As an alien administration ruling over four million Chinese residents, the colonial government of Hong Kong always had its legitimacy questioned.Footnote 1 Part of this legitimacy rested on its ability to supply clean water to Hong Kong residents via the public Water Authority.Footnote 2 This supply was vital, as only a small number of farmers and industrialists had access to streams or wells.Footnote 3 Owing to meteorological and geological factors, the colony suffered from frequent endemic water shortages. Rain fell on the colony seasonally, mostly in summer and autumn from May to October, leaving the winter months from December to April dry and prone to drought.Footnote 4 The problem was further exacerbated by limited underground water supplies.Footnote 5 During the water emergency of 1963–1964, water was only supplied for four hours every four days. Ultimately, this crisis was resolved through the importation of water from mainland China.Footnote 6
In the broader Cold War context, this water trade held a particular significance, intersecting with questions about Hong Kong’s eventual retrocession to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Hong Kong’s early water policy reflected a drive for self-sufficiency. Dorothy Tang shows how heightening Sino-Hong Kong tensions from the early 1960s to the late 1970s drove the colonial government to pursue water self-sufficiency through the costly expansion of water-supply infrastructure.Footnote 7 However, over time, Hong Kong became increasingly reliant on Chinese water, shifting to a policy of regional interdependence after 1978.Footnote 8 Such growing dependence on Chinese water left the colony strategically vulnerable and provided China with the means to influence the everyday lives of Hong Kong people. For example, Siu-keung Cheung argues that the Dongshen–Hong Kong Water Scheme functioned as a biopolitical strategy. It left Hong Kong subject to “Chinese national hydro-hegemonic control,” while allowing Beijing to demonstrate “the traditional Confucian political ideal of benevolent rule,” thereby enhancing its legitimacy and promoting Chinese nationalism in the colony.Footnote 9 This approach reflected China’s pragmatic approach towards Hong Kong: rather than trying to take over the colony through military control or ideological propagation, the Chinese government prioritized stability, adhering to the policy of “full utilization and long-term planning.”Footnote 10 Viewing Hong Kong as an economic asset and a valuable window to the world, Beijing’s approach to the colony was often classified by scholars as “highly practical,” “pragmatic” and “accommodative.”Footnote 11 Tangible and instrumental assistance, such as water, agrarian support and education, was often offered to solicit public support in Hong Kong.Footnote 12
While existing scholarship has primarily examined the China–Hong Kong water trade and its alignment with China’s broader Hong Kong policy, the shifting perceptions, reasoning and policy choices that guided the colonial administration’s handling of water issues are less understood. Existing literature acknowledges that the colonial government’s approach to China was characterized by “firmness without provocation.”Footnote 13 With the decline of the British Empire and the scaling down of the garrison after the Korean War, Hong Kong was militarily indefensible, and its internal stability and external security rested on China’s will to maintain the colony’s status quo.Footnote 14 Hong Kong’s heavy reliance on the supply of water and food from the mainland left it even more vulnerable.Footnote 15 However, how British officials conceptualized vulnerability, risk and interdependence in relation to water in response to changing geopolitics remains underexplored. The influence of other factors, such as changing public attitudes towards water consumption, economic considerations and specific local and global developments, notably the 1967 riots and Middle East oil crisis, has rarely been integrated into this analysis. These dynamics can help us to gain a better understanding of how the colonial regime adjusted its water security strategy – balancing reliance on China with strengthening domestic resilience – amid profound regional and global transformations.
Using underexplored archival materials housed in both Hong Kong and London, this article examines Hong Kong’s evolving attitudes towards Chinese water, particularly between 1967 and 1982. In 1967, amid the leftist-inspired riots, the water supply was severely interrupted due to a lack of rainfall, insufficient storage and uncertainties over China’s supply. The 1967 water emergency raised concerns that Beijing had departed from its former “pragmatic” approach and exposed how communication breakdowns with the PRC authorities could abruptly jeopardize water supplies to Hong Kong. This article argues that such political uncertainties, along with changing water consumption patterns and public opinion, led the colonial government to recalibrate its approach, shifting from a policy of manageable dependency in 1960–1966 to one of risk aversion in 1967–1976. An “insurance” water policy in the form of the Lok On Pai desalination plant 樂安排海水化淡廠, which sought to guarantee a minimal but reliable water supply during crises, was developed to manage vulnerabilities. Only after 1976 did this cautious stance begin to give way to a more flexible and regionally integrated strategy. This article reveals why a strategy of pragmatic regional accommodation was gradually implemented from 1976 and why the water insurance policy officially ended in 1982. Such a strategic shift was determined not only by improved Sino-British relations but also by increased public intolerance of water rationing and rising oil prices – domestic and international factors which are under-investigated.
