Dimitar Bechev is one of our most active public intellectuals, commenting in a variety of venues on domestic and international developments emanating from and affecting Russia, Turkey, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Balkans. Taken together, these places constitute southeastern Europe, and Bechev's volume explores thoroughly the historical and contemporary dynamics of Russian involvement in this region. In doing so, Bechev employs a wide range of sources in a variety of languages and brings to bear three analytical perspectives. He begins with a historical story for each subregion, focusing on Russian ties to and policies in the Balkans, Black Sea, and Greece since roughly the nineteenth century. This is the richest part of the volume, providing contemporary readers with an understanding of a past that, in this region especially, exemplifies William Faulkner's famous sentiment that “The past isn't dead. It isn't even past” (Requiem for a Nun, 1951, 85). But he does not succumb to a deterministic vision, which is demonstrated most effectively in the section on Russia-Turkey relations which puts a past dotted with conflict into the context of a more complex historical arc.

Second, in Part II, he applies an overlay based on themes to all the constituents. Successive chapters explore the contemporary Russian take on its (military) security in this part of Europe; its energy capacities and their use in a region significantly dependent on Russian supply; and its soft power. This is the most data-driven part of the volume and contains several useful maps and tables.

Third and most valuable, is the interpretive dimension, woven throughout the volume. Bechev's major contribution is to shred standard stereotypes; for example, the assumed automatic support of Orthodox countries for Russia, usually invoked with regard to Serbia, Bulgaria, or Greece. Of this Bechev states—but also proves: “As in the case of Serbia or Bulgaria, it is tempting to explain Greece and Cyprus's attachment to Russia via religion and the bonds of shared past. Yet in both of those countries Western influences throughout modern history have been more consequential. With the partial exception of the Cypriot left, Russophilia is a skin-deep phenomenon” (115). He accepts the idea that Russian economic, military or soft power will influence the smaller states of the region. Indeed one purpose of the book is to demonstrate that power. But he also shows how several southeast European partners have exploited their own options, most importantly, their ability to play off the west, and that these actors keep in mind their own national interest; they are not simply pawns of Russian power. Moreover, since national interest will be a subject of contestation, the book offers fulsome descriptions of the domestic politics of Russian relations in each case, showing how orientation toward Moscow is often less a product of affection for Russia than it is an aversion or even hostility toward the west.

Across the region and across policy areas, Bechev characterizes Russia as “opportunistic,” taking advantage of western—especially EU—fumbling that has given Russia ample opportunity to make gains. For Bechev, two key events provide the fulcrum around which Russia's ties with the region pivot: western support for Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo's independence in the 1990s, and Russian dismembering of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea in 2014.

Because it is thoughtfully and carefully organized, the volume can act as a handbook of Russian involvement in the region for both the past and present, across subregions and topics. Because the writing is fluid and effective, it is a pleasure to read. Areas for expansion in a (hoped for) second edition might include: further consideration of the effect on the region of Russia's significant military involvement in the Syrian civil war, much of which postdates this volume; a consideration in this time of illiberal democracy of the idea that some of the attractiveness of Russian soft power lies in its role as an example of such governance. (This is suggested by Vincent Keating and Katarzyna Kaczmarska in “Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias and the ‘Hidden’ Attraction of Russia,” Journal of International Relations and Development (Jan.) 2017: 1–22). Finally, of course, is the impact of new US attitudes toward Europe, NATO, and Russia. Much to our benefit, Dr. Bechev's consideration of this last aspect is accessible via his public commentary.