There are presently two modern critical editions of Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides.Footnote 1 One, the edition of the Oxford Classical Texts, was completed under the auspices of Carlos Steel in 2009. The other, the Budé edition, under the editorship of Concetta Luna and the late Alain-Philippe Segonds, followed soon after, with the third of the first three books of the commentary having appeared in the early 2012.Footnote 2 This most recent two-part volume of the Budé addresses, for the final time it seems, the Budé's criticisms of the OCT edition.Footnote 3 The first volume could be well described as a long philippic against the OCT and its editor and contributors, going well beyond the tone of measured academic discourse.Footnote 4 Relentlessly, it imprecates the readings of the OCT,Footnote 5 the length and tone of which criticisms will not weather time well. However, there is one disagreement between the two editions, perhaps the most textually significant one and certainly the largest, which is noted as a part of a comprehensive list by the Budé, but no discussion ensues.Footnote 6 This is all the more curious because Steel had, in a separate article, directly raised objections to their solution to this passage.Footnote 7 Why in this single case is the Budé suddenly so taciturn?
Our problematic text comes early in the commentary, where Proclus surveys previous interpreters of the Parmenides. Proclus presents two groups or individuals who interpret the σκοπός of the dialogue to be a logical γυμνασίαFootnote 8 and then another to concern πραγματειώδη or ‘reality’.Footnote 9 He thus presents a total of five separate interpretations.Footnote 10 The main division seems to be between an interpretation of the Parmenides where there is no doctrine or where nothing dealing with ‘reality’ is given (and hence must be a logical training of some sort) and those interpretations, beginning with Plotinus, where there is some sort of positive content concerning reality. The part of the manuscripts (630.26–633.9) that deals with the very first interpretation, the ἀντιγραφή one, is by the unanimous opinion of modern editors problematic.Footnote 11 Victor Cousin and the editors of the OCT and the Budé have all altered the part of the text that describes how the logical groups ignored the ancient title, ‘On ideas’ (631.1–5). Revealing remaining suspicions about the correct order of this convoluted section, Cousin in his second 1864 edition moved the section that deals with the Theaetetus (632.21–5), without noting this in his apparatus, which text Morrow–Dillon follow.Footnote 12 However, our problem comes with the ἀντιγραφή interpretation's discussion of the Parmenides. Should we leave the passage where it is found in all manuscripts, as Steel and, before him, Cousin have done, or should we move it, as the Budé has?
My contention is that the passage makes perfect sense where it occurs in all the manuscripts, thus validating Cousin and Steel's reading. Moving the section of text to where the Budé has done renders the passage itself and the area immediately around it materially incomprehensible. Additionally, it renders problematic later passages in the commentary that refer back to this disputed passage (633.10–634.4; 640.17–20) and also the Budé's interpretation and translation of these later passages. Finally, the Budé editors' interpretation of the logical γυμνασία of the ἀντιγραφή group also means that the Parmenides is no longer a logical γυμνασία, providing, instead, doctrinal content. This renders the entire ostensible purpose of Proclus' inclusion of the ἀντιγραφή interpretation within the broader logical classification entirely senseless.
This article will have the following structure. First, we will introduce the issue of how the ἀντιγραφή interpreters account for the Platonic corpus as a whole so as to understand the principles of their interpretation. Second, we will look at the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides and evaluate the Budé's interpretation of it. Third, we will show how, in the Budé's interpretation of the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή, where Parmenides is presented as imitating Zeno's refutation, the method that Parmenides outlines operates in exactly the opposite way that Zeno's does. Fourth, we will compare the Budé's account of the relation between Zeno and Parmenides with that presented within the ἀντιγραφή interpretation itself. Then we will show that, in Proclus' history, the later interpreters represent the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides to be one not of imitation, but of opposition. Fifth, while examining the last account of the ἀντιγραφή interpretation, we will show that the Budé's interpretation and translation of this last report about the ἀντιγραφή interpretation conflicts with their own reconfiguration of the original ἀντιγραφή account. The Budé editors' account of the later presentation of ἀντιγραφή shows that the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή is not, in fact, Parmenides' imitation of Zeno and his method, but rather his refutation. Finally, we will make some general observations about their remarks about the Parmenides itself and the difficulties that any interpreter, ancient or modern, must face when reading this dialogue. They seem to treat, and use as evidence of their reading, the ending of the dialogue (somewhat problematically) as adumbrating a proof that being is one. The result will be that this edition's decision to ignore the manuscript tradition in this instance was wrong and should be corrected.
