In 1887, the famous historian and intellectual Heinrich Treitschke visited various Transylvania Saxon towns (a German-speaking enclave in the south-east of Austria-Hungary), writing in a letter that ‘it was, for me, an inexpressible joy to see the best Germans of Austria, there, in the far Carpathian lands’.Footnote 1 His host, and the recipient of the letter, was Georg Daniel Teutsch – a Lutheran bishop and a fellow historian – who had entered into correspondence with Treitschke in the early 1870s. Their friendship was based on shared concerns about the erosion of Saxon traditions and culture under pressure from an assertive Hungarian government as well as the relationship between the Transylvanian Saxons and Imperial Germany.
This article investigates these two intertwined, concurrent issues. First, the evolving dynamic between the Hungarian government and the Transylvanian Saxons is traced using the issue of Saxon municipal autonomy on the Königsboden/ Pământul crăiesc/ Királyföld. After the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Hungarian elites were in the political ascendancy and pushed for a unitary, standardized, ‘modern’ Hungarian nation-state encompassing all historical territories, including Transylvania and its Saxon Königsboden. On this specific issue, Teutsch wrote to Treitschke for help in publicizing the Saxon cause in Germany.Footnote 2 Treitschke wrote back on 2 December 1876 that ‘I think it is finally time for the German press to speak openly about the arrogance of the Magyars and the subjugation (Vergewaltigung) of our loyal Saxon compatriots (Landsleute). I will personally say a few words in the December edition of the Preussische Jahrbücher [a prominent journal edited by Treitschke].’Footnote 3 This points to the second issue, the potential support for the Saxons from Imperial Germany. Aid might come either from the large German public – which had the potential to be a valuable source of cultural, moral, and financial strength – or from the German government, which could apply official pressure on the Hungarian government through diplomatic channels.
These two issues are refracted through the lives, thinking, and actions of Teutsch (1817–93), his friend Jakob Rannicher (1823–75), and the slightly younger Guido Baussnern (1839–1908). Teutsch was an important focal point for potential help from Germany. In his formative years, he had studied history, geography, and theology in Berlin and had many contacts in Germany, mostly through his work as a respected medieval historian but also through the Lutheran church. Along with these German connections, Teutsch was intimately involved in local Saxon political and public life. As bishop of the Lutheran church in Transylvania, he had direct access to Francis Joseph and to the Hungarian government in religious and cultural matters. He regularly stayed in Vienna and Budapest, where he had many friends and colleagues. An active and engaged public figure, Teutsch participated in associations, official appointments, cultural issues, church visitations, and numerous other Saxon matters. Teutsch's rich life was an example of the intersecting links and loyalties within the layered web of Saxon politics. Jakob Rannicher – a long-term Saxon political leader – was similarly at the centre of Saxon life, as a politician, bureaucrat, church figure, and member of many associations. Over time, he took a more pragmatic stance than Teutsch and argued that the Saxons had to accept being a very small minority in a larger Hungarian polity. Since Rannicher's connections were primarily in Budapest and Vienna, Germany barely impacted on his political thinking. The final figure, Guido Baussnern, represented another viewpoint. Baussnern's opinions were changeable but he generally regarded Transylvania and its Saxons as an integral part of Hungary. He, in turn, conceived of Imperial Germany and Hungary within the wider international landscape, in particular the upcoming clash between European culture and Asiatic barbarity. Thus, Baussnern advocated a permanent alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, arguing that a unitary, powerful Hungary was vital for the interests of Germany and the wider German Volk (people).Footnote 4
These three individuals demonstrate that it was a difficult task to articulate clear political viewpoints while negotiating loyalties towards the German ‘Motherland’, Imperial Austria (whether in the forms of the monarch or the idea of a unitary state), Hungarian ‘Fatherland’, Saxon ‘nation’, and local traditions. Teutsch slowly moved from mild opposition against the Hungarian government towards an acceptance of the general situation. Rannicher went through this process slightly earlier and had to endure a vote of no confidence from his electors and considerable public animus in the early 1870s. Baussnern constantly adjusted his views as he was pulled in different directions by his ideas, loyalties, and the changing events. In Saxon politics, changeability (both in opinions and political allies), disunity, individuality, and specific context were ever present.
Taking into account these factors and processes means rethinking the conceptual framework for Transylvanian Saxon history in the late nineteenth century, including the place of German nationalism both in Imperial Germany and in south-eastern Europe.Footnote 5 The prevailing historiography on the Transylvanian Saxons emphasizes the gradual development of German nationalism coupled with growing links to Germany.Footnote 6 Friedrich Teutsch, the son of G. D. Teutsch, played a key role in shaping this historiography.Footnote 7 He followed in his father's footsteps as an extremely active community leader, a prominent historian, and eventually also as bishop of the Lutheran church from 1906 to 1932. This article argues that there is no teleology of rising German nationalism or, indeed, one specific path for Saxon history. In fact, there was considerable disunity amongst the Saxons, characterized by contrasting regional and municipal traditions, local conditions, political viewpoints, religious affiliations, social groupings, and personal rivalries.Footnote 8 In a retrospective article on 3 January 1894, the main Saxon newspaper, the Siebenburgische-Deutsche Tageblatt (SDT) described the strong individualism of the Saxons as the ‘inner disease that plagues us Saxons’.Footnote 9 The pro-German viewpoint of the Teutschs (father and son) was only one viewpoint within the broad spectrum of Saxon politics. For some Saxons, Imperial Germany was merely a minor, insignificant factor in everyday politics under a dominant Hungarian government. These pragmatic Saxons were often drawn towards finding some form of modus vivendi with the Hungarian government, rather than assertive German nationalism.
