While writing this article, we learned that Mamosta Mohammad Khizr-Nejad, a Kurdish religious activist involved in the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom) uprising, was sentenced to death in addition to sixteen years of imprisonment by Iran’s Supreme Court.Footnote 1 Arrested on 19 November 2022, he has since been imprisoned, without access to legal services or representation. The charges include allegations such as “corruption on earth,” “threatening national security,” and “propaganda against the state.”Footnote 2
With the onset of the Jina uprising, Kurdish clerics and hundreds of mosque leaders in Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat, in Kurdish) engaged in public protests by delivering Friday sermons, issuing public declarations of solidarity with the protesters, and helping shape a more inclusive framework for the uprising. These religious figures, like all Kurdish dissidents, were met with threats, interrogations, and arrests by the state security apparatus. When the uprising began to wane, several prominent leaders who had assumed key roles faced harsh sentences. Mamosta Luqman Amini, a Kurdish Friday imam, was sentenced to eleven years in prison, permanently stripped of his clerical position, and exiled.Footnote 3 Similarly, Mamosta Ebrahim Karimi, another Kurdish Friday imam, received a twelve-year prison term, permanent removal from his clerical office, and exile. Likewise, Mamosta Ibrahim Salimi and Mamosta Saber Khodamoradi were sentenced to three years and fifteen months in prison, respectively. The charges brought against them by the special clerical court in Hamedan included “propaganda against the regime in support of Kurdish parties,” “inciting unrest and encouraging protesters,” and “disrupting public order.”Footnote 4
At the peak of the uprising in fall 2022 and winter 2023, it was frequently characterized by the sovereign elites and media as a feminist movement, a revolution and the first of its kind in Iran.Footnote 5 The movement’s progressive mantra centered essentially on women’s rights and civil liberties. However, in two ethnically minoritized and economically underdeveloped regions, Eastern Kurdistan and Baluchistan, religious leaders became key supporters, actively encouraging the protesters and sometimes pushing the movement in ways that went beyond its original message. This article examines the role of Sunni Muslim religious forces in the Eastern Kurdistan uprising and how religious discourse can catalyze social movements.
The murder of Jina (Mahsa) Amini on 16 September 2022 once again thrust the issue of women’s repression in Iran into the spotlight. Jina, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman, was detained by the Islamic regime’s morality police in Tehran for allegedly breaching hijab regulations. Her death in custody triggered widespread protests throughout Iran, unprecedented since the 1979 revolution. The protest swiftly evolved into a broader sociopolitical series of protests against the regime and its long-standing national oppression, economic deprivation, and systemic discrimination.Footnote 6 Although the protests spread throughout much of Iran, in areas with religious communities outside the official Twelver Shiʿi Islam, Sunni Islamic leaders emerged as key figures in leading and popularizing the uprising. In Eastern Kurdistan, where Sunni Muslims are the majority and where support for the Kurdish struggle for self-determination has been strong for over a century, both religious and ethnic discrimination exacerbated the unrest. The protests in these areas, therefore, intensified and stretched beyond Eastern Kurdistan. It also received a fierce response from the Iranian regime, which resulted in the deaths of 134 civilians and the imprisonment and torture of thousands.Footnote 7
It is essential to provide a brief overview of Iranian nationalist discourse and its treatment of the “ethnic other.” The rise of Iranian nationalism is traced back to a mix of intellectual and political trajectories in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that epitomized the establishment of the Pahlavi regime in 1925. Reza Shah, who came to power in 1925 through a British-led coup, aimed to modernize Iran by adopting a centralization strategy designed to homogenize Iran’s diverse ethnolinguistic composition. Central to this process was the imposition of the Persian language and identity, which criminalized and marginalized non-Persian peoples such as the Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Turks, and Turkmen, among others.Footnote 8 Pahlavi’s regime pursued a systematic campaign of forced settlement, assimilation, and, more importantly, Persianization. Non-Persian languages such as Kurdish, Turkish, Balochi, and Arabic were officially banned from education and restricted in public spheres. Iranian nationalism had also been deeply intertwined with Islam, striving to nationalize it under the guise of Persianate Islam.Footnote 9 The enforced Persianization was strictly implemented in the educational system, administrative appointments, and cultural realms. Economic marginalization went hand in hand with the state’s campaign against internal “others.” Eastern Kurdistan was at the forefront of state violence, deliberately neglected during developmental investment, and turned into an economically segregated enclave. The 1979 revolution initially seemed to promise a break from the Pahlavi regime’s oppressive policies. Shortly after the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI hereafter), issued a fatwa declaring the Kurds infidels and directly ordering their massacre, alongside suppression of the Kurdish liberation movement.Footnote 10 The new regime under Ayatollah Khomeini maintained Persian Shiʿi nationalism as the core state ideology. The IRI’s official constitution declared Persian the official language of the country (Article 15) and Shiʿi Islam as the official religion of all people of Iran (Article 12). Despite ongoing efforts to impose a homogenized Persian Shiʿi identity, Kurdish resistance, which started even before the advent of Pahlavi’s regime, remained steadfast and further fueled by demands for recognition of their ethnic, linguistic, and religious rights in the post-1979 era.