1. HOW THE ΑΝΤΙΓΡΑΦΗ INTERPRETATION UNDERSTANDS THE PLATONIC CORPUS
The first interpreters that Proclus outlines classify the Parmenides as a kind of writing called ἀντιγραφή. It is difficult to know what this classification means. In an effort to reassert the ‘doctrinal’ character of Plato against the aporetic assertions of the New Academy, it was commonplace in Middle Platonism to categorize the Platonic dialogues: some were instructive, some investigative and so on.Footnote 13 While Proclus preserves the only extant example of classifying a dialogue as an ἀντιγραφή, it seems clear that an attempt at classification is very much what this group is doing here. The difficulty, then, is how to understand Proclus' presentation of ἀντιγραφή as a sort of literary classification.Footnote 14 It is clear that Proclus himself firmly rejects this particular interpretation, mainly discussing it, one might guess, as a foil and to highlight how each subsequent interpretation he outlines provides a more comprehensive and internally consistent account of the dialogue. While not uncritical, Proclus' incorporation of the second logical exercise interpretation is decisive for his own development.
According to Proclus, the ἀντιγραφή interpreters divided this into three kinds. The first is accomplished by imitation (κατὰ μίμησιν), which follows the style of a writing or speech of a rival, but, as Proclus presents it, it ‘carries the imitation to greater perfection by adding what his rival's discourse omits’.Footnote 15 Proclus presents them as citing Menexenus as an example where, although Plato composes a public funeral oration to rival that of Thucydides, that oration has none the less ‘the same purpose as his rival's’ (εἰς ταὐτὸν ... ἐκείνῳ καθείς, 631.18; italics mine), that is, to praise the life and works of the Athenian dead. The only difference, according to the interpreters, is one of quality, for Socrates' oration had a better arrangement, better arguments and more clarity (631.18–20). Importantly, ἀντιγραφή according to imitation accepts the content or the purpose of the original (e.g. these were great people; let us compose a competing funeral oration about them).
The second ἀντιγραφή is described as done ‘according to opposition’ (κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν). According to Proclus, these interpreters cite the Theaetetus (631.21–5) as an example where we encounter Socrates' response to (ἀντέγραψε, 631.22) Protagoras' dictum ‘man is the measure of all things’. While Proclus does not explain what this group intended through reference to the Theaetetus, the meaning is clear. In that dialogue Socrates feigns amazement about Protagoras' notion that man is the measure of all things. He then examines the position using Theaetetus as an interlocutor. The implications of the doctrine are examined from many angles, conclusions are drawn along the way and then, using these, Socrates finally deduces that because being is necessarily connected to seeming, whatever is able to perceive is the measure of all things, men, pigs and baboons included (Theaetetus 152a–161e). Protagoras' proposition is thereby shown to be false. The ἀντιγραφή here is thus like a reductio ad absurdum, whereby the opposite of the demonstrandum is asserted (in this case, that man is the measure of all things or the premise underlying that, that perception is knowledge) and intolerable conclusions are drawn that show the original premise to be false. The point is that in this kind of ἀντιγραφή an opposing position is (at least implicitly) offered in response to the opening theory.
