accession during his journey to Iran. Through such wording, the tsar’s secretary likely intended to assure Warkotsch of the friendly diplomatic relations between the tsar and shah.Footnote 54

In June, Nicholas von Warkotsch visited the Kremlin for further discussions with Boris Godunov. During their conversation, Godunov displayed remarkable statesmanship by acknowledging the emperor’s significant expenditure on anti-Ottoman defenses in the ongoing war with the Ottomans. Warkotsch confirmed this, highlighting the fact that, despite the armistice, border skirmishes resembling a state of war continued. Consequently, alongside the conflict with Iran, the Ottoman sultan had to maintain troops on the Hungarian border.Footnote 55 In response, Godunov extended assistance to Warkotsch, listing potential Asian allies willing to join the fight against the Ottomans. This was a deliberate demonstration of Russia’s political strength and capabilities on the international stage. However, when Warkotsch inquired about the method and timing of military operations, Godunov responded with caution, stating: “each country would contribute in its own way and with overwhelming force if necessary.” He assured Warkotsch that the allies would “relentlessly press the Ottomans, aiming to defeat them decisively or at least weaken them significantly.”Footnote 56 Godunov’s response seemed to promise everything and nothing simultaneously. While he spoke of potential aid, he did not provide the emperor with any guarantees or present a concrete plan. Warkotsch’s report indicates that he was well aware of the complexity, and perhaps even the impracticality, of executing coordinated military operations in Hungary and the Caucasus. As he noted:

[…] If the Turks were already defeated in Europe to the point where their resistance crumbled, it would be futile to pursue further victories in Asia. Moreover, the vast steppes and deserts between the Russian tsar’s country and Turkey pose significant logistical challenges, making it unlikely to accomplish a three-month military march within a year. In contrast, fighting in Europe could continue year-round […].Footnote 57

This highlights the recognition that the proposed joint military operations faced logistical and geographical obstacles, making successful coordination and execution uncertain.

According to P.P. Bushev’s analysis of Russian documents, Warkotsch did not have a concrete plan when he arrived in Moscow.Footnote 58 However, in his message to the emperor and king of Spain, Warkotsch proposed a course of action involving a potential attack by the tsar on Ottoman allies, particularly the Crimean Tatars, due to the considerable distance between Russian and Ottoman lands. In exchange for the financial and material assistance promised by Boris Godunov, the emperor and his allies would be able to assemble a strong army and push the Ottomans back to their own territory. The Spanish king, with his fleet, could launch attacks across the Mediterranean, targeting Alexandria, Egypt, Jerusalem, or the Berber coast of North Africa.Footnote 59 In this scenario, Iran’s role was not clearly established or considered by the debaters. While Godunov knew about the potential allies and their military capabilities, there were no specific statements about Iran as a key participant in the fight against the Ottomans.

Two days later, Warkotsch had another audience with Tsar Fiodor and the Boyar Council, with each council member expressing their individual views on the matter. Regarding the anti-Ottoman league and proposal by Safavid envoy Hādī Beg, Ielizar Vyluzgin and Ivan Vasilievich Godunov offered their insights, believing that the tsar intended to form an alliance with the emperor and king of Spain against the Ottomans, the same wish shared by the shah.Footnote 60 To solidify this alliance, the tsar had dispatched an envoy to Iran. Godunov stated that as soon as a Safavid envoy arrived in Moscow, the tsar would promptly send a message to Prague informing the emperor of the agreement between the tsar and the shah.Footnote 61 In the meantime, the tsar would engage in negotiations with the shah and other rulers of Asian empires to secure concrete assistance in the fight against the Ottomans.Footnote 62 Vyluzgin pointed out that the shah commanded an army of 200,000 soldiers and anticipated the participation of other rulers, such as Bukhara (up to 100,000 soldiers), Khiva (50,000 soldiers), and Issaur (30,000 soldiers). Including these forces, and along with potential contributions from the Georgian tsar (50,000 soldiers), the Shamkhal ruler (30,000 soldiers), the Circassians (70,000 soldiers), and the Nogais (100,000 soldiers), they aimed to oppose the Ottomans under the leadership of the Russian tsar.Footnote 63 It should be noted that these numbers are likely exaggerated in the sources, exceeding the actual military capabilities of these actors. However, the practice of overestimating military strength and number of soldiers can also be observed in other contemporary sources. Such overestimations emphasized the military and political power of the ruler (in this case, the Russian tsar) or the significance of the issue discussed. Based on this, one can discern the importance the Boyar Council attributed to the formation of an anti-Ottoman league alongside the emperor and the shah.

