Doctor Garth, in his admirable poem of the Dispensary, says;— “Even health for want of change becomes disease.” This is the case with nations sunk in prosperity.
(William Playfair Reference Playfair1805, p. 17)I. INTRODUCTION: THE SICKNESS OF THE BODY POLITICK
The comparison of commercial difficulties to a diseased condition of the economic system, as opposed to a healthy state of prosperous trade, is probably as old as economic discourse itself—quite naturally, perhaps, given that ‘political arithmetik’ was thought of as the anatomy of the ‘body politick.’Footnote 1 For instance (to pick only a few from numerous early occurrences), in his The circle of commerce, Misselden wrote very generically of the “dangerous disease of the decay of trade,” for which a “wholesome medicine or remedie” ought to be found (1623, p. 3), while Thomas Mun contrasted “the harmony of [a country’s] health” to “the diseases of excess at home, violence abroad, charges and restriction at home or abroad” (1669, pp. 74–75).Footnote 2 Chamberlayne stressed the analogy of ‘health’ and ‘prosperity’: “Manufacture is to the Body Politick, what Exercise is to the Body Natural, viz. Prosperity to the one, Health and Soundness to the other. Idleness being alike pernicious to both, and causing both alike Debauchery of Manners, Distemper and Beggary” (1683, p. 70). John Battie resorted to the idea of contagion, pointing out that if Britain should lose some of its foreign trade, a chain of effects on all kinds of commercial and productive activities would follow, not only “within our owne Land, [but] will extend itselfe (like an Epidemical disease) into all or most other Kingdomes where we have Trade” ([Battie] Reference Battie1644, p. 8). Daniel Defoe described trade as consisting in “circulating meanders,” the “Health of the whole Body of Trade” requiring that the main stream runs “as to the Center, as the Rivers to the Ocean, and as the Blood to the Heart,” failing which, “our Trade must necessarily Languish, Droop, and Die,” while it has instead been suffering a decay due to “strange shock and Convulsions [and] great Obstruction” (1730, pp. 8 and 18). The reference to illness was often associated with the search of a remedy, in the rather natural assumption that “It being the first Step to a Remedy to find out the Nature, Quality and Root of the Disease” (from the Bookseller’s introduction to Pollexfen Reference Pollexfen1697), which required an examination of the specific symptoms. Generally, writers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries frequently resorted to the analogy between the human body and body politick—for instance, the comparison of the circulation of blood and money, or of the needs of nourishment of the body and those of the society—to discuss the solidarity but also the hierarchy between parts of the body and constituents of the society. This analogy also played a part in the methodological foundation of the discipline.Footnote 3
When, at the turn of the nineteenth century, commercial crises began to increase in violence and generality, and also began to show common features and a tendency to return—at first in England, then also in France and the United States, only later in Germany—the metaphor of disease vs. health was specifically applied to commercial distress vs. prosperity. The association with the search for a remedy was retained, the references to contagion became more numerous and specifically focusing on speculative activities and the spreading of bankruptcies, while on occasion the analogy was made more precise by referring to specific diseases, in particular to intermittent fevers.
The history of the use of the medical metaphor takes place in the context of the early history of the theories of crises, with which it is intimately intertwined. The earliest explanations of the phenomenon relied on the fragility of the credit and debit chain when it is pushed too far, for credit is based on confidence (the term “credit” derives from the Latin verb meaning “to believe”) and is liable to collapse as soon as one feels one can no longer rely on the debtors’ solvency. The analysis soon focused on the institutional setting, encouraging, or at least permitting, the onset of overtrading and speculation on credit. As a result, by 1810 the main bones of a theory of crises that was to be widely shared for a large part of the remainder of the century were clearly recognizable. In the following decade, some writers (including Malthus and Sismondi) focused on the factors liable to cause overproduction or underconsumption, but their position was theoretically defeated in the debate with the Ricardo–Say viewpoint. The overtrading argument, which avoided the obstacle of the impossibility of a general overproduction by moving onto the monetary terrain, offered for decades the only viable explanation of crises, besides those relying on the events of the day. Meanwhile, the first occasional remarks that crises tend to recur with some regularity were strengthened by the observation of new events, and, by the late Reference Cockburn1840s and especially after the 1850s, the feeling that crises are a periodical phenomenon was fairly widespread. It was also observed, beginning from the late Reference Gore1830s, that there is a similarity in their morphology. This suggested to some writers, beginning from the early Reference Cockburn1840s, that these events are perhaps best treated as instances of the same class, rather than as disconnected incidents. The overtrading explanation was further refined, and the principle was formulated that each phase in the succession leading to crises and following them should be linked in a causal chain. But prosperity was still seen as the ‘normal’ state of the system, and it was felt that it needed no explicit explanation. Complete causal chains were formulated only at the end of the century, when the theories of crises turned into theories of business cycles.Footnote 4
Most of the characters who contributed to this development were not professional economists. With Ricardo’s adoption of Say’s Law, theoretical research on the possible roots of crises in the production relationships was, as a matter of fact, choked off, and survived only, for most of the nineteenth century, in the underworld of some dissidents. There were a few ‘mainstream’ economists who felt compelled to admit, under the force of the evidence, that crises cannot be attributed solely to exogenous or accidental causes focused on money, banks, and circulation. Yet, the bulk of writings concerned with the causes and remedies of crises (whether of one specific crisis, in the early decades of the century, or of crises generally at a later stage) was enormous. It consisted mostly of topical pamphlets, the publication of which proliferated immediately after the outburst of each crisis and petered out as soon as the recovery was on its way.Footnote 5 As Ann Fabian remarked (1989, p. 128), “panics produce texts,” most of which were written by amateurs (landowners, preachers, and operatives, but also merchants and bankers, who probably had better competence in the matters under discussion), and a fair share of them was published anonymously. By their nature, most of these pamphlets had only local diffusion, probably not a pervasive one, and, taken singularly, they could have been only scarcely influential.Footnote 6 But as a mass, they reflect the way in which the views on crises were formed, consolidated, elaborated, strengthened, or, on the contrary, abandoned without leaving further traces. A reader can recognize family threads in the arguments and the emergence of some common traits. One of them is the recourse to medical metaphors to qualify crises or discuss some of their features. This is not exclusive: other metaphors were also used,Footnote 7 but surely the medical ones were by far the most common. Nor were they strictly necessary to analyze the phenomenon, but their usage reflects (and, on occasion, helped in framing) some broad views on crises that circulated at the time. This paper examines the role played by medical metaphors in the early stage of the story of crises theories, focusing on the very general interpretation of the phenomenon rather than on analytical details, and on the formation of some views rather than on their solidity and ways of diffusion.