The final ἀντιγραφή is a combination of imitation and opposition, with Proclus giving the Phaedrus as an example. In the first part of this dialogue, we find the imitation, and in the second the opposition. What is important for us is that in the mimetic ἀντιγραφή, the same position is espoused, while in the oppositional ἀντιγραφή the position argued for is opposed to or contradicts the original. In the first part of the dialogue, we remember that Socrates takes the same topic or argumentFootnote 16 as Lysias' speech (Phaedrus 227c) as read by Phaedrus, showing the deleterious effects of consorting with a lover rather than a non-lover (Phaedrus 237c). Socrates' first speech, according to this group, differs from Lysias' in three ways: (1) in response to (ἀντί) Lysias' disordered speech, Socrates introduced a necessary order (632.22–5), giving it the structure of a living being;Footnote 17 (2) in response to (ἀντί) Lysias' vague starting points, Socrates proceeded scientifically – for example, Socrates begins his speech with a definition of what love is;Footnote 18 (3) and in response to (ἀντί) Lysias' repetitive speech, Socrates ‘adds all sorts of colour and variety of speech’ (632.24–6). We find thus that Socrates' first response (ἀντιγραφὴ κατὰ μίμησιν) was not one that presented opposing content, but one that merely improved the quality of the form of the argument. The entire purpose of Socrates' first speech was, according to this group, to improve on the sophist's discourse on the non-lover (632.26–633.2). According to these interpreters, we find the oppositional ἀντιγραφή in the second half of the dialogue. There Socrates addresses a position in conflict with his previous oneFootnote 19 and defends instead the lover (633.3). Employing perfect moderation, he refutesFootnote 20 his opponent with definitions, divisions, demonstrations and every sort of means (633.4–5) overwhelming the leanness of his opponent's style. Having summarized the three different kinds of ἀντιγραφή held by the first group of interpreters, the problem is: what kind of ἀντιγραφή is the Parmenides?
The first and easier problem is that Proclus is witness here to the only extant example of using the term ἀντιγραφή as a means to classify dialogues.Footnote 21 One does not have recourse to other texts to verify one's assertions about what it could be. Accordingly, scrupulous attention must be paid to the text itself (such as it is) and to the context where it is discussed. The more fundamental and difficult obstacle is, as mentioned above, the apparent corruption in the manuscripts in the area surrounding this passage. The OCT has chosen to leave the passage that discusses the Parmenides where it is found in the manuscripts, thereby asserting that this group understood the ἀντιγραφή of the second half of the Parmenides to be done according to opposition. The Budé editors have decided that this section of the text is better understood in the discussion of the mimetic ἀντιγραφή and they have relocated it thence for their edition. Thus, according to what we have laid out above, for the Budé, Parmenides must imitate the method of Zeno, as well as have the same goal.
To be clear, the Parmenides could, in principle, be interpreted as an imitation or oppositional ἀντιγραφή. If Parmenides engages Zeno with an ἀντιγραφή, and Zeno's mode of discourse is elenchus, does Parmenides merely imitate him in his ‘elenctic’ response? Or if Parmenides takes up Zeno's chosen method of discourse (elenchus), does Parmenides oppose/refute him? When presenting the passage about the Parmenides in this manner, one is able to interpret it either way and so, at first glance, there are grounds for the Budé to move this passage from oppositional to imitation. To determine which is the correct interpretation, I will focus on whether the Budé editors were justified in moving this section of the text by evaluating the extent to which they correctly interpret the context within and immediately surrounding these crucial parts of the text.
