Introduction
It is 1970, and in Milan, as in all other Western metropoles, ecology is becoming ‘the most fashionable science around’. So observed journalist Alfredo Todisco in the pages of Il Corriere della Sera, and for him the reason could be, quite literally, breathed in the air. That year, smog in the city reached new heights. Just a few kilometres from the newspaper’s offices, in Milan’s industrial hinterlands, pollution scandals kept being uncovered. For Todisco, if ecology, ‘after languishing on the margins of knowledge like a Cinderella, is swiftly turning into a diva’, that was simply because civil society – in Milan, Italy, and across the globe – was finally becoming aware of a looming ecological disaster.Footnote 1
Especially thanks to his reportages and editorials for Il Corriere della Sera, Todisco played no small role in the growth of a widespread environmental consciousness in Italy during the 1970s. On one level, this consciousness carried a strong sense of collective responsibility: environmental degradation demanded a reckoning with the fallout of industrial modernity’s waste and consumption – in the Italian case, with the carefree ethos of the post-war economic ‘miracle’. Often evoking Kenneth E. Boulding’s popular image of a rationalised ‘spaceman economy’ replacing a reckless ‘cowboy economy’, environmental journalists and intellectuals predicated a societal transformation of values informed by ecological thinking.Footnote 2 On another level, though, Italy’s nascent environmentalism recognised that alongside collective responsibility came individual culpability: pollution also had very specific authors – industries, corporations, business owners. Following the denunciatory path blazed by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, for example, another Todisco’s article from 1970 did not shy away from naming a petrochemical ‘devil’s factory’ that turned suburban Milan’s verdant rice fields into ‘scorched earth’.Footnote 3 Beyond Milan, smog blanketed cities across the entire northern industrial triangle. By the late 1960s, industrial effluents had severely contaminated rivers and coastal waters across the peninsula, from the Po Valley’s waterways and Tuscany’s textile and tanning districts to the petrochemical complexes springing up along southern shores.Footnote 4 Denunciation of this mounting degradation did not stop at the printed page. In the early 1970s, a wave of young, crusading prosecutors – dubbed pretori d’assalto (assault magistrates) – launched thousands of legal actions against polluters nationwide, taking on companies large and small.Footnote 5 Politics followed suit, not least because Italy’s legislative framework had until then barely kept pace with the scale of the problem. A national antismog law enacted in 1966 had remained largely unenforced, while a first attempt at comprehensive water protection legislation had stalled in parliamentary proceedings.Footnote 6 Spurred by mounting public pressure and international developments within both foreign governments and the European Economic CommunityFootnote 7, Italian lawmakers began pushing for closer oversight and regulation of industries’ environmental impact. By the start of the 1970s, then, Italy had reached a turning point, confronting what many contemporaries saw as a genuine environmental crisis.
In the name of ecology, the Italian business world found itself facing what was becoming a familiar pattern across industrialised countries: unprecedented public scrutiny and pressure from multiple fronts. While individual companies seemed to stonewall and stall, likely hoping that the environmental question would eventually peter out as nothing more than a temporary ‘fashion’, organised business argued that business needed, precisely, to be organised in response. Similar to European counterparts, Confindustria – Italy’s leading private business interest association – recognised early on that the challenge ahead would reshape business operations. As noted in 1972 by Diego Guicciardi, president of Confindustria’s newly formed Technical Committee on Ecology:
private companies … do not appear to give the issue of ecology the weight it deserves, given the growing influence that the pursuit of an ever higher “quality of life” already has – and will continue to have – on industrial activity. [They] have so far tended to view these issues as a primarily cultural phenomenon. [On the contrary], the Committee believes they will ultimately exert a considerable influence on industrial activity.Footnote 8
In line with the leadership of Confindustria, Guicciardi insisted that the ecological challenge had to be faced proactively, with a plan, and as a united front. Lest business succumb to the ‘diva’ of ecology, it would have to court her, even transforming itself, in the public eye, into an ecological actor. Amid the uncertain environmental politics of the 1970s, Confindustria set out to provide the leading example for how Italian industry would refashion itself for the ‘Environmental Age’.Footnote 9
This article examines how the world of Italian organised business navigated the domestic and international growth of environmental awareness and regulation during the 1970s. Focusing on the key role played by Confindustria, it charts how Confederation executives and federated companies’ representatives debated and responded to pressures from politics, markets and public opinion to commit to new environmental standards and responsibilities. Most significantly, the article shows how this response extended beyond defensive manoeuvring. Despite internal tensions, Confindustria established a narrative of compatibility between industrial and ecological interests alongside a systematic set of political lobbying practices. This approach proved crucial not only in helping Italian business emerge largely unscathed from threats of regulatory constraints, financial penalties and reputational damage but also in recasting it from the environmental villain into an authoritative voice influencing the production and implementation of environmental norms.
The article draws on and contributes to an emerging international historiography examining the role of business in environmental governance. Recent scholarship has traced how, especially since the 1970s, corporations and business networks influenced environmental policy across diverse national and international contexts and through transnational channels.Footnote 10 By foregrounding the strategic importance of peak business interest organisations, the article establishes an original avenue for exploring these broader dynamics. In particular, the Confindustria case study offers an analytical entry point for observing the heterogeneity and internal dynamics within the world of business as it responded to the 1970s ecological turn. While historiography at times inadvertently falls into the self-representation of public, private and organised businesses as strategic and operational blocs, the article demonstrates how responses to environmental pressures actually emerged through internal negotiations among multiple actors. Rather than treating Confindustria as a monolith, it presents it as an arena where the convergence of different interests – including those of internal officials and technical experts, regional and sectoral federations, large corporations and small enterprises – was far from assured. By recovering these voices from the Confindustria archives, the article thus develops a historical counternarrative that emphasises the plurality and contingency of business engagement with environmental politics, from polemical obstructionism to backroom lobbying and strategic co-optation of environmental concerns.