The Jina uprising heralded a transformative turning point in the Kurdish struggle that has spanned over a century. This momentous episode not only reinvigorated long-standing Kurdish demands for ethnoreligious and linguistic recognition but also linked them to gender-based resistance.Footnote 11 Kurdish women, long at the forefront of the Kurdish liberation movement, emerged as influential figures of defiance against both the Persian Shiʿi state and entrenched patriarchy. The role of religious forces in Eastern Kurdistan during the uprising was significant, showing that religion, far from being a marginal force, remained formative to social movements in the region. This challenges the secularization theory, which, as Smith observes, has historically pushed religion to the margin of social movement analysis. According to secularization theory, as societies progress and modernize, the influence of religion diminishes, leading to its exclusion from the dynamics of social movements. Religion was underestimated as a crucial component of social change during the early development of social movement theories. The mainstream theoretical approaches, particularly those grounded in structural functionalism, theorized religion as a stabilizing force for preserving social order rather than a potential catalyst for challenging the status quo and fostering social transformation.Footnote 12 Smith tells us that social networks are essential for the emergence of social movements. The regular interactions within religious groups strengthen support for these movements by fostering established social networks. These networks facilitate the development of trained leadership within religious communities and aid in motivating and attracting participants. Moreover, religion provides a legitimizing narrative, offering moral justification for activism and helping movements sustain themselves by appealing to a higher truth when faced with external challenges.Footnote 13 In this process, nationalism is understood as a potent source of emotional energy, especially when espoused with religious or ethnic appeals.Footnote 14 Religion enhances collective mobilization by providing preexisting symbols, rituals, and a sense of solidarity that leaders can readily utilize.
Religious Dynamics of the Jina Uprising
Kurds in Iran reside in the four provinces of Western Azerbaijan, Kurdistan (Sanandaj province), Kermanshah, Ilam, and the northern parts of Khorasan province in the northeast, with approximately 60 percent identifying as Sunnis. Eastern Kurdistan also is a home for a minority who practice the Yari (Ahl-e Haqq) religion. Unlike their Sunni counterparts, Shiʿi Kurds have not faced religious discrimination; Iranian nationalism has historically had a more significant influence in the Shiʿi Kurdish regions. As a result, religion has not been a major driving force behind the Jina movement in Shiʿi Kurdish areas. In Sunni-majority regions of Eastern Kurdistan, where certain Islamic groups share common ground with Kurdish nationalism, religion has played a more prominent role in organizing protests. Sunni Islamic groups such as Salafism and the Iranian Call and Reform Organization have been involved in the Jina uprising in various ways.Footnote 15 Salafism opposes Kurdish nationalism and ignores demands for women’s rights, and the Iranian Call and Reform Organization resonates more closely with Iran’s reformist agenda. Their discourse frames Jina’s murder as an outcome of Iran’s laws and their inefficiencies, a view reflected in the limited news coverage on their official website, which echoes the state reformist views.Footnote 16
In Iran, especially in Eastern Kurdistan, the strict restrictions that the state places on forming parties and organizations have prevented religious groups from creating formal political entities. Despite this, their influence remains visible. These groups have maintained a robust network of mosques across cities and villages, ensuring a solid organic connection with Kurdish society. In addition to the previously mentioned groups, two outstanding Islamic organizations—the Maktab-e Qur’an (Qur’an School) and the Yekyati Mamostayani Ayini Meriwan wa Hewraman (Yemame, or Union of Religious Clerics of Marivan and Hewraman)—have developed distinct discourses that extensively inform the perspectives of some Kurdish mullahs and Muslims.Footnote 17 Although many Kurdish Friday imams may not formally affiliate with these groups, they are fully aware of the significance of the Kurdish language and culture. For many of them, Islam constitutes an essential part of Kurdish identity.