Background to the Hong Kong–China Water Agreement
The idea of importing water from China to Hong Kong can be traced back to the immediate post-war period. The notion that the Shenzhen River 深圳河, which lay just across the border and was “full of fresh drinking water,” could serve as a viable “new channel of water supply” first emerged in colonial correspondence after the 1954 drought.Footnote 16 This idea was further catalysed in 1955–1956 when Hong Kong’s Public Works Department acknowledged that implementing water rationing and relying on existing local reservoirs could no longer meet rising water demand.Footnote 17 By 1960, the Far Eastern Department assessed that local sources of water could, at most, sustain a supply of four hours per day, except during the wet seasons; this ongoing shortage was expected to persist for eight years and beyond.Footnote 18 In January, Governor Robert Black acknowledged that it was necessary to explore the possibility of importing water from China: “Since [the] need for additional water is undeniable, so long as the terms on which this water could be supplied have not even been explored, the Government’s position would be indefensible to communists and non-communists alike.”Footnote 19 However, Black pointed out that Chinese water should only be accepted if it did not involve absolute dependence and if the proportion of external to domestic supplies could be reduced progressively. The exchange should also be presented as a commercial transaction.Footnote 20 The secretary of state then recommended that any approach to the Chinese government be guided by an assessment of its motives.Footnote 21 In other words, the dependability of Chinese water would hinge on Beijing’s intentions. The British and colonial governments were aware that the PRC government could use the water trade as political propaganda and to increase its political representation in Hong Kong.Footnote 22 China could also “in theory cut off supplies for political reasons.” However, these actions could only be undertaken “at the cost of local political odium and loss of foreign exchange,” which Black considered unlikely.Footnote 23
Guided by these principles and beliefs, in November 1960, Hong Kong and Guangdong province signed their first water supply agreement, under which Guangdong would deliver up to 5,000 million gallons of raw water annually from the Shenzhen Reservoir, subject to sufficient rainfall, at a rate of HK\$0.234 per 1,000 gallons.Footnote 24 The cost of this water was cheap, with the government charging consumers HK$1 per 1,000 gallons, compared with HK\$2 per 1,000 gallons for water from Plover Cove and an estimated HK$5 per 1,000 gallons for water produced by the desalination plant.Footnote 25 Between December 1960 and March 1963, Hong Kong imported approximately 17,665 million gallons of water from China.Footnote 26 During the water emergency in 1963, the colonial government acknowledged that “the East River pipeline does not present a satisfactory solution.”Footnote 27 Further, since the Sino-Hong Kong exchange in 1960 was “remarkably cordial,” Black considered the political risks of engaging in water diplomacy with China to be low.Footnote 28 It seemed unlikely that China would use water diplomacy as a premise to request increased political representation in Hong Kong or to demand the resumption of through trains from Guangzhou.Footnote 29 Following the water emergency in 1963–1964, Hong Kong and China signed a long-term agreement in April 1964, under which Hong Kong would receive 15,000 million gallons of water from China annually at a cost of HK$1.06 per 1,000 gallons.Footnote 30 At a meeting with the representatives of the People’s Council of Guangdong Province on 10 November 1966, it was agreed that China would provide the Hong Kong Waterworks Office with additional water from the East River (Dongjiang 东江) from July to September, provided that the Hong Kong officials gave at least one month’s notice of their monthly requirements.Footnote 31
The water agreement reflected Britain’s strategic thinking that, under normal circumstances, Chinese economic considerations would weigh heavily against their interference in Hong Kong’s present status.Footnote 32 This view was reinforced by China’s large annual trade surplus: Hong Kong imported more from China than it exported/re-exported back to China.Footnote 33 In the first half of the 1960s, Chinese exports in Hong Kong accounted for over 90 per cent of the annual two-way trade. Part of this surplus also came from remittances sent by overseas Chinese through Hong Kong. These funds were regularly converted into sterling and played a crucial role in financing the PRC’s trade deficits with countries in Western Europe, Canada and Australia.Footnote 34 Although the sales of water contributed only about 0.7 per cent of China’s total exports to Hong Kong,Footnote 35 these broader economic interdependencies reassured British authorities that Beijing had a strong incentive to maintain a steady supply of water to the colony, thereby rationalizing this “manageable” dependence on Chinese water.
Communication Breakdowns in 1967
In 1967, the thinking that China would continue to provide a steady flow of water to Hong Kong changed. That year proved to be a “particular trial for [the] Water Authority,” which had to contend with labour strikes as well as severe drought conditions. The period from August 1966 to June 1967 was “the driest ever recorded.”Footnote 36 Total recorded rainfall in 1967 was significantly lower than usual: only 1,570.6 mm, compared to 2,352.6 mm in 1965 and 2,398.2 mm in 1966.Footnote 37 Water rationing was already in place in February, several months before the outbreak of industrial disputes in May.Footnote 38
As the water situation deteriorated, on 23 May 1967, the acting director of water supplies, A.S. Robertson, invoked the agreement to request an additional 2,000 million gallons of water in July from the People’s Council.Footnote 39 In the 1960s, as Sino-British diplomatic relations had not been formalized, Sino-Hong Kong communications were largely conducted through the New China News Agency (NCNA) and officials in Guangdong.Footnote 40 Thus, the request was made first in a telephone call to Tan Kan 譚干 at the NCNA, and then followed up with a letter.Footnote 41 China had fulfilled its agreed supply of 15,000 million gallons for the nine-month period ending in June, as well as an additional 1,800 million gallons under the supplementary agreement of November 1966. However, by 26 June, the NCNA officials had not responded to the May request for additional water; instead, they told the director of water supplies that they were “still awaiting instructions.”Footnote 42 On 29 June, Robertson wrote to Tan again, providing the NCNA with a formal one-month’s notice, expecting him to forward the request to the Guangdong authorities. In this letter, Robertson requested another 2,000 million gallons of water in August.Footnote 43