2. ZENO'S MODEL: WHAT HE ARGUES AGAINST AND HOW
Proclus begins by presenting the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of Zeno, Zeno's opponents and the specific character of his discourse. Examining this in detail is important because Zeno's method and philosophical position are unproblematic. This will act as a baseline against which to evaluate which kind of ἀντιγραφή Parmenides himself uses. Proclus writes: ‘Zeno produced a rich and varied show of arguments aimed at catching out those positing that beings are many, and brought forth in his refutation not less than forty arguments wherein contradictories were tested together.’Footnote 22 Zeno's method is, first, aimed against those who propose that being is multiple. Zeno is, according to the ἀντιγραφή interpretation, understood to be (1) against multiplicity and therefore (2) indirectly for unity. This establishes Zeno's aim. Second, the refutation is achieved by drawing contradictory attributes or consequents from the subject under consideration – the many. This establishes how his method works. Zeno's method had been, according to the ἀντιγραφή group, used ‘to show the clash of contradictory predicates’.Footnote 23
3. AGAINST WHOM PARMENIDES ARGUES
Next we see Proclus presenting Parmenides' own ἀντιγραφή of the second half of the dialogue, against whom (or what) he argues, and the specific character of his discourse (that is, how he ‘responds to’ Zeno). As this text and its interpretation and translation form the centre of my disagreement with the Budé edition,Footnote 24 I will accordingly provide their translation as well and will highlight the words and phrases that are important and pose problems for us (by using underlining and italics in the quotations below):
αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸ ἓν ποιήσασθαι τὴν παντοδαπὴν ταύτην τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐπίδειξιν, ἁμιλλώμενον πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ὄντων γυμνασάμενον, δεικνύντα τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον ἐκείνῳ τὰ ἀντικείμενα περὶ ταὐτόν· (632.3–6)
[Platon] a fait servir, en faveur de l'un, tout cet étalage varié d'arguments, rivalisant avec celui qui s'est exercé contre la multiplicité des êtres en montrant, de la même manière que lui, les contraires à propos de la même chose.
PlatoFootnote 25 produced against the One this display of every sort of argument, contending against those exercising themselves against the plurality of beings, showing in a similar way as he [sc. Zeno] contradictions about the same subject. (trans. mine)
We see that Parmenides is represented as having a similar method to that of Zeno. He achieves the desired refutation by drawing conflicting attributes or consequents from the subject under consideration. We also see that Zeno and Parmenides take opposite subjects for their method (Zeno: the many; Parmenides: the One). These two things are not in dispute.
Crucially, however, according to the Budé's interpretation, the two passages quoted above (631.25–63.6) show that Zeno and Parmenides agree with each other, with both Zeno and Parmenides arguing for the One. The Budé translates πρὸς τὸ ἕν (623.3) as ‘en faveur de l'un’, while I (Morrow–Dillon and Steel) have chosen to interpret it adversarially, ‘against the One’. Both translations are grammatically possible, though the adversarial reading would be more natural, but the determination of the friendly or hostile sense of πρός must be derived from the context.Footnote 26 If we interpret πρός as ‘in favour of the One’, as the Budé does, and so Zeno and Parmenides agree with each other, the Budé was correct in moving the passage. For myself, Steel, Morrow–Dillon and Cousin, in the ἀντιγραφή of Parmenides, Zeno argues against the many, while Parmenides argues against the One. In our account, they are opposed. Which account stands up to scrutiny?
Despite their translation of πρὸς τὸ ἕν (623.3), the Budé editors translate the phrase describing with whom Plato is contending, ἁμιλλώμενον πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ὄντων γυμνασάμενον, as ‘rivalisant avec celui qui s'est exercé contre la multiplicité des êtres'. The sense of this Greek text, as well as how they translate it, is that Parmenides will refute those who fight against the plurality of being. According to this Greek clause, Parmenides should be, logically, for the many and against the One. Putting these two arguments together, however, we find the following in the Budé text:
(1) The group to be refuted are against the many. (They are, thus, indirectly for the One.)
(2) ParmenidesFootnote 27 will refute them (and so must be against the One).
(3) Therefore Parmenides is for (πρός) the One.
This quite obviously makes Proclus' meaning contradictory. On the other hand, my and Steel's interpretation and the Morrow–Dillon translation are internally consistent, simply by following the order as found in the manuscripts:
(1) The group to be refuted are against the many. (They are, thus, indirectly for the One.)
(2) Parmenides will refute them (and so must be against the One).
(3) Therefore Parmenides is against (πρός) the One.