Contextualizing German nationalism leads to questions about framing Transylvanian Saxon life and politics as part of a German ‘diaspora’.Footnote 10 German nationalism varied across the Saxon spectrum and changed over time. Moreover, the long history of Saxons in Transylvania often meant fierce pride in specific Saxon traditions and particularity, corresponding to a mental universe framed by local and regional life with little reference to the wider German-speaking world. Indeed, there were important Saxon relationships with other non-German-speaking nationalities (often friendly and co-operative, especially with Romanian-speakers) and with various authorities (whether at a Transylvanian level, in Budapest or Vienna), which can be obscured by the focus on German nationalism. Another historiographical viewpoint, linking regional tropes and loyalties to wider nation-building projects, similarly does not easily fit the Saxon example.Footnote 11 Both as German-speakers and Lutherans, the Saxons were very distinct from potential nation-building projects in the region, primarily Hungarian (1867 to the First World War) and Romanian (post-Second World War). At various points in time, different Saxon politicians argued that Saxon particularity and traditions could potentially harmonize with and contribute to Habsburg imperial aims, Hungarian unitary nationalism, Romanian nation-building (after the First World War) as well as pan-German dreams (especially in the 1930s and during the Second World War). Saxon particularity could equally lead to an introspective focus on perpetuating Saxon life and traditions, especially when there were perceived threats from a centralizing state. Rather than as nascent ‘diaspora’ or ‘ethnic’ identity, Saxon history from the mid-nineteenth century onwards can be interpreted as an attempt to retain Saxon particularity and traditions under the strains of economic modernization and assertive, centralist state-building. Difficulties and disappointments coalesced into the slow formation of an embattled ‘minority mentality’. Viewed in this fashion – as the development of an alienated minority on the margins – Transylvanian Saxon history can be an illuminating lens for German, Hungarian, Romanian, Habsburg, and Transylvanian historiographies.
The actual nature of pan-German nationalism and its importance both in Germany and amongst the Transylvanian Saxons takes a different hue when context, perspective, division, flexibility, and Saxon particularity are kept in mind. The existing historiography, mostly dealing with the 1890s onwards, has stressed the importance of the pan-German nationalism – its access to decision-makers and its framing of the wider discourse.Footnote 12 This perspective argues that the Transylvanian Saxons were a significant grouping within the widespread, fragmented German-speaking populations in eastern and south-east Europe. But this is only one side of the story. Both in Imperial Germany and for the Saxons, it was the limitations and constraints on German nationalism – in particular, diplomacy, indifference, and pragmatic politics – which often prevailed.Footnote 13 G. D. Teutsch's move from initial optimistic hopes for German support towards gradual sober acceptance of the status quo was largely prompted by general indifference towards the Saxon cause from the German government and public. In short, the strand of German nationalism in Transylvanian Saxon politics and history should not be foregrounded or placed in a pan-German teleology. Instead, Transylvanian Saxon history in the late nineteenth century should be represented ‘in the round’, with multiple loyalties and connections, disunity, changeability, local traditions, and possibilities.Footnote 14
I
For the Transylvanian Saxons, who could trace their origins in the region to the twelfth century, the years around the 1867 Compromise were a tumultuous and defining period. Politics broadened in the more open environment of representative bodies, uncensored press, and flourishing associational life. The particular configuration of overlapping and competing levels of authority – local, sub-regional (Saxon), regional (Transylvania), Hungarian, and Imperial – was subject to sudden and dramatic changes. For example, in the course of seven years from 1860 to 1867, there were four major changes to the governmental system: from neo-absolutism through the October Diploma, the February Patent, the suspension of the February Patent, and, finally, to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Each change could emphasize a particular level of authority, which in turn would have different and far-reaching consequences for Saxon politics and administration.
Looking at the levels in turn, at the lowest was the celebrated Saxon local autonomy. By the nineteenth century, there were eleven Saxon municipal administrative units (nine seats – grouped around and including Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben/Sibiu – and two districts – Kronstadt/Brașov/Brassó and Bistritz/Bistrița/Beszterce). The separate Saxon legal and administrative system traced its formation to medieval grants of lands to German settlers. This autonomy lay at the very heart of the Saxon narrative of origins. Each municipality had traditional privileges covering the administration of justice, the appointment of officials, economic matters, and internal regulations.Footnote 15 In general, citizens would meet at regular public meetings to decide on local matters and to elect their own mayor and officials. Demographics differed between municipalities, but generally consisted of majority Saxon populations with substantial Romanian and Hungarian minorities. For example, Hermannstadt – where Teutsch, Rannicher, and Baussnern lived as adults – was a provincial military and bureaucratic centre of about 20,000 people with a varied population. The linguistic make-up was German (70 per cent), Romanian (20 per cent), and Hungarian (10 per cent). There was an even wider range of religious communities in Hermannstadt.Footnote 16 Historical and political traditions of the towns and districts evolved differently. For example, in his evocative memoirs, Karl Ernst Schnell described Kronstadt, a bustling business and trading town, as dominated by the local Freemason lodge.Footnote 17 Hermannstadt's focal point was the Lutheran church and its circle (especially around Teutsch), reflecting its institutional and bureaucratic character. Local spoken Saxon dialects were sometimes mutually incomprehensible, though a limited bridge for the various Saxon towns and localities was provided by the shared formal German language (Hochdeutsch).Footnote 18
The next level was the Universitas Saxonum, a collective body of representatives from the eleven municipalities under the aegis of an elected Saxon count. This unified legal and administrative area was officially recognized and codified by the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus in 1476 and often carried the name of Königsboden. For much of its existence, it was responsible for taxes and military recruits as well as constituting the highest form of legal court for the territory. The combination of municipal autonomy and the Universitas formed the bedrock of specific Saxon institutions and Saxon self-perception as a distinct people and nation.