Even though Kurdish political parties (all banned in Iran) have been central in organizing protests in Eastern Kurdistan, only the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan has historically demonstrated Islamic inclinations. The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) has a body called Yekyeti Zanayani Ayini Kurdistani Iran (UZAKI; Union of Religious Scholars of Kurdistan of Iran). Both organizations have publicly supported the Jina uprising.Footnote 18 UZAKI and Yemame share some intellectual grounds, particularly in their view of Islam as a fundamental element of Kurdish identity. They emphasize that the influence of Islam in Eastern Kurdistan is most clearly seen through Sufism, as many classical Kurdish poets and Muslim scholars were Sufis. Both groups recognize that many Kurdish political leaders, including Qazi Muhammad (1893–1947, founder of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Republic of Kurdistan in 1946 in Mahabad), Mullah Mustafa Barzani (1903–1979), Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji (1878–1956), Shaykh Ubeydullah Nehri (1826–1883), Shaykh Said Piran (1865–1925), and Seyid Riza Dersim (1863–1937) were all religious figures active before the second half of the twentieth century. The other forms of Islam, such as Salafism and the Iranian Call and Reform Organization (a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iran), are considered relatively recent imports and therefore lack deep roots and authenticity within Kurdish society.
The scope and level of engagement among Kurdish Muslim leaders, clerics, and protesters with religious identities are deeply informed by their understanding of Kurdish nationalism. Taking issue with Kurdish nationalism, Salafi and the Iranian Call and Reform Organization seek to integrate within Iran’s existing Islamic regime and endorse conservative positions on women’s rights. This may explain their absence from the Jina uprising. Conversely, other Islamic factions either show sympathy for Kurdish nationalism or recognize fundamental elements such as the Kurdish language and culture. This distinction is crucial in Shiʿi-majority areas of Eastern Kurdistan (such as Kermanshah and Ilam), where involvement in the Jina uprising was less when compared to Sunni regions. Shiʿi Kurdish religious leaders, deeply embedded in the statist discourse, perceived the uprising as a threat and chose not to participate. This stance received criticism from Sunni Kurdish clerics, who called for solidarity with the movement.Footnote 19
Religion, Gender, and the Politics of Identity
During the peak of the mass protests in November 2022, Sunni Kurdish clerics across nearly all cities in Eastern Kurdistan voiced strong support for the Jina uprising in their mosques. Their declarations were delivered in a distinctive and impactful manner. In major urban centers such as Sanandaj, Marivan, Javanrud, Saqqez, Baneh, Bukan, Mahabad, Piranshahr, Sardasht, and Oshnavieh, clerics assembled in prominent mosques, where a designated representative read the statements aloud. Participants in these events were often dressed in traditional Kurdish attire, and brief videos of these gatherings quickly circulated on Telegram and Instagram.Footnote 20 In some cities, delays in issuing a statement prompted public pressure on the prayer leaders to explain their delay. Influential figures like Mamosta Luqman Karimi at Ciwar Yari Nebi Mosque in Sine, Mamosta Saber Khodamoradi at Qewix Mosque in Saqqez, and Mamosta Ibrahim Karimi at Nenele Mosque in Sanandaj, who served as imams of Friday prayer, played decisive roles in shaping their congregations’ perspectives. These leaders later faced severe prison sentences, as mentioned. Throughout six general strikes that lasted over twenty-five days and were often spearheaded by Kurdish political parties, prayer leaders in mosques typically supported the strikes.Footnote 21 One branch of the Qur’an school group, led by Hassan Amini, officially endorsed the strikes in their statements.
An analysis of the Friday prayer sermons and statements of prayer leaders in mosques during fall 2022 and winter 2023 reveals several common themes. More detailed information can be found on the official Yemame Telegram channel.Footnote 22 This channel covers many sermons and statements, although each mosque has its own Telegram channel. The following outlines the key common themes in the Friday prayer sermons.