As a preliminary, a brief overview is offered concerning the possibilities opened for thought processes by the metaphorical and analogical transfer of terms and concepts from one discipline to another (section II). The paper then shows that some of the terms used to describe crises have a medical origin (section III). In section IV, I consider the general implication of the medical metaphor to indicate the normal state of the system as opposed to crises, their remedies and the means of prevention. It shows, in particular, that the analogy did not help in breaking the circularity intrinsic in the overtrading approach, which did not clearly express the conditions for trade to proceed smoothly; similarly, health and disease were often defined in terms of each other, so that references to this pair failed to solve the problem. Some more specific usages of the medical metaphor are examined next (section V). The comparison of speculation with a febrile state or with madness shifted the emphasis from the crisis itself to the conditions that bring it about. In this view, the diseased state is no longer the crisis, but the excess of speculation and the overtrading that precede and cause it. The crisis, in this view, is the system’s response to the investors’ and traders’ overindulgence, which the ‘madness’ metaphor explicitly qualified as ‘irrational’ (section V). The spreading of such a state, as well as the transmission of its consequences, was often compared to an epidemic. In medicine there were two distinct (but to some extent complementary) explanations of epidemics, and both find their equivalent in the theorization of the propagation of the causes and consequences of panics (section VI). The metaphor of the ‘intermittent fever’ to illustrate the recurring character of crises is discussed next, as a first attempt to account for the periodicity of the phenomenon, and as a clear illustration of the heuristic role of metaphors (section VII).
Besides not being professional economists, the vast majority of pamphleteers using the medical metaphor were not trained in medicine, either. Therefore, they probably had only a very general and intuitive notion of the concepts they were referring to, possibly differing from the understanding of practitioners, as medical knowledge was developing fairly quickly and radically in the first half of the nineteenth century.Footnote 8 Correspondingly, their metaphors remained at a general level, and one should not try to read into them more than what they can actually say. This was not the case of Clément Juglar, who was schooled in medicine and practiced for a short time. Section VIII illustrates, as a counterintuitive example, how the epistemic contribution to crises theory offered by Juglar anticipated the shift from multi-causal theories to an etiological approach in medicine, in spite of being formulated with the help of medical jargon.
Finally, the demise of the medical metaphor for the description of crises, and its substitution with mechanical analogies, is discussed in the epilogue (section IX).
II. THE METAPHORICAL TRANSFER
While not wishing to provide a full theoretical discussion of analogies and metaphors,Footnote 9 in order to understand the implications of the examples listed in the previous section I find it nevertheless expedient to try to characterize some features of the postulated similitude between the medical notion of ‘disease’ and economic crises.
The Greek word “metaphor” means “transference,” and indicates the transferring of some connotations of an object or concept from one domain to another. As a figure of speech, the metaphor consists in the process of using a word in a phrase designating something with which the original word has no immediate relationship, thereby implying a comparison between the things referred to in the domain from which the words originate and that to which they are transferred. Such a transference can, and often does, have relevance in thought processes, as the comparison is suggestive of similarity in the properties of the objects or phenomena. Thus, one can think (or suggest that the reader can think) of one object in terms of what one already knows of the other object. The metaphor itself is often very general: comparing a crisis to a disease (‘crises are a malady of the body politick’) does not specify in what respect the two phenomena are similar. It suggests, however, that one can develop a reasoning about crises in the same terms as one thinks about diseases. In other words, the concept of malady helps in organizing the concept of commercial crises. The use of metaphors thus opens up the possibility of identifying several (or, possibly, infinite) combinations of similitudes, some of which may be illuminating while others can be misleading.Footnote 10 The writer may emphasize some, explicitly discard others, or leave the task to the reader to whom the comparison is bequeathed. The writer may also use them more specifically to infer, by analogy,Footnote 11 some similarity in form or function between the objects or processes so compared. For instance, if money is compared to the blood of the state,Footnote 12 one can draw some conclusions concerning the effects of its stagnating in the body politick from what is known about its stagnating in a living body.
Such carrying over of properties from an object/phenomenon to another does not exhaust the field of possible similitudes, nor does it help in understanding how analogies and metaphors are used in thought processes. The similitude that the analogical process suggests to explore is not necessarily limited to the metaphorical borrowing of terminology or to the properties of the two terms of the analogy, but can concern the epistemic or the methodological level. The reference to a different discipline is sometimes called to supply scientific foundations for the discipline that borrows terms and concepts, as was the case for the root metaphorFootnote 13 on which the pair ‘disease–crisis’ relies; namely, the idea that society can be thought of in the same terms as an organism.Footnote 14 Correspondingly, the idea that crises are a pathology of the body politick finds a foundation in the medical conception of disease, treats the problem of crises mimicking the medical process (from diagnosis to therapyFootnote 15), imitates the way of asking pertinent questions, and finally incorporates medical terminology and refers to specific diseases or modes of contagion.
Also concerning their functions in scientific texts, it is important to recognize that analogies and metaphors (at all the above-mentioned levels) do not have only rhetorical uses, but can also play an heuristic role; their relevance covers both the conception and the communication of ideas. The rhetoric of metaphors is not limited to the embellishment of the text, but essentially consists, on the one hand, in making the message more easily understandable for the reader by discussing something new in more familiar terms, concepts, and approaches—in other words, by bridging the gap between any new treatment of the problem and what is understandable to the audience. On the other hand, analogies and metaphors assist in carrying conviction, in particular when the writing incorporating them has normative implications. Far more important, however, is the heuristic function of metaphors. The reference to a different discipline often suggests new approaches or solutions to a problem, or even enables the inquirer to identify new problems. In this perspective, the metaphor is conceived not so much as discovering and selectively developing some previously hidden isomorphism between different objects, but as creating such similarity.Footnote 16 Its main contribution to knowledge thus consists not so much in the detailed transposition of properties from one object to another, but in the development of a language capable of articulating a new view of the target object.
If we examine the medical metaphors used to describe commercial crises in this perspective, we will see that most of them are called to play some of these cognitive or communicational roles, even if only occasionally and only in a passive way.
III. BORROWING FROM THE MEDICAL LEXICON: DISTRESS, STAGNATION, CONVULSIONS, AND CRISIS
One should note at the outset that most terms used to characterize such events were borrowed from the medical lexicon or also had a medical meaning. The expression “distress”—in usage since at least the 1720s in opposition to “prosperity”—has a general meaning, also applied to the state of the patient. The Oxford English Dictionary (from which all the following definitions are quoted) gives: “The sore pressure or strain of adversity, trouble, sickness, pain, or sorrow; anguish or affliction affecting the body, spirit, or community.”Footnote 17 “Stagnation,” also to be found in the 1720s in expressions such as “stagnation of trade,” refers to “The condition of being stagnant; an instance of this,” be it of water, ice, or air (in use since the 1660s), but also “Phys. of blood, sap, etc. in a living body” (the first occurrence cited in OED is dated 1707).Footnote 18 In the 1780s, the terms “convulsion” and “revulsion” began to be applied to trade. The former was used only occasionally. The economic meaning was probably extended from “violent social or political agitation.” However, some later uses—in the Reference Cockburn1840s, when the recurrence of crises was taken as an established fact—may have relied on the medical meaning: “An affection marked by involuntary contractions or spasms of the muscles, alternating with relaxation, and producing violent irregular motion and agitation of a limb or of the whole body.” The term “revulsion” started to indicate “a sudden reaction or reverse tendency in trade, fortune, etc” well after it was established as a medical term denoting “The action or practice of diminishing a morbid condition in one part of the body by operating or acting upon another,” e.g., by bloodletting. In the second decade of the nineteenth century, two other terms were applied to crises: “mercantile delusions” and “commercial embarrassments” (a general form taking over from the earlier references to embarrassment of this or that commercial concern), neither carrying medical implications. After the crisis of 1825–26, the terms “panic” and “commercial crisis” were widely adopted to describe the cognate events up to the 1870s, after which “depression” became the dominant form up to the end of the century. The latter has the general meaning of “a lowering in quality, vigour, or amount; the state of being lowered or reduced in force, activity, intensity, etc.,” but also the medical implication of “a lowering of the vital functions or powers; a state of reduced vitality.”
