In recent years scholarly interest in inducement policies has been rekindled. Stephen R. Rock's new book is an important contribution to this emerging literature. Rock challenges the assumption that concessions do not work, and that hostile leaders cannot be appeased. He reminds us that appeasement was once an accepted practice of European diplomacy and was considered an effective means of reducing tensions and removing the causes of conflict. Through analyses of five cases—British concessions to the United States in the late 1890s, the appeasement of Germany before World War II, the Anglo-American acceptance of Soviet demands at Yalta, the American “tilt” toward Iraq in the late 1980s, and the use of incentives that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework containing North Korea's nuclear program—Rock offers lessons on the benefits and limitations of conciliatory strategies. He develops theoretical propositions and policy guidelines to aid scholars and policymakers in assessing the merits of inducement policies.

As Rock notes, appeasement is a subcategory of the broader concept of engagement. He acknowledges that engagement is a more widely accepted term among scholars and policymakers. Engagement is the more encompassing concept, referring to the building of longer-term cooperation. Appeasement tends to be narrower in scope, referring to concessions that remove the causes of conflict and reduce tensions. Because Munich still casts such a long and dark shadow, it would be best to subsume the analysis of appeasement under the general heading of engagement. A book with the word appeasement in the title is inherently handicapped. This is unfortunate, for there is much insight and wisdom in Rock's compact volume.

Rock catalogs the various purposes that appeasement policies may serve, the mechanisms by which inducements exert influence, and the factors that account for success or failure. Inducements may seek to preserve the status quo—through crisis resolution and prevention—or to alter conditions—by offering political tradeoffs and developing alliances. The four mechanisms by which such policies reduce tensions are satiation, reassurance, socialization, and altering political dynamics within the adversary regime. Incentive policies, like sanctions, are an attempt to influence the political debate within a target or recipient regime by strengthening the hand of advocates of cooperation, while weakening the position of hostile factions. These internal influences are most likely to occur where some degree of pluralism exists.

While it is true that war-seeking states cannot be appeased, most countries that engage in hostile behavior are pursuing objectives that can in theory be appeased. Rock draws a major distinction between hostile policies that are driven by greed—a state's pursuit of territory, resources, or commercial advantage—and those that are security-driven—when a nation is motivated by concerns for its safety. Rock's characterization of these motives and how they function in different cases is not always convincing—nor is his attempt to define the circumstances in which incentives should be conditioned on reciprocity and accompanied by threats. Rock argues that when the adversary is motivated by greed, inducement policies should be conditional and combined with coercive measures. When the adversary is motivated by insecurity, inducements should be offered without the requirement for reciprocity and without accompanying threats. These are innovative propositions, but they have little grounding in Rock's case studies. They are based more on what he terms their “logic” than on hard empirical evidence. These propositions may be valid in some circumstances, but they need more thorough testing than Rock offers in his study.

The nature of inducements and how they are perceived by the adversary are crucial to the chances of success. Inducements must be properly directed to address the goals and motivations of the adversary. They should be delivered as much as possible to the supporters of reform rather than hostile factions. They must be of sufficient scale to satisfy the adversary. Finally, the state or coalition offering incentives must send clear signals and have a reputation for fulfilling its commitments. Mixed or confused messages and a failure to deliver on promised incentives can undermine effectiveness. As Rock notes, the hesitation and slowness of the United States in fulfilling its promises under the 1994 Agreed Framework have impeded progress in freezing Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and slowed efforts to tackle ballistic missile testing and other contentious issues.

Inducement policies carry significant risks. They may be perceived by the adversary as a sign of weakness and may lead to further attempts to extract concessions. The adversary may become more daring and aggressive in pursuit of its hostile objectives. Rock argues that this is more likely in a regime that is motivated by greed than by insecurity, although his evidence in support of this claim is limited. Rock is on firmer ground when he identifies means for avoiding this moral hazard. A state can diminish the chances of being perceived as weak by making concessions conditional on reciprocal cooperation, by establishing a reputation for firmness and strength, and by maintaining the materiel capability to employ deterrent or coercive strategies if conciliatory gestures fail. In the case of North Korea, the United States and its South Korean and Japanese partners offered incentives on a step-by-step basis and made the delivery of benefits conditional on reciprocal cooperation from the other side.

Rock's case studies and theoretical propositions significantly advance our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of inducement strategies in the conduct of international affairs. The book has limitations, including an overreliance on the distinction between greed and insecurity as motivations for hostile behavior, but its strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. Rock has confirmed, as other scholars have demonstrated, that engagement strategies can be and have been successful in advancing international cooperation.