First, despite the Jina uprising’s emphasis on women’s rights and the fact that the Iranian state forces murdered Jina for allegedly violating Islamic dress codes, the hijab issue was rarely addressed by prayer leaders or cited as a primary reason for the nationwide protests. Many prayer leaders, although not vehemently against the Islamic hijab, argue that the traditional attire of Kurdish women is consistent with Islamic customs, implying that Kurdish women do not face hijab issues. In contrast, Kak Hassan Amini, a leader of the Qur’anic school, has noted that although Islam encourages women to wear the hijab, no woman was punished for not wearing it during the time of Muhamad or the Rashidun Caliphate.Footnote 23
Second, Kurdish imams viewed themselves as a vital part of the Kurdish community, believing they had resisted the demands of the Iranian Islamic government in solidarity with the people. Some also perceived themselves as the rightful successors to esteemed Kurdish religious leaders who led Kurdish movements. In one of his prominent speeches, Mamosta Khodamoradi emphasized that notable figures such as Qazi Muhammad, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji, Shaykh Ubeydullah Nehri, Shaykh Said Piran, and Seyid Riza Dersim were all educated in Kurdistan and subsequently became leaders of the Kurdish nation.
Third, in their sermons and statements, all the imams recognized that the primary drivers of the protests included rampant inflation, poverty, economic hardship, social inequalities, and the government’s failure to address these issues. They argued that even if the state resorted to excessive violence to quell the protests, the underlying problems would persist, leading to renewed unrest. They generally contended that, although Iran was a wealthy country, the state misallocated its resources to support its political ambitions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.
Fourth, the imams underlined that a significant source of discontent among the Kurdish people—and other ethnic groups such as Baloch and Arabs—was the double oppression they experienced. Ethnically, they were denied the right to learn, teach, and use their languages in education; this violated the very IRI constitution, which granted this right. This denial has fueled widespread opposition to Iran’s political rule, particularly among the Kurds. Additionally, as Sunnis, they endured persistent religious discrimination. Kurds, due to their language and religion, have been treated as second-class citizens, with their national and religious rights systematically violated since 1979.
Fifth, in addition to condemning the state’s use of violence to suppress dissent, the imams advocated for the release of all prisoners. They honored those who were killed by state forces in Eastern Kurdistan as martyrs and regularly attended their funerals to provide comfort and support to grieving families. Furthermore, they consistently encouraged peaceful civil disobedience while advising against violence or the destruction of public property.
Finally, as the protests continue and the Islamic government avoids meaningful engagement, opting instead for violent collective punishment of the Kurdish population, some imams and religious leaders have called for a referendum. They propose amending the constitution through a referendum overseen by impartial international institutions. The imams urge state officials to honor the will of the majority and avoid driving the country further into regression and ruin.
Closing Remarks
The nexus between gender struggle and religious mobilization during the Jina uprising in Eastern Kurdistan reveals the complexity of Kurdish resistance in Iran, which rises above a purely feminist movement and intersects deeply with religious and national identities. A significant yet often overlooked force in the Kurdish resistance, Sunni Islamic discourse has proven central to shaping and sustaining the momentum of the uprising. Kurdish clerics and religious leaders not only provided spiritual and moral backing for the protests but also created an organized structure of dissent that drew from both religious and nationalist sentiments. This religious mobilization, particularly within Sunni-majority regions of Eastern Kurdistan, extended the reach and influence of the movement far beyond its gender boundary. The participation of religious figures, many of whom faced severe repression from the Iranian state, illustrated the enduring influence of Islam in Kurdish society. Their involvement challenged conventional secular theories that excluded religion as a driving force in social movements, particularly those advocating for political change. Instead, the Jina uprising showed that religion can be a powerful mobilizing tool, providing both emotional resonance and a legitimizing force for broader struggles against state repression.
The religious dimension of the Kurdish resistance also reveals an internal division based on religious sects within the Kurdish community. Sunni clerics were actively present in the uprising, seeing it as an opportunity to challenge both gender oppression and the systemic ethnoreligious discrimination their people faced under the Persian Shiʿi-dominated state. In contrast, Shiʿi Kurdish leaders, more assimilated to the state’s nationalist and religious ideology, largely distanced themselves from the movement. Moreover, the active involvement of Kurdish clerics in the uprising complicated the Iranian state’s narrative that portrayed dissent in Eastern Kurdistan as purely nationalist or separatist in nature. By framing their participation within Islamic discourse, Kurdish religious leaders exposed the state’s hypocrisy of enforcing religious uniformity while simultaneously suppressing minority Sunni communities. This dual struggle against both religious and ethnic forms of oppression resonates with the long history of Kurdish resistance, which has always embodied demands for cultural, linguistic, and political rights.
