Arguments in political theory often suffer from diminished intellectual returns. The leading participants in the debates know the basic arguments for and against socialism, legal abortion, torture, or property rights. Some participants make the moves better than others. For this, they gain better salaries, better academic positions, and, sometimes, better sales. Nevertheless, the basic countermoves almost always remain, needing at most a little more refinement after particularly ingenious interventions. The result is academic trench warfare, where each side expends a great deal of energy to gain a few feet of intellectual turf.
John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness is a recent contribution to the long-standing debates over governmental power to redistribute property rights. The book maintains that classical liberal policies can be justified on the basis of the high liberal principles developed by such thinkers as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls. Tomasi asserts that a fairly limited state that provides substantial protection for property rights will treat people as moral equals and is likely to produce distribution patterns that benefit the least well off. Free Market Fairness deftly executes various maneuvers to reach this conclusion. Those who disagree with Tomasi's liberal proscriptions still have most standard progressive countermoves at their disposal.
Free Market Fairness is a fine book that merits promotion, a merit raise, a cohort of graduate students, a fine reputation, and all the other benefits of academic life. The book is well written and well researched. The arguments are clearly stated and well defended. Political thinkers of all stripes will benefit from Tomasi's discussion of classical liberalism and libertarianism (a distinction somewhat confused by the numerous blurbs on the cover of the book). Tomasi is a classical liberal who believes with Adam Smith and others that breaking feudal chains and restricting state power will liberate the energies of ordinary people. Much contemporary libertarianism, he points out, is far more deontological and less consequential than early classical liberalism.
Tomasi fairly complains that high liberals, who favor substantial redistribution, have too instrumental a conception of economic liberty. Rawls and his allies regard economic liberty largely as a means for increasing income, which provides beneficiaries with more opportunities to pursue truly human goals. Tomasi insists that economic liberty has intrinsic value. Free Market Fairness claims that we should treat humans as moral by respecting their choices about how much work they wish to do for what salary, or how much health insurance they wish to purchase at what price. “For many people,” Tomasi observes, “independent economic activity is an essential, ongoing part of a well-lived life” (183).
Free Market Fairness as vigorously insists that a limited state might provide a fairer distribution of economic goods than a socialist regime. Economic growth, Tomasi argues, creates a rising tide that lifts all boats. Assuming, and Tomasi insists on this assumption, that the government provides a safety net for the truly needy, state policies that encourage economic growth provide more material benefits to the working poor than state policies that redistribute income. In his view, “economic growth” is “an antidote to the problem of worker vulnerability in postindustrial societies” (110).
Both insights have merit when properly cabined. The vast majority of people spend far more time working than pursuing leisure-time activity. A political theory that restrains what most people do sixty hours a week to free people to pursue human goods six hours a week seems silly. Professors should be particularly sensitive to economic liberties, given that most have clearly traded the income they could earn as, say, lawyers for less stressful working conditions. Tomasi also correctly notes that limited government might better realize the Rawlsian principle that policies should benefit the least well off in society. Rawls and most high liberals have little training in economics and related subjects. At the very least, therefore, a political philosophy committed to achieving certain distributional outcomes should be a bit more agnostic on the policies that will actually achieve those outcomes.
How far these arguments push the trench lines forward is more contestable. Tomasi's arguments about economic liberties better describe the lives of the upper-middle class than the working poor. Some highly affluent Americans bargain over their precise job responsibilities, their hours, and how much salary they wish withheld for health care and retirement. The working poor more often sign standardized contracts, which they often do not fully understand, but nevertheless have little power to alter. Even most law school graduates find themselves without much choice about the conditions under which they work (if they wish to be lawyers and pay off six-figure debts). Tomasi eventually reaches this conclusion. By the end of Free Market Fairness, free market fairness is pitched primarily as a means for improving the incomes of the working poor, not as a set of policies that will improve their working lives. “Free market fairness,” Tomasi believes “seeks … to maximize the personal wealth of the poor” (192).
History has less to say about the distributional outcomes of classical liberal policies than Tomasi suggests. The Western world witnessed an economic boom in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when certain feudal restrictions were removed. Whether that boom would have been greater if even more restrictions were removed or whether the boom occurred because of the right balance between liberty and regulation is the subject of ongoing debate. Progressives insist that the deregulation of banking played a major role in the present economic recession. Conservatives insist we need more deregulation to jumpstart growth. Everyone with a PhD in a social science knows the basic moves in this game. Nothing in Free Market Fairness or any other book published by a person whose primary expertise is in political theory is a game changer.
Curiously, with very little work Free Market Fairness can be transformed into a progressive constitutional tract. Tomasi maintains that the classical liberal state must have securities for basic minimums. He also insists that the judiciary should provide more aggressive protections for classical property rights. Presumably, therefore, the judiciary should also provide some security for basic minimums to the extent that classical liberal or high liberal policies fail to achieve those goals. At this point, Tomasi morphs into Frank Michelman, who has for forty years championed judicial decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to provide basic necessities for human beings.
The major philosophical advance high liberals made was to insist that persons enjoyed the right to certain basic necessities. Free Market Fairness reminds readers that high liberals were largely speculating when they assumed that democratic socialism was the best means for realizing such rights. The devil now is entirely in the details. Whether political philosophers, even those whose thought is as clear and interesting as Tomasi, have much to say about those details is doubtful.