Despite the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, when this breakdown of communication occurred in May, the Far Eastern Department still believed there was no evidence that China was planning to take over Hong Kong: “it was considered unlikely that the Chinese would cut off water and fresh food as this would harm the Chinese population [in Hong Kong].”Footnote 44 Governor David Trench was also convinced that the risk of China cutting off Hong Kong’s water and food supplies should not be overstated.Footnote 45 Selling water to Hong Kong provided China with approximately £1.5 million of foreign exchange annually. The stoppage of the water supply was, therefore, considered unlikely, given the adverse political and economic consequences for the PRC.Footnote 46
In June, the colonial government further reduced the supply hours to four hours on alternate days. The water situation was deteriorating. With consumption at 120 million gallons per day and remaining stores of only 3,221 million gallons in late June, Hong Kong could not maintain its daily supply without additional water from the East River.Footnote 47 On 12 July, the Foreign Office checked with Donald Hopson, the British chargé d’affaires, about how the Chinese might respond to a direct request to Beijing for water supplies. Hopson, however, believed it was “not a good moment” to raise this matter due to the internal political turmoil in China. He believed that it might be wise to keep water discussions at the provincial level.Footnote 48
In mid-July, the colony’s water storage was at a critical point. Normally, reservoirs would be about 70 to 80 per cent full by this time; however, in 1967, they were only 20 per cent full.Footnote 49 From 13 July, water was only supplied for four hours every fourth day, with resettlement areas with communal water supplies receiving four hours of supply on alternate days.Footnote 50 Colonial officials were aware that a serious problem could occur if the rains failed and China refused to provide additional water supplies.Footnote 51 Trench began to fear that China’s strategy had changed and that it would not miss a “golden opportunity” to leave Hong Kong in a “waterless” situation.Footnote 52 With increased political uncertainty, the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee even suggested that the British should be prepared to consider withdrawal after a period of Chinese pressure, as there was “little point in waiting for final disintegration.”Footnote 53
On 22 July, the colonial government’s attempts to send a letter through “technical channels at the border” failed.Footnote 54 The only official response Hong Kong received was a defensive report published by the NCNA, which blamed the colonial government for the water situation.Footnote 55 In public, the colonial government still maintained that China would honour its agreement. Yet, in private, colonial bureaucrats started preparing for potential stoppages.Footnote 56 Trench believed that if no reply were forthcoming, he would have to send another letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a simple request to transmit it or deliver it directly to Beijing.Footnote 57 On 24 July, A.M.J. Wright, the director of Public Works, escalated the matter and wrote to the director of the East River Water Supply Project Administration Bureau, reiterating Hong Kong’s request.Footnote 58 By early August, according to the governor, the Chinese officials had ignored all water requests from Hong Kong.Footnote 59
Trench continued to believe that these communication breakdowns could be due to the ongoing disorder in the PRC under the Cultural Revolution: “it may become increasingly difficult for Peking to exercise firm control over local communist hotheads, both here and in Kwangtung.”Footnote 60 According to the South China Morning Post, the 147th army had taken full control of the Guangdong–Shenzhen railway and had moved to the East River region.Footnote 61 The East River water projects were also subjected to frequent guerrilla attacks by local communists loyal to Tao Zhu 陶鑄. It was also speculated that the Guangdong Command of the People’s Liberation Army was reluctant, or unable, to respond to Hong Kong’s request for water, as it was uncertain about the security situation in the water project area, which had been under attack.Footnote 62 Colonial bureaucrats also suspected that Beijing was undecided on how to handle the situation, possibly due to “growing confusion in China.”Footnote 63 While these circumstances could potentially explain the prolonged silence from the Chinese authorities, they did little to ease the anxiety of the colonial government.
Political Uncertainty and Mounting Domestic Pressures
But why was the 1967 water emergency more of a concern for the colonial government than earlier droughts? By 1967, Hong Kong had become far more urbanized and population density had increased from 2,902 people per square kilometre in 1961 to 3,468 people per square kilometre in 1966.Footnote 64 As Wright had rightly pointed out in 1963, “when the population was under one million persons … it was an inconvenience, but of no great significance”; however, with the rapid population increase, “the inherent dangers of a major water shortage are, to put it mildly, frightening.”Footnote 65 In May 1967, it was estimated that the reservoir had just 4,422 million gallons of water left, the lowest since the 1963–64 water emergency. If the drought continued, Hong Kong’s water would run out in less than 60 days.Footnote 66 With water rationing in place, residents had to cope with the sweltering weather and inconvenience; no one was exempt from this “sordid time.”Footnote 67
The unrest among local leftists further compounded the government’s concern. In May, labour disputes in shipping, textile, cement and artificial flower companies led to demonstrations. Pro-Beijing trade unions were involved. The demonstrations soon erupted into violent confrontations between pro-Beijing leftists and the colonial government.Footnote 68 After the NCNA became radicalized, it issued a dispatch requesting an immediate cancellation of the water restrictions.Footnote 69 In the summer of 1967, local left-wing newspapers frequently exploited the water emergency to attack the colonial government.Footnote 70 Between May and October 1967, Ta Kung Pao highlighted “water rationing” in 28 separate reports, with 11 reports each in July and August, demonstrating how the water shortage was exploited to fuel public discontent during the riots; 23 of these reports appeared on pages three to five, with one report on the front page, indicating that the topic was considered significant enough to feature prominently in the main news sections.Footnote 71 Many reports used politically charged language. For example, in July, Ta Kung Pao accused the colonial government of stirring anti-China sentiments in Hong Kong by imposing severe water restrictions.Footnote 72 The idea that the 1967 water emergency was a deliberate “political conspiracy” cooked up by the colonial government to “create artificial tensions” among residents became a constant theme in left-wing newspapers in the summer of 1967.Footnote 73 The government’s inability to maintain a stable supply of piped water threatened to undermine its legitimacy, leaving it vulnerable to increased leftist criticism.