But the most interesting word in this perspective is “crisis,” the first meaning of which is the medical one: “The point in the progress of a disease when an important development or change takes place which is decisive of recovery or death; the turning-point of a disease for better or worse; also applied to any marked or sudden variation occurring in the progress of a disease and to the phenomena accompanying it.” The economic (and more general) sense was transferred from the medical connotation, to denote figuratively “a vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning-point; also, a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is imminent.” The same applies to the term “remedy,” naturally used as the counterpart of the disease to be cured: this is indeed the original use of the word, “A cure for a disease or other disorder of body or mind; any medicine or treatment which alleviates pain and promotes restoration to health,” from which it was transferred to other disciplines and to the common language in a figurative sense.Footnote 19
In all these cases, the metaphorical transfers fulfil only the function of filling a gap in the vocabulary (“catachresis”). This transposition is interesting as it reveals what was the first approach to the subject. It does not, however, by itself carry further implications as to the strength of the connection between the original and the destination disciplines. After the usage has become consolidated, the mere usage of terms carrying some medical connotation must be seen as inherited from common speaking practice, and is, therefore, to a large extent passive and devoid of specific implications.
IV. ILLNESS, THE CURE, AND HEALTH
A number of writers went far beyond the mere usage of terms of a medical origin. They decided to stress the analogy between crises and a diseased condition of the economy, as opposed to prosperity as a healthy state of the system, by means of the explicit use of medical metaphors.
The Disease
Some of these references were very generic, and did not consist in much more than a qualification of economic difficulties as an illness. John Hill, for instance, wrote of “that financial disease under which our country labours,” with emphasis more on ‘financial’ than on ‘disease’ (Hill Reference Hill1810, p. 50). George Chalmers similarly stated that
If the public revenue be ill-managed, unproductive, and unequal to the national establishments, the private revenues of every individual will, immediately, feel this financial distress; both public and private credit, will be infected with the same evil; and the necessary effects, as experience evinces, will be an impeded circulation, which is commonly called, a scarcity of money; and which is the worst disease, that can afflict such a country as ours
(Chalmers Reference Chalmers1817, p. 36).Less frequently, others compared some crisis-generating situations to specific diseases, in particular, cancer,Footnote 20 or with some infirmity such as a “paralysis of trade”Footnote 21; figurative expressions such as “injury” or “wound” or “lesion” have also been in use.
Especially when the medical metaphor was used in such a generic way, writers did not refrain from also using metaphors of a rather different origin. Adolphe Blanqui, for instance, wrote of crises as a “periodical disease” but also in terms of a “storm clearing the horizon” (Blanqui Reference Blanqui1836, pp. 258 and 257). Similarly, Overstone wrote of the “healthy state of trade” (Loyd Reference Cockburn1840, pp. 84 and 90) but also of “commercial storms” (p. 83), and commented that “storms and tempests are not more certain and inevitable in the material world, than are the periodical convulsions of commercial affairs; and they both answer similar purposes” (p. 104). A correspondent of the Morning Chronicle observed that
for the last eighty years we have had periodical visitations of commercial and manufacturing distress, the frequency and the severity of which appear increasing. Are these fluctuations inevitable? Can we no more prevent them, than can we change the course of the wind, or prevent the thunder storm or the hurricane? If so, our fate would be a melancholy one. Our social state would then be afflicted with an incurable internal disease, every paroxysm recurring with more frequent certainty and more violent effect. … But common sense revolts such a notion
(Anonymous 1, 1845).Or again, a correspondent of The Derby Mercury wrote that “That there is a disease in the existing system is manifest to all,” and also that “commerce and manufacture have ever been subject to ebbing and flowing in alternation; and probably ever will be, until some new and effective remedy be devised to regulate the course of trade and check the present evils” (Anonymous 1, 1841). A commentator for The Bankers’ Magazine eclectically drew a number of different metaphors in the same short piece, referring to an “epidemic of failures,” “the present storm,” and “the storm will gradually pass off, having purified the atmosphere of commercial credit during its disastrous passing through it,” the panic that as “a malignant epidemic, has crossed the ocean” (p. 2), and “series of explosions” (Anonymous 1875).
At any rate, even the passing and most generic references to disease in this connection imply, explicitly or not, a comparison with a healthy state of the system. Trivial as they may seem, medical metaphors convey the view that crises/diseases are the expression (or the result) of something not working as it should (or, at least, as it could). The comparison of crisis and disease thus reveals a judgment that the system is not operating smoothly but is affected by some disturbance, often with the implication that the healthy state is the ‘normal’ one. Besides being central in the process of understanding and interpreting the phenomenon of crises, the disease metaphor also suggests as a proper way of approach that the causes of the disturbance can be identified and, perhaps, removed.
The most explicit example is surely Say’s statement that production will eventually find its market, and that any mismatch with consumption can only be partial and temporary unless some
natural or political calamity, or the avidity or incompetence of the Government, force a scarcity [in some branches of production] which causes a glut [in some other branches]. As soon as this cause of political disease is discontinued, the means of production find their way towards the empty channels, and their product absorbs the excesses produced by the other [trades]. Equilibrium is re-established; in truth, it would rarely fail if the means of production were always granted their full freedom (Say Reference Say1814, vol. 1, pp. 149–150).Footnote 22
The origin of the malady is blamed on something external to the proper working of the economic system, which would instead tend towards a stable equilibrium of demand and supply. The formulation of the problem in these terms itself suggests the remedy, consisting in the removal of the institutional cause. The combination of the disease metaphor and the attribute ‘political’ is meant precisely to stress the evil effect of State interference with the economy, and to suggest the appropriate policy.