Turning to the level of Transylvania, the region had a long and distinct history as a political and administrative unit within, successively, the medieval kingdom of Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Habsburg monarchy. The key representative body was the Transylvanian diet. Since 1437, the Transylvanian Saxon burghers had been included as one of the three privileged estates (or natio) – the other two being the Hungarians nobles and the Székely border guards (who spoke a form of Hungarian). The Romanian population were not traditionally represented as a corporate body in the diet, even though they were the most populous language grouping within Transylvania. The approximate figures for Transylvania according to the 1880 census were Romanian-speakers 57 per cent, Hungarian-speakers 30 per cent, German-speakers 10 per cent, though many inhabitants were bilingual or trilingual and national categories were not clear or fixed.Footnote 19 In the nineteenth century, the diet had declined in importance and was subject to manipulation from the two higher levels of authority – the kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg monarch. This triangular relationship between Transylvania, Hungary, and Imperial Austria dominated, even defined, Saxon political life through to the early 1870s. There were, for example, two very different Transylvanian diets convened in succession during the turbulent mid-1860s. The first was called by the centralist Viennese government and met in Hermannstadt with, for the first time, Romanian participation but also a boycott by Hungarian representatives. The second was convened in 1865 to reconcile Hungary with the monarch and the central state. This diet had an overwhelming Hungarian majority and, significantly, met in the Hungarian stronghold of Klausenburg/Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. It had just one item on the agenda: Transylvanian union with Hungary.
At the Klausenburg diet of 1865, Jakob Rannicher gave the majority Saxon address. Rannicher had emerged as a respected Saxon political leader through the various political changes. After a spell in the Imperial civil service in Vienna following the 1848–9 revolutions, he returned to Transylvania in 1856 as secretary to the governor. He was also envoy of the education and religious ministry (run from Vienna) and a member of the upper consortium of the Transylvanian Lutheran church. As an active politician, he had been elected to the Hermannstadt diet, where he had assumed a leading role (especially in promoting Romanian interests), and then to the Viennese parliament from 1863 to 1865. He was also heavily involved in the revived Universitas Saxonum. In his 1865 address to the Klausenburg diet, he raised concerns about Transylvania's incorporation into Hungary. Rannicher and the Saxons feared that ‘[i]n an assembly [parliament in Budapest] where our fate will be decided, the lonely voices of the Saxon and Romanian representatives will disappear unnoticed in the desert’.Footnote 20 Rough political groupings were forming in response to Hungarian pressure. The ‘Old Saxons’ (including Rannicher and Teutsch) looked to Vienna and argued for a defence of traditional Saxon autonomy, principled opposition to Hungarian centralization, and a continued belief in an overarching unified Austrian state. By contrast, the ‘Young Saxons’ (who would eventually include the young Guido Baussnern) advocated co-operation with the Hungarian elites on the basis of progressive reforms, liberal tolerance, and a commitment to the construction of the Hungarian nation-state.Footnote 21 There was often bitter conflict between the two sides including personal attacks, stone throwing, and street fighting, even though individuals like Baussnern could manoeuvre between groupings and even switch allegiances. The split between ‘Old Saxons’ and ‘Young Saxons’ was exacerbated by a contest over the railway route from Vienna-Budapest to Bucharest (and the Black Sea). There were two possiblities: one going through Kronstadt (the stronghold of the ‘Young Saxons’) – the eventual route – and the other going through Hermannstadt (dominated by ‘Old Saxons’).Footnote 22
Baussnern was only just beginning his political career in 1866 but wrote prolifically on the events of the time. Already, he was showing a capacity for sudden changes of opinion. Amidst the real possibility of union with Hungary and a dualist settlement, he published a pamphlet in favour of a federal, decentralized system within an overarching Austrian Gesamtstaat allowing the Saxons considerable autonomy – a position similar to Rannicher's.Footnote 23 In his next brochure, published shortly after the Compromise, Baussnern changed opinion and gave qualified support to the recently installed dualist system.Footnote 24 His explanation was that one simply had to accept history's judgement; in this case, dualism had favoured the Germans and Magyars.Footnote 25 The idea of a natural harmony between German and Hungarian interests would become a constant of his political thinking through his many changes of opinion.Footnote 26
Teutsch was also negotiating the changes to Saxon life. Compared to Rannicher and Baussnern, Teutsch had the most direct contact with Germany and the strongest attachment to its culture and learning. This was largely through his academic contacts as a historian and his frequent visits to Germany. Teutsch's most important historical writing appeared in the 1850s, while he was a secondary school teacher in his hometown of Schässburg/Sigișoara/Segesvár. These included edited documentary collections and the hugely influential and popular Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen (History of the Transylvanian Saxons). All of his historical research conceived the Transylvanian Saxons as one entity, while emphasizing the links to the German ‘Motherland’.Footnote 27 In 1858, Teutsch returned to Germany for the first time since his student days, writing excitedly that ‘Now my burning, long held wish has been fulfilled – I am again in Germany…our spiritual homeland.’Footnote 28 On 19 September 1867, he was elected bishop of Hermannstadt and leader of the Lutheran church in Transylvania, the highest ecclesiastical position in the Saxon community. In his confirmation audience with Francis Joseph in Vienna, Teutsch mentioned the new dualist system and his hopes that Saxon living conditions would not be touched. Francis Joseph replied: ‘Certainly, certainly.’Footnote 29
At the outset of dualism, the Hungarian government pursued a cautious, differentiated policy towards the Saxons.Footnote 30 In the Nationalities Law (1868) cultural and linguistic rights were recognized, though premised on a unitary state with Hungarian as the official language. The Union Law (1868), which formally incorporated Transylvania into Hungary, provided for equality of religions and promised a separate law to secure Saxon self-administration on the Königsboden. The Saxon representatives in the Budapest parliament, including Rannicher as one of the leaders, sat with the main government party, known informally as the Deák party (after the Hungarian political leader and architect of the 1867 Compromise, Ferenc Deák). One of Deák's closest associates, the cultural and religion minister József Eötvös – a prominent intellectual and liberal parliamentarian – offered Rannicher a post in the education ministry, which he accepted. In a letter to Teutsch, Rannicher explained that he wanted to protect Saxon schools and ‘the “flourishing” German oasis beyond the mountains [in Transylvania]’.Footnote 31 He increasingly viewed the autonomy of the Saxon church and schools as vital protection against the prevailing attitude in Budapest about ‘unity of the Empire, nation, language, supremacy, centralization’; in other words, the construction of a unitary Hungarian nation-state.Footnote 32 Within the education ministry, Rannicher worked on drafts of the elementary school law, while in parliament he negotiated with Deák about the exact terms of the nationality law. He also assiduously learned Hungarian, which progressed quickly, so he could soon give long speeches in parliament.
