This solid book is a case study that explores how interactions between formal and informal institutions shape political behaviour within the local state and within rural communities in China. It is based on the author's extensive fieldwork in a county in south-west China over a decade between 2002 and 2013. Fieldwork is an effective method to collect data on some of the interesting but sensitive issues that this study aims to address. The main finding of the book is that the politics in the studied county is driven largely by “the machinations of informal political networks” or “patronage networks” (p. 7). According to the author, despite reform, the Chinese state is still characterized by a high degree of bureaucratic indiscipline and an absence of rule of law. It is a system in which personal power prevails over formal rule.

Few people would deny the importance of networks or personal connections in Chinese society and Chinese politics. It is not new to suggest that Chinese officials of different levels connect to form factions or coalitions, either. But it remains to be explored how such informal coalitions interact with formal organizations and rules in daily governance at the grassroots level. This book uncovers the ways the local state operates in a decentralized context where patronage networks affect local politics at all levels of the grassroots government, that is, from the village level to the city level. It shows that in a system with fragmented power, patronage networks sometimes help coordinate policy enforcement across bureaucracies. Patronage networks thus supplement formal state institutions by providing a mechanism for bureaucratic coordination and by regulating political competition within the local state, serving to hold the local state together.

At the village level, informal networks based on kinship and patron–client ties play a decisive role in the outcome of village elections and in the distribution of resources. The revitalization of kinship networks serves as the basis of social and political organization, exercising influence in resource management, land use, employment and access to funding. At county and city levels, patronage networks are crucial to officials' career advancement and resource allocation. Cadres who have committed mistakes can still be promoted because of their patrons. Patronage networks are also used to obtain financial resources, such as special-purpose grants or resettlement programmes, for both personal and community interests. Not surprisingly, the way the funds are allocated can fall between a grey area and corruption.

As far as the formation of the patronage networks is concerned, native-place ties remain at the core of the patronage networks (such as Network A and Network B in the studied county and city, chapter four). Networks can also be cultivated through the introduction of a third party as the broker or through guanxi. There is an exchange or reciprocal relationship between patrons and followers. Patrons derive their primary strength from their ability to control the bureaucratic levels of authority, and they are thus motivated to control leading cadre posts. Indeed, the recent corruption cases involving high-ranking officials, such as Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua, show that such network patronage also permeates the high level in the political system.

Nevertheless, despite the permeating influence of networks, they do not always contradict the wish of the Party-state. The book also finds that the patrons lack the incentive to promote under-performing cadres because the strength of the patronage network depends on the bureaucratic skills of its members. Moreover, despite the book's stress on the influence of personal ties or patronage networks, the cases presented in the book indicate that formal institutions can take root and limit the influence of networks or other types of informal politics. The fascinating account of the election of the township head (chapter three) indeed shows that kinship ties, networks with upper-level officials, and irregularities (for example, buying votes) did play a role in the election, but the effectiveness of all these factors had to be decided by the voters. The formal institution of election was not always easy to manipulate, although the selection of candidates was tainted by informal politics and plots. In the election in Haidi township, although the rival, Old Yang, had tried to manipulate the election, he still failed. In the case of Dongli, Long Hair, the incumbent head, also failed despite spending 100,000 yuan on buying votes and using intimidation.

This book suggests that patronage networks can both supplement and undermine formal institutions, but it has not adequately specified the circumstances under which they do so. But overall, this is a very well-researched book that uncovers the operation of Chinese local state in a context where formal institutions interact with informal politics. It enhances our understanding of Chinese local officials' complex motivations in governance and policy enforcement. This book should be of great interest to people who wish to understand Chinese politics, especially the operation of the Chinese local state.