Moreover, the Italian case yields important comparative insights. Confindustria’s environmental politics mirror, in many respects, discursive and operational patterns observed in other national contexts. Peer associations such as the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie; BDI) and the National Council of French Employers (Conseil national du patronat français; CNPF) similarly established ad hoc committees seeking to shape, rather than merely resist, the terms of emerging pollution policies.Footnote 11 Yet, the institutional landscape that Confindustria navigated was distinctively complex. Unlike cases across Western Europe and the United States where newly established environmental agencies provided clear interlocutors, Italian business had to contend with a highly fragmented state bureaucracy throughout the 1970s, making lobbying efforts potentially more difficult and their result unpredictable. Compounding this institutional complexity, leading state-owned industrial conglomerates established themselves early on as pioneers of environmental action and responsibility, creating a powerful competitor largely absent in other national contexts. And yet, as the article shows, Confindustria achieved remarkably swift success in securing its influence among the country’s environmental policymakers. The very fragmentation of state bureaucracy that might have appeared as an obstacle likely facilitated this political penetration, whereas business organisations in countries with more consolidated and ostensibly more accessible environmental administrations faced more protracted struggles to achieve comparable clout.
The article also contributes to a growing body of scholarship that recentres the environment as a key theme in the political, social and economic history of post-1945 Italy. Several works on the subject have adopted a localised approach, focusing on specific events – such as the 1976 Seveso dioxin disaster and its aftermath – or examining regional case studies and industrial sites within their local environment.Footnote 12 In recent years, more wide-ranging studies have shed new light on the intersection of industrial pollution, environmental governance and business interests through broad thematic lenses such as health, urbanisation and scientific expertise.Footnote 13 Other studies have engaged with these questions by focusing on specific actors, such as political parties’ environmental positions and the policies they implemented;Footnote 14 civil society and mainstream environmental movements;Footnote 15 and industrial workers’ environmentalism.Footnote 16 Despite a recent special issue devoted to the topic, in-depth historical research on corporate strategies vis-à-vis the rise of the environmental question remains rather limited in the Italian case.Footnote 17 Most studies have focused on state-owned enterprises, not least because of the accessibility of their archives. By contrast, the fragmentary nature of private corporate archives and the difficulties of accessing them have left the perspective of private business largely unexplored – even though a few major corporate archives remain available yet underutilised. This article makes a significant contribution towards addressing this empirical gap by turning to the Confindustria archives. Drawing on rich, diverse and previously unexploited sources, it provides an original and detailed reconstruction of how the world of private business, through its principal representative institution, grappled with the rise of environmental politics in the 1970s.
Seizing the Initiative: The Ecology Committee
Founded in 1910 to coordinate and represent the interests of Italian industrial employers, Confindustria established itself during the post-war years of reconstruction and economic boom as the undisputed voice of private business and a powerful actor in national politics. Its membership encompassed the full breadth of Italian private enterprise, from automotive and chemical giants to textile manufacturers and small-scale producers. As the country’s largest and most diverse employers’ association, it presented a unified employer front in wage negotiations with trade union confederations, while wielding privileged access to the ministerial apparatus to shape economic legislation in industry’s favour.Footnote 18 The most significant exception to Confindustria’s representation of Italian industry was state-owned enterprises, which accounted for a substantial share of industrial output, were represented by their own associations and answered to an ad hoc Ministry of State Holdings rather than the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
Like most of its European counterparts, Confindustria’s environmental engagement emerged in response to government efforts to address rising pollution in the post-war years. As parliament began discussing air pollution in 1957, the Confederation established a Pollution Commission which monitored and influenced the drafting of the antismog law eventually passed in 1966.Footnote 19 These early lobbying efforts mirrored the prevailing approach to pollution at the time, which viewed it as a predominantly sectoral and technical matter. As environmental degradation evolved into a systemic and political problem by the turn of the 1970s, however, Confindustria leaders recognised the urgent need to adapt by developing an equally systemic and political business response. In line with contemporary initiatives within European business circles, at the heart of this response lay the imperative to harness and reframe ecological concerns to render them compatible with industrial interests.
This imperative found expression, first, in how officials from Confindustria’s division tasked with ecological affairs – the Central Directorate for Economic Relations, hereafter REC DirectorateFootnote 20 – conceptualised the environment in starkly economistic terms. Rejecting ‘neo-romantic’ interpretations that treated unspoiled nature as possessing absolute, immaterial value, they framed it strictly as a commodity whose preservation – like any other dimension of welfare – carried a concrete price and demanded cost–benefit calculation.Footnote 21 From this purely economic perspective, pursuing zero environmental impact appeared fundamentally unrealistic and misguided: ecological measures must not compromise the ‘free pursuit’ of other material benefits, much less result in the ‘subversion’ of the ‘production system’ purportedly sustaining such freedom.Footnote 22 Quite the contrary: while recognising the need for ecological protection, central to this framework was the unwavering primacy of market-oriented economic growth over clean air and water. ‘Realistic’ and ‘pragmatic’ environmental policy, therefore, should aim to contain pollution and degradation ‘within limits acceptable to the kind of society we live in today’: acceptable, certainly, to public health, but above all to the economic freedom of business.Footnote 23 What is more, while in the short term ‘containment’ through regulation of industrial activity could be tolerated, Confindustria officials envisaged a progressive shift towards a system of environmental governance predominantly grounded in prevention. By ‘educating rather than imposing, and convincing rather than punishing’, such an approach would not just become compatible with industrial interests, but ultimately recast business as a central actor in its design and implementation.Footnote 24 Embracing the techno-optimist outlook of those years, technological innovation was presented as the key to pollution prevention. Given their purported capacity to develop and deploy these technologies, industrial enterprises would therefore become essential interlocutors with whom policymakers and society at large should pursue collaboration, rather than conflict, to achieve effective environmental protection.