The crux here is to interpret and translate πρός as ‘in favour of’, but if the Budé editors wish to interpret the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή as mimetic (and doing so by moving a large swath of the text), they are bound to interpret and translate it as adversarial. This, however, renders the meaning of the text contradictory.
4. HOW THE PARMENIDEAN METHOD OF AΝΤΙΓΡΑΦH WORKS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
In this section we will examine the ἀντιγραφή's account of Parmenides' method, the understanding of which is uncontroversial. Using this, we can look at how the ἀντιγραφή group compare and contrast Zeno and Parmenides' refutation. Proclus thus describes Zeno's (and indirectly Parmenides') employment of the method and a reassertion of the subject of the method for each party:Footnote 28 ‘As Zeno refuted (ἤλεγχε) the many by showing that they are both alike and unlike, the same and different, equal and unequal, so in the same way (κατὰ τὰ αὐτά) Parmenides shows that the One is like and unlike, not like and not unlike, the same and not the same, different and not different, and so for all the other conflicting things, and not, like Zeno, simply affirming them’ (632.6–11; modified; italics mine). What we read here is this: Zeno hypothesizes the many. The subject under dispute is therefore the many and is here the refutandum. Contradictory or conflicting attributes are drawn from the idea of the many (alike and unlike; same and different, and so on). On the basis of these contradictory things drawn from that subject (the many), the many are refuted. That is, whatever he posits, that thing is refuted.
According to the Budé's interpretation, which artificially places the Parmenides in the mimetic grouping, this is the archetype to be imitated by Parmenides and we should find the same in the second half. Let us look at how the editors interpret it, though: Parmenides posits the One, something not under dispute. Conflicting attributes are drawn from its existence and non-existence and on the basis of these contradictory attributes drawn from that subject (the One), according to the Budé interpretation, the One is substantiated. That is, according to the Budé's understanding of the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides, the second half of our dialogue is an elaborate proof in favour of the One. But in the Budé's interpretation, Parmenides' ‘imitation’ of Zeno does not conform to the way Zeno's method works. If Parmenides were merely imitating Zeno's method, what Parmenides posits – the One – should be refuted. Thus what is not explained by the Budé is how a method that is refutative in Zeno's hands (that is, it refutes whatever is the subject under consideration – the many) becomes a method of positively and directly establishing the subject under consideration in Parmenides' (the One). However, by leaving the disputed passage where it is in all of the manuscripts, the method works the same way with Zeno as it does with Parmenides.
5. PARMENIDES AND ZENO IN HARMONY? THE LOGICAL GYMNASTIC INTERPRETERS AND SYRIANUS AGAINST THE BUDÉ
Apart from the details of the area immediately around this passage, we can learn more about the nature of this Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή later in Proclus' history of interpretations of the Parmenides, where there are no problems with the manuscripts. Above, we saw in the Budé's interpretation that Zeno and Parmenides were in agreement with each other. However, according to Proclus, both the logical γυμνασία group (the second in Proclus' presentation of five) and Syrianus assert that the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides was not valid because of the opposition they posit between Parmenides and Zeno. These later passages show that the Budé's editorial choices render Proclus' text, beyond the disputed passage, internally inconsistent.