In addition, by 1967, water-intensive industries, particularly the textile sector, accounted for a significant share of Hong Kong’s exports. Garments represented over 60 per cent of all textile exports and 35 per cent of all Hong Kong products; manufactured textiles accounted for 52 per cent of all Hong Kong’s exported products. More importantly, the finishing sector, which comprised primarily water-intensive processes such as dyeing and bleaching, employed more than 40 per cent of the workforce engaged in manufacturing. Any large reduction in textile production, therefore, would be “most serious,” affecting “the entire economy adversely probably to a marked degree,” and would in turn undermine Hong Kong’s political stability.Footnote 74 These economic and political pressures made the situation more precarious.
Uncertainties surrounding China’s water policy added further confusion and tensions to the situation. Back in early June, the Commonwealth Office assessed that there was no evidence that the PRC’s policy towards Hong Kong had changed or that Beijing was responsible for instigating “the present troubles.” Instead, intelligence suggested that Beijing was “undecided about how to handle the situation,” an impasse which reflected “the conflicting pressures on the central authorities.” However, such indecision could potentially trigger more actions by local extremists.Footnote 75 Although several factors supported the original pragmatic policy of the PRC government – primarily foreign exchange earnings and how people in Hong Kong “reacted with surprising firmness to communist action” – the Cultural Revolution called for a more radical anti-colonial policy. Under such circumstances, it was possible that local leftists might engage in actions that were “against the wishes of central authorities.”Footnote 76 With food strikes being called by local leftists and further food cuts threatened in late June, the colonial government became increasingly anxious.Footnote 77 In August, colonial bureaucrats became extremely concerned as “the first case of China breaking a contract,” which “may be of importance in connection with water,” emerged. The Hong Kong and China Gas Company had been told that China would renege on a contract to supply 50,000 tonnes of coal, of which only 20,000 tonnes had been provided. According to the Foreign Office, this could be “a precedent for China also to renege on water.”Footnote 78 These developments fuelled suspicions that Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Hong Kong might be shifting, further nurturing scepticism.
Despite China’s substantial foreign exchange earnings from Hong Kong, the British government in London believed it could not rule out any extreme actions by Beijing, given the volatility of the Cultural Revolution. At that time, it appeared that Beijing would continue to encourage local communists to maintain their present campaigns against the colonial government and to use violent methods, although direct intervention was unlikely.Footnote 79 The Defence Review Working Party also recognized that while most local Chinese were still on the colonial government’s side, tensions could escalate rapidly following any incident.Footnote 80 Although the temporary cutting off of water supplies alone would not make the colonial government “untenable,” if these pressures were “applied systematically over [a] prolonged period,” they would definitely threaten the colony’s survival, and the colonial bureaucrats would “be forced to withdraw in an atmosphere of animosity.”Footnote 81
Political Anxieties and Rising Water Demands
Amid growing concerns that China would not resume water supplies on 1 October, various government investigations looked to secure alternative sources “at maximum levels.”Footnote 82 Proposals to operate a tanker operation to Manila, Taiwan and Japan were explored but were ultimately deemed infeasible due to the high cost and time involved.Footnote 83 Fortunately, the water situation improved owing to the timely arrival of Tropical Storm Kate, which temporarily led to the restoration of a 24-hour supply of water after 22 August. However, it was only when the PRC resumed its water supplies (without prior notice) on 1 October that Hong Kong’s water crisis was fully resolved.
The colonial government’s anxieties did not subside completely with the resumption of the water supply. From November 1967 to January 1968, China refused to accept payment for the water because Hong Kong, deeming it too risky, refused to send a foreman to the Man Kam To Bridge 文錦渡橋 to reconcile the account.Footnote 84 According to the water agreement, at the beginning of each month, the Hong Kong and Shenzhen water authorities should certify each other’s statements of supply for the previous month. This exchange of suggestions and documents “has traditionally been done at Man Kam To,” even though it was not a legal requirement.Footnote 85 Using the closure of the bridge as an excuse, Shenzhen’s water authorities blocked Hong Kong’s water-payment process.Footnote 86 The Bank of China also rejected Hong Kong’s water payment in November 1967.Footnote 87 Another cheque sent on 9 December by registered post was similarly returned, with the bank claiming that the water charges statement “had not been reconciled with the statement prepared by the Administration Bureau of the East River/Shum Chun Water Project.”Footnote 88 Colonial bureaucrats were worried that “in the long run they may use this pretext to make serious trouble about water.”Footnote 89 These routine disputes over water payments in late 1967 and 1968 reflected the Shenzhen authorities’ uncertainties about how to handle the water payments, rather than a directive by higher-level authorities in Beijing. This demonstrated to the Hong Kong government that China’s water policy was implemented at a local level and was not concrete, further heightening concerns. The colonial government also realized that a secure water supply was closely linked with its legitimacy. If water rationing had to be implemented because Chinese water was unavailable due to “outstanding technical differences,” “any part of the responsibility for which can be made appears to be ours,” which could trigger widespread “public antipathy even without communist prompting.”Footnote 90