While Rannicher tried to accommodate to the realities of Hungarian dominance, Teutsch continued to hope for a change to the system, preferably in the direction of a constitutional, federalist Austrian state with Saxon autonomy.Footnote 33 He exerted great influence behind the scenes in Saxon politics. One example was his support for the foundation of the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsche Wochenblatt (SDW), the forerunner of the SDT. The first issue on June 1868 contained a programme that reflected Teutsch's position. The newspaper proclaimed proudly that the Saxons ‘are German and want to remain German’, yet lived in ‘another home’ and would never be German citizens.Footnote 34 Teutsch's influence extended to a regular Thursday evening reading group that met at the bishop's residence for cigarettes and conversation.Footnote 35 Teutsch assembled the best of Saxon intelligentsia around him and dominated the discussions. Even here, in the privacy of his home and surrounded by fellow Saxons, there were differences of opinion. The journalist Karl Wolff, who would become the first editor of the SDT, was described as knowledgeable, nationalist-minded, and ready to fight. By contrast, Friedrich Müller, the Hermannstadt local priest, and Oskar Meltzl, an economist and politician, were more conciliatory.Footnote 36
II
Around the time of the Franco-Prussian war and German unification in 1870–1, the Hungarian government was in the gradual process of constructing and securing the dualist system through numerous laws and institutions. In general, this meant policies of standardization and Magyarization, though there was room for negotiation and the rates of implementation varied from sector to sector, region to region. Increasingly, Saxon rights, traditions, and everyday life were affected. This was the situation when Wilhelm Wattenbach, a medieval historian at Heidelberg University, stayed with Teutsch during the summer of 1869. Upon Wattenbach's return to Heidelberg, he held a series of lectures about the Saxons.Footnote 37 After a cursory overview of Saxon history, Wattenbach portrayed the current situation as Saxon defence of church and schools against an assertive Hungarian state.Footnote 38 The Saxons, according to Wattenbach, were merely asking for the necessary freedoms and independence to remain Germans – which any Hungarian Comitat (county) could demand. His characterization of ‘Hungarian freedom’ was scathing, describing it as freedom solely for Magyars plus ‘arbitrary domination over others’.Footnote 39 Ultimately, Wattenbach recognized that the Saxons were not strong enough to confront the Magyars, yet he pointed to the church and to education as the keys to retaining German consciousness and a sense of community. He argued for a vigorous defence of the Saxons’ German character and continued educational links to Germany.Footnote 40
Many universities in Germany had long, close links with Transylvanian Saxons since study at the Protestant Universities of Heidelberg, Göttingen, Tübingen, Leipzig, Jena, Halle, and Berlin was a common route for the Saxon elite, especially the priests.Footnote 41 In the 1860s and early 1870s, Heinrich Treitschke was a professor at Heidelberg (he would later move to Berlin in 1874) and a close friend of Wattenbach. It is possible that Wattenbach initiated Treitschke's contact with Teutsch. In any event, Treitschke soon began commissioning and publishing essays on the Transylvanian Saxons in his Preussischer Jahrbücher. In a letter dated 15 April 1872, Treitschke wrote to Teutsch that ‘I hold it as our duty to support the threatened Deutschtum (Germandom) in the Carpathians…the Transylvanian problem is as good as unknown in the [German] Reich.’Footnote 42
Treitschke was, in fact, a keen observer of the Habsburg monarchy and in December 1871 he wrote a perceptive long article entitled ‘Austria and the German Reich’ including a typically complimentary reference to the Transylvanian Saxons.Footnote 43 The article contained two potentially contradictory ideas that would dominate Treitschke's thinking on Hungary and the Saxons. First was the diplomatic consideration of the Habsburg monarchy as an integral, stabilizing force in the region and in Europe. This implied German non-interference in Hungarian domestic affairs. Second was the German cultural perspective that the Magyars were abusing their power and placing undue pressure on the Transylvanian Saxons.Footnote 44 This implied possible intervention on behalf of German-speaking minorities. These two strands remained delicately balanced in Treitschke's mind. In conclusion, Treitschke counselled non-interference by the German government.Footnote 45
Thus, around the time of German unification, three themes in German thinking on the Transylvanian Saxons were forming. First, there were the notions of cultural affinity – a wider German world based on language, culture, and religion. Common terms used by Wattenbach, Treitschke, Teutsch, and others, such as ‘Motherland’, ‘German Volk’ (people), ‘German culture’, ‘German science’, and ‘Western civilization’ all referenced this framework of thinking. There were a number of nebulous concepts behind this viewpoint. For example, there were ideas of a shared linguistic and cultural heritage based on a perceived integrated, medieval, Christian, German-speaking people.Footnote 46 Wattenbach in particular portrayed the Saxons as part of the great medieval colonizing mission by German-speaking Christians.Footnote 47 Layered onto this conception was the shared German heritage of the Protestant Reformation, since the vast majority of Saxons were Lutheran. An additional layer came from the idea of an enlightened, cultured, scientific-minded, learned German-speaking elite community. Teutsch's attitudes incorporated these different aspects to form an idealized image of a common, progressive, humanist, Christian German cultural world encompassing the Transylvanian Saxons as proud, distinguished representatives in the East.Footnote 48 The second theme in German attitudes to the Transylvanian Saxons was the rising importance of diplomatic considerations.Footnote 49 The formation of Imperial Germany fundamentally changed the European state system. Attitudes towards distant, isolated communities such as the Transylvanian Saxons became increasingly refracted through the interests and channels of the new German state. This pragmatic German policy, coupled with Vienna's passivity under dualism (effectively ceding domestic matters to Budapest) led to the Saxons being largely left alone by Vienna and Berlin. The third and final theme was indifference.Footnote 50 The German public never really adopted the Saxon cause, despite attempts to rouse interest and sympathy. There were a number of factors to explain this indifference. The German public had a multitude of other more pressing issues in the wake of unification. Moreover, the German government did not articulate any official position on the Transylvanian Saxons and maintained a neutral silence. Treitschke struck a resigned tone in a letter to Teutsch: ‘What should we do against [Magyar arrogance]?’, he wrote. Neither the German public nor official opinion was prepared to intervene in internal Hungarian affairs.Footnote 51
These three themes of cultural affinity, diplomatic considerations, and general indifference are also evident in Saxon attitudes towards the new Imperial Germany. For example, Teutsch believed Prussia's victory over France and the subsequent unification of Germany were examples of what the German spirit could achieve. He celebrated the turn of events in a number of articles for the SDW.Footnote 52 Guido Baussnern followed events closely and took a broad geopolitical perspective coupled with cultural arrogance. He outlined his viewpoint in a passionate appeal to Hungary at the outset of hostilities between Prussia and France. For Baussnern, Russia and the Slavs in general were Hungary's real enemies. With the formation of Austria-Hungary, the monarchy was now, according to Baussnern, internally structured along the lines of Germans and Magyars against the Slavs. A strong, united Germany would serve as the natural ally of Austria-Hungary against pan-Slavism. In other words, ‘Hungary's interests in relation to Eastern Europe coincide with those of Germany's – Hungary's natural ally is therefore Germany and Hungary's future depends on the natural unification of the German people.’Footnote 53 In conclusion, Baussnern evoked the familiar struggle of European civilization against Asiatic barbarism. Thus, Baussnern, like Treitschke, placed the Transylvanian Saxons in the wider perspective of European diplomacy and the historical process of clashing peoples and cultures. For Baussnern, there was no apparent contradiction between Saxon, German, and Hungarian loyalties since in geopolitical terms a strong Hungary would be good for the German state and people.
