The large January 2015 demonstration in Paris after the attacks by Islamist extremists on Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket makes it easier to accept the core argument of this book—that Danes, contrary to their reputation for Islamophobia, are pretty good arbitrators of the application of abstract principles about equity when it comes to judging what civil liberties to grant Muslims. The authors extrapolate their findings to a general argument about what they call “inclusive tolerance” based on a “tough love” covenant: Do as we do, and we are happy to include you. As the title of the book indicates, the study of the Danes has broader implications for how we understand European attitudes to the integration of Muslims.
The throngs in Paris exhibited a remarkable degree of social cohesion and reciprocity. Muslim and Jewish neighbors from the banlieues—which actually are just large housing complexes rather than fearful ghettos—turned up carrying placards saying #JeSuisJuif (I-am-a-Jew) and #JeSuisAhmed (I-am-Ahmed), a reference to the Muslim policeman killed on the street by the assassins exiting the magazine’s office. Unity was quickly pierced days later by Islamist attacks on synagogues and Marine Le Pen’s invocation of the “Islam is the problem” meme. The return to politics as usual notwithstanding, we witnessed an impressive display of a core fact. The French—like other Europeans—have come a long way toward accepting religious and racial pluralism.
Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy is based on survey data collected between February and August 2006 in several locations in Denmark. The dates of the interviews coincided with the unexpected explosion of worldwide protests against 12 cartoons published in an editorial in a Danish provincial newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in 2005, five months earlier. Most of the interviews were conducted between March and May, at the height of the protests. The questions put to the respondents were designed to elicit attitudes about social trust, economic policy and welfare state redistribution, immigrants and what Danes legitimately can demand from them, and “cultural ideology.” This included a strange mix of questions about ecology and surveillance, as well as the old test of authoritarian personality desires for “strong man” politics (pp. 157–65).
This is a complicated book presenting a complicated argument, and Paul Sniderman and his coauthors are to be praised for laying out their argument with admirable clarity. The authors are justifiably keen to impress on the readers that they used an experimental control-case methodology. Rather than asking all respondents to rate Muslims against other groups assumed to be subject to dislike and fear, the respondents were divided into panels each of which was questioned about the level of their toleration for a particular group. Their point—which is a good one—is that traditional survey procedures often prod respondents to make insidious comparisons by asking survey participants to rank-order groups. It is not the relative level of dislike or toleration that is of interest but the absolute level of tolerance (p. 143). The panel data were pooled to compare how tolerant respondents are—using the same metrics—toward different groups known to be generally disliked and even feared.
The logic of a model comparing popular attitudes toward Muslims with attitudes toward Evangelical Christians may not be obvious to most readers. The authors do a good job of providing such explanations in this well-written book. Every country has its own “out-group,” and in Denmark the overtly religious folks are it. Danes have a strong preference for quietist religion. Evangelical Christians and Muslims are presumed to be governed by their religious beliefs to a degree that is exceptional in Denmark. Therefore, the Evangelical Christians represent a good same-case comparison for a model that aims to control for the specificity of being Muslim.
Using this methodology, the authors find that the respondents were generally willing to extend to Muslims the same freedoms and rights that they would grant to Evangelicals. And it turns out that when it comes to risk perception, Muslim extremists were rated about as dangerous as neo-Nazis or left-wing extremists.
The main conclusion of the study is that in “long established democracies . . . judgments about core political rights are anchored in consensual rules identifying which controversial groups should be categorized as dangerous or not, and which individuals should be entitled to the benefits of the welfare state or not” (p. xiv).
When it comes to how their tax money is used, Danes are more censorious. Entitlements are the Achilles’ heel of Danish toleration. Perhaps unexpectedly, Danes are willing to grant young Muslim men the same license to take their time to find a job that they grant all young men—but when it comes to older women they are not so tolerant. In fact, the level of overt dislike of nonworking older immigrant women is astounding. It is interesting to note that the left wing is about as willing to use social policy to force immigrants into the work place as is the Far Right (p. 71).
The authors’ explanation is that the social compact behind the welfare state stresses obligations over entitlement—you work and pay into the collective purse. When you cannot work, but only then, you are entitled to support. On the left, judgment eases when children are mentioned, but paradoxically not for the respondents who self-identified as being on the right. The authors describe the phenomenon as “retrospective judgment” based on the “moral covenant” of the welfare state. Older immigrant women are punished for what is seen as the immigrant penchant for exploiting the welfare state to have many children. Danes, they argue, apply universal principles but with discriminatory consequences for this particularly vulnerable group (p. 83).
The authors are of two minds about the Danes. On the one hand, they conclude that they exemplify an older liberal tradition of “affirmative, supportive, and inclusive … tolerance” (p. 152). Yet the Danes unquestionably also exhibit discriminatory impulses and a lack of charity when it comes to the apportionment of tax money returned to citizens and residents—even “ill will” (p. 154).
Questions arise, as always, about the general applicability of a one-country study. The reference in the subtitle to “Western Europe” and “Islam” indicates broader aspirations. To be sure, some of the findings are likely to have wider application, but others are particular to Denmark. European Catholics are probably less willing to take a punitive view of older women who have stayed home to tend the kitchen fires and who never worked. Only the Dutch and the Danes have, to my knowledge, fixated on forcing older women out of their homes and into mandatory language classes and employment.
I am less inclined to interpret the results of this admirable study as evidence of “inclusive tolerance.” Arguably, the divergent sentiments on civil liberties and entitlement equality are not as much at variance as the authors think. Self-interest looms large as a motivation on both scores. Danes are accustomed to noise in the public sphere. They even like it. The editors at Jyllands-Posten went as far as to say that the right to cause offense was part of Danish culture. The country is home to a long-lived libertarian counterculture. For more than 40 years, public sentiment has thwarted government efforts to shut down a squatter community in the center of Copenhagen know as the Freetown of Christiania. Few Danes condoned insulting Muslims as a matter of principle, but they thought that the newspaper should be free to do so. Like the Dutch, Danes appreciate civic weirdness within limits. If you start restricting Muslims’ right to be different, who knows what the boomerang effect may be on cherished Danish values? Self-interest rather than highfalutin principles about reciprocity provides a cogent explanation for the Danes’ general support for the right to be outside the mainstream.