This meeting also addressed concerns around a potential peace agreement between the Ottomans and Safavids. On this front, the tsar’s envoy, G.B. Vasilchikov, was tasked with dissuading the shah from making peace, encouraging him to continue the war. Vasilchikov was also to assure the shah of military support from the tsar and other European allies.Footnote 64 Towards the end of the meeting, Warkotsch was asked to pass on that, if the emperor agreed to this plan, he should send an envoy to Moscow the following year (1590) to discuss the next steps for an anti-Ottoman league.

After his last audience with the tsar, Warkotsch departed Moscow more than a month later. He traveled by ship from Arkhangelsk to Amsterdam and then reached Prague via Hamburg. Upon his return, he was promptly received by Emperor Rudolph, who did not take any immediate action regarding the matter under discussion. Unfortunately for Rudolph, the situation soon began to unfold unfavorably for him. Shāh ʿAbbās (1587–1629) signed a treaty with the Ottomans, effectively putting an end to the military conflict. As such, the Ottoman sultan could redirect his attention to events in Central Europe, leading to the outbreak of the Fifteen Years War (1593–1606). In this case, the emperor undertook another diplomatic initiative, dispatching Warkotsch to Moscow to engage in discussions regarding an anti-Ottoman alliance.Footnote 65

Russian envoy G.B. Vasilchikov in Iran

In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations between the tsar and shah were underway. Envoy G.B. Vasilchikov was sent to Iran in April 1588, accompanied by envoy Hādī Beg, and remained there for over a year.Footnote 66 Historians studying Russian-Safavid relations have largely highlighted two primary objectives of Vasilchikov’s mission: to establish friendly trade relations and clarify the details of the surrender of Baku and Darband in exchange for assistance in the struggle against the Ottomans.Footnote 67 However, further research has revealed that Vasilchikov was also tasked with discussing the terms of forming a grand anti-Ottoman alliance. Sudden political changes in Iran influenced the course of negotiations on this matter. At that time, Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda no longer ruled, replaced by his son ʿAbbās. Vasilchikov only learned of ʿAbbās’s accession to the throne during his journey. The shah, preoccupied with fighting the Uzbeks and attempting to settle the conflict with the Ottomans, was not eager to receive Vasilchikov for an audience. As such, this meeting did not occur until April 1589. By that time, however, the shah’s envoys were already in Constantinople negotiating peace with the Ottomans.

Based on historical documents, it can be inferred that before negotiations with Vasilchikov commenced, Shāh ʿAbbās was likely unaware of the potential creation of an anti-Ottoman league, which his father had proposed to the tsar. Envoy Vasilchikov likely introduced the issue to the young shah, sparking his interest.Footnote 68 Vasilchikov informed the shah that the tsar had sent him to Iran in order to bring the shah into this alliance.Footnote 69 Vasilchikov deliberately emphasized the tsar’s position, claiming that messengers from several European countries had come to Moscow to implore the tsar to join the alliance.Footnote 70 Vasilchikov apparently wanted to reassure the shah that only with the tsar’s help could the shah participate in this significant anti-Ottoman project.Footnote 71 To learn more about this proposal, Shāh ʿAbbās decided to send his own envoys to Russia.

Būdāq Beg and Hādī Beg in Moscow

To respond to this proposal, Shāh ʿAbbās dispatched Būdāq Beg and Hādī Beg to Moscow, together with G.B. Vasilchikov, to acquire further information about the proposed project. At the end of June 1589, they departed from the southern shores of the Caspian Sea. After passing through the city of Astrakhan and the Volga River, they reached Moscow on December 23, 1589. It seems that during their journey to Moscow, the shah’s envoys had already expressed interest in the tsar’s relations with the emperor. The envoys had several discussions with Russian representatives, including Dmitriĭ Vasilievich Turgenev, Semion Romanovich Alferiev, and Ondreĭ Fiodorovich Klobukov, asking whether the emperor and other rulers had dispatched their own envoys to the tsar. Considering Hādī Beg’s prior dealings in Moscow, it is plausible that his interest in the matter was connected to his previous (at least basic) knowledge of the subject. Presumably acting on predetermined instructions from the tsar’s court, the Russian representatives responded by stating that, during the previous summer (i.e., 1589), the imperial envoy, Nicholas von Warkotsch, had visited Moscow with a request that:

[…] The Tsar and the Grand Duke to be with him [the emperor] in agreement and alliance and to stand with him against the Turkish [sultan] and all enemies together […] [and with the shah] he wishes to be in friendship, brotherhood and to stand together against all enemies […].Footnote 72