Further examples are available, before and after Say, although mostly with respect to a general condition affecting trade rather than specifically with crises. An anonymous writer in 1768 maintained that “the present high price of provisions (the political malady under which we now labour) is owing, in a great measure, to the increase of our taxes” (Anonymous 1768, p. 3). Taxation was similarly considered the source of troubles by Egerton Brydges, who stated that “high taxation is …, on the whole, a great political malady, and essentially interferes with the ease, riches, and happiness of the Country, where it has taken place” (1819, p. 216). The prefacer to Law’s Oeuvres wrote that “the scarcity of species … is a political disease, the remedy of which can only be found in the establishment of credit” (Anonymous Reference Law1790, p. ix). With specific reference to the 1825 panic, another anonymous writer blamed stagnation, overproduction, and universal glut on the rigidity of incomes (in particular rents and wages) for preventing prices to fall in proportion to rises in the value of the currency that follow a drop in confidence, and concluded that “such is the nature, the cause and the extent of this political malady” (Anonymous 5 [1826], pp. 1–3). Finally, two decades later Patrick James Stirling neatly distinguished the physiology of trade, in its healthy state, from the result of the disturbances of a political origin:
I might perhaps, without much impropriety, have entitled it the Physiology of Trade; for my design is rather to describe the laws which regulate the operations of trade, in its healthy and unfettered state, than to discuss the origin, symptoms, and cure of those derangements to which it is subject from the action of extrinsic causes. Throughout the entire argument I have taken for granted that commerce is free from external interference of every kind, even from the influence of taxes imposed upon commodities for the sake of revenue. I have assumed that the sovereign power of a state in no case does more than afford protection to industry and security to property, preserving strictly the standard of money once established, enforcing covenants, and thereby maintaining credit; but leaving demand and supply to perform their appropriate functions, without restraint or encouragement.
The disorders incident to trade—a subject more nearly allied to politics—would require a separate and a larger volume. This comes not within the compass of my present design; and besides, it would be idle to attempt a treatise on those disturbances and convulsions to which commerce is occasionally liable, until I had submitted to public judgment my views (which are in some respects peculiar) of the laws which determine value, and govern the rise and fall of profits and of prices
(Stirling Reference Chalmers1846, pp. iii–iv).In these examples the cause of the disease is seen to reside outside the normal operation of the economic system. Some writers, however, argued that the origin of diseases could also be endogenous. Jean-Edmond Briaune, for instance, applied to economics a distinction he found in medicine: “similarly to the human body, the social body is subject to diseases, some of which originate from external accidental causes and only temporarily trouble the vital functions, while others originate instead from organic defects and, on becoming chronic, affect the constitution and development of individuals and societies.” In Briaune’s view, commercial crises belong to this second sort.Footnote 23 Similarly, Tocqueville argued that the recurrence of crises depends on the nature of trading people rather than on external accidents: “I believe that nowadays the return of industrial crises is an endemic disease among democratic countries. It may be made less dangerous, but cannot be cured, because it does not have an accidental origin but pertains to the very temperament of these people” (Reference Cockburn1840, p. 320). The medical metaphor could thus be invoked to support both the view of those who thought that the economic system is fundamentally self-adjusting, and of those who thought instead that the economy can occasionally run into a deep crisis as a consequence of the operation of its own mechanisms.Footnote 24
Health and ‘Normality’
The notion of a healthy system is tacitly implied by the comparison of crises and illness, and it is often explicitly referred to; nevertheless, it is rarely defined with precision.Footnote 25 I have been able to find only a few constructive characterizations of a healthy state, in terms of demand matching supply. An anonymous contributor pointed out that “the safe and natural measure of production is the demand of consumer. In the usual healthy and undisturbed state of trade, the one must regulate the other pretty nearly” (Anonymous 1, 1830, p. 17). Similarly, the author of the entry “Consumption” for the Encyclopaedia Americana wrote that “In a healthy state of the national industry … the consumption of products should bear a just proportion to production” (Anonymous 2, Reference Lieber1830, p. 494), and later another encyclopedia suggested that perfect health requires that production and consumption perfectly match—a condition that, in actual experience, never occurs (Halle Reference Halle1888, p. 87). Thomas Crewdson added that such a state implies a fair remuneration to those taking part in the production and trading processes: “a healthy state of trade is that, in which the demand so readily takes off the supply, as to afford a fair remuneration to the operative, the manufacturer, and the merchant” (Crewdson Reference Crewdson1830, p. 11).
Most other implicit definitions were negatively stated as the absence of shortages or excesses (of credit or currency, in particular), or of unsound speculation with respect to legitimate trade, or of monopoly and tariffs. The latter view is obviously the counterpart of the opinion that the disease is brought about by interference with free trade. Wholryche Whitmore, for instance, wrote that the abrogation of the Corn Laws would guarantee a further advance in manufacture, commerce and wealth “based, not on monopoly and protection, but on the solid ground of a natural and healthy trade” (Reference Pym1839, p. 19), while John Ashton Yates stated that “a vigorous and healthy state of trade … can only be brought about by [a relaxation] of our code of monopolies” (Reference Attwood1841, p. 17).
References to the currency and the issue of credit go, to some extent, in the same way, as excesses or scarcities can be blamed on the Central Bank. Williams, writing anonymously, thought that currency should be based on precious metal only: “A standard so pure, if properly maintained, is sure to check that plethora of money which naturally results from a country possessing great wealth and credit, and, in consequence, to keep the circulation in a healthy state” ([Williams] Reference Cockburn1840, p. 28). Similarly, Nathan Appleton observed that the portion of the United States (New York and the northern states) where currency was convertible into coin on demand “enjoys a sound currency, and no scarcity of it. There is no want of confidence where it ought to exist. Its internal trade is in a healthy and natural state. All is well” (Reference Attwood1841, p. 25). Edmund Ruffin argued that “though there must be at any period a certain amount of currency necessary for the health and proper exchanges, trade, and business of a country, the amount so needed can not possibly be known; and even if ascertained fairly for a certain day, it would be different perhaps on the next day expanding with the growth and prosperity of business, and contracting under adverse circumstances.” He maintained, however, that the currency, “if left to itself and not affected by the abuses of paper issues,” would properly and speedily adjust to the needs of a healthy trade, as any deficiency or redundant quantity would be imported or exported (Ruffin Reference Attwood1841, pp. 12–13).
Speculation (as we shall see in more detail below) was the real villain of the piece for a large number of writers. The vast majority of pamphlets and treatises written in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century held some variant of the overtrading theory, which blamed crises on the excess of commercial activity permitted and stimulated by credit (be it credit among traders or from the banks), which would generate price rises and windfall profits, thereby stimulating further speculation and overtrading, until the process becomes unsustainable and the system collapses. This view is related to the concerns regarding the issue of paper money, which was seen—if excessive—as fostering the process.Footnote 26 In this approach, the problem was that of drawing a line between ‘legitimate trade’ and ‘excessive speculation.’ Accordingly, the ‘health’ metaphor was called in to stress by contrast the unhealthy character of speculation. An anonymous writer reported that “Lord Liverpool … distinctly predicted the evil consequences of that mania for excessive speculation which then prevailed. He distinguished it from the healthy spirit of trade; and while he condemned the former, he gave to the latter just commendation” (Anonymous 1, 1826, p. 41). Archibald Rosser pointed out that
By these various means in which, taken together, credit affects the prices of necessary provisions, the poor man and the punctual man are made to suffer for the folly, weakness, or imprudence of those who are richer or less punctual: and the sellers are enabled, not by fair trading, but by a system very unconscientious though quite common, to accumulate fortunes, which a healthy state of trade really would not admit of (1823, p. 30).