This conceptual reframing found institutional expression in early 1972, when Confindustria established a Technical Committee on Ecology.Footnote 25 By absorbing the earlier Pollution Commission and other ecology-related work scattered across various confederal offices, this new body represented far more than an institutional upgrade. Tasked with a distinctly political mandate both within the organisation and in its external relations, the Ecology Committee signalled that environmental policy had become a priority within Confindustria’s broader political agenda.Footnote 26
As evident from its composition, the Committee was designed to serve three key internal functions: forging a common line among major industrial stakeholders; fostering the participation of the entire confederal network and leveraging the technical expertise and political links of influential figures in and around the world of business. REC Directorate officials were careful to ensure balanced representation across sectors, appointing executives from major polluting industries – especially FIAT in automotive, Montedison in petrochemicals and Shell Italia in fossil fuels.Footnote 27 Diego Guicciardi, outgoing president of Shell Italia, was appointed Committee president. Regional and sectoral representation was anchored by figures like Sergio Pampuro, secretary-general of Assolombarda, one of the Confederation’s most powerful regional associations from Italy’s industrial heartland. The Committee’s membership list also featured prominent names such as Piero Giustiniani, former president of the European Economic and Social Committee with extensive ties in the chemical sector, and especially Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei, co-founder of the Club of Rome.Footnote 28
At the Committee’s inaugural meeting in April 1972, the main item on the agenda addressed Confindustria’s public ecological stance. The REC Directorate outlined two possible orientations. The first was essentially reactive: intervening ex-post to contest or temper policies ‘autonomously conceived by public authorities or suggested to them by public opinion’. The second was markedly proactive: investing time and resources to shape the terms of environmental debates and policies from their earliest stages.Footnote 29 The Ecology Committee’s endorsement of the latter ratified what was clearly Confindustria’s preferred pathway. All the parties involved agreed that this more ambitious and assertive strategy would enable them ‘not only to contest the many unwarranted accusations levelled at industry in the name of ecology, but also to contribute to resolving the current ecological crisis’.Footnote 30
Following this deliberation, the Ecology Committee was tasked with discussing and amplifying Confindustria’s engagement in international environmental initiatives. A key objective was securing coordination of environmental policies across international and European arenas, ideally towards the least stringent common denominator. Shared widely among business organisations internationally, such push for coordination aimed to prevent ‘market distortions’ arising when firms faced divergent regulatory burdens depending on their national location.Footnote 31 To this end, the REC Directorate regularly turned to the Ecology Committee for input on international policy documents, informing both the broader position of Italian business within UN and EEC forums and Confindustria’s specific stance within European business federations, most notably UNICE and CIFE.Footnote 32 Confindustria’s penetration of these international networks operated also through the individual engagement of Ecology Committee members. President Diego Guicciardi played a key role in this regard. As a member of the International Chamber of Commerce’s environmental committee and UNICE delegate to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Guicciardi worked actively to elevate the Ecology Committee’s international standing: he was the one, for example, who took the initiative of recruiting Peccei. Guicciardi’s international credentials also served Confindustria’s public relations (PR) strategy domestically. Speaking on behalf of the Committee, he articulated the Confederation’s ecological vision at two major conferences on business and economics in the EEC held in Italy in 1972.Footnote 33
Indeed, improving industry’s public image in the eyes of an increasingly environmentally conscious domestic public opinion was another primary goal of the Ecology Committee. Guicciardi’s talk ‘Industry and Ecology’ at the Fondazione Europea per l’Economia, which he also distilled into a Corriere della Sera op-ed, laid out what would become business’s core arguments against environmental critics.Footnote 34 This response operated on two registers: defensive self-victimisation and offensive blame-shifting. Industry, Guicciardi argued, was undergoing unfair collective demonisation as the primary culprit for environmental degradation. This narrative was rejected outright, with business positioning itself instead as the rational, expert voice in ecological debates while dismissing critics as driven by emotion and demagoguery. True, industrialists needed to undertake a full ‘reckoning’ (presa di coscienza) with the ecological problem, recognising their share of responsibility for pollution. This responsibility, though, was considered to be unwitting, circumstantial and above all partial. The bulk of blame for the ‘ecological crisis’, Guicciardi and others insisted, lay not with business but with modern consumer society as a whole. Besides Guicciardi, other Committee members as well as REC Director Alfredo Solustri intervened on Confindustria’s behalf to articulate this simultaneously conceding and self-absolving narrative.Footnote 35 To strengthen this argumentative line, the Committee endorsed Confindustria’s undertaking of surveys and research to certify both industry’s relative responsibility for pollution and its commitment to addressing the problem.Footnote 36 As the next section will show, this research agenda would prove crucial not only to Confindustria’s PR campaign but also as a means of securing legitimacy and influence in policy circles.
The importance of data and expertise in advancing Confindustria’s political agenda found further expression in sectoral subcommittees tasked with translating the Committee’s directives into technical counterproposals to government policy and draft legislation. The framework of the earlier Air Pollution Committee was revived and broadened in a new subcommittee addressing water and air pollution. This time, however, it operated alongside a newly established Subcommittee on Territorial Planning. Within both Italian business and politics, a growing consensus held that geographic imbalances in industrial siting – especially, though not only, between North and South – represented a distinctive driver of Italy’s environmental issues.Footnote 37 The subcommittee’s remit, therefore, involved engaging with public authorities for whom territorial planning had become increasingly important, particularly within the framework of national economic planning and the establishment of Italy’s new regional administrative structure in the early 1970s.Footnote 38
‘Quiet’ Environmental Politics
The establishment of the Ecology Committee marked Confindustria’s acceptance that environmental politics demanded head-on engagement. Faced with the high political salience of ecological concerns at the turn of the 1970s, the Confederation wielded the Committee to amplify its voice and assert its authority in the public sphere. Yet the forming of this public front was only one side of Confindustria’s ecological strategy. Environmental degradation and pollution control were viewed as risky ‘noisy’ politics, but the nascent bureaucratic infrastructure of Italy’s environmental policy still offered several opportunities to make those issues ‘quietly’ manageable for private business. Confindustria executives were quick to recognise the substantial influence that could be acquired by penetrating new environmental committees and decision-making bodies away from public scrutiny. Discreet but persistent lobbying indeed formed the ‘quiet’ side of the Confederation’s engagement with environmental politics.Footnote 39 Crucially, this strategy resided in Confindustria constructing itself as the bearer of unique technical expertise and practical experience in environmental matters. This carefully cultivated authority would not only secure the legitimacy and power of private business interests in policy circles, but it would in turn bolster its public agenda with the weight of objectivity.
Confindustria’s interventions in both the ‘noisy’ and ‘quiet’ dimensions of Italy’s environmental politics were complementary parts of a coordinated, multi-pronged strategy, yet operated within a clear hierarchy favouring the latter. Real authority resided with the REC Directorate executives ‘quietly’ pursuing the Confederation’s ecological agenda: director Alfredo Solustri and officials Luigi Felici and Francesco Ferrante, operating under the oversight of Director General Franco Mattei. Guicciardi came to recognise this hierarchy. Despite his prominent role as the face of Confindustria’s ecological commitment, he grew increasingly frustrated that the Committee presidency afforded him minimal decision-making power.Footnote 40 In its early years, the Ecology Committee remained a fundamentally consultative body of external experts, validating or at best advising on positions already determined internally by the REC Directorate.
Confindustria’s lobbying proved rather quick to take effect, reflecting a broader European pattern whereby peak-level industry associations secured early on positions of influence within national environmental governance structures.Footnote 41 What made this all the more remarkable was that Confindustria, unlike its counterparts in countries with established corporatist traditions of business-state consultation such as Germany and France, achieved political penetration with no ready-made institutional channels to leverage.Footnote 42 For all the fears – and fear-mongering – about ecology creating a hostile political climate for business, it is striking that even before the Ecology Committee held its first meeting in early 1972, Confederation officials had secured a foothold in virtually every government body dealing with ecological matters.Footnote 43 The working group ‘Industry and Ecology’, established within the Ministry of Industry in 1971, offered a telling example. Its stated objective was to develop a ‘philosophy of the general ecological problem in its relationship to industry’.Footnote 44 Solustri was invited to participate alongside ministry officials and executives from state-owned companies. That Confindustria would be directly involved in formulating the state’s own environmental philosophy suggested how permeable the boundaries between public authority and private interests had already become. What is more, the contours of this philosophy closely echoed Confindustria’s own. Working Group President Vito Panunzio argued that industry should abandon its ‘inferiority complex’ regarding the ecological question and become instead ‘a protagonist and primary interlocutor’, claiming its ‘full right of citizenship in this new situation now taking shape’.Footnote 45
This intellectual proximity extended to institutional recommendations. One of the main topics discussed by the Working Group was the creation of an ad hoc environmental ministry, as was already occurring in other Western countries.Footnote 46 Confindustria generally viewed favourably the model of the British Department of the Environment, for example,Footnote 47 and Solustri did not oppose such a solution in principle. Indeed, during the Working Group meetings, he emphasised that institutional rationalisation was needed given the fragmentation and confusion within Italy’s state apparatus dealing with environmental matters.Footnote 48 Yet it was also Solustri’s input that ultimately led the working group to dismiss the creation of a dedicated environmental ministry.Footnote 49 The Working Group’s final report concluded that ‘in our [Italian] system’, a new ministry would further exacerbate bureaucratic dysfunction – especially because existing ministries would be unwilling to relinquish overlapping environmental competencies.Footnote 50 While a Minister for Ecology without portfolio was appointed in 1973, the position proved indeed devoid of any effective power. As editorialist Guido Ceronetti acidly observed:
his colleagues from Industry, Public Works, the Interior … will crush him as soon as he opens his mouth to object to anything… . An Italian minister of Ecology seems to me to have only three possibilities: to be complicit, or useless, or to resign as soon as possible.Footnote 51
Echoing what Confindustria had envisioned internally, the Working Group’s report recommended instead an ‘Interministerial Committee on the Environment’ coordinating the establishment of an ecological programme across existing political and administrative structures.Footnote 52 Given the reality of Italian bureaucracy, such a solution likely suited Confindustria’s strategy better than a centralised ministry. Maintaining multiple decision-making venues under loose coordination would have multiplied the access points for Confederation representatives’ lobbying. By prioritising ‘constant concerted action among interested parties’, the Interministerial Committee would have eased Confindustria’s political penetration, while averting the risk of an autonomous centralised ministry whose regulatory initiatives could prove less permeable to business influence.Footnote 53
Confindustria’s influence pervaded the entirety of the Working Group’s report, from its overall ‘philosophy’ down to sectoral recommendations. REC Directorate officials were directly entrusted with drafting the section on water management and decontamination policy – but their authority extended well beyond this remit.Footnote 54 In a private meeting with Panunzio, for example, Solustri and Felici expressed their disapproval of the draft section on territorial planning and proposed their own alternative – which the Working Group subsequently adopted.Footnote 55 Throughout the drafting process, the Ministry representative displayed an alignment with Confindustria’s positions that bordered on deference. This dynamic became even clearer when Solustri gave Panunzio his imprimatur to the final draft, though not before demanding the removal of even passing references to neo-Malthusianism and zero growth, as they formed no part of his ‘spiritual and cultural baggage’.Footnote 56 Director General Mattei could not but note with satisfaction the ‘decisive and predominant’ contribution of the REC Directorate to the published report, seeing how its proposals ‘aligned with orientations that the Confederation had already adopted’.Footnote 57 ‘Quietly’, Confindustria secured public validation of its environmental arguments from a state institution – albeit one historically sympathetic to businessFootnote 58 – at a historical moment and on a subject where such validation could hardly be taken for granted.
These early successes did not, however, guarantee that Confindustria would become the dominant voice of industry in Italy’s environmental politics. The Confederation had to face strong competition from state-owned enterprises – a challenge distinctively Italian in its scale and political significance. While state-owned corporations existed across Western Europe, Italy’s sprawling public sector gave them unmatched economic weight and direct access to government circles, advantages that private industry, however well-organised, could not easily replicate. As Confindustria began constructing its ecological strategy, two of Italy’s most powerful state-owned conglomerates – IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) and ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) – were mounting parallel initiatives to establish their own environmental credentials. IRI – particularly through its steel subsidiary Finsider – sought to acquire a prominent role in environmental discourse and policy, especially by promoting investments in pollution control technologies.Footnote 59 ENI’s expanding environmental ambitions, however, posed the greatest threat to Confindustria. At the turn of the 1970s, the state energy corporation launched a series of high-profile environmental initiatives, culminating in the creation of its subsidiary Tecneco in 1971. This company was designed to operate on two fronts. As a commercial enterprise, it would dominate the decontamination sector, then expected to become a booming market. But its mandate was equally political: by seizing the institutional space that the state had yet to fill, ENI would establish Tecneco as the leading national institution producing and disseminating ecological expertise. Things appeared to be heading in precisely that direction when in 1972, under government auspices, Tecneco was entrusted with coordinating a comprehensive ‘report on the environmental situation of the country’.Footnote 60
Unsurprisingly, Confindustria’s leadership feared that the ‘mushrooming expansion of the Tecneco phenomenon’ would sideline its economic and political interests, if not eclipse them entirely. An internal memorandum spelled out the stakes: without an effective counterstrategy, private business risked finding itself ‘at the mercy of an environmental policy conceived and instrumentalised, ultimately, by ENI – with all the obvious consequences for competitiveness in the production and sale of decontamination equipment, for the choice of [regulatory] standards, and for how certain pollution problems are resolved’.Footnote 61 True to form, Confindustria’s counterstrategy centred on quiet politics – what REC Directorate official Francesco Ferrante called ‘insertion tactics’.Footnote 62 First, the Confederation managed to position itself as a broker between Tecneco and the world of private business – whose collaboration was essential for producing the report on Italy’s environmental conditions.Footnote 63 This foothold quickly expanded: first informally, then officially, Confindustria joined the Committee responsible for the report and secured the task of drafting the section on private industrial initiatives in pollution control.Footnote 64 It was the Committee’s coordinator himself, Gianni Scaiola, who invited the Confederation and publicly praised its commitment, seeing the move as a spur to ‘shake the reluctance’ of other state-owned enterprises – themselves wary of ENI’s expansionism – to collaborate in the initiative. As Felici observed, this instrumentalisation worked in Confindustria’s favour: being used as a stick to prod state-owned competitors into action allowed it to showcase the ‘sensitivity’ of private business to environmental issues.Footnote 65 To allay fears of a blatant ‘ENI-isation’ of the initiative, the government also established a Scientific Committee composed of ostensibly impartial experts overseeing the objectivity of the final report. And yet here too, the Confederation deployed its insertion tactics. In a private meeting with the Minister of Scientific Research, Felici, aided by Guicciardi, secured the inclusion of one name from a shortlist of three academics flagged by Confindustria but ‘free of overly obvious Confederal labels’.Footnote 66
While a national survey of private industrial initiatives in environmental matters was already in Confindustria’s pipeline, it now became an outright ‘counteroffensive’ to prove that private business had just as much will and capacity – if not more – than state-owned corporations to invest in pollution control.Footnote 67 As the next section will show, collecting information for the survey proved laborious, hinging on what individual firms chose to supply. Still, the REC Directorate managed to produce a document that painted a decidedly optimistic picture of private industry’s dynamism in this field. Compared to an early version, the final draft was stripped of overtly political arguments to pass muster with the Scientific Committee. Consulted ‘for understandable reasons of caution’, FIAT, Pirelli, Shell and Montedison voiced some reservations about this restraint, but ultimately fell in line with Felici’s approach of advancing their political case discreetly through the data itself.Footnote 68
Tecneco’s ‘first report on the environmental situation of the country’ – three volumes totalling well over a thousand pages – was officially presented at a large-scale public conference held in Urbino, Umbria in the summer of 1973.Footnote 69 Given the wide spectrum of political, scientific and civil society figures in attendance, Confindustria’s leadership anticipated sharp criticism of its approach to ecological issues. To counter this, it orchestrated a ‘massive presence’ of business-friendly figures across the conference’s various sessions.Footnote 70 The Confederation itself, represented by Guicciardi, was granted a prominent platform. Armed with Confindustria’s survey, Guicciardi’s speech recast the business world as the champion of pragmatic, results-driven environmental action – as opposed to critics who demonised industry while merely sounding alarm bells.Footnote 71 These demonising critics did not materialise in force at Urbino. Ferrante reported with satisfaction that industry as such faced no ‘frontal attacks’, and that its responsibility for pollution was viewed far less severely than anticipated.Footnote 72 On the contrary, the conference unleashed a firestorm of criticism against Tecneco, ENI and the political system that supported it. Media and student protests cast the event as emblematic of the hypocrisy and opportunism with how Italian capitalism and politics handled environmental issues.Footnote 73 Moreover, several participants exposed and rejected Tecneco’s thinly veiled attempt to supplant the public sphere as the chief authority on environmental matters. While industry was inevitably caught in this crossfire, there’s no denying that these critiques – by placing state-owned enterprises on the same footing as private ones – worked to the Confederation’s relative advantage. Ultimately, the PR fiasco of the Urbino conference marked a victory for private business, not least because it significantly deflated competition from ENI in shaping public environmental discourse and policy.
Confindustria’s successful incursions in the dealings of Tecneco only reinforced the REC Directorate’s conviction that developing authoritative environmental expertise through research initiatives was an excellent tool for both political legitimisation and policy penetration. The Ecology Committee itself emphasised from the outset how crucial it was for Confindustria to become a promoter of environmental research. By generating its own technical and financial evidence base, the Confederation could construct an effective discourse validating its political objectives.Footnote 74 This logic underpinned Confindustria’s early involvement in ostensibly apolitical initiatives such as, for example, the Centre of Initiative for Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation (Centro di Iniziativa per la Tutela e la Riabilitazione dell’Ambiente; CITRA). While Solustri and Felici assessed that the Centre bore all the hallmarks of an organisation destined to remain on paperFootnote 75, they took interest likely because of the formal backing it enjoyed from prominent political, scientific and business figures – including Peccei and renowned environmentalist Giorgio Nebbia.Footnote 76 Moreover, the Centre’s approach ‘perfectly aligned with industrial priorities’, as its research and consulting activities would aim at promoting collaboration rather than confrontation between the state and private business.Footnote 77 Hence, according to Felici, Confindustria’s participation would secure another excellent ‘formally neutral forum through which to advance our positions’.Footnote 78
Besides backing external initiatives, this emphasis on research and expertise as a lever for discreet political penetration found its chief expression in the development of Confindustria’s own independent projects. Gathering data on private sector environmental investments remained a cornerstone of Confindustria’s ecological strategy. After the 1972–3 survey mentioned above, the Ecology Committee commissioned an updated study in 1977, with a specific focus on pollution control initiatives by private companies that had effectively substituted for public responsibilities.Footnote 79 The agenda of this research was explicit: ‘to gather information on public authorities’ failures to uphold environmental standards, as a means of highlighting industrial achievements by contrast’.Footnote 80 One of the first projects heavily promoted by Confindustria as evidence of its commitment to environmental research was the so-called Masterli Plan, a computational model developed by its Research Office in 1972 to optimise industrial location decisions.Footnote 81 Framed as a ‘scientific-mathematical interpretation’ of territorial capacity – including acceptable pollution thresholds – the model promised to provide public and private actors alike with an objective basis for balancing industrial development with environmental protection.Footnote 82 Such research initiatives served to demonstrate private industry’s unique expertise and thus further reinforce the case for state-business relations centred on partnerships rather than sanctions. For example, in 1973–4, the Ecology Committee approved a proposal to establish a ‘Central research and analysis laboratory for pollution’ managed jointly by state and private business representatives. Modelled on analogous institutions in England, Sweden and Germany, the laboratory would have developed high-profile environmental research and consulting, serving private companies and public administrations nationwide. As Confindustria envisioned it, the arrangement would have transformed private business from a passive respondent into a driving force in environmental action, while establishing a permanent institutional platform for public–private collaboration.Footnote 83
The Confederation also considered establishing independent research and consulting services focused on pollution control technologies – combining market analysis with practical implementation guidance. However, this more ambitious trajectory was soon overshadowed by an ever-greater emphasis on the industrial costs and broader socio-economic consequences of ‘green’ technological shifts. This research would reveal the ‘real dimensions’ of the economic burden facing industry and society, providing hard data for ‘realistic’ policymaking and thus strengthening Confindustria’s standing in government circles. Quantifying pollution control costs to push back against regulations deemed too restrictive, abrupt or burdensome remained a Confindustria leitmotif throughout the decade. Especially in the late 1970s, Confindustria pressed this argument with renewed urgency, fearing that growing confidence in the profitability of ‘clean’ technologies – and the presumed ease of their widespread adoption – would normalise ambitious environmental regulations. Overall, conducting or flagging research such as this paid off for Confindustria, as it ‘quietly’ helped to establish its authority and secure seats at decision-making tables. Yet many of these investigations struggled to take hold or proved sluggish in execution, undermined by frequent tensions and difficulties with the federated base.
Success Breeds Friction: Challenges to Confindustria’s Ecological Strategy
Stimulating engagement with environmental issues across Confindustria’s membership network proved to be one of the Confederation’s main challenges throughout the decade. The Ecology Committee’s earliest meetings identified it as a central objective. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) demanded particular attention, as many seemed oblivious to the financial and legal consequences that emerging environmental policy could bring to bear on their operations.Footnote 84 Yet the concern ran deeper than SMEs alone: a dangerous complacency across the business world might prevent to grasp the stakes of the ecological turn. As Ecology Committee member Sergio Pampuro put it:
The ecological problem is real, not just an obsession of the Club of Rome or a few other “Cassandras”. Before long – if we don’t start taking it seriously ourselves, both as an organisation and as an entrepreneurial class – the very firms that are least sensitive to the problem today will reproach us for not doing enough, for failing to shake them from their torpor and their optimism at any cost… . The Confederation must therefore have no qualms or hesitations in its action to sensitise and galvanise the membership base.Footnote 85
For Confindustria’s leadership, this posed a particularly acute problem, especially since their ecological strategy was highly dependent on the collaboration of the membership base. The privileged and capillary connection to Italian business constituted one of the key pillars of Confindustria’s authority and expertise. If these connections malfunctioned – e.g. if information did not adequately flow to the centre due to scarce engagement from the periphery – Confindustria’s claim to technical credibility would be at risk. The 1972–3 survey of private businesses’ ecological initiatives for the Tecneco report illustrated these difficulties. Confindustria distributed questionnaires to three thousand enterprises but received responses from only six hundred, mainly large firms.Footnote 86 REC Directorate officials recognised this undermined the scope and representativeness of the survey. They papered over this weakness in the report, presenting the concentration of data from large companies as a deliberate choice based on the assumption that environmental matters would affect them most directly.Footnote 87 In private correspondence, however, Felici expressed frustration not only about the quantity but also about the quality of the material received: even large firms’ participation in the survey was deemed inadequate on account of ‘anachronistic reluctances’ to disclose information.Footnote 88
The Ecology Committee approved a series of initiatives aimed at improving engagement from the confederal membership. In 1974, Confindustria compiled and distributed a comprehensive collection of pollution legislation to help all firms ‘understand and apply confused and uncertain existing norms’.Footnote 89 At the same time, it organised expert visits and meetings with regional associations and SMEs in southern Italy, where business engagement with environmental policy was considered particularly weak. Southern enterprises continued to be singled out as requiring special assistance in 1977, when Confindustria planned a new ‘cycle of sensitisation to ecological problems’.Footnote 90 However, these initiatives appear to have had limited impact. Still in the early 1980s, attempts to launch two new surveys were a ‘total fiasco’ due to foot-dragging from regional and sectoral federations – a development that Confindustria officials considered extremely serious.Footnote 91 This risked creating tensions not only with the membership base, which had to be pressed repeatedly to comply, but also with public authorities, as maintaining ‘good collaborative relations’ with them often depended on the ability to respond to their requests for information.Footnote 92
While tensions brewed internally, externally the picture was markedly different: ‘good collaborative relations’ had indeed become the norm between Confindustria and public authorities. Taking stock of the Ecology Committee’s first three years of activity in 1975, Felici noted how the Confederation’s ecological strategy had successfully tilted this relationship in private business’s favour: ‘after an initial phase marked by an emotional approach, highly critical of industrial activity and therefore hardly realistic, we can register … a more responsible engagement by public authorities’.Footnote 93 The consolidation of Confindustria’s political clout emerged clearly during the tortuous legislative process leading to Italy’s first national water protection law, also known as the Merli law after its main rapporteur. Through the Ecology Committee’s technical bodies and the REC Directorate’s lobbying within the parliamentary committee entrusted with drafting the law, the Confederation had sought to promote a framework of ‘technocratic centralism’ that, it was assumed, would keep water pollution management under predictable and sympathetic terms.Footnote 94 The growing political weight of Italy’s newly established ordinary-statute regions ultimately steered the legislative debate towards a decentralised approach opposed to what Confindustria had championed. Still, what the Confederation conceded in the institutional architecture of the law, it abundantly recovered in its technical substance. The focus shifted towards tilting the law’s technical provisions and appendices in industry’s favour, from widening exemptions and altering sampling methods, to loosening pollution thresholds and extending compliance grace periods. As these efforts proved largely effective, the REC Directorate threw its weight behind the law, and all the more so since this new measure of legal predictability and standardisation would give firms a credible shield against the pollution charges that vague pre-existing statutes had until then left them ill-equipped to contest. Though some sectors of the membership base remained reluctant, Confindustria’s official line of ‘full support’ for the law ultimately prevailed when parliament ratified it in May 1976.Footnote 95
Confindustria’s environmental politics in the second half of the 1970s indeed appear to be defined by an apparent paradox. The more its official line of ‘quiet’ lobbying delivered victories for private business, the more private business grew less defensive and more confident about navigating ecological pressures. As the membership base began acquiring greater influence over the Confederation’s ecological strategy, though, a more hard-line and aggressive stance gained ground and increasingly strained against the established modus operandi that Confederation executives had carefully cultivated.
A first significant sign of this development was the loosening of the hierarchy between the REC Directorate and the Ecology Committee. In late 1975, this body was reconstituted as Technical Committee on Environmental Issues.Footnote 96 While large corporations remained prominently represented, the Committee’s composition became more diversified, drawing more heavily on mid-sized companies, sectoral associations and regional federations.Footnote 97 This tendency intensified following a further restructuring of the Committee in late 1977. The membership base had been demanding greater say since the early 1970s, and this time the demand appeared to materialise.Footnote 98 The Committee grew exponentially in both size and diversity of representation: fifty out of eighty formally enrolled members attended the first meeting in early 1978.Footnote 99 Moreover, participation increased through the multiplication of working groups focused on specific issues previously handled jointly by the Pollution Subcommittee. In this way, the Environment Committee appeared as far less an elite circle of experts and major industrialists de facto aligned with Confederation’s leadership, and more a political body encompassing diverse business interests. Predictably, the REC Directorate did not welcome this evolution, viewing it as an obstacle to its operational autonomy. As Felici observed, ‘we have created Committees open to all Associations and therefore utterly bloated (pletorici) and ungovernable …; the impression has been given that these Committees are consequently “representative” of the base, which cannot be the case since they are merely consultative bodies’.Footnote 100
The predicaments of Confindustria’s leadership came to a head when Montedison’s PR chief Paolo Schmidt Muller became the Committee’s president in 1977. Schmidt Muller had already stirred controversy when he first joined the Committee in 1975. While Montedison pushed to assign him a prominent role, FIAT feared that the ‘excessive dynamism of the person’ would diminish their political weight.Footnote 101 Caught between the political whims of two industrial giants it could not afford to alienate, the REC Directorate brokered a compromise, handing Schmidt Muller responsibility over Confindustria’s international ecological relations. Felici recognised early on that Schmidt Muller’s verve clashed with the Directorate’s subtle methods, yet acknowledged that ‘a certain activism no one on the Committee currently provides’ might serve the Confederation well.Footnote 102 The containment of Schmidt Muller, however, proved short-lived. As the Environment Committee’s new president in 1978, he presented a far more combative line of action than in the past. The emphasis shifted decisively towards public messaging – ‘loud’, pervasive and unapologetic in promoting private business’s ecological narrative and achievements.Footnote 103
Even before his presidency, Schmidt Muller pushed for a stronger industrial voice in the international arena. In 1976, the constitution of a working group on ‘international issues and links with public opinion’ reflected the Environment Committee’s growing dissatisfaction that business interests were not adequately defended in the EEC – whether due to Italian public authorities’ allegedly ‘sporadic and inattentive’ representation, or to the ‘sluggishness’ of UNICE’s lobbying.Footnote 104 Schmidt Muller amplified this frustration with UNICE into outright defiance. In 1980, even though no longer Committee president, he proposed bypassing UNICE’s established coordination framework in favour of direct bilateral meetings between the environmental committees of Europe’s major business confederations. Though the Environment Committee endorsed the proposal, the REC Directorate repeatedly rebuffed Schmidt Muller’s insistence, viewing such circumvention of UNICE as ‘embarrassing’.Footnote 105
Tensions between Confindustria’s leadership and an Environment Committee increasingly swayed by Schmidt Muller’s obstinately unyielding stance culminated with the approaching three-year compliance deadline for the 1976 water protection law. The REC Directorate maintained its characteristic stance: ‘to operate discreetly’ to secure revisions of the law, hoping they ‘would pass unnoticed by public opinion’. This time, however, the call for quiet politics also carried a realistic note: industries needed to be placed on ‘advance warning’ that certain provisions could be neither revised nor postponed.Footnote 106 As Felici observed, continuously demanding amendments and extensions risked triggering ‘a dangerous return of the old anti-industry crusades, given that it was said that the Merli law was wanted and made by us (which is, at least partly, true)’. However, as agitation and denial mounted among large swaths of the membership base, Confindustria’s discreet manoeuvring looked less like prudence and more like retreat. When the Environment Committee took up the issue in mid-1978, Schmidt Muller won out, securing approval for a PR campaign to ‘prepare public opinion for the possible revision of the law’.Footnote 107
The question of what role Confindustria should assume regarding the application of the water protection law continued to be debated even after the 1979 approval of a decree that partly accommodated industrial demands. Member companies – especially those in the chemical sector – did not stop complaining: the mere fact that they would finally have to comply with the law was viewed as an unsustainable imposition resulting from inadequate protection of their interests. Confindustria’s Director General Paolo Savona bluntly refused these criticisms. In a circular to all regional and sectoral associations, he made clear that the Confederation’s defence of private business interests should not be stretched beyond reason: ‘Our action in this matter is, and will explicitly be aimed at protecting those business operations where non-compliance with the Merli law requirements is motivated exclusively by objective and genuine technical and economic constraints’.Footnote 108 And yet, many companies represented in the Environment Committee remained so dissatisfied that they went as far as threatening formal withdrawal from the Confederation in protest.Footnote 109
The turn of the decade marked a concerted push for normalisation within Confindustria. The Environment Committee was reformed once more, this time with Gianni Varasi as president – like Schmidt Muller, another prominent figure from the Lombard chemical sector, but one who proved far more aligned with Confindustria’s leadership.Footnote 110 After all, the smoothing over of internal tensions was facilitated by an ever-improving external landscape. Especially considering the doom-laden predictions of the early 1970s, private business now enjoyed, by and large, a position of political comfort in its relations with both civil society and government regulators. In little less than a decade of strategic adaptation, Confindustria had effectively transformed the industrial position in the ecological discourse: ‘we are no longer the polluters, but the bearers of a function (the producers) that is necessarily linked with episodes of pollution’.Footnote 111
Conclusion
‘The truth is that industry is a counterpower. It is a strong counterpower, a counterpower that is both cultural and scientific.’Footnote 112 This remarkably candid assessment came in 1980 from Piero Bassetti – a prominent Christian Democrat politician and important actor in Italy’s environmental policy during the 1970s. That a leading figure representing political power itself would acknowledge, almost resignedly, organised business as a rival authority in shaping ecological discourse and expertise spoke volumes about what the previous decade had achieved. As this article has shown, Confindustria played a fundamental role in steering private industry out of what threatened to become a political quagmire and reputational crisis, turning mounting environmental pressures into an opportunity to expand its influence over policy and public discourse. Similar to business interest organisations elsewhere in Western Europe – indeed, perhaps more so – Confindustria penetrated government regulatory initiatives while simultaneously working to rehabilitate industry’s public ecological image. In doing this, it also confronted challenges distinctive to the Italian context, most notably a fragmented national environmental bureaucracy and competition from state-owned corporations.
Confindustria entered the 1980s from a position of self-conscious strength. Confidence that environmental politics had become industry’s terrain materialised in 1981 when the Confederation orchestrated an ad hoc public conference in Portofino, Liguria, with all major political parties. This was no collaborative roundtable. If anything, the event demonstrated how the political dynamics of the early 1970s had been inverted. Where private industry had once stood in the dock as environmental culprit, it now positioned itself as a driving force for the right kind of environmental policy, casting politicians as reluctant followers in need of business leadership and expertise.Footnote 113 Bassetti’s blunt observation about industry as counterpower, delivered at this conference, seems almost understated given this bold posturing. Despite predictable attacks from opposition parties, the Portofino event was successful for Confindustria in terms of both PR and political influence – a fitting culmination of the path it had travelled over the previous decade.
Yet this path, as the article has demonstrated, was neither inevitable nor straightforward. Confindustria’s engagement with ecology revealed and fuelled persistent tensions: between officials and the membership base, lobbyists and public advocates, competing sectors and regional associations. Each of these actors brought diverse interests, expectations and approaches to environmental policy, meaning that Confindustria’s ecological strategy must be understood not as institutional diktat but as the contingent product of multiple voices operating in sometimes uneasy coexistence.
Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to the principal investigator of the project ‘Organised Business and Environmental Governance in Western Europe [1945–95]’, Professor Sabine Pitteloud, to the project team and to the whole academic community at UniDistance for their support, guidance and feedback.
Funding statement
I researched and wrote this article while a postdoctoral researcher on the project ‘Organised Business and Environmental Governance in Western Europe [1945–95]’ funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and based at UniDistance Switzerland.