It is noteworthy that the representatives informed the envoys that the emperor had requested that the tsar conclude “an agreement and alliance.” But in the case of the shah, there was talk only of “a friendship and brotherhood.” In sixteenth-century Russian diplomatic writings, the latter primarily denoted amicable relations between two rulers but not a binding alliance treaty.Footnote 73 Moreover, even the pope, king of Spain, king of France, Venice, and the “rulers of Pomerania” intended to join the anti-Ottoman alliance.Footnote 74 Similar to G.B. Vasilchikov in Iran, the representatives of the Russian state also deliberately provided the shah’s envoys with incorrect information about the alleged arrival of several envoys in Moscow sent by the pope, the emperor, and other Christian rulers.

A year and a half after their arrival, the Safavid envoys were granted an audience with the tsar and boyars.Footnote 75 Discussions with the Secret Boyar Council primarily revolved around Russian-Safavid affairs, including trade and the alliance agreement.Footnote 76 Disputes occurred over the origin of the idea for an alliance against the Ottomans and the exchange of Darband and Baku for military aid. Būdāq Beg argued that the Russian translator had misinterpreted some of Hādī Beg’s statements from his previous visit to the tsar’s court in 1587. The Russians denied these accusations. Būdāq Beg further contended that Hādī Beg was not an envoy of Shāh ʿAbbās but of his father, Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda, who had assigned different tasks.Footnote 77 After multiple discussions and explanations, Būdāq Beg was ultimately compelled to acknowledge that it was the Safavid envoy who had initially raised the issue.Footnote 78 However, it was no longer relevant to them at that point, as the deposed shah was its proponent and the political situation in Iran had changed significantly after the replacement of the shahs. Although Būdāq Beg agreed to the prospect of joint action against the Ottomans, he refrained from making any concrete proposals and commitments in this regard. Moreover, at that time, the shah’s envoy was already engaged in negotiations for a peace treaty in Constantinople.Footnote 79 The conclusion of any formal agreement or binding promises was not under consideration at the time.

There is no particular mention in the sources regarding the forming of an anti-Ottoman league with the emperor and other European rulers. However, towards the end of the negotiations, the shah’s envoys were given assurances that as soon as envoys from the emperor and other Christian rulers arrived in Moscow and reached an agreement on “the great matter,” the tsar would promptly inform the shah of the outcomes of these negotiations.Footnote 80 It seems that, given the circumstances, the tsar and Boris Godunov made the decision to prioritize foreign political interests over their own interests in the Southern Caucasus. This approach guaranteed their ability to negotiate and mediate positions, resulting in potential territorial benefits such as the possible acquisition of Baku, Darband, and Baltic territory. Moreover, this approach elevated Russia’s international status significantly in both European and Asian foreign politics.Footnote 81 Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, Shāh ʿAbbās successfully reached an agreement with the sultan in 1590, effectively putting an end to their conflict. This momentous development caused a major reshuffling in the international political sphere, subsequently impacting the organization of the anti-Ottoman league itself.

The question of who originated the proposal of forming an anti-Ottoman league

The present article raises the question of the originator of the proposal to establish an anti-Ottoman league in the late 1580s. It seems that after Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda proposed to Tsar Fiodor Ivanovich and Boris Godunov the formation of an alliance against the Ottomans, Godunov took the initiative to organize this alliance. However, questions remain around whether this proposal originated solely from the shah and the extent of its modification by the Russians to serve their own political interests. Some historians, such as P.P. Bushev and J.P. Niederkorn, argue that, in the late 1580s, the idea of creating a grand anti-Ottoman league encompassing European Christian states, the Russian tsardom, and Safavid Iran was primarily conceived by the Russians, particularly Boris Godunov.Footnote 82 This hypothesis is supported by the absence of direct sources verifying the shah’s proposition of forming a major anti-Ottoman alliance that included the emperor, king of Spain, and other European Christian rulers. Complicating matters further is the scarcity of surviving documents, both Russian and Persian, concerning Hādī Beg’s mission. Only indirect references can be found in later diplomatic records of the Russian tsarist court. Additionally, from the late 1580s onwards, relations between the Safavid shah and the emperor were mediated by the Moscow court.Footnote 83 Consequently, verifying the aforementioned claim poses practical challenges.

