Since its introduction in the early 1990s, the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy change has had a profound influence on the study of policy change processes. Jay Eungha Ryu's recent book exemplifies the steady accumulation of knowledge about punctuated change in policy processes. In particular, Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States provides insight into the impact that bureaucratized budgetary processes have on budgetary outcomes across three domains: federal executive budgeting, federal legislative budgeting, and state-level budgeting. In doing so, Ryu builds on a steadily growing literature on the structural determinants of budgetary punctuations and policy change.
With the recent focus on budgetary indicators of policy change, punctuated equilibrium theory stands at the intersection of many research traditions. Ryu ably situates his study within public administration, public finance, and policy change theories. Most obviously, the tradition has roots within the incrementalist traditional of decision making and institutional change. Here the book traces recent punctuated equilibrium research from its origins in the work of Charles Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky through that of Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner. The review is most valuable, though, in linking the arguments about disproportionate information processing and incrementalism to research traditions in public administration and public finance. In particular, the linkages drawn between incrementalism and recent attention to issues of administration reform (with emphasis on the New Public Management movement of the 1990s), network strategies of implementation, and managerial strategy open new opportunities for inspiration and application of punctuated equilibrium theories.
On the basis of this review of the varied foundations for theories of budgetary change, Ryu narrows his attention to the impact of bureaucratic capacity and centralization on the size of budgetary changes. Here, he represents the most recent wave of research in budgetary change. Whereas early work, particularly within the punctuated equilibrium tradition, was largely descriptive in its illustration of the presence of patterns of punctuated policy change, Ryu adopts an inferential approach to identify factors related to greater or lesser tendencies towards punctuation. In doing so, he illustrates the power of such an inferential approach in its ability to accumulate information about policy-change processes through studies of varied domains and institutions.
The first area in which Ryu investigates the relationship between centralization (of bureaucratic capacity for budget writing) and executive budgeting. Here, he identifies a nonlinear relationship between the number of personnel in a key budgetary agency (The Office of Management and Budget [OMB]) and the size of annual changes in budgetary authority. Initial increases (from a very low level of centralization) reduce the probability of budgetary punctuations—suggesting improvements in rational planning. However, eventually, high levels of centralization reverse the trend and begin to increase the probability of punctuation as centralization begins to hamper the decision-making process. It is interesting to note that this pattern only holds during eras of unified government. Eras of divided government decouple the process from executive budgetary centralization.
Ryu then turns his attention to congressional budgeting processes. Here, he finds a relationship between Congressional Budget Office (CBO) staffing and punctuation that mirrors the nonlinear patterns observed previously in executive budgeting. Here, though, the nonlinear pattern is only present during periods of divided government—the opposite of the patterns in executive budgeting.
Ryu concludes his empirical investigation by looking for similar patterns within state-level budgetary processes. Carefully navigating the difficulties of comparing budgetary processes across various states (and their various procedures, relevant organizations, policy domains, etc.), the author illustrates that the capacity of state budgetary agencies plays a critical role in the rates of their states' policy changes. This illustrates the commendable characteristic of much of the research in the punctuated equilibrium tradition of testing theories against a wide variety of samples, rather than building increasingly elaborate statistical models tested on the same data sets.
This is the point where the book becomes more than a competent, if incremental, addition to the existing literature on budgetary change processes. While the book illustrates that the pattern of centralization applies to state budgets as well, the most distinctive contribution is in the conditional nature of the role of centralization. Centralization operates differently within executive and congressional budgeting. as partisan alignment, veto pivot points, and other budgetary procedures change in order to open (or close) windows of opportunity for budget analysts at the CBO or GAO to buffer the budgetary change processes.
The connection between partisan alignment and budgetary bureaucracies links the literature on punctuated equilibrium and disproportionate information processes to more traditional political science subjects, such as formal models of legislative organization and policy making. While not directly investigated within Ryu's book, an extensive agenda is clearly within sight. Given this preliminary evidence of the importance of partisan alignment as an intervening variable between budgetary centralization/capacity and budgetary punctuations, it is now appropriate to consider the integration of such core concepts as pivot points in congressional organization and the impact of voting procedures. While the punctuated equilibrium literature has developed largely independently of the general congressional organizational literature, this independence will clearly not be the case moving forward.
The chief limitation of the book is that it does not pursue the opportunities that it reveals. Of course, no book can pursue every avenue of research revealed by its results. However, Ryu's text is noticeably conservative in its coverage. In fact, one can fairly describe the text itself as an incremental contribution. The book would have been greatly strengthened by a direct treatment of the formal models of partisan control and policy change—and what these models could illuminate in the budget processes studied here. Similarly, the empirical models sometimes read as an exercise in adding a variable to existing models, rather than as a dramatic innovation in the way in which we understand budgetary change processes.
That being said, this limitation is a commendable quality in the text and the policy change literature as a whole. The various authors writing in this tradition have carefully built on previous work, slowly moving from descriptive studies illustrating the existence of punctuated budgetary processes to informal comparisons of punctuations to, as exemplified in this book, inferential tests of hypotheses related to explanations as to when we should expect punctuations to occur. It is the steady cumulative contributions like this that have allowed the literature to build over the decade. Most importantly, Ryu builds on the existing foundations while pointing the way to vast expanses of fertile territory for future research in the area. He makes clear that the punctuated equilibrium model of budgetary change need not worry about running out of potential additions, modifications, and new questions in the near future.
