It is an interesting parlor game to track down what Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah (hereinafter MN) think they are up to in their writing of the “history of information in modern economics,” and of the “knowledge that we [whoever we are] have lost in information.” They note the “sundry treatments of information by economists” already in their acknowledgment, and their authorial intention seems to be to “summarize this previous work and draw from it lessons relevant to our post-crisis world ... to weave ... a coherent and ... compelling narrative beyond anything that [they] had previously written” (p. ix). It is of interest that they elaborate their objective in the first two chapters from at least seven different, but nevertheless overlapping and motley, perspectives.
They identify the “core of [their] narrative” by asking “where did the earlier neoclassicals derive their most nagging questions from, and what was happening in the other sciences that caused them grief and aggravation” (p. 24). Two paragraphs later, they write, “This rotation on the time axis is one of the main epoch-making events we explain in this volume” (p. 25), this 180-degree turn being a volte-face from the “quaint concertedly backward orientation of prewar neoclassical economics to its post WWII preoccupation with the future governing the present” (ibid.). Done with the identification of the core, and that which is to be explained, MN turn to a third perspective, to what they see as the “watershed around the mid-century, the rise of the ‘decision’ as the hallowed hallmark of our (in)humanity” (p. 27). They ask where this came from, and see their volume as fleshing out a “three-fold short punchy answer: the military, the digital computer and the political doctrine of neoliberalism” (p. 27). But the volume is also seen as a rectification: a rectification of a dual disembodiment arising from the reification of “choice independent of the consumer” and that of “information independent of cognizer” (p. 28). MN write:
[W]e now live in a radically different epistemic era from that of our forebears, [and] there is nothing like observing the culture of disembodiment inscribed in the mathematics of the economic models themselves. We strive to rectify that oversight. (p. 29)
These are not facile expressions, and they cry out for further explanation. The “neoclassicals,” leaving aside a sharper identification of their Harsanyi-type, surely take pride in the capaciousness and the applicability of the theory of the consumer that “they” have developed: other than the minimal assumptions of decisiveness and consistency of tastes (completeness and transitivity of the preference relation formalizing preferences), nothing further is needed. And indeed, Andreu Mas-Colell, to the extent that he is a stalwart in the neoclassical ranks, even jettisoned them in 1974: the convexity requirement was enough. But perhaps this jettisoning, a further hollowing-out and disembodiment, is precisely the essence of the MN complaint and criticism. They cite Paul Erickson et al. (2013) from How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind,” and quote the words of Hunter Heyck (2012) in Producing Reason: “Instead of asking whether people were rational creatures, the question should be, what is the best system for producing rational choices? The object of study needed to be the choice not the chooser” (p. 28).
They also cite Shakespeare, and Cesar Hidalgo (2015) in Why Information Grows on the chameleon-like nature of information: how this renders “information” not as something easily appropriable by neoclassical economics, if only because there was no simple, unique thing to appropriate (p. 32).
In my own attempt at understanding, I fall back on what I understand: the difficulty of commodification. And to be sure, mainstream economic theory teaches nothing if not the valuing and pricing of all that it commodifies and renders commodifiable. MN use the words of Hidalgo and of Kenneth Boulding (1968) in Beyond Economics: Essays on Society, Religion and Ethics to reference this hammer and its hammering attempts to insinuate “information into the canonical model of microeconomics” (p. 31).
Information can be easily moved around in the products that contain it ... but knowledge and know-how are trapped in the bodies of people and [the] networks that these people form. Knowledge ... has a dimension that goes beyond that of mere information or improbability. This is a dimension of significance which is very hard to reduce to quantitative form.Footnote 1
But I digress. Let me remain on track of the seven-fold elaboration of the authors’ motivation, and turn to their fifth, one that revolves around an incongruity and necessitates a meditation: “One major motivation for writing our book is to provide a meditation upon why and how such an incongruous trajectory has pirouetted to meets its antithesis” (p. 33)
So what is this incongruous trajectory that pirouettes and, not unlike Mark Rothko’s Slow Swirl by the Edge of the Sea, meets its antithesis? MN refer to the “gradual transition from economists’ regarding information as an unalloyed good to praising ignorance as the appropriate state of a dedicated market participant” (p. 32). After referring to models that yield theorems on symmetric ignorance being welfare maximizing and (strictly) dominating even perfect information, MN ask, “Why must an economics of information end up propounding a doctrine that economic agents should be ignorant?” (p. 33). They see it as “one profound philosophical question that needs to be broached” before anything else, and see their book as a meditation on it (ibid.).
This distinction between the analyst and her analysand, the theoretician and the subject of her theorizing, the potter and the pot, has epistemological and ontological consequences; see, in particular, the questions that serve their protocols (p. 43).
The disparagement of the sagacity of Homo economicus has direct bearing on the asymmetry between agent and analyst…. [T]he legitimacy of the modern economics profession almost demands that their representative rational agent needs to be rendered less knowledgeable (or, to court offense, more stupid) than the orthodox economist himself. To allow the agent to know substantially more than the economist is transparently a non-starter, since in that instance the pretense to special economic expertise comes to naught. (p. 34)
MN rule this to be the modern economist’s “sweet spot”—perhaps even that of economic science. They know that it was not always so, and cite a blog referring to Alfred Marshall’s reference to “British upbringing and morals” as an explanation of the principal-agent problem, and that the ensuing “repercussions might even be momentous” (pp. 35–37).