It is worth noting, however, that the report by Magnus Pauli, which provided detailed information on the shah’s proposal, contradicts the previous view. Based on this report, it appears that the shah was indeed the initiator of the idea to form a broad anti-Ottoman alliance.Footnote 84 The claim finds additional support in another document in which the messenger, Lucas Pauli, affirmed that he personally met the shah’s envoy, mentioning: “[…] the Shah of Kizilbash sent his messenger to the Ruler [Tsar] by his side, Lucas—and he [Lucas] himself saw it […].”Footnote 85 Furthermore, during conversations with Nicholas von Warkotsch, Boris Godunov himself acknowledged that messengers from Moscow, including Lucas Pauli, were instructed to inform the emperor about the shah’s proposal to establish an anti-Ottoman league.Footnote 86 Thus, Godunov essentially admitted that the initiative for organizing an anti-Ottoman league originated from the Safavid side. It is important to note that this information is only found in Warkotsch’s report and not in other Russian documents. Nevertheless, other contacts between Iran and other European states—such as the Kingdom of Spain, the Papal State, and Venice—aimed at forming an alliance against the Ottomans further affirm the shah’s interest in establishing such a league.Footnote 87

The Russian historian I.V. Magilina is of the opinion that, while attempting to form an anti-Ottoman alliance, the tsarist court pursued its own interests. In order to achieve their objectives, Russian officials may have introduced amendments to diplomatic communications with the Safavid and imperial courts, thereby influencing negotiation outcomes in their favor.Footnote 88 Documents from the missions attest to the fact that the tsar’s court and its envoys inserted corrections into diplomatic communications. During an audience with Shāh ʿAbbās I in Isfahan, envoy G.B. Vasilchikov reported that envoys from all European countries (including the emperor, the kings of Spain and France, and the Polish-Lithuanian king) had come to Moscow in the summer of 1588 to confidentially request that the tsar join the anti-Ottoman alliance.Footnote 89 However, no envoys arrived in Moscow during that time.Footnote 90 Even if this claim were true, Vasilchikov could not have known about it, as he had left Moscow in April 1588.Footnote 91 His knowledge would have been limited to information about tsarist envoys sent to the emperor in Prague in 1588. It is possible that Vasilchikov’s testimony before Shāh ʿAbbās was expedient, aiming to reassure him of both tsarist and imperial support while persuading him to continue the war with the Ottomans. The tsarist court, being interested in creating an anti-Ottoman league, probably did not wish to lose the shah as a potential ally due to diplomatic complications. Moreover, the Russians did not want to miss the opportunity to gain the strategic cities of Baku and Darband from the shah, as previously mentioned.

Conclusions

In the latter half of the 1580s, the Safavid shah found himself in a challenging situation, grappling with ongoing war against the Ottomans and territorial losses in the South Caucasus and along the Caspian Sea coast. Consequently, he sought potential allies to address these pressing concerns. One significant indicator of this pursuit was the mission led by Hādī Beg to Moscow, which marked the beginning of a fresh phase of diplomatic negotiations involving the Habsburgs, Rurikids, and Safavids. Reexamining several historical documents suggests that, through this mission, Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda initiated the idea of forging a broad anti-Ottoman alliance. However, the Safavid stance towards the Ottoman question underwent a shift with the change of rulers in Iran. Although the new shah, Shāh ʿAbbās, did not outright reject the notion of joining an anti-Ottoman league, he deemed it counterproductive given the prevailing circumstances. Following the signing of an agreement with the Ottoman sultan in 1590, the urgent need to find an ally subsided.

In the case of the Habsburgs, the missions of Lucas Pauli and Nicholas von Warkotsch primarily served to strengthen the longstanding relationship between the emperor and the tsar. Boris Godunov pledged material assistance to the emperor in case of war with the Ottomans, as well as support for the Habsburg claim to the Polish-Lithuanian throne. The concept of an anti-Ottoman alliance played a pivotal role in the background of these negotiations, serving as an effective instrument that aligned with the international policies of all potential participants in the league. The Habsburg side sought guarantees of material, financial, and potentially even military aid against the Ottomans, who posed a tangible threat. As evidenced by Warkotsch’s negotiations with the Secret Boyar Council and Boris Godunov, the emperor was indeed in favor of forming an alliance. However, due to the international situation and the state’s internal financial constraints, a direct commitment and promise from the emperor was not feasible at that time. Nonetheless, with the conclusion of the Ottoman-Safavid War and the Ottomans redirecting their focus to the conflict in Hungary, the emperor eventually took action. Diplomatic negotiations in Moscow resumed again with the dispatch of Nicholas von Warkotsch to Russia in 1593.