The logical γυμνασία group are reported as criticizing the ἀντιγραφή group in the following way: ‘[the ἀντιγραφή group] is inconsistent with [1] the contents because Zeno has [in the logical γυμνασία group's opinion] the same purpose as Parmenides in confuting (καὶ ὁ Ζήνων εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ βλέπων σκοπὸν διήλεγχε) those who ... have no conception of that unity in virtue of which the many are many ... And it is inconsistent with [2a] the persons, for [in the logical γυμνασία group's opinion] it is most incongruous to describe Parmenides and Zeno as lover and beloved, one the teacher and the other a disciple trained by him, and then make the lover and teacher swim through such a sea of controversy against (πρός) his beloved, the person whom he has trained. And it is also most discordant (as one can truly call it) to say that [in the logical γυμνασία group's opinion] [2b] the one [Zeno] had prepared the book he wrote as an aid to Parmenides’ doctrine, while the other [Parmenides] argued against this aid (τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὴν βοήθειαν ἀντιγράφειν) that Zeno had given to him [Parmenides] by working out these numerous arguments' (633.10–634.4; modified). Thus one of the very points of departure of the logical γυμνασία group's criticism of the ἀντιγραφή group is that the latter group assert that Parmenides and Zeno were opposed to one another, in terms of both the content of their positions and their pedagogical relationship. According to the logical γυμνασία group, the ἀντιγραφή interpretation maintained that Parmenides argued against (ἀντιγράφειν ... πρὸς) Zeno's help. That is, Zeno argued against the many (and so for the One) and Parmenides (according to the logical γυμνασία's account of the ἀντιγραφή) argued against that. That is, Parmenides argued against the One (πρὸς τὸ ἕν). The sense of πρός in this latter passage is clearly adversarial and so helps elucidate the proper interpretation of the earlier use. Therefore in Proclus' account of the logical γυμνασία's interpretation of the dialogue, the logical γυμνασία interpreters report that the ἀντιγραφή group opposed Parmenides and Zeno. Yet in the Budé's interpretation of this text discussed above, there is no such opposition. Rather, according to the editors Parmenides, with Zeno, argues ‘en faveur de l'Un’ and thus there is no opposition.
My reading is confirmed again by Syrianus' opinions regarding this same first group of interpreters. According to Proclus, ‘... [Syrianus] dismisses the idea that it [the σκοπός of the dialogue] is an ἀντιγραφή as implausible. That Zeno should ask Parmenides to practise his method before the company and that Parmenides in practising it (γυμνάζειν) should attack (ἀμύνεσθαι) Zeno's treatise is altogether incredible in the light of what has been said’ (640.17–20; modified). Syrianus' point here is that it does not make any sense that Zeno (who endorses the One through the refutation of the many) would be attacked by Parmenides and be refuted by him. From Syrianus' account we can confirm again the correct interpretation of the nature of the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή: Parmenides endorsed the many, he argued against the One and he was not in favour of it. Again, based on this later text, the correct interpretation of Parmenides' ἀντιγραφή is one that opposes Zeno and Parmenides. As we have seen, in the Budé edition, the teacher and student agree with each other, but our editors are forced into this assertion based on their decision to move the passage under discussion. Keep the passage where it is in all the manuscripts, and these later accounts of the ἀντιγραφή group are suddenly unproblematic.
6. BUDÉ IN OPPOSITION TO BUDÉ?
More troubling still, the Budé edition translates the above passage in a puzzling way. Earlier, the ἀντιγραφή of Parmenides was presented as mimetic: Parmenides and Zeno are in unison. Here, however, they translate the ἀντιγραφή undertaken by Parmenides as a ‘réfutation’. This not only confirms that, in Syrianus' estimation of the ἀντιγραφή interpretation and, in an uncorrupted part of the manuscripts, Zeno was attacked by Parmenides; it shows an internal inconsistency in the editors' own presentation of the ἀντιγραφή group. Their interpretation and translation of Syrianus' objections are evidence of the problematic and precipitous editorial choices about the earlier and disputed passage. Accordingly, the Budé was not justified in moving the passage that discusses the Parmenides from the oppositional to the mimetic ἀντιγραφή.
Now that we have cleared up these misunderstandings we can make some general remarks about the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides. As an ἀντιγραφή, the nature of the discourse is determined by the form of discourse chosen. In the Menexenus, it was a funeral oration. In the Parmenides' case, the discourse belonged to Zeno and so was refutative. As an oppositional ἀντιγραφή, we can assert that the second half, through Parmenides, was meant to refute Zeno. Zeno argued against the many (again, this is uncontested); Parmenides argued against the One. Thus we can understand the second half of the Parmenides to be a sort of ἀντιγραφή ad absurdum against (πρός) Zeno and his indirect proof for the utter unity of being. While his method may be able to destroy those who posit the many, thereby proving One-being, Plato via Parmenides can ‘out-do’ him in his response – his ἀντιγραφή – to Zeno. Zeno's Eleatic One suffers from just as many if not more contradictions as what follows from the many using Zeno's own method.