Yet, as the Saxons celebrated both the victory over France and the unification of Germany, these events had little concrete effects on Saxon political or daily life and the practical issues of adjusting to a dominant Hungarian government. The mental horizons of many Saxons continued to be their locality and region in relation to the larger Hungarian polity and, more distantly, the monarch in Vienna. For example, in Jakob Rannicher's correspondence around this time, there is barely a mention of the Franco-Prussian War or the unification of Germany. Instead, there are long discussions of educational policies, official appointments, ongoing divisions within the Saxon community, railway politics, parliamentary tactics, the upcoming municipal law, local business initiatives, church affairs, and various personal matters.Footnote 54 Rannicher was absorbed in daily political matters and seemed unconcerned about any potential support from the German public or government.
III
Around this time, the Hungarian government's reform to Saxon autonomous institutions and practices on the Königsboden was provoking intense discussions.Footnote 55 This issue would dominate Saxon politics for the next five years and would initiate the first concerted Saxon appeal to Imperial Germany. It illustrated the new configuration in Saxon politics: fundamental changes in Saxon culture and traditions, a powerful Hungarian government, an acquiescent monarch in Vienna, and potential outside support from Imperial Germany.
In the years leading up to 1876, the Hungarian government produced successive drafts for legislation concerning the Königsboden, generally in the direction of increased centralization in an attempt to create a standardized, unified political and administrative system across greater Hungary. After much manoeuvring and outlining of respective positions, a government draft was published in March 1871. The SDW, representing the ‘Old Saxon’ viewpoint, opposed the draft and based its arguments on legal precedents and continuity.Footnote 56 On the other hand, the ‘Young Saxon’ leaders, including Guido Baussnern, portrayed themselves as a liberal, democratic party willing to co-operate with the Hungarian government.Footnote 57 The Universitas Saxonum met to prepare for consultation over the upcoming reforms. Under new Universitas electoral regulations, decreed by the Hungarian government, many more Romanian voters were included than before. Coupled with the subtle influence of the newly appointed Saxon Count Moritz Conrad, this produced a slight pro-Hungarian majority consisting of ‘Young Saxons’, sympathetic Romanians, and one Hungarian. Baussnern celebrated the majority in the Universitas as the ‘solid advocacy of all nationalities for the Hungarian state idea’.Footnote 58
Almost immediately, however, Baussnern began to move towards opposition, possibly concerned over the lack of consultation and the continued drive for centralization and Magyarization. Baussnern would eventually become a strong voice against the government's Königsboden law. He was also attempting to achieve some political unity within the Saxon camp, especially in light of the upcoming 1872 parliamentary elections. Baussnern described his position in a personal letter: ‘I have not become an “Old Saxon”, but I am no longer a “Young Saxon”. Rather I am only a Saxon and it is my conviction that this standpoint must be the one of every loyal son of our [Saxon] nation, if our unity shall become a reality.’Footnote 59 Considering the division and rancour within the Saxon camp, it is no surprise that political unity and a common programme proved difficult to achieve. There were numerous discussions and drafts (including one from Baussnern) in the early months of 1872. After weeks of meetings in the small town of Mediasch/Mediaș/Medgyes, a common programme was eventually issued on 5 June 1872.
The Mediasch programme was an awkward mix of ideas.Footnote 60 The dualist system and Transylvania's union with the Hungarian state were not directly challenged; indeed, there were clauses calling for a true Rechtstaat (rule of law), full realization of the 1868 Nationality Law, and general good governance. Saxon autonomy and the continued unity of the Universitas were defended as compatible with a modern, progressive Hungarian state. Further clauses called for municipal and local reforms in accordance with Clause 10 of the 1868 Union Law including open elections for important official positions rather than appointments by the government. Stress was laid on the Universitas as the correct party for negotiations over any administrative reforms. The Mediasch programme contained nothing about relations with Imperial Germany or support from the wider German-speaking world.
Rannicher had participated in some of the background discussions to the Mediasch programme but was preoccupied by his work within the system. He struck a moderate tone in his report to his electors on 16 June 1872. He talked about Hungary's modernization in the direction of Western culture, but described the municipality law as the ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over the Saxon people.Footnote 61 The Saxon parliamentary representatives, who continued to sit with the government party, presented the Mediasch programme to Deák in September 1872.Footnote 62 The moderates in Deák's party were still prepared to listen to Saxon viewpoints and the final terms of the municipal law had not been settled, though a new draft was being prepared. Here were the everyday realities of Saxon politics – fragile unity masking deep internal divisions, while in negotiation with a powerful Hungarian government.