Regarding Russia, maintaining diplomatic contacts with the Ottoman Empire made the possibility of mutual military conflict unrealistic at the time. As early as 1584, the Russian ambassador Boris Blagoĭ arrived at the court of Ottoman Sultan Murad III (1574–1595) to address the issue of Russian-Iranian relations. Blagoĭ told the Ottomans that the shah had been seeking military assistance from the tsar, but the Russian ruler had not responded to the request and expressed Russia’s friendly intentions toward the Ottomans.Footnote 92 Again in 1592, Russian envoy G.A. Nashchokin came to Constantinople and asked Sultan Murad to forbid the Crimean Tatars from plundering Russian territories. In return, Nashchokin promised that Moscow would not agree to requests from the pope, emperor, shah, and other rulers to fight against the Ottomans.Footnote 93

Nevertheless, the concept of an anti-Ottoman league intrigued the tsar’s government. Given the Russian position in Euro-Asian politics, Boris Godunov, representing real political power, attempted to pursue a multi-faceted approach. He aimed to preserve the political prestige of the Muscovy while exercising a considerable degree of influence over the western (in the case of the Baltics) or southern (in the case of the Caucasus and Crimea) borders of the empire. For Russian officials, the idea and project of an anti-Ottoman league served as convenient means to achieve their own political and power objectives.Footnote 94 As part of this strategy, Godunov assumed the role of mediator in diplomatic relations and communications between the Habsburgs and Safavids, as evident in the aforementioned missions. However, the tsarist representatives made certain adjustments to the communications to suit their own interests, formulating reports to keep both the shah and emperor engaged in the diplomatic game and facilitating negotiations of the logistically demanding plan for a joint anti-Ottoman offensive. Despite the complexities and challenges associated with the project’s feasibility, the idea continued to play a significant role in the subsequent period (late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries), with all the actors involved pursuing their distinct international political goals and interests.

Acknowledgements

This article is supported by the project VEGA 1/0164/23, Central European diplomacy, between regionalism and universalism (1000–1700).

Archival sources

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Russland I-2, I-3.

Footnotes

1 See, for instance, Amīr Hussain Barāzish, Ravābaṭ-i sīyāsī-dīplomatīk-i Īrān va jahān dar ʿahd-i ṣafavīya (Tehran: Amīr-i Kabīr, 1392/2013); Muḥammad ʿAlī Jamālzāda, Tārīkh-i ravābaṭ-i Rūs va Īrān (Tehran: Sokhan, 1358/1979); Najafqulī-yi Ḥisām Muʿizī, Tārīkh-i ravābaṭ-i sīyāsī-yi Īrān bā dunīyā, vol. 1 (Tehran: Chāpkhāna-yi ʿilmī Publ., 1324/1945).

2 In Russian: Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv drevnikh aktov (RGADA).

3 The editor of the document collection is not listed in the publication.

4 N.I. Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ Moskovskoĭ Rusi s Persieĭ, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tovarishchestvo parovoĭ skoropechatni Iablonskiĭ i Perott, 1890); S.A. Belokurov, Snoshenia Rossii s Kavkazom, Vypusk 1. 1578–1613. Materialy, izvlechennye iz Moskovskogo glavnogo arkhiva Ministerstva inostrannych del (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1889); Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ drevneĭ Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi. Snosheniia s gosudarstvami evropeĭskimi. Chastʹ pervaia. Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ s imperieiu Rimskoiu (s 1488 po 1594), vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tip. II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoĭ E.I.V. Kantseliarii, 1851).

5 HHStA, Russland I-2, konv. 10 (k), 1588, fol. 56–59v; Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 70–105v.

Warkotsch’s report from his mission to Moscow in 1589 was translated into Russian by Liudmila Lapteva, “Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla o poezdke v Moskvu v 1589 godu,” Voprosy istorii 6 (1978): 95–112.

6 The Spanish version has been published in several editions: “Estudio sobre la Misión de Praga a Moscú emprendida en 1589 y su importancia,” in Poselství z Prahy do Moskvy v roku 1589, ed. Josef Polišenský (Prague: Universita Karlova, 1974), 23–79; “Sumario de la relacion de Nicolas Warkotsch embaxador que fue de Su Magestad Cesarea en Moscovia,” in Rossiia i Italiia. Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov i issledovaniĭ, kasaiuschikhsia snosheniĭ Rossii s Italieĭ, vol. 3, part 2, ed. E.F. Schmurlo (St. Petersburg: Akademiia Nauk, 1915), 352–372; “Ignotus ad usum officii refert summatim amplissimam relationem quam de sua missione in Moscovia a die 31.1II ad 3.VII.1589 fecit Nicolaus Warkotsch,” in Elementa ad Fontium Editiones XVI. Documenta Polonica ex Archivo Generali Hispaniae in Simancas. V Pars, ed. Walerian Meysztowicz (Roma: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1966), 185–197.