7. THE PARMENIDES AND THE BUDÉ
One final note about the Platonic text at issue here. The hypotheses of the Parmenides are ostensibly the most complicated, most internally contradictory and most contradictory in relation to the Platonic corpus itself. Any interpreter, ancient or modern, or a modern scholar making notes about the ancients, has to account for this. This is, after all, the Schwerpunkt of any interpretation of this dialogue. However, the Budé editors perfunctorily claim that the text of the Parmenides renders a clear verdict that being is one.Footnote 29 Of course, the Parmenides could be interpreted in such a way (as the Neoplatonists did), but surely one cannot use the opposite of the ostensible meaning of a text to help support an argument, at least without a word or two of further elaboration. The same goes for their treatment of the ἀντιγραφή. They present its method of drawing conflicting attributes regarding the existence of the One and its non-existence as a proof in favour of the One. While the conclusion of this dialogue can and has elicited the most varied interpretations, its immediate reading is one that rather places ‘the one’ in doubt, and so Zeno and Parmenides in opposition to one another. This is all to say that the text of the Parmenides also lends itself (at first glance) to an interpretation where ‘the one’ is called into doubt, placing Zeno and Parmenides in opposition to each other.
Perhaps more gravely still, if the result of the hypotheses is that Parmenides, and so Plato, supports the One, this would make this dialogue doctrinal and not a logical exercise. The Budé's artificial rendering of the Parmenides as a mimetic ἀντιγραφή not only makes its account of this critically problematic; it also destroys the whole purpose as to why these ancient interpreters classified it as a mere logical exercise and so non-doctrinal, in the first place. The Budé, after all, asserts that the first two logical gymnastic interpretations (ἀντιγραφή and logical γυμνασία) are incompatible.Footnote 30 It is not so much that it overstates their difference: it is consistent for them, for if one sees the ἀντιγραφή interpretation as providing Platonic doctrine (Zeno argues in favour of the One; so does Parmenides) and the logical γυμνασία (the second interpretation) is a mere training exercise, then, indeed they are incompatible.Footnote 31 If, however, we interpret the ἀντιγραφή as oppositional and thus providing no doctrinal content, the two interpretations do share something – if somewhat minimal – in common. Thus in our interpretation, Proclus' classification also makes more sense.
What we see here, then, is that the Budé edition's relocation of the section of text that deals with the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή is completely misplaced and that the OCT's reading, concurring with the earlier Cousin edition and the unanimous testimony of the manuscripts, should be retained. The first goal of the philologist should be to do no harm, that is, only provide alternative readings of manuscripts when the text cannot possibly make sense as it is. I have shown that the manuscript tradition as we have received it makes perfect sense, and that the Budé's solution renders the area around the problematic passage and in the manuscripts, where there is no corruption, entirely contradictory. Even its own translation of Syrianus' account of the ἀντιγραφή group contradicts its earlier interpretation.
The task of completing a modern critical edition, with translation and notes, is gargantuan. The Budé has had and still has the advantage of employing what was intended as an editio minor of the OCT. Despite obvious vitriol emanating from the former, I maintain that the interaction has had and has the opportunity, wittingly or not, to produce a superior product for scholars of Neoplatonism. Whatever the errors of the OCT, the opportunity to compare different readings can be invaluable, so long as there is not only the Dorian mode which encourages warfare, but also the Phrygian mode of persuasion and being persuaded (Republic 399ab). In this case, the Budé noted but unjustly ignored a different reading of this very long passage. However, on evidence, the Budé's decision to excise the passage that discusses the Parmenides' ἀντιγραφή from one of opposition to imitation seems to be misguided and should be retracted, and the reading presented by the OCT (and Cousin before it) should stand as the correct reading.