By November, the Saxon delegates in Budapest were already disagreeing about tactics and starting to go their separate ways.Footnote 63 Some such as Teutsch, the SDW, and the committed ‘Old Saxons’ stressed historical rights and promises. This was often coupled with an appeal to the German government and public for support. Others such as Rannicher, a one-time leader of the ‘Old Saxons’, wanted to work from within the Deák party to obtain some concessions for the Saxons. Previously, for example with the 1868 Nationalities Law, Rannicher had spoken privately with Deák, who had been prepared to compromise.Footnote 64 These tactics did not involve any appeal for wider support from the German-speaking world since this may have displeased the Hungarian government. Another camp was the ‘Young Saxons’, who supported the Hungarian state idea and conceived Saxon life largely as a personal matter, subsumed within a greater Hungary.
Teutsch, in particular, began to place hope in Imperial German support. In the early to mid-1870s, he published a number of essays, anonymously, in Treitschke's Preussische Jahrbücher trying to mobilize German official and public opinion. The first essay appeared in 1872 portraying the Saxons as an upstanding Bürgervolk (citizenry), progressive Protestants, and proud Germans.Footnote 65 Teutsch was highly critical of the present Hungarian state, claiming it was ‘a chauvinist power which struggled for sole dominance, which wanted to destroy the presence and the roots of the vigorous German tree’.Footnote 66 According to Teutsch, the Hungarian state idea professed liberalism and reform, but in fact operated as absolute parliamentary control over the state with no rights for the minorities. In conclusion, Teutsch called for support from the ‘Motherland’ (a term he constantly used for Germany) but also peaceful co-existence with the Hungarian state based on respect for Saxon rights and laws.Footnote 67 There was an echo in other German journals, such as Die Grenzboten, which published two articles mirroring the ideas in Teutsch's essay.Footnote 68
In the meantime, Hungarian politics was in a state of flux moving in the direction of increased centralization and more strident nationalism. Many of the older, more moderate Hungarian political leaders were leaving the national political stage for various reasons. Gyula Andrássy, the first prime minister under dualism, became foreign minister of Austria-Hungary in 1871. József Eötvös died in the same year. Deák retired from public affairs in 1873 while his supporters were moving towards Kálmán Tisza's more assertive, Hungarian nationalist Left-Centre party, eventually to fuse in 1875. Parallel to Hungarian party consolidation, many Saxons were strengthening their opposition to the government. In the Universitas, there was now a solid majority insisting on continued Saxon autonomy. Baussnern, for instance, had changed sides and now strongly opposed Magyarisation in general and the specific reforms to the Königsboden.Footnote 69 The Universitas presented two majority petitions (December 1872 and December 1873) to the Hungarian interior minister asserting the Saxon oppositional viewpoint. Essentially, the petitions affirmed the unity of the eleven Saxon municipalities as represented in the Universitas, the election of officials (rather than appointments) and continued self-administration. The 19 December 1873 petition, in particular, stressed that any changes should be negotiated through the Universitas and the municipalities.Footnote 70 In an open letter dated 23 May 1874, Baussnern wrote of ‘the almost unbearable conditions…that have generated the feeling of bitter disappointment’.Footnote 71 These strong sentiments placed considerable pressure on the Saxon parliamentary representatives in Budapest to leave the fracturing Deák party and enter into opposition.
A number of heated meetings both in Budapest and in Saxon towns about moving into open opposition placed enormous pressure from below on the Saxon parliamentary representatives. Divisions amongst Saxons were particularly evident within localities.Footnote 72 This was, to a large extent, a continuation of the bitter struggle between ‘Old Saxons’ and ‘Young Saxons’, though some individuals had swapped sides, like Baussnern. Prominent ‘Young Saxons’ such as Friedrich Wächter (from Kronstadt) and Karl Fabritius (a priest from Schässburg) were not prepared to break with the government party, despite considerable pressure from sections of the Saxon public and press. Both Wächter and Fabritius would eventually vote in support of the 1876 Königsboden law. Jakob Rannicher and his moderate position suffered amidst the antagonism and hardening of stances.Footnote 73 In March 1874, when ten Saxon parliamentarians finally left the Deák party, Rannicher remained. At a meeting in Hermannstadt, his actions were denounced by his electorate and there was an effective vote of no confidence in him. Allegations were made that Rannicher's position in the education ministry meant he could not challenge the government. Rannicher denied this. Privately, Rannicher counselled moderation, flexibility, and understanding with the Hungarian government and politicians, rather than the desperate politics of ultimatums.Footnote 74 In a long letter dated 31 March 1874, Rannicher summed up his views in the following words: ‘We Saxons are not in the position to burn the bridges behind us.’Footnote 75 Rannicher instinctively looked to negotiate with the state authority – whether in Vienna or Budapest – rather than turning outwards to Germany for support. Rannicher described the oppositional stance as useless isolation ‘finally turning one's back and breaking all bridges to a possible understanding’.Footnote 76 He died shortly afterwards of tuberculosis on 8 November 1875, greatly troubled by the events of the last two years.