7 This is stored in Spain in the historical archives of Simancas (Archivo General de Simancas). Polišenský, Poselství z Prahy, 12–13.

8 J.P. Niederkorn, Die europaischen Machte und der “Lange Turkenkrieg” Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593–1606) (Vienna: Verlag Publ., 1993); J.P. Niederkorn, “Zweifrontenkrieg gegen die Osmanen. Iranisch-christliche Bundnisplane in der Zeit des ‘Langen Turkenkriegs’ 1593–1606,” Mitteilungen des Instituts fur osterreichische Geschichtsforschung 104, no. 3–4 (1996): 310–323.

9 I.V. Magilina, Rossiia i proekt antiosmanskoĭ ligi v kontse XVI – nachale XVII vv. (Volgograd: MIRIA, 2012).

10 Rudi Matthee, “Anti-Ottoman Concerns and Caucasian Interests. Diplomatic Relations Between Iran and Russia, 1587–1639,” in Safavid Iran and Her Neighbors, ed. Michel Mazzaoui (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2003), 101–128; Rudi Matthee, “Anti-Ottoman politics and transit rights: The seventeenth-century trade in silk between Safavid Iran and Muscovy,” Cahiers du Monde Russe 35, no. 4 (1994): 739–761; Rudi Matthee, “Safavid Iran and the ‘Turkish Question’ or How to Avoid a War on Multiple Fronts,” Iranian Studies 52, no. 3–4 (2019): 513–542; Rudi Matthee, “The Ottoman–Safavid War of 986–998/1578–90: Motives and Causes,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 20, no. 1–2 (2014): 1–20.

11 Carl Max Kortepeter, “Complex goals of the Ottomans, Persians, and Muscovites in the Caucasus, 1578–1640,” in New Perspectives on Safavid Iran, ed. Colin P. Mitchell (London: Routledge, 2011), 59–83.

12 Murat Yaşar, The North Caucasus Borderland Between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, 1555–1605 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2022).

13 Selim Güngörürler, The Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran, 1639–1683. Diplomacy and Borderlands in the Early Modern Middle East (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2024); Sinen Arcak Casale, Gifts in the Age of Empire Ottoman-Safavid Cultural Exchange, 1500–1639 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2023).

14 David R. Stokes, A Failed Alliance and Expanding Horizons: Relations between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Safavid Persians in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2014).

15 For more details, see Aneliya Stoyanova, “Habsburg Intelligence and Ottoman-Safavid Diplomacy, 1570s–1590s,” CAS Sofia Working Paper Series 12 (2022): 10.

16 Josip Žontar, Obveščevalna služba in diplomacija austrijskih Habsburžanov v boju proti Turkom v 16 stoletju, Vol. 18 (Ljubljana: Slovenska Akademija Znanosti im Umetnosti, Razred za zgodovinske in družbene vede, 1973), 167–179.

17 See Stoyanova, Habsburg Intelligence, 3–38; Walter Posch, Osmanisch-safavidische Beziehungen 1545-1550: Der Fall Alḳâs Mîrzâ. (Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Klasse, Band 841), Part 1 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013).

18 Matthee, Anti-Ottoman Concerns, 108; Matthee, Anti-Ottoman politics, 744; Kortepeter, Complex goals, 61–62.

19 P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv i diplomaticheskikh otnosheniĭ Russkogo i iranskogo gosudarstv v 1588–1612 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 57.

20 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1012.

21 The documents were published in the above-mentioned editions of N.I. Veselovskiĭ, S.A. Belokurov, and Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ.

22 N.M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiĭskogo, book 3, vol. 10 (St. Petersburg: I. Ėĭnerling, v tip. Ė. Pratsa, 1843), 41.

23 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 7, fn16.

24 For this matter, see Lukas Rybar, “Shirvān and its Role in the Russo-Safavid Trade and Diplomacy in the 16th Century,” Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History 65, no. 2 (2020): 605–617. Azerbaijani historian F.A. Hüseyn suggests the hypothesis that the initiative may have been forced by the separatist tendencies of Ahmed Khān Gīlānī, a vassal of the Safavid shah but not his official representative. This idea is indeed interesting, but it remains questionable and appears to lack coherence. Despite limited evidence from G.B. Vasilchikov’s mission documentation in Iran supporting Hüseyn’s inference that Ahmed Khān did not desire an alliance between the tsar and the shah, the scarcity of surviving sources provides little support for his hypothesis. See F.A. Guseĭn, “K voprosu ob obeshchanii shakha Abbasa I ustupit Moskovskomu gosudarstvu Derbent, Baku i Shemakhu,” Voprosy istorii 9 (2010): 113–124.