In 1967, the Hong Kong government expressed its hope to plan its water resources so that a daily four-hour supply of water, which it deemed to be the bare minimum in the long run, could be guaranteed independently of Chinese water.Footnote 91 In fact, following the 1963–1964 water emergency, a Water Resources Survey Unit was established to plan for a continuous 24-hour supply of water under conditions of average rainfall, and no less than four hours daily during severe drought, with special reference to the period 1970–1980.Footnote 92 The extended water supply hours between 1964 and 1967 further encouraged the government to accelerate the implementation of this plan. From 1 September 1964, the Hong Kong government was able to provide a 24-hour supply on 897 consecutive days. Only on 15 February 1967 was the water supply reduced to 15 hours a day.Footnote 93 Due to the increased water supply hours, in 1966, the colonial government already anticipated that rationing would be “much less frequent” in the future: “The public will become unaccustomed to having to accept restrictions, and the Executive Council will become unaccustomed to making decisions to impose restrictions. This may mean the public and the Executive Council will be more reluctant to accept the need for rationing in future than they have in the past.”Footnote 94
The higher sanitary standards in newly constructed housing also made residents less tolerant of water rationing and raised expectations that a basic level of utilities could be provided by the government. For example, in 1957, only half of the floors in tenement buildings had a tap and just one-third had a bath.Footnote 95 However, sanitary standards had improved since then, and so people were using more water. Therefore, it would “not be possible to explain the need for rationing in the manner of the past,” and a more stable water supply system should be developed.Footnote 96
Prompted by changing water consumption patterns, the escalating water crisis and political tensions in 1967, many newspapers started to caution against an overreliance on Chinese water. The Times argued that “naturally Hong Kong has added reason for anxiety over this source of water” because it was “a time of undisguised political confrontation with the communist mainland.”Footnote 97 One reader even wrote to the Star newspaper that it was “fatal to expect heavy downpours in the coming weeks” and “equally disastrous to hope that the mainland authorities will sell us more water,” especially since such negotiations would have to be with “the rioters, strikers, trouble-makers and other agitators.” The reader went on to suggest that this “hardship” could only be resolved “with the aid of scientific desalination.”Footnote 98 However, some argued that such caution was “wasteful and illogical” as Hong Kong was already dependent on Chinese water.Footnote 99 Despite these divergent views, public discourse highlighted the vulnerability of Hong Kong’s water security, especially at a time when demand was growing rapidly. In 1970, the government estimated that water consumption was likely to increase at a rate of 8 per cent per annum.Footnote 100 To meet rising public expectations and guard against future disruptions, the government needed to ensure a reliable basic local water supply.
Seeking Water “Insurance”: The Desalination Plant
Reckoning with the political situation and lack of rainfall in 1967, the colonial government realized that it “must plan now for the possibility of inadequate storage and no Chinese water.”Footnote 101 According to the Commonwealth secretary, Herbert Bowden, although local leftists were responsible for Hong Kong’s disturbances and incidents on the border, Beijing had been “giving [them] full moral support.”Footnote 102 As Dick White (later revealed to be the head of MI6 at that time) had argued, such an approach could be interpreted as encouraging a sustained revolutionary movement in Hong Kong, even though the PRC was not ready to launch a direct intervention.Footnote 103 These security concerns prompted the colonial government to work towards a minimal contingency water reserve as “insurance” to guarantee a basic supply in the event of an emergency or disruption: “a limited daily supply would be maintained, without water from China, even in periods of drought.”Footnote 104
Earlier, in 1963, Wright had proposed that “there is a good case for part of our water supplies to be obtained by desalination simply as an insurance policy,” which could prevent the severe water stoppages that had become routine in the previous 15 years.Footnote 105 Although it was acknowledged that the problem of future water supplies would likely not be solved by desalination, it could at least provide Hong Kong with a “basic ration.”Footnote 106 However, the nuclear and non-nuclear desalination proposals were not implemented at that time for two main reasons: 1) the cost of producing water by this means was high and cheaper conventional sources were available; and 2) desalination plants “on the scale proposed” were “untried and untested.”Footnote 107 In addition, there were political and security considerations regarding the construction of a nuclear reactor in Hong Kong. In the Colonial Office’s consultations with the Foreign Office in 1965, it was pointed out that building a reactor in the colony risked exposing sensitive nuclear technology to Beijing. Furthermore, there were concerns that the Chinese seizure of the reactor would grant them access to fissile material.Footnote 108 At the time, the construction of a desalter was considered the least preferred option for augmenting Hong Kong’s water supply,Footnote 109 and discussion and calls for bids for a desalination plant soon “became dormant.” In April 1966, the government decided “not to go ahead” but stated that the desalination plan might be reviewed in a few years’ time.Footnote 110 Subsequently, the Water Resources Survey Unit prioritized investigating other, more conventional means of increasing water supply, such as raising the Plover Cove dam and developing untapped catchment areas in the Sai Kung 西貢 peninsula as reservoirs.Footnote 111