In the heated political environment, many Saxons placed their hopes on possible help or influence from Imperial Germany. At one of the preparatory meetings in November 1873 about the SDW becoming a daily newspaper, Baussnern proposed a clause on promoting and caring for the spiritual connection between the Saxon people and Germany.Footnote 77 It was subsequently adopted. The editorship was offered to Karl Wolff and, in the lead article of the SDT’s first edition, he struck a new note of passion. He wrote of ‘forced language use’ (Sprachenzwang) and the ‘hot blooded chauvinism of the Magyars’.Footnote 78 Wolff counselled a defence of municipal and church autonomy in the struggle ‘for the just existence (Dasein) of a people’.Footnote 79 Around this time, there was a concerted wave of publications in Imperial Germany about the Transylvanian Saxons. Teutsch's personal connections were important. He published another article in Treitschke's Preussischer Jahrbücher, while a new German edition of his general history was reprinted (arranged by Wattenbach through his publisher Samuel Hirzl).Footnote 80
Two substantial books on the Transylvanian Saxons intended for the general German public also appeared in 1874, including one anonymously written by Guido Baussnern. In a private letter, Baussnern described his hope that the ‘moral intervention of the German Volk would settle matters in favour of the small Saxon house’.Footnote 81 The book begins with Baussnern expressing his disappointment at Hungarian policy. After the great hopes of 1867 and the reputation of Hungarians as lovers of freedom, the subsequent years had witnessed the Hungarian parliament relentlessly pursuing a policy of Magyarization.Footnote 82 Baussnern argued that
[The Saxon nation] demands nothing more or less than the recognition of those rights, which are inscribed in inextinguishable words within the foundation documents of each nation and nationality, and which are also written in the modern spirit in the laws – the right to live and to develop in accordance with its own character.Footnote 83
Baussnern was against assimilation into Magyar society since he believed the Magyar cultural level was far below that of the German people.Footnote 84 It was, according to Baussnern, not a world language, had no high literature, nor culture, nor ethics, nor administrative talent – there was no Shakespeare, Byron, Voltaire, Mirabeau, Schiller, Goethe, or Humboldt!Footnote 85 Certainly, the Hungarians could offer a love of freedom, Baussnern conceded, yet this was coupled with a tendency towards totalitarianism. Baussnern, under the cloak of anonymity, called Magyarization ‘a formal war of extermination against all’.Footnote 86 In fact, he was so worried over these strong statements that he expected to be jailed for the publication of the brochure if his identity was revealed.Footnote 87 Nevertheless, Baussnern had not lost all hope of co-operation and concluded his book by calling for a common Magyar-German cultural mission to the East.Footnote 88
The other book appearing in 1874 came from the pen of Franz Löher, a native of Paderborn, a veteran German democrat and now a respected historian in Munich. Löher had also written the foreword to Baussnern's book. Löher's own book, entitled Die Magyaren und andere Ungarn, condemned the recent tyranny of the Hungarian government and its policy of Magyarization.Footnote 89 He agreed with Baussnern that the existential threat to Hungary came from Russia and only Germany could protect Hungary in a future battle of the races (Völker).Footnote 90 Indeed, Löher argued for increased trade and general links between Germany and Hungary.Footnote 91
Löher's book provoked a spirited brochure setting out the Hungarian case.Footnote 92 The Transylvanian Saxons were portrayed as uncommitted to the Hungarian state idea, while other German-speakers in Hungary, more open to assimilation and freedoms, were praised as the ‘most patriotic, hard-working, loyal sons of Hungary’.Footnote 93 Saxon antiquated privileges and special rights were contrasted with the Hungarian aim of a modern legal system based on liberal institutions and the equality of rights. As evidence of Hungarians’ modernizing convictions, the author cited the voluntary end to Hungarian noble tax exemptions, which had been in accordance with the spirit of the age.Footnote 94 The Universitas Saxonum, on the other hand, was branded a ‘mummy from medieval times’.Footnote 95 No mention was made of the contradiction, pointed out by an article in the Preussische Jahrbücher, that the Hungarians had relied on historical rights in their fight against Vienna yet condemned traditional Saxon rights as outdated privileges.Footnote 96 In relation to possible support from the wider Germanic world, Saxon politics within Hungary was, according to the brochure, not a matter for Imperial Germany or its people.Footnote 97
The German government indeed remained silent, though the foreign ministry was informed about the Hungarian government and its policies. There were a series of detailed reports addressed to Bismarck from the general consul in Budapest, Ludwig Wäcker-Gotter. These plotted and explained the various changes in Hungarian politics.Footnote 98 In a report from 2 March 1875, Wäcker-Gotter commented favourably on the formation of a united Hungarian liberal party under Tisza.Footnote 99 Hungary and the Habsburg monarchy would be more stable, he reasoned, and this was of primary importance for Germany.Footnote 100
The municipal laws eventually came up for parliamentary debate in March 1876. Kálmán Tisza, now interior and prime minister as well as leader of the dominant parliamentary party, was personally responsible for the legislation. The proposed laws confined the jurisdiction of the Universitas Saxonum to cultural matters (including school funding) and to administration of its property. This meant that the Universitas would no longer have any form of political, administrative, or legal authority or function and the interior minister would have oversight of its operations at all times. Finally, the Saxon administrative districts would be redrawn to harmonize with the Hungarian Comitat system, meaning a dilution of Saxon control through the incorporation of more Romanian- and Hungarian-speakers.Footnote 101 The majority of Saxon parliamentarians (fourteen out of sixteen) were determined to fight the legislation, even though there was an overwhelming Magyar majority in parliament and no chance of stopping its adoption.Footnote 102
In the debate, Baussnern began his speech boldly, stating that in the Hungarian parliament there was no observance of law (Gesetzachtung) or feeling for rights (Rechtsgefühl).Footnote 103 These were sensitive topics for the legal-minded, combative Hungarian politicians – of whatever political stripe – and the Speaker of the House called him to order. When he continued, Baussnern asserted that the Saxon nation's existence was contained in the laws and associated promises. These were not being upheld or kept, according to Baussnern, because in contravention of laws from 1791, 1848, and 1868 guaranteeing Saxon political and territorial integrity, Hungarian parliament and law were dismembering the Königsboden. His arguments and Saxon opposition in parliament were to no avail. Once the law came into effect, Friedrich Wächter, who had introduced, supported, and voted for the law, received his reward: the post of Saxon count and Hermannstadt lord lieutenant, thus becoming head of the surviving Universitas Saxonum.
