In War's Wake is a cogent argument for the centrality of the “refugee” in the legal, political, and moral construction of the postwar international order and its humanitarian mission. Focusing on the first decade and a half after World War II, Gerard Daniel Cohen offers a shrewd blend of international, social, and intellectual history to chart conceptual shifts in the definitions and treatment of refugees, along with the practical and political challenges they posed to Allied victors and their new international relief organizations, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA, 1943–47) and its successor, the International Refugee Organization (IRO, 1946–52). In clear and sometimes compelling prose, Cohen argues that the period 1945–60 gave rise to a “humanitarian refugee regime” that departed significantly from its interwar antecedents and helped to constitute today's definitions, assumptions, and practices. Based upon research in the UNRRA and IRO archives, he maintains that this new humanitarian regime was shaped by experiences in Europe, “Americanized” during the early Cold War, and then globalized to Asia, the Middle East, and beyond starting in the 1960s.
Nazi defeat in Europe left millions of refugees and displaced persons (DPs) of diverse nationalities and wartime experiences in the care of the victorious Allied forces and international relief workers. UNRRA represented a departure from the previous international humanitarian work of private charitable organizations. It was conceived as an international relief agency based upon a new model of international cooperation (of forty-four nations), cost sharing, central planning and administration, efficiency, and professional competency. Although the “Grand Alliance humanitarianism” of UNRRA was short-lived (done in by the Cold War, which, Cohen argues, was exacerbated by heated disagreements between Soviet and American policy makers regarding the handling of refugees), it initiated a new era that profoundly shaped practices of international aid, definitions of refugee status and entitlements, and international human rights law (p. 30).
Initially, the Allies and UNRRA agreed that the answer to the refugee and DP problem in Europe was repatriation. UNRRA established nearly 700 camps to house and aid refugees in Germany, Austria, and Italy while they were transitioned home. In Germany, UNRRA housed and fed some eight million displaced persons in 1945; within a year, six to seven million had returned to their countries of origin. By 1946, more than a million “hard core” refugees remained who refused repatriation; soon they were joined by a quarter-million Jewish “infiltrees” fleeing Poland in the hope of emigrating to Palestine or North America. Over the next few years, European refugees became “objects of precise social-science knowledge” (p. 79). DP camps “functioned as social laboratories” for medical experts, social workers and child-welfare experts, psychologists, and occupational therapists who interacted with and scrutinized refugees, wrote reams of reports on them, undertook surveys, and helped to launch subfields in migration and refugee studies (p. 155). Cohen explores the more expansive aid and freedom of movement and of political organization allowed postwar refugees compared to that extended to “stateless persons” of the interwar period. After 1945, refugees received not only food and housing, but also medical attention, language lessons, education, job training, and other forms of entitlements, creating, in effect, “an alternative welfare state for the stateless” (p. 66).
To enjoy such aid, one had to be granted refugee status. From 1946, the staffs of UNRRA, and later, the IRO, worked to sort “genuine” refugees and displaced persons from “pretenders”—those who were not victimized by the Nazis or those, according to the Soviets, who were Nazi collaborators or quislings during the war. In late 1946, the IRO was created to care for the “last million” refugees who remained in the camps after disagreements between American and Soviet officials about proper vetting and whether repatriation (or later, resettlement) should be compulsory or elective and based upon individual “free choice.” Under IRO auspices, with the withdrawal of Soviet and East Bloc participation, “genuine refugees” became those persecuted by one's own government (whether Nazi or Communist), making “the fundamental incompatibility between the individual and his government . . . the essential characteristic of the refugee” (pp. 93–4). Achieving refugee status became “increasingly dependent on a decipherable and convincing narrative of persecution” (pp. 33–35): the innovative category of the “asylum seeker” was thus born. The IRO definition “imprinted” the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, enshrining the rights of the individual in international law (p. 94). It also formalized the distinction between “political refugee” and “economic refugee,” which left its mark on international human rights law and continues to condition access to humanitarian aid.
Cohen explores the evolving “special status” accorded Jewish refugees by the IRO, Americans, and even Soviet and Polish officials, who declared them “exceptionally entitled to emigrate with international assistance” (p. 139). Initially classified according to their prewar citizenship by the Allies and UNRRA, Jews were ultimately permitted to shrug off offending citizenships, whether German, Austrian, Polish, or Soviet. The postwar DP experience and refugee policy, Cohen argues, rendered Jews an “extraterritorial nation” and “normalized the idea of Jewish self-determination in international politics” (p. 143), giving rise to a “philosemitic” moment in international politics that allowed for the creation of a Jewish state (p. 129). In practical terms, the IRO reimbursed the migration of millions of European Jews to Palestine/Israel. Cohen argues, in a brief aside, that the IRO “did not ignore the dire situation of Palestinian refugees” but nonetheless considered them a different case from the Jews since they were “perceived as not in conflict with their place of refuge” (p. 147).
In War's Wake also considers valences of the “Americanization” of international humanitarianism. This ranged from the international dissemination of American modern social-welfare practices to Europe and beyond, to American leadership in addressing the perceived overpopulation of Germany and western Europe, and its feared destabilizing political and economic effects, via a centrally managed, planned population redistribution beyond Europe.
Cohen's book complicates Mark Mazower's arguments regarding the shift from collectivist group-rights language of the interwar period to the post-1945 emphasis on individual rights. Cohen shows that in DP camps and beyond, collectivist claims and politics—based upon appeals to national or ethnic belonging and experiences of suffering—continued and were permitted by Allied officials and aid workers even as such claims were mixed with American-sponsored “civilizationist” arguments in favor of individual choice in resettlement and individual rights to elective “therapeutic” citizenship (p. 89). Cohen does not discuss the broader implications of his argument for chronological and definitional debates about the emergence of the human rights regime, whether in relation to Samuel Moyn's notable interpretation that privileges the 1970s or to various others. If this slim but ambitious volume doesn't do everything, it still does a lot. In War's Wake engages and illuminates an impressive range of historiographies: on postwar reconstruction and the start of the Cold War, on migration and immigration, on international aid organizations and evolving modes of humanitarianism, on postwar American influence abroad, on the foundation of the state of Israel, and on legal conceptions of human rights. It deserves a wide readership.