William Anderson, a stationmaster commenting anonymously on the Reference Anderson1847 railways speculation, asked that “a broad line be drawn between a sound healthy trade or transaction, and mere speculation” ([Anderson] Reference Anderson1847, p. 12).
Most of the examples of the ‘health’ metaphor cited here are either ill-defined or manifestly circular. Consider this passage: the increase of paper money is “to be governed by a healthy state of trade; never to increase in quantity so as to produce over-trading, or to be lessened in quantity so as to produce the withering effects upon the industry of the nation, of which we have seen of late such frequent and lamentable instances” ([Pym] Reference Pym1839, p. 14). Health is understood not as a specific state of the system, but as absence of disturbance. Such a conception is analytically self-referential, does not lead anywhere in terms of policy, and fails to provide a specification for its counterpart, the disease. This is not surprising. On the one hand, it reflects a similar difficulty experienced in medicine in defining ‘health.’ Some medical dictionaries did not even carry entries under such a heading (Hooper Reference Hooper1817), others referred only to ‘Hygiene’ (Parr Reference Parr1819), and those attempting a definition focused on the unfettered functioning of the body: “Health is that state of the human body … in which the structure of the parts is sound, and their functions properly performed; rendering the individual fit for all the duties and enjoyments of life” (Macaulay Reference Macaulay1831, p. 306); “Health. State in which all the functions are freely and easily performed. It is the normal state” (Beaude Reference Beaude1849, vol. 2, p. 780).Footnote 27 On the other hand, the problem does not reside in the metaphor alone. The idea of ‘overtrading,’ as well as the qualification of speculation as ‘excessive,’ implies a reference to an appropriate level of trading, which, however, writers of the time failed to define. Trading was recognized to be excessive when it started to create problems, a condition that becomes apparent only ex post.Footnote 28 The ‘health’ metaphor reveals a possible cause for this omission. If ‘health’ is understood as the normal state, it does not require a specific explanation. An explanation is required only to account for the anomalies. The emphasis is thus on the disease and its causes, which determine the deviation from the norm. It is via the identification of the causes of the disease that a remedy can be found, and the system brought back to its normal and healthy state by the removal of the morbid cause, if this is external or due to the interference with the operation of the natural self-regulating mechanisms.Footnote 29 If, instead, the disease is due to a failure (or absence) of an homeostatic mechanism, the medical metaphor translates into therapeutic pessimism; one can only witness the illness run its course, and at most apply some palliative cure such as public works or relief to the poor.
The Rhetoric of the Remedy
Most writings on crises in the first half of the nineteenth century were not theoretical in their ambition, but specifically aimed at suggesting some antidote, normally consisting in the removal of the cause of the disease previously identified.Footnote 30 In the first six decades of the century, well over a hundred pamphlets, articles, or treatises carried in the title the words “cure” or “remedy,” referring to crises or distress, while hundreds more offered advice on treatment in the internal pages. Naturally, a number of these writings were polemical in character, and the medical metaphor was indirectly used to disparage the adversaries and give legitimacy to one’s own approach.Footnote 31 The opponents’ arguments were, in fact, disqualified as ‘quack medicine,’ thereby implicitly qualifying the opposite course as ‘scientific.’ The following examples, all concerning one of the two most debated policies from the turn of the century to the disputes between the Currency and the Banking schools (via the Bullionist controversy),Footnote 32 are illustrative of this point. At the beginning of the century, Walter Boyd wrote: “It is because I feel the most complete conviction that the real resources of this country are now, and always have been, too solid and extensive to require the aid of forced paper-money, that dangerous quack-medicine, which, far from restoring vigour, gives only temporary artificial health, while it secretly undermines the vital powers of the country that has recourse to it” (1801, p. 58). Calvin Colton, who wrote in parables, compared currency to the blood of the body politic, and argued that disturbances or quack remedies clog it up and undermine its health (1843, p. 8). David Buchanan ridiculed John Law’s scheme: “The Mississippi scheme, of which Law was the author, combined an unlimited issue of paper, the infallible specific prescribed by this political quack for the malady of depressed trade, under which France was then labouring, with a vast project of finance and foreign trade, out of which stock-jobbing speculations arose to an unheard-of extent” (1844, p. 266). In France, Wolowski defended Peel’s Act against those who criticised it for being incapable of preventing all crises by analogy with a quack’s panacea. In Wolowski’s view, the 1844 Act has radically cured the monetary instability and has given powerful means to counteract the other kinds of crises: “To criticise it for failing to cure all crises one must be temerarious and ungrateful. Only charlatans resort to a universal remedy capable of removing all illnesses” (1866, pp. 943–944).
Generic Metaphorical Transfers
Most of the metaphors of health, disease, and remedy in connection with crises discussed in this section are very generic. In spite of their lack of precision, they have important implications for the approach to, and the understanding of, the phenomenon. Such unspecific usage of the medical metaphor contributed to the framing of the problem in terms of a disturbance to a healthy state of the system, albeit failing to define precisely how this health is characterized, and to the selection of the approach to this problem in terms of the identification of the causes of the perturbation and its removal. This is itself momentous. The view that emerges from this usage of the metaphor is that crises are a time when the body politick is not working properly; it is clear that there are some impediments, mostly of a ‘political’ or institutional nature, and that their removal would bring the system back to its natural state. Whether it is this view that inspired the metaphor, or the metaphor that inspired the view, is not easy to ascertain, and probably cannot be stated in a general way. Here the similitude is still working at the very general and fundamental level of the root metaphor. Medicine did not only provide the terms to denominate economic distress at the time of the very appearance of such phenomena, but kept supplying to a large number of writers the general framework of their understanding.
The story becomes more interesting as usages of the medical metaphors became more selective, in particular as it was asked what kind of disease affects the trading community, how it spreads, and what makes it appear in the first place. But, more important, choice of particular medical metaphors gives the story a different twist.
V. THE FEVER OF SPECULATION
I have already mentioned in passing (section IV) that the explanation of crises most frequently advocated in the first half of the nineteenth century relied on one version or another of the credit–speculation–overtrading mechanism. The possibility of trading on credit or borrowing money from banks enables merchants to expand their operation beyond their own capital. This allows them to take advantage of any deal they think good enough, while the lenders are happy—as it is in their interest, and it is made possible by the banking policy on currency issues—to encourage traders to do so. Trading on credit, however, can get out of hand: it induces a first rise in prices, which opens the possibility of purely speculative buying, which in turn further raises prices. This results in generalized overtrading at an accelerating pace, which may involve both commodities and stocks. Such a process is intrinsically fragile. Credit is based on trust; as soon as someone defaults, the creditor in turn will not be able to meet his commitments, and the original difficulty is bound to spread quickly to the entire economic system, which eventually collapses, bringing embarrassment and distress.