However, following the 1967 water emergency, the colonial government restarted “their enquiries about the possibilities of a desalination plant”Footnote 112 as an “insurance policy.”Footnote 113 In particular, the Foreign Office “would be very happy to see any method used for reducing Hong Kong’s dependence on China for water supplies.”Footnote 114 Initially, other, less conventional options to augment the water supply were considered and tested. For example, cloud seeding was tried six times, but the experiment only led to a splatter of rain because of the wet and misty nature of the clouds in Hong Kong.Footnote 115 The government also attempted, unsuccessfully, to import water from neighbouring countries.Footnote 116 Having weighed all these options, the director of Public Works recommended revisiting the “possibility of limited desalination” alongside the development of conventional supply schemes.Footnote 117 This time, the proposal was endorsed by officials in Hong Kong and London, particularly those with a vested interest in Hong Kong’s industries. For example, one unofficial Legislative councillor, P.Y. Tang, who ran the South Sea Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd., argued that the government “should consider adopting without further delay, a policy for a certain portion … of our needs to be met by desalination,” which would “allow us a margin of insurance, a safeguard against the shortages of rainfall or other causes.”Footnote 118 Robertson also believed that Hong Kong should “enter the desalination age at the right time – not too early, not too late.”Footnote 119 Even in London, the prime minister, the Ministry of Technology, Ministry of Overseas Development and the Atomic Energy Authorities were “all very interested in the prospects for desalination in Hong Kong.”Footnote 120
The commitment to the desalination scheme would offer Hong Kong an insurance option of an additional local water source independent of rainfall uncertainties and Cold War tensions, at a foreseeable lower cost: “It seems likely, however, that before long there will come a stage when the exploitation of conventional sources in Hong Kong will become increasingly expensive and the cost margin in their favour will narrow to a point at which the higher cost of desalination will be more than off-set by the advantage of being independent of the vagaries of the annual rainfall and Chinese supplies.”Footnote 121
The long-term plan was that Hong Kong would be able to provide a daily four-hour supply of water independent of both Chinese water and rainfall – in other words, the basic ration.Footnote 122 Earlier, in June 1967, the private secretary, O.G. Foster, also concluded that “installation of a reactor need not be denied on security reasons” since information and materials were likely to reach China within the project’s timeline anyway.Footnote 123 Cheap oil prices in the late 1960s and early 1970s were also an important economic factor shaping Hong Kong’s turn towards desalination. By 1972, the estimated cost of desalted water was about HK$5.50 per 1,000 gallons.Footnote 124 Although this was higher than the cost of local water and imported Chinese water, which were about HK\$1.45 and HK\$2 per 1,000 gallons (after being treated) respectively in 1971,Footnote 125 it was believed that once larger units of desalters had been built, the price of desalted water could be brought down.Footnote 126 Motivated by these factors, the Lok On Pai desalter, which required 200 tonnes of oil a day to provide up to 40 million gallons of freshwater, was constructed and commissioned in 1975.Footnote 127 The project traded the risks of importing water from China for a dependency on what was then thought to be a steady flow of cheap oil from the Persian Gulf, thereby providing Hong Kong with an “insurance” option.
From Managing Vulnerability to Accepting Regionalism
To manage potential vulnerabilities and ensure the supply of a basic ration between 1967 and 1976, the Water Authority was “naturally reluctant to rely on sources of water other than those directly under its own control” such as the reservoirs and desalters. The local system, therefore, should be designed to “provide a given level of supply in times of drought without Chinese water.”Footnote 128 The aggregated total expenditure on water supply demonstrates the government’s pursuit of a water insurance policy. There was significant investment in ensuring basic water security and constructing water infrastructure, such as a single-purpose desalting plant, reservoirs, pumping stations and dams (see Table 1).Footnote 129 Non-recurrent spending in the early 1970s increased largely owing to the construction of Lok On Pai, which finally began in 1971. These figures, however, do not capture a major loan provided by the Asian Development Bank to fund the desalter (about $121.5 million).Footnote 130 With this external loan, Hong Kong was able to spread the rising capital costs over time, rather than paying the full amount upfront. Therefore, the official non-recurrent expenditure in 1967–1971 was lower than that in the 1964–1966 period, when key water projects like Plover Cove and Shek Pik 石壁 were developed.Footnote 131 The non-recurrent expenditure only reduced significantly in 1977–1978 after the completion of the High Island Reservoir.Footnote 132
Estimated Total Expenditure on Local Water Infrastructure, 1964–1978
Table 1 Long description
Yearly non-recurrent water expenditure is listed in million HKD for 1964 through 1978. Values are 165.4 in 1964, 190.5 in 1965, 145.1 in 1966, 87.8 in 1967, 67.3 in 1968, and 30.4 in 1969. Spending then rises to 72.8 in 1970, 119.6 in 1971, 266.3 in 1972, 371.3 in 1973, and 483.1 in 1974. After 1974, values are 295.5 in 1975, 268.4 in 1976, 147.0 in 1977, and 138.3 in 1978. The lowest value in the series is 30.4 in 1969 and the highest is 483.1 in 1974.
Notes: Non-recurrent water expenditure was the cost incurred by the waterworks section of the Public Works Department for planning, surveying and building new infrastructure, including pipelines, pumping stations and reservoirs. This amount was separate from the annual cost of supplying water to the colony, which was otherwise labelled as recurrent expenditure.
Such a risk-averse attitude persisted until the mid-1970s. In 1973, water from the PRC, which was given the status of “a resource not to be relied upon,” was still limited to under 30 per cent of the planned supply to mitigate the risk of failing to meet the basic ration.Footnote 133 This criterion remained in 1975 despite the improved Sino-British-Hong Kong relations in the early 1970s: “even [though] conditions might have changed sufficiently to justify a higher reliance on water from China,” with the experience of the 1967 water emergency in mind, “the status assigned to Chinese water should remain unchanged.”Footnote 134 In January 1976, the secretary for the environment, J.J. Robson, still demonstrated caution and asserted that “the crux of the problem” was “how China’s intention in this matter can be ascertained and to what extent this supply should be limited in relation to the quantity of water which is consumed.”Footnote 135 This statement reflects that the inherited scepticism towards China since 1967 continued to affect official attitudes towards Chinese water in the mid-1970s.