The parliamentary debate was followed by the German consul Wäcker-Gotter, who expressed some sympathy for the Saxon plight in a report dated 25 March 1876.Footnote 104 He described the Saxon speeches as ‘uncommonly passionate’ and opined that ‘certainly what is happening to them is unjust’. Nevertheless, Wäcker-Gotter balanced these sympathies with the acknowledgement that historical privileges had to fall in the interests of modern state development. In particular, the old Königsboden administrative territorial divisions were described as ‘geographically impractical’ and ‘parcels and enclaves’. Wäcker-Gotter presented a balanced assessment of the law and certainly did not demonstrate overly strong support for the Saxons. Clearly, the German government had no intention of intervening in a domestic matter, especially for a region where continued stability was the priority.
After the passage of the 1876 municipal law, Teutsch wrote bitterly to Treitschke about the end of Saxon local autonomy. Privately, Teutsch continued to want an end to the dualist system.Footnote 105 Treitschke was more circumspect since an uprising in the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire was unfolding. In a letter dated 5 August 1876, Treitschke stated his belief that it would be unpatriotic to comment publicly on Bismarck's foreign policy, especially at a time of changing alliances and the possibility of a Balkan War.Footnote 106 However, in his later letter of 2 December 1876, Treitschke wrote that it was now finally time for the German press to fight the ‘arrogance of the Magyars’.Footnote 107 As ever, Treitschke was balancing between two positions: on the one hand, non-intervention for the sake of regional security and German diplomatic interests; on the other hand, intervention to aid fellow German-speakers and to protect the threatened Deutschtum in the East. In any event, the next sustained campaign in Germany to support the Saxon cause occurred in 1881 with the formation of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein (ADS) in Berlin, which also foundered on official silence and general public indifference.Footnote 108
IV
After the fight against the 1876 Königsboden law, there were many Saxons who believed continued struggle was useless and that an agreement with Hungary was needed. Baussnern was now counselling reconciliation with the Hungarian government.Footnote 109 He stood down from his Mediasch parliamentary seat in April 1878, since he had been elected on the platform of opposition to the government. In his resignation speech, Baussnern stated that after the unsuccessful fight against the Königsboden law it was time to ‘finally make peace’ with the Magyars.Footnote 110 Baussnern even opined that perhaps a compromise in the municipal autonomy question would have been better than hard opposition – this from one of its strongest advocates who had even contemplated going to jail for the Saxon cause! For Baussnern, the instability in the Balkans and the military actions of Russia were of overwhelming importance. Baussnern was immediately re-elected to parliament in nearby Agnetheln as a government candidate. He then sat with and supported the Tisza government in parliament over the next decades. For Baussnern, the signing of the dual alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary on 7 October 1879 was the culmination of his principal political goal and affirmation of his recent switch to the government ranks. By 1889, Baussnern could assert that ‘the Magyars in Austria-Hungary are the strongest and most secure support for the German alliance’ and that the only means to secure the existence of the Saxons was through the Hungarian state idea.Footnote 111 While Baussnern supported and served the Hungarian government and state, he did so as a Saxon and German.Footnote 112
Teutsch, too, was starting to move away from oppositional tactics. In 1882, after the events surrounding the ADS, Teutsch spoke with the Hungarian cultural and education minister Ágoston Trefort about the need for peace. Throughout the mid- to late 1880s, Teutsch attempted to bring about some understanding with the Hungarian government, though Tisza's considerable presence proved a stumbling block.Footnote 113 In the course of the 1880s, Karl Wolff, who had now become one of the acknowledged Saxon leaders both as editor of the SDT and as a parliamentarian from 1881, also moved from political opposition towards a more conciliatory position. He resigned from the editorship of the SDT in 1885 to become the director of the Hermannstädter Allgemeine Sparkassa (Hermannstadt General Savings Bank), then left parliament in 1887. Eventually Teutsch, Wolff, and Baussnern (the last from the government benches) began working behind the scenes for an understanding with the Hungarian government and a unified Saxon stance of reconciliation, which was achieved at the 1890 Saxon Day.Footnote 114
Many of the individuals in this article began their political careers with Saxon defence, opposition to the Hungarian government and desire for German support, then moved gradually to an acceptance of the existing conditions and resignation at the Saxon position. The reasoning varied according to each individual depending on their own mix of belief in common German culture, political possibilities, geopolitical considerations, and widespread indifference to German–Transylvanian Saxon links. Teutsch held to his pro-German convictions the longest and had the closest personal connection with Imperial Germany, but eventually accepted the situation (and Imperial German indifference). Similar processes were occurring in Imperial Germany amongst the sympathizers and advocates for the Saxons. Wattenbach retained an interest in Saxon affairs and revisited Teutsch in 1881. Shortly afterwards, he became involved in the formation of the ADS and its initial campaign to aid the Transylvanian Saxons. His final published piece in the late 1890s was a review of a book edited by Friedrich Teutsch, who had been his lodger while a student in Heidelberg. He called the recent history of the Saxons ‘a history of suffering’ but also acknowledged that both externally and internally the Saxons now accepted dualism and had to make the best of the situation.Footnote 115
The dualist system and the unification of Germany brought about fundamental changes to Saxon politics. Hungarian political dominance and potential aid from Imperial Germany introduced new factors to the Saxon political matrix. After initial hope and a push for support, German state and diplomatic pragmatism allied to a general public indifference meant there was little chance of concrete benefits or any alleviation of the Saxon situation from Imperial Germany. Yet notions of German solidarity did not disappear after its failure as a political tactic. Abstract ideas of a common shared culture with the wider German-speaking world persisted, though now divorced from the official policies of the German state. Vague pan-Germanism found some followers, especially around Kronstadt and the ‘Green’ movement, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, partly in response to the conciliatory stance at the 1890 Saxon Day. Others, including Baussnern, gradually assimilated into the Hungarian elite, while continuing to assert their individually defined German and Saxon identities. The German nationalist element in Saxon politics thus changed and transformed, waxed and waned, seemed all-important for some or irrelevant for others. There was a spectrum of strategies and responses by Saxons as they adjusted to and negotiated the post 1867–71 situation – subsumed within a powerful Hungary, detached from other German-speakers within the Habsburg empire, neglected by an acquiescent monarch in Vienna, subjected to demographic and economic pressures, then shorn of autonomy and largely ignored by Imperial Germany.
