Russia, with Vladimir Putin at the helm, has for some time now been a central focus—one almost might say an obsession—of discussions about US foreign policy, and at times even about internal American politics. From Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, to claims that Russia “hacked” our elections in 2016, followed by President Trump’s near-adoration of Putin, to the current administration’s view of Russia as part of a “great power competition,” it is no wonder that some pundits have claimed that “it’s Putin’s world now.”
In short, a sober assessment about Russia and Putin has never been more needed. Thankfully, Tim Frye has provided that assessment, and successfully so, one that is written in clear prose and intended for a general audience. It will appeal to a wide readership, including scholars and others who do not focus on Russia but want to know more, political scientists who do focus on Russia and will find the broad survey of research helpful, and students who want to get up to speed on what the field of political science can tell us about Russian politics.
The argument is clear, as spelled out in the full title: although Putin is certainly a strong leader, indeed a “strongman,” there are substantial limits to his power. Those substantial limits suggest a notable contrast to what one would gather from popular discussion, including some discourse from the think tank and policy world. Frye takes on two commonly held views about Russian politics, which he summarizes as “Putinology” and “exceptional Russia.” The former view states that the best way to comprehend Russia is by understanding Putin the person, as a former KGB officer who surrounds himself with like-minded security officials or, in some versions, with fellow conspirators in a kleptocracy. The latter view argues that Russia is doomed by its history and geography to return to autocratic rule. Although at times Frye can set up these arguments as straw figures that are easily knocked down, both are prevalent enough in contemporary discussion to warrant attention.
In their place Frye argues that Putin’s rule is best viewed as a personalistic autocracy, one that—far from being distinct to Russia or Putin—has much in common with Erdoğan’s Turkey, Orbán’s Hungary, or Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. Here, Frye firmly grounds his analysis in the literature of comparative politics, particularly the study of authoritarian rule in which personalist autocracy is one subset.
Frye is most eager to expose the divergence between popular discourse about Russia, including among policy elites, and the work that has been done by political scientists. In this effort, the book is popularizing in the best sense of the word. Frye’s analysis remains firmly grounded in empirical findings and is a thorough survey of political science literature, both Western and Russian, on the politics of the country. Thus Frye has provided a considerable credit to the field. As a leading scholar with postings at important research universities in both the United States and Russia, he is well positioned to do so.
Frye’s main goal, however, is to explain that, despite how Putin’s swagger is often portrayed not only in Russia but also in the Western media, his power is constrained by his blunt instruments of rule, difficult policy trade-offs, and weak state institutions. Relying on the findings of comparative politics, Frye reminds us that similar constraints can be found in several (upper) middle-income countries. In addition, personalistic autocracies have particular dilemmas. Compared with single-party or military dictatorships, personalist autocrats face weaker institutions. Studies show that they are more vulnerable to public protests and to challenges from rival elites. The latter concern leads to greater levels of corruption, which in turn can negatively affect economic growth, increasing the potential for protest. Because there is no institutional mechanism for transferring power, personalistic autocrats can find themselves stuck without an exit ramp, with the tendency to cling to power more tightly. All this rings true for Russia.
In Putin’s case his high approval ratings are real (as Frye and colleagues have demonstrated through survey list experiments) but have become something of an obsession. Given much lower approval ratings for other government officials and institutions, they underscore the “personalistic” nature of his rule.
In terms of foreign policy Frye acknowledges that here Russia is truly different, given its imperial legacy, its huge nuclear arsenal, and its seat at the UN Security Council. Yet, although Russia under Putin remains deeply concerned about security in the Eurasian space (often to the detriment of its neighbors), its threat as a military power has been greatly exaggerated: it is vastly outspent by NATO members (even excluding the United States). Moreover, it faces trade-offs in this realm as well; surveys demonstrate that the Russian population is much more interested in social welfare than superpower status. Likewise, Frye corrects the record on the influence of Russian hacking and cyber threats, noting that “few topics have gotten more attention and been less well understood” (p. 176).
In his conclusion Frye provides a concise summary of the trade-offs and dilemmas for autocrats like Putin: “Cheat too much on elections and signal weakness, but cheat too little and risk losing office. Use anti-Westernism to rile the base, yet not so much that it provokes an actual conflict with the West. Use corruption to reward cronies, though not so much that it stunts economic growth” (p. 200). The same goes for dilemmas over media manipulation, political repression, and reliance on security services. Throughout, while explaining the findings of political science research in plain English, Frye adds colorful anecdotes of his personal experience in Russia, starting with his time serving as a USIA guide in the perestroika-era USSR.
In short, Weak Strongman succeeds, and quite well, in what it intends to do. There are inevitably shortcomings, although overcoming them would require that the author go beyond what he set out to do. For one, the political science literature is well surveyed, but we learn little about how Russia might be viewed through other disciplinary lenses, such as history, sociology, or anthropology. Relatedly, although the work of Russian scholars is highlighted, the Russian people themselves appear, if at all, as percentages of respondents to survey questions.
Likewise, although Frye rightly pushes back on the more particularistic—and often intellectually lazy—tropes about Putin and Russia’s uniqueness, the narrative can err on the side of portraying contemporary Russia as just one more personalistic autocracy. As Frye points out, “The former Soviet space has proven to be especially fertile ground for this type of government” (p. 39). Why might that be exactly? Explaining a bit more about how the Soviet legacy combined with the cataclysm of the 1990s could deepen the reader’s understanding of how Putin became a strongman and why he is faced with some particularly dire trade-offs.
Then again, Frye is right to note that in the contemporary world, personalistic autocracy is having a moment. His analysis pushes us to ask further questions. For one, is personalistic autocracy a policy choice or a historical accident? Interestingly, after explaining in depth why Putin is a personalistic autocrat, Frye concludes—convincingly, I would argue—that were Putin to be removed from power, the political picture in the country might not substantially change. He cites the counterintuitive finding that, in contrast to military dictatorships, personalistic autocracies are much less likely to be replaced by democratic regimes (p. 201).
Further, this leads to the question of why this type of autocratic rule appears prevalent at this point in time (and not only in the former Soviet space). One intriguing hypothesis to explore is whether Putin’s style of rule has become a successful Russian export, perhaps somewhat consciously adopted (and adapted) by Hungary’s Orbán or Turkey’s Erdoğan. A more structural question is why middle-income countries in particular seem to be prone to personalistic rule. Is there something about the “middle-income trap” or, viewed through a different theoretical lens, being stuck in the semi-periphery of global capitalism, that explains personalistic rule and the appeal of anti-Westernism and illiberalism?
Again, these are questions well beyond the scope of what Frye set out to address. What he has done quite well is to place Putin’s Russia in context and to bring the findings of political scientists into the mainstream. Popular discourse about Russia will greatly benefit from the book’s wide readership.