Fever and Madness
Most of the instances of use of the medical metaphor cited so far compared a disease with the final outcome of this process; that is, the crisis. Some writers, however, shifted the emphasis onto the paroxysm of speculation, and, correspondingly, the medical metaphor was applied to the onset of excessive speculation. An expression frequently usedFootnote 33 was “fever of speculation.”Footnote 34 We find it for instance in McCulloch (“those infected with the fever of speculation,” McCulloch Reference McCulloch1826c, p. 93), and in Chalmers (“fever of railway speculation,” [Chalmers] Reference Chalmers1846, p. 93); Robert Cockburn wrote of “feverish excitement and distress” and of “mercantile fever” ([Cockburn] Reference Page and Hardcastle1842, p. 28). The expression has Italian and French equivalents. Gerolamo Boccardo discussed the “feverish excitement” and the “fever of speculation” that caught Italy in the early 1850s as the main features of those crises originating from the “intrinsic conditions of a country’s trade” (Boccardo Reference Boccardo1854, pp. 5–6). Courcelle-Seneuil noted that “the number of paupers follows the uncertain oscillations of a feverish industry, sometimes producing madly and sometimes stopping altogether, frightened by its own excesses” (Reference Page and Hardcastle1842, p. 697). Baron Dupin wrote of “the times when speculating nations are excited by a fever more burning than usual, which makes them forget any notion of prudence; then they blindly accept thousands of unreasonable adventures” (Reference Chalmers1846, p. 309). Charles Coquelin summarized as follows the view that the concession of the right of issuing currency to all private banks would multiply the havoc created by the issues of a single privileged bank:
They would compete one against the other, and impress upon trade that state of feverish excitement,[Footnote 35] the dangers of which have so often been experienced. The delirium of speculation and the madness of over-trading which, from time to time, gain possession of everybody, would become the normal state of the country. One crisis would then succeed another and downfalls follow in chain, until the final collapse of both public credit and private banks (1848, p. 207).
As in the French examples just cited, the diseased condition was often considered to consist of morbid irrationality. Expressions such as “madness of speculation” or “speculation mania”Footnote 36 are very frequently met. For example, in a passage occasionally cited in the following decades, David Macpherson described the events of 1772–73:
The spirit of launching into rash and boundless projects in commerce, which were to be supported by artificial credit, and the madness of towering speculations in national funds, which carry the adventurer out of the proper sphere of trade into the unfathomable abyss of gambling, had now spread through the commercial world in most part of Europe, and even some of the cautious and phlegmatic merchants of Holland were infected with it (1805, vol. 3, p. 533).
Robert Mushet wrote that
In the state of the currency, therefore, alone shall we find the true explanation of the state of public madness for speculations that existed throughout 1824 and the earlier part of the last year. With the increase of money, affecting generally for the time the rate of interest, the madness began; as the means of excitement were supplied it continued; and when withdrawn, suddenly and perhaps unexpectedly at the fountain head, the first cause, the Bank of England, we see the nature and extent of the calamity that is spread over the country (1826, p. 152).
William Huskisson pointed out that the “mania for speculation, which in March and April 1825 had taken hold of persons of all classes,” was not confined “to speculators, but [extended] to steady merchants and traders” and concerned all kinds of goods (Reference Wade1826, p. 452). Harriet Martineau commented that “the rage for speculation might fairly be … regarded … as if some prevalent mania infected the whole people,” and made it clear that the fever leading to “this rapid money-making is a merely temporary evil. A bursting of the bubble must come soon” (1837, vol. 1, p. 180). Thomas Doubleday wrote of a “sudden madness of absurd speculation” and of a “mad epidemic of speculative gambling (Reference Anderson1847, pp. 89, 91, 88); Cargill described “a cycle of enterprise, prosperity, speculation, madness, and ruin” (Reference Anderson1847, p. 17); and Younger reported of people “hurried to folly and madness in wild speculation” (1845, p. 28). Two anonymous writers stressed that such a mania is a morbid state. One wrote that “the mania of speculation … is a disease, which may, possibly, visit the body politic, and the same individual, a second time” (Anonymous 2, 1841, p. 9). The other so described “the rage, or, as some have termed it, the mania for speculation”: “In a period of great public prosperity, other matters not calling the attention, men become supremely devoted to the acquisition of property. Nothing forces the mind away from this one object, and men fix upon it with a sort of morbidness” (Anonymous 1838, p. 29).
Some writers used the expression “insane speculation.” “A plain man” reported that, according to some, the greater part of “every evil and every distress under which the country is labouring” “proceed from no other cause than the insane spirit of speculation and overproduction which have sprung up during several years past” (Anonymous 1842, p. 13); the editor of the Circular to Bankers accused the government of “encouraging an insane speculation which could have no other effect than lessening the productive power of the country and increasing the power of money in great cities, and teaching people habits of gambling instead of patient industry” (Anonymous 4, 1845, p. 170); and Doubleday qualified the South Sea scheme as a “fraudulent and insane speculation” (Reference Anderson1847, p. 88). Speculation was also qualified by some as ‘crazy’ and, more often, ‘foolish.’ As an example of the former, Gouge argued that “The present rage for rail-road stock shows that part of our population already want something to be crazy about—or rather want something by which to set their neighbours crazy. The old modes of speculation no longer afford full employment for their time and talents” (1833, p. 126). Newman, in his Elements of political economy, pointed out that besides wars, “intemperance and luxurious indulgences of every form,” “also a prevailing propensity to wild and foolish speculation and adventure, will drain off a portion of a nation’s capital from its more useful employment” (Reference Sedgwick1835, p. 261). An anonymous writer more forcefully concluded his plea that monopoly of the Bank of England should cease by arguing that “The Bank of England is the creator of mercantile panic, is the stimulator to wild and foolish and unprofitable speculation; and is the very origin of the evils which have cramped the trade of this Country, ever since she became a State Bank” (Anonymous 1, 1836, p. 17). Another writer stressed that a prudent (as opposed to wild and lavish) policy in the concession of credit by a country bank would not “encourage foolish speculation” (Kelley Reference Kelley1838, p. 7). Or again, an anonymous writer describing a seven-year cobweb cycle in agricultural prices and production as a consequence of the operation of the Corn Laws, argued that “such a trade in corn would assume … at one period, the character of a rash and foolish speculation; at another it would altogether fail to satisfy the wants of the population” (Anonymous 2, 1846, pp. 7–8).