And the sixth perspective on this (their) work? It questions David Hollinger’s 1997 reading of the disciplinary (identity-) debates of the period 1970 to 1995. They refer to, but questioningly, his insistence that the economics profession was immune to (innocent of?) the “contextualization and historicization of ideas” that proceeded apace during the period. “One could write an exceedingly detailed history of this entire episode without mentioning a single economist. This exclusion applies even to ... Robert Heilbroner, Albert Hirschman or Amartya Sen ... Epistemic Universalism was never really challenged” (p. 33). MN write:
We shall demonstrate in this volume that economists were also swept up with popular concerns that truth may appear to be contingent and dependent upon personal identity during the same period, but that those disputes were carried out primarily in technical discussions of mathematical models in specialized journals; furthermore, the issues of identity that drew the most attention were not those of race and gender, but rather, the minatory perseverance of an epistemic divergence. (p. 34)
This again is quite a mouthful and surely deserves some de-packaging and deconstruction.
Referring to Dani Rodrik’s 2014 lament that “ideas are strangely absent from modern models of political economy,” MN retouch Frank Knight’s 1940 question as “What is truth in modern economics?” and, in asserting a linguistic turn, testify to what they surely see as a sea change.
For orthodox economists today, truth is not a matter of morality, nor of individual standards of veracity, nor even coherence with some simplistic notion of scientific method ... truth is the output of the greatest information processor known to humankind—namely, The Market. The Market alone ... effectively winnows and validates the truth from the glut of information. If markets indeed validate truth, then the cadre that gets to construct the market gets the final say on the nature of truth. The visible hand that fashions the auction believes that it can govern the world. A reliance on consensus that is the lazy man’s definition of Truth. (pp. 4, 7–8)
MN say, “The main task of this volume is to explain how we got from there to here”: how, Joseph Stiglitz, whom they see on one end of the continuum of orthodoxy, has been constantly alluding to the “fact” that the economics of information has turned the world of neoclassical economics upside down (p. 41).
Finally, the authors read their book as addressing the following questions (p. 42):
How is it possible that a neoclassical economic theory, committed to a thoroughly ahistorical, noncontextual theory of equilibrium (and notoriously weak on how the equilibrium is attained) could provide an adequate account of the process by which is knowledge is gained, interpreted and understood? How do these economists know that knowledge has become ineluctably central to their discipline?
And, in this addressing, they see their book replacing “older, potted, orthodox histories of the economics of information” by one which attempts to understand the “curious impasse that through the ignorance of their own history has permitted economists to believe the most extraordinary things about knowledge and their place in it” (p. 44). MN modestly write,
Fortified with this history, the student will ... recognize ... New Economics, if and when she encounters it. She may even learn something. (p. 44)
So much for what MN think they are doing in, and with, their book. This is the place to pause for breath, even in a brief review.
Through this pause, I should also like to remind the reader that so far I have confined myself only to the first forty-four pages, and to its first two chapters; but even here, I have been cursory and incomplete. I have not given any coverage, for example, to the important connection MN make to Michel Foucault’s reliance on, and use of, parrh¯esia in their invocation of the genre of the detective story; how Truth, in their eyes, is alienated information, and how the “best they can hope for is to sneak up on it, like a spy, and catch it in flagrante delicto” (p. 13). The stage that Rob Horning (2012) sets in Agents without Agency, and Michael Chabon (2013) follows,Footnote 2 for tales of ratiocination” is an important section of their first chapter. But the remaining fifteen chapters? Do the authors fulfil their ambitions? Does the book succeed in doing what they see it to be doing? And what about my own responsibilities as a reviewer? Do I meet them? What is my take?
My take is simply that Table 8.1 in the eighth chapter on the three different modalities of information, supplemented by Table 4.1, the picturing of John Harsanyi’s set-up and Stanley Reiter’s schematic, also figures 10.2 and 12.1, and the maximization problem (p. 186), constitute the analytical core of the book. The identification of the two turning points (information as a thing to it as an inductive index to it as symbolic computation—Claude Shannon to Basil Blackwell to Alan Turing) is original to the reading, and its consequent contribution/provocation to the history of economic thought of the last seventy years is, to my mind, incontrovertible. There is, however, some irony in that the book demands the engagement of the very bˆete noire of the authors, the so-called neoclassical economist: he clearly stands to learn the most from engaging the book, learns about the alleged centrality of the von Mises–Lange–Lerner socialist debate, the role of Leonid Hurwicz and Reiter and the devaluing of Kenneth Arrow, is forced to mull over the orchestrated response of Jacob Marschak to Shannon, and whether or not Friedrich Hayek changed his mind. He needs to read it as an antidote to his sense of expertise, but without getting distracted by Mirowski’s gifts as perhaps the foremost caricaturist (cartoonist) of the mainstream economics community.Footnote 3 Since this is a review instead of a review article, in lieu of this engagement, but also as deeper technical engagement, I send my reader (and perhaps even the authors) to my recent work with Patrick Beissner and Yongchao Zhang, and leave it to them to discern and determine my identity: a neoclassical economist? even an economist? a social scientist? a human scientist? worst of all, a humanist?