25 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 3–4; Belokurov, Snoshenia Rossii s Kavkazom, 563. The quote in Russian reads, “v druzhbe i v bratstve i v liubve i v ssylke i v dokonchanʹe i v soedinenʹe.”

26 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1011–1012, 1057–1058. The quote in Russian reads, “ukriepiasʹ v dokonchanʹe i v soedinenʹe.”

27 See, for instance, R.G. Skrynnikov, Rossiia posle oprichniny. Ocherki politicheskoĭ i sotsialʹnoĭ istorii (Leningrad: Izdatelʹstvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1975); Hans Uebersberger, Österreich und Russland seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts (Vienna and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1906).

28 Indeed, later works by the aforementioned scholars J.P. Niederkorn and I.V. Magilina stand as exceptions to the limited scholarly attention previously given to the missions’ secondary objective.

29 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 85.

30 Due to the dispute around succession to the Polish throne, tensions arose between Russia and the Austrian Habsburgs on one side and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the other. This led to a state of enmity between the parties involved. See B.N. Floria, Russko-polʹskie otnosheniia i politicheskoe razvitie Vostochnoĭ Evropy vo vtoroĭ polovine XVI – nachale XVII vekov (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

31 Lucas Pauli, known as Lucas Pavlusov in Russian documents, was appointed as the emperor’s agent and sent to Moscow in the autumn of 1587. Pauli’s primary objective was to gather information about the attitudes prevailing at the Russian court and seek assistance for the Habsburgs in securing the Polish throne and combating the Ottoman Empire. Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1102, 1113–1114, 1124; Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 67; Norbert Mika, “Tatarská otázka v politických misích císařskych kuryrů a poslů k moskevskému dvoru v letech 1587–1589,” in Rus’ and the World of the Nomads (The second half of 9th–16th century), Colloquia Russica, series I, vol. 7, ed. Vitaliy Nagirnyy (Krakow: Jagiellonian University, 2017), 425.

32 The letters carried by all the aforementioned messengers shared similar contents. See Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1004–1097.

33 Ibid., 1057–1058.

34 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1073–1074. Magnus Pauli—“Magnus Pavlusov” in Russian sources—was Lucas Pauli’s father. Like his son, Magnus also served as an imperial agent and messenger at the Russian court during the rule of Tsar Ivan IV and Tsar Fiodor Ivanovich. HHStA, Russland I-2, konv. 10 (k), 1588, fol. 56, 57; Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1073.

35 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1059, 1074. The term “dokonchanʹe” refers to a particular political agreement, either peaceful or friendly, between two rulers or princes. “Soedinenʹe,” or alliance, denotes an alliance treaty or union formed against a common third party; in this instance, the Ottomans. See I.I. Sreznevskiĭ, Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka, vol. 1 (Moscow: Tipografiia Imperatorskoĭ akademii nauk, 1893), 693; I.I. Sreznevskiĭ, Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka, vol. 3 (Moscow, Tipografiia Imperatorskoĭ akademii nauk, 1912), 704–705; A. Filiushkin, Tituly russkikh gosudareĭ (Moscow; St. Petersburg: Arkheo Publ., 2006), 220–238.

36 HHStA, Russland I-2, konv. 10 (k), 1588, fol. 56–59v.

37 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1059.

38 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 76; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 98.

39 Boris Godunov was well aware of the potential impact the proposal to form an anti-Ottoman league would have on the “West,” using it as a diplomatic strategy to elicit a reaction from the emperor around the issue of succession to the Polish-Lithuanian throne. This issue was also of great interest to the Russian court. By emphasizing the proposal for an alliance against the Ottomans, Godunov aimed to capture the emperor’s attention and involvement in Polish-Lithuanian succession, thus furthering the diplomatic goals of the Russia. Uebersberger, Österreich und Russland, 527.

40 Walter Leitsch, “Rudolph und Sudosteuropa, 1593–1606,” East European Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1972): 302; Miloslav Skovajsa, Habsbursko-osmanské mierové zmluvy 1498–1616 (PhD diss., Comenius University, 2012), 170–171.