However, in early 1976, as the Cultural Revolution was losing momentum, the Water Resources Policy Committee was assigned the task of obtaining a new agreement with China.Footnote 136 In the same year, the Executive Council acknowledged Chinese water as a “valuable asset in the shorter term.”Footnote 137 However, as either party could terminate the existing agreement before 1 October in any year, the Water Authority still classified Chinese water as “unreliable.”Footnote 138 From March 1976, further approaches were made to the Guangdong authorities regarding increasing water supply, signifying a shift towards regional accommodation, that is, Hong Kong’s water supply should be managed within the broader South China context rather than being treated as a self-contained system. The Guangdong authorities verbally agreed to increase water supply from 24,000 million gallons to 30,000 million gallons per year.Footnote 139 In May 1976, the Guangdong authorities agreed “in principle” to supply 37,000 million gallons per year “in the long term.”Footnote 140 This development marked a shift to greater reliance on water imported from Guangdong. Following this agreement, the Executive Council prioritized purchasing water from the PRC to augment Hong Kong’s water supply, while the construction of additional desalination plants was relegated to the least-favoured option.Footnote 141
From late 1976, the end of the Cultural Revolution and improved Sino-Hong Kong relations led to further changes in the government’s attitudes towards the PRC and its water. According to Governor Murray MacLehose, the death of Mao Zedong 毛泽东 in particular brought many “reassuring” “surprises,” and there seemed to be growing indications that Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong “remains unaffected.” However, since this was only “the beginning of a period of adjustment in China,” which might be “prolonged,” Hong Kong should remain cautious.Footnote 142 The Water Supplies Department, meanwhile, recommended accepting Chinese water as “reliable,” in the short term, to address shortfalls.Footnote 143 Economic considerations also propelled Hong Kong towards a greater dependence on Chinese water, as conventional low-cost methods for increasing supply were nearly exhausted. In late 1977, the secretary for economic affairs proposed that “priority should be given to China as the most desirable and probably the cheapest source of water supplies.” Furthermore, the plan of constructing a reservoir in Tolo Harbour, which could provide storage of 29,700 million gallons of water but would incur a capital cost of HK$2,100 million, should “only come into the picture” if adequate supplies could not be obtained from China at a reasonable price.Footnote 144 The Executive Council also pointed out that, “in view of the improved relationship with China” and the availability of permanent facilities on both sides, consideration should now be given to approaching the PRC authorities to secure a water agreement that covered a longer period of time, which would then enable Chinese water “to be considered ‘reliable’ for planning purposes.”Footnote 145 By contrast, increasing supply via conventional methods, such as developing additional catchments or creating reservoirs, was no longer feasible on a large scale, as all viable sites had already been used.Footnote 146
In May 1978, after reviewing Hong Kong’s future water resources, both the Executive Council and the governor stated that the PRC authorities should now be approached with a view to meeting the colony’s future water demand.Footnote 147 In August, following an official request from Hong Kong for an additional supply of Chinese water to meet the shortfall of 1994–1995, a water agreement between Hong Kong and Guangdong was finally formalized: the PRC would increase its annual water supply to Hong Kong from 136 million cubic metres to 182 million cubic metres (the equivalent to 29,920 million gallons and 40,040 million gallons).Footnote 148 In September, R.J.T. McLaren and W.E. Quantrill observed that there was “increasing Chinese interest, and benevolence towards Hong Kong.”Footnote 149 In October, Hong Kong entered into another supply agreement with the Guangdong authorities: water supply would increase incrementally from 1983 onwards to reach a total of 620 million cubic metres by 1995.Footnote 150 The cost of Chinese water under these agreements was about HK$0.41 per cubic metre, which was considered economically “reasonable” compared to alternative means of local supply.Footnote 151 After 1978, non-recurrent expenditure on water infrastructure was concentrated on the construction of pipelines, generators and pumping stations linking reservoirs in Guangdong to Hong Kong. This upgrade in infrastructure on both sides of the border was carried out in three phases over a ten-year period under the “Future increase of water from China” scheme, designed to meet the increase in supply as agreed in 1978.Footnote 152 These developments signified Hong Kong’s shift to regionalism. They committed the colony to a long-term supply arrangement and established a precedent in which water supplies from China increased annually, rather than remaining at a fixed amount.
By the early 1980s, the public’s increased expectations regarding water supply led the government to abandon Hong Kong’s water insurance policy. In 1980, the Executive Council made the following assessment when discussing whether water rationing should be implemented on Hong Kong Island:
Any form of restriction on a geographical basis would be embarrassing to Government and difficult to explain to the public … Even if the reasons for imposing water restrictions are explained, the general public is likely to be highly critical of [the] Government for its failure to foresee the possibility of such a situation arising and for not constructing additional pumping stations to boost the cross-harbour water supply.Footnote 153
The earlier notion of providing a basic ration of water supply – originally conceived as an insurance strategy – was clearly insufficient to meet the modern needs and expectations of the public, who had now grown more accepting of dependence on Chinese water. By the early 1980s, water rationing had become politically and socially unacceptable, paving the way for the adoption of long-term regional water solutions.