The False Healthiness of Prosperity
Such expressions are interesting as they reverse the traditional metaphorical usage by which the crisis was described as the diseased condition. All the above-mentioned expressions indicate a state of nervous excitement,Footnote 37 ‘crazy’Footnote 38 or ‘foolish,’Footnote 39 or, more forcefully, ‘mad’Footnote 40 and ‘insane.’Footnote 41 These expressions are used more in generic terms than with reference to their specific medical meaning to indicate a condition of irrationality, but still retain the implication that the associated state is pathological. The feverish state is in the speculative phase, during prosperity; the crisis is, in this view, the outcome of the previous fever. Prosperity itself, in spite of the healthy appearance, is thus feverish, and becomes the cause of the following panic and distress. The emphasis is on the failure of rational thinking, the folly being evident from the past outcomes of similar processes,Footnote 42 with each chain of failures and bankruptcies contradicting the expectations of most participants in the speculative schemes. Individual rationality is pitted against the irrationality of the entire process,Footnote 43 as epitomized by banker Thomas Martin, who communicated on 18 June 1720 to one of the partners of his house that he had subscribed £500 to the South Sea Stock, reasoning that although one who witnessed the dealings would scarcely have the courage of venturing, “When the rest of the world is mad we must imitate them in some measure.”Footnote 44 Yet, some writers denied that the process is irrational. A “citizen of Western New York,” for instance, criticized the fashionable denunciations of the mania for speculation, stressing that it is fully rational to try to readily embark on any profitable scheme, regardless of its seemingly unusual and extravagant character; except in rare circumstances, errors are rectified by the usual market mechanism (Anonymous 2, 1836, pp. 11–12). In this conflict between individual and market rationality, however, several writers have been very explicit in stressing that, as the speculation phase is either feverish or plainly mad, prosperity is only seemingly healthy. As early as 1818, a Practical Man pointed out how easily the excitement could be misunderstood for real prosperity:
many are too apt to mistake the mere bustle of trade for its prosperity; the flush of fever for the glow of health; and under this delusion they attempt to allay feverish thirst by ardent spirit; to restore health to the country, by means which they have induced disease; to apply machinery where it ought to be suppressed. How fallacious then are such boasted symptoms of prosperity!
(Anonymous 1818, pp. 23–24)A certain Polœconomicus, more briefly, wrote after the 1825 panic that the previous state was “of high health and prosperity (perhaps of fever)” (Anonymous 3, Reference Wade1826, p. 5). Another anonymous writer was more detailed a few years later:
Such, for the last fifty years, has been the condition of England, and such must ever be the condition of a country where the banking system has taken deep root. Periods of excitement will be surely followed by periods of languor. The commerce of the country will be always vibrating between scarcity of money and over abundance. As speculation creates nothing, the fortune of the successful adventurer must be at the expense of some other persons; his wealth is no addition to the means of the country. Yet, where unproductive industry is the only road to riches, the large estates raised by bankers and speculators will give an appearance of prosperity that does not really exist—the flush of fever will be mistaken for the glow of health
(Anonymous 1829, p. 6).In a similar vein, an anonymous author wrote of the “fever of prosperity” (1831, p. 43); Poulett Scrope ascribed to the issues of paper money by country banks the fomenting of “the most extravagant speculations on fictitious capital,” from which “arose the mad excitement and delusive prosperity of 1824 and 1825, till, at the end of the latter year, the bubble burst” (Reference Gore1830, p. 59); Wright wrote that “The Joint Stock banks, it was hoped, would supply a gentle and wholesome stimulus. These however shortly brought on a high fever; and prosperity was again the cry” (Reference Attwood1841, p. 2); “Scrutator” wrote of “the evil spirit of inordinate gain, arousing the mania for a blind overtrading, which has infected the very root of our commercial prosperity” (Anonymous 3, [Reference Attwood1841], p. 9); Innes pointed out that “Scotland has been subject to the periodical revulsions which attend all commercial enterprise, where the very prosperity and success tempt to overtrading, and out of the superabundance of health comes the malady” ([Innes] Reference Innes1848, p. 380); and the anonymous author of an article mentioning the “unreal prosperity” in the title wrote that when the bubble burst, “prosperity [based on speculation] is found to be a fever” (Anonymous 1849, p. 57). Similar expressions and conclusions could also be found in France; for instance, de Broglie remarked that in contrast with unfettered economic systems that run “without storms,” when there are legislative interferences, industry moves along in fits and starts in which “fictitious prosperities” are succeeded by crises, the overexcitement is suddenly interrupted, and there never is a day of peace. Such industries “have sometimes the fire of fever, and never the mild and natural warmth of health” (Broglie Reference Broglie1849, p. 372). John Wade drew the inevitable conclusion: “Physicians tell us, that in the highest health we are most exposed to deadly maladies, so, in the excitement of successful industrial pursuits may we be most on the eve of fatal reverses” (1836, p. 1).Footnote 45
Prosperity as the Antecedent to Crises, and Crises as a Means to the Restoration of Prosperity
The interpretation of prosperity as ‘the healthy state’ having been turned on its head, the understanding of the crisis was correspondingly bound to be, in turn, toppled upside down. At the end of the Reference Cockburn1840s, and increasingly so in later decades,Footnote 46 a number of writers understood the crisis no longer as the diseased state, but as the necessary—though painful—process by which the system is brought back to its natural and healthy state. Some explicitly resorted to the medical metaphor in this connection. For instance, Viscount Halifax, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, observed that in Reference Pym1839 there was no longer any pressure, and that “trade was in a sound and healthy state [after] the events of 1837 had removed those houses which had unduly extended their credit” (Reference Anderson1847, p. 12). The translator of Louis Blanc’s L’organisation du travail argued that “the innumerable failures in France … are perhaps essential to the restoration of trade on a healthy basis” (Blanc Reference Blanc1848, translator’s note, p. 34). Eisdell wrote that the fall in wages during depressions “is the salutary, though painful, process through which alone industry can again arrive at its healthy state of renewed activity; it is the medicine which cures the disease of over-selfishness by which commercial prosperity is prevented” (Reference Pym1839, p. 517). And James Aytoun commented that “Our present embarrassment has arisen simply from the country attempting to do more than it can possibly accomplish, and the pressure in the money market is the mark or proof of this; and is, at the same time, the safe and certain cure for the disease, which, if it be only allowed fair play, and is not interfered with, will very soon restore the trade of the country to a completely healthy state” (Reference Anderson1847, p. 22). Ledru-Rollin, however, strongly disagreed. Reflecting on “The periodical return of commercial crises which have occurred in England since the peace of 1815,” he reported that “A theory has been invented … assuming that these interruptions are necessary to trade; and according to these theorists, crises are an advantageous means of liquidation, which enable the principal houses to rectify their accounts,” and commented that “This is a truly strange remedy; it must finish by destroying the patient, under pretence of eradicating the disease” (1850, p. 283).
Although this shift in the usage of the metaphor still remains rather general, it contributed to a momentous outbreak in the theory of crises. The crisis originates in the previous state of prosperity, and solves the problems affecting the economy at that stage. This chains together three stages of the process: prosperity, crisis, and liquidation. It sets the premises for the fourth stage: a recovery into the next prosperity, although without specifying a necessary causal connection. In this case, the metaphor thus played an important heuristic role, enabling writers to switch to a completely different approach to the crises problem. It was not the only possible route to this change in the interpretation of the phenomenon. Some writers, as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, had done so without the help of a medical metaphor (see Besomi Reference Besomi2010a). But, at any rate, it surely consolidated this view, and made it more easily understandable and allowed it to take roots.
VI. EPIDEMICS
A large number of commentators saw the main feature of both the speculation fever and the subsequent panic in its spreading throughout the entire economic system. Several of these writers expressed this peculiarity by means of medical metaphors such as ‘epidemics,’ in particular after the 1825 crisis.Footnote 47 Some were remarkable for their colorfulness; for example, an anonymous writer referred to a state of “distress, which overspreads the country like a leprosy” (Anonymous 1844, p. 140).Footnote 48 More often, however, the metaphor was presented quite plainly, witnessing its self-explanatory character. A few instances will suffice. Among those who stressed the spreading of the speculation fever, we have the following: “the mania of speculation has latterly become epidemic” (Anonymous 6, 1826, p. 7); “the phrenzy of speculation which raged like an epidemic” (Leeves Reference Leeves1831, p. 109, with reference to Huskisson); “the spirit of commercial speculation, then so contagious” (Quin Reference Quin1833, p. 79); “the speculation of 1825 [was] the result of a moral epidemics” (Great Britain, House of Commons, Committee of Secrecy 1833, p. x, questions to Norman); “the spirit of speculation is often epidemic” (Wade Reference Wade1833, p. 209); “this epidemic fever to be rich by sudden speculation” (Bacon Reference Bacon1837, p. 9); “a wide-spread spirit of speculation is apt to infect a whole community” (Anonymous [1837], p. 66); “Abundance of money makes men buoyant, sanguine and enterprizing, and hence they go into speculation. The feeling becomes contagious, and sometimes a whole nation goes mad” (Gilbart Reference Attwood1841, p. 7), and “The spirit of speculation, when once excited, is always contagious, and ultimately becomes uncontrollable” (ibid., p. 25); the “contagious nature of speculation” (Eden Reference Chalmers1846, p. 1); the “speculative spirit is contagious” (Anonymous 1850, p. 1); “the fever [of speculation] has become epidemic” (Anonymous 1869, p. 235); “a sort of fever or epidemic of mind” (Anonymous 1879, p. 33). Marx and Engels also resorted to this metaphor:
It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that in all earlier epochs would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of overproduction (1848, English trans. pp. 47–48).
Other writers stressed instead the diffusion of panic and bankruptcies. Buchanan explained that “In the mutual dependence created by credit and confidence, every merchant involves others in his fate; the contagion of bankruptcy spreads, and in the general commotion the greatest mercantile establishments may be overthrown” (1814, p. 99). Edward Tatham maintained that the consequence of speculation afloat had been “stoppages without end, failures without number, agricultural and commercial embarrassments, bankruptsies [sic] upon bankruptsies, operating upon the public like a contagion and sweeping with them to the grave many of those paper-mints founded upon false credit, by which they were supported” (1816, pp. 3–4). McCulloch noted that “no contagion spreads so rapidly as that of a panic. A failure in Portsmouth not infrequently excites a strong sensation in Newcastle; and has ultimately, on more than one occasion, led to a ruin in the latter!” (Reference Wade1826b, p. 82); “One of the initiated behind the scenes” argued that in 1845 there was “no indication of a panic—no appearance of any general and contagious alarm, or of universal anxiety to sell.… It was not thus in 1825: the failure of one scheme, and the appearance of a large body of sellers than usual, became the signal for a headlong, ruinous, fatal crush—an unconditional and reckless sale ‘at any price’” (Anonymous 2, [1845], p. 7). Sismondi also wrote of epidemic failures of bankers (Reference Wade1826, English trans. p. 117).
The Modality of Transmission
The ‘epidemics’ metaphor is interesting on several counts. In the first place, the idea of spreading of the disease can refer to several dimensions. One concerns the modality of transmission, from person to person, as in this statement by Longfield: runs to the banks are “like an epidemic, one man runs to the bank for gold, because he sees his neighbour do the same” (Reference Cockburn1840, p. 222). A second one concerns the universality of affliction among different classes of the society, as stressed by this anonymous writer: “the curse of the country is the exaggerating real evils, and inventing imaginary ones, to terrify silly old men and women into a mental fever, which, by contagion, may spread universal distrust, and produce distress to many thousand innocent families, which would otherwise never have happened” (Anonymous 1, 1826, p. 57).Footnote 49 A third dimension concerns the spatial spreading of the embarrassments, the “epidemic diffusion of the same rage of speculation from the metropolis through the country” (Anonymous 2, 1826, p. 7). In the same vein, Torrens remarked that the low rates of profit and of interest, coupled with the desire to see one’s capital adequately remunerated, “rendered the spirit of speculation epidemic throughout the country” (Torrens Reference Torrens1826, p. 324). The theme was also taken up by Milford, who added a further dimension, the size of banks going bankrupt:
within the last thirty years that we have witnessed three or four periods wherein commercial and almost national convulsions have occurred from the failure of Country Banks. On former occasions, in time of war, and from scarcity of money, the agitation and distress to individuals has been confined to particular towns or counties; on the late occasion, the panic, like a general epidemic, in an instant extended its influence, without discrimination, from the highest to the lowest establishments both in town and country; including, perhaps, the Bank of England
(Milford Reference Milford1826, p. 1).Buchanan had also stressed that the contagion of bankruptcy is a consequence of the disorders that arise “in the centre, [and] quickly extends to the remotest parts of this great system of money dealing” (1814, p. 99). Finally, the author of the entry on commercial crisis in Meyers Konversations-Lexikon stressed the international spreading of crises: “Often the events we call commercial crises carry a fraudulent spirit and nonsense speculation that at times spread simultaneously and epidemically through entire nations, as it has recently been experienced in North America, England and also in Germany” (Anonymous 2, Reference Meyer1849, p. 1030).
A second interesting feature of the ‘epidemics’ metaphor is that it does not belong to the same family as the generic analogies with illness or with some specific disease, for the latter refer to a malady affecting the body politic as a whole, while the former refer to the spreading of some disease from individual to individual.
Bad Atmosphere vs. Contagion
A third feature is that this metaphor refers to a debated field in its discipline of origin, and we see examples of both main interpretations in the economic transposition. Before Koch’s work on tuberculosis in the 1880s, the medical literature offered two rather different explanations of epidemics:
The first, familiar since Antiquity, was a combination of bad air (‘mal’aria’) and individual imbalance. The foulness of the air explained why many people had the same symptoms of disease, individual susceptibility why not everyone caught it. In 1546 the Veronese doctor Girolamo Fracastoro in his De morbis contagiosis developed another theory from Antiquity, that of contagion, to explain plague. The notion of contagion was already well known, sometimes referring to something transmitted by touch, but more loosely to diseases of propinquity.… Fracastoro’s achievement was to offer a new explanation of what happened in contagion. ‘Seeds of disease’ were passed on directly from the sufferer into the atmosphere, where they multiplied and could