41 Uebersberger, Österreich und Russland, 529.

42 For more details of the mission, see Uebersberger, Österreich und Russland, 535–544; Lukáš Rybár, “Misia Mikuláša Varkoča a Lukáša Pauliho do Moskvy v roku 1589 a otázka spojenectva Habsburgovcov s Perziou proti Osmanom,” in Byzantinoslovaca VII, eds. M. Hurbanič, L. Rybár, and V. Zervan (Bratislava: Comenius University, 2020), 214–229; Vladimir Panov, “Tři moskevske mise Mikulaše Varkoče 1589–1594 ve světle diplomatickeho ritualu Ruska,” Opera historica: časopis pro dějiny raneho novověku 20, no. 1 (2019): 7–20; Jiří Procházka, “Cesta slezskeho šlechtice do Ruska v roce 1589,” Slezsky sbornik/Acta Silesiaca 95, no. 4 (1997): 255–262.

43 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 79v; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 101.

44 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1134.

45 Ibid., 1107–1108.

46 Ibid., 1118–1119.

47 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 75v; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 99.

48 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 79v; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 101.

49 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 79v–80v; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 100–101.

50 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 96v–97; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 107; Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1154.

51 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 80v, 96v; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 101, 107; Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1154.

52 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 81v–82; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 102.

53 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 81v–82; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 102.

54 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 92.

55 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 95; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 106–107.

56 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 96; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 107.

57 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 96; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 107.

58 Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 67.

59 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 96–96v; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 107.

60 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 97v–98; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 108.

61 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1181.

62 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 98; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 108.

63 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1185–1186.

64 Ibid., 1186.

65 For Warkotsch’s second mission to Moscow, see Lukas Rybar, “Habsburg-Safavid Diplomacy: Nicholas von Warkotsch and Haji Khosrow in Moscow,” Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History 66, no. 4 (2021): 1132–1148.

66 For his mission to Iran, see Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 73–120.

67 Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 74; Matthee, Anti-Ottoman Concerns, 110–111; Matthee, Anti-Ottoman politics, 745.

68 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 84.

69 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 95.

70 Ibid., 92, 118.

71 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 83.

72 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 10, 118.

73 In sixteenth-century documents, the Russian term druzhba (friendship) primarily signified a state of peace, strong diplomatic ties, and thriving trade connections, often coupled with an alliance. The Russian term bratstvo (brotherhood) was regarded as a social category, distinct from kinship, and served as a diplomatic symbol representing equality between two sovereign entities. Filiushkin, Tituly russkikh gosudareĭ, 224–229; Panov, Tři moskevske mise, 14–15.

74 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 118.

75 Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 123.

76 For more details see Ibid., 121–143.

77 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 139.

78 Ibid., 140.

79 The Treaty of Istanbul was concluded on March 21, 1590. H.R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 6, ed. Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 266.

80 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 142–143, 144.

81 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 83.

82 Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 123; Niederkorn, Die europäischen Mächte, 432.

83 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 87.

84 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniĭ, 1073–1074.

85 Ibid., 1130. P.P. Bushev holds an opposing opinion, contending that a Russian translator made a mistake in this instance and Lucas did not actually meet the messenger. Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 68.

86 HHStA, Russland I-3, konv. 1, 1589, fol. 95v–96; Lapteva, Donesenie avstriĭskogo posla, 107.

87 Examples of these other contacts include: Safavid merchant Xwāje Moḥammad of Tabriz in Venice (1580) and the missions of the Spanish envoy Simón de Morales (1582) and papal envoy Giovanni Battista Vechietti (1586) to Iran. Giorgio Rota, “Safavid Envoys in Venice,” in Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit, eds. Ralph Kauz, Giorgio Rota, and Jan Paul Niederkorn (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 219–221; Enrique García Hernán, “The Holy See, the Spanish Monarchy and Safavid Persia in the Sixteenth Century: Some Aspects of the Involvement of the Society of Jesus,” in Iran and the World in Safavid Age, ed. Willem Floor and Edmund Herzig (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 189–191.

88 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 87.

89 Veselovskiĭ, Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh i torgovikh snosheniĭ, 92, 118.

90 Magilina, Rossiia i proekt, 83.

91 Bushev, Istoriia posolʹstv, 73.

92 Barāzish, Ravābaṭ-i sīyāsī-dīplomatīk-i Īrān, 284. For Blagoĭ’s mission in Constantinople, see Yaşar, The North Caucasus Borderland, 140–141.

93 Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiĭskogo, book 3, vol. 10, 138.

94 See I.V. Magilina, “Antituretskaia koalitsiia kak instrument vostochnoĭ politiki Moskovskogo gosudarstva,” Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 4, no. 1 (15) (2009): 69–77.

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