These developments coincided with events in the Middle East that caused oil prices to rocket.Footnote 154 In October 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke out. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) subsequently imposed an oil embargo on Israel’s supporters, throwing global markets into turmoil. Oil prices quadrupled, doubling the operational costs of producing water at Lok On Pai. In 1975, desalinated water had a minimum unit cost of HK\$10–12 per 1,000 gallons, while water from Guangdong cost only HK\$3–5 per 1,000 gallons, depending on supply.Footnote 155 By 1978, it was estimated that the cost of producing desalinated water by reverse osmosis was now “exorbitantly high” at HK$14.11 per 1,000 gallons.Footnote 156 This significantly diminished “the attraction of the (desalting) scheme.”Footnote 157 As a result, since its inauguration, Lok On Pai only produced desalinated water twice: once between 1976 and 1978 and once again between October 1981 and May 1982. The cost to restart water provision in 1981 was particularly high, at HK$35 million.Footnote 158 It was estimated that by 1983, the capital investment needed to supply water from internal sources would be nine times greater than the cost of receiving it from China.Footnote 159 The director of information services, B.R. Johnson, gave the following assessment of the potential public response to this increased cost:
While it will be generally accepted that a contingency plan must be drawn up now because of insufficient rainfall, the public and the news media may question the need to put the desalter into operation because of the very high expenditure involved … The Government may also be accused of failure to make long-term plans to remove the threat of water restrictions and for wasting public funds on the desalter.Footnote 160
In May 1981, the Executive Council debated whether the operation of the desalter should be discontinued following “misgivings expressed in the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council about the high cost” involved.Footnote 161 By 1982, Lok On Pai desalter was finally decommissioned. Since existing local water sources could no longer meet the colony’s increasing water demands and there would be a growing shortfall each year thereafter, it was decided then that Chinese water would become “the most economical and practical source of further resources.”Footnote 162 With the public’s “widespread support” for the importation of Chinese water, the Executive Council reclassified it as “reliable,” marking an official end to the colonial government’s water insurance policy.Footnote 163
Conclusion
This article shows why and how the colonial government recalibrated its approach to water provision, moving from a strategy of manageable dependence in 1960–1966, towards risk aversion after 1967, and then gradually to regional accommodation from 1976. Before 1967, the British administration largely viewed Hong Kong’s reliance on Chinese water as a manageable dependency: the water supply agreement was interpreted as mutually beneficial economically and carried a low political risk. Following the communication breakdown during the 1967 water emergency, coupled with changing water consumption patterns and public opinion, the colonial government’s approach towards Chinese water shifted to one of risk aversion. This recalibration of risk led to increased initiatives to manage vulnerability and seek insurance options that could provide Hong Kong with a “basic ration.” Conceived at a time when cheap oil was readily available from the Middle East, the decision to reconsider and then construct Lok On Pai as an “insurance policy” reflected a subtle shift in the colonial government’s mindset, from an assumption of low-risk interdependence to preparation for potential disruptions.
It was not until 1976, when the Guangdong authorities agreed “in principle” to increase water supply in the long term, that Hong Kong gradually adopted a regional accommodation approach. The formal water agreements between Hong Kong and Guangdong drawn up in 1978 and the construction of cross-border water infrastructure set a precedent for annual increases in water supplies from China and committed Hong Kong to a long-term regional supply arrangement. This gradual strategic shift between 1976 and 1982 was determined not only by improved Sino-British relations but also by changing public expectations and international oil prices. The public’s growing intolerance of water rationing rendered the concept of a “basic ration” obsolete. The closure of the Lok On Pai project due to the Middle East oil crisis was the final straw. By 1982, Chinese water was finally classified as “reliable,” signifying the official end of the “insurance policy.” By revealing how the interplay of political calculations, economic considerations, changing local consumption patterns and international dynamics shaped the colonial administration’s evolving mentality and strategic decisions in water planning, this article illuminates how complex factors beyond Cold War politics underpinned water governance in Hong Kong.
Data availability statement
The data supporting the findings of this study are derived from archival materials held in the National Archives in the United Kingdom and the Public Records Office in Hong Kong. These materials are subject to the access conditions and regulations of the respective archives but can be accessed directly from the archives in accordance with their policies. Details of the sources used are provided in the references and footnotes.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive and insightful feedback. Sincere thanks are also extended to Sahil Bhagat, Charles Fung and Niklas Fung for their excellent research assistance. The author further appreciates the valuable comments and suggestions from Doris Chan, Kelvin Chan, Sam Lai, Adonis Li and Allan Pang. Earlier versions of this work were presented at conferences at Nanyang Technological University in 2023 and 2024, as well as at the Society for Hong Kong Studies Annual Conference held at the University of Hong Kong in June 2024. The author thanks the conference participants for their helpful questions and suggestions.
Funding statement
This research would not have been possible without the generous support of the Nanyang Assistant Professorship start-up fund (award No. 021280-00001). Additional support was provided by the Chiang Ching Kuo Foundation–Asia-Pacific Centre for Chinese Studies Young Scholars Visiting Scheme at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Competing interests
None.
Florence MOK is a Nanyang Assistant Professor of history at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She is a historian of colonial Hong Kong and modern China, with an interest in environmental history, the Cold War and state–society relations. She is the author of Covert Colonialism: Governance, Surveillance and Political Culture in British Hong Kong, c. 1966–97 (Manchester University Press, 2023) and co-editor of A New Documentary History of Hong Kong, 1945–1997 (Hong Kong University Press, 2025). She is also series editor of Routledge’s “Cold War in Asia and Beyond” book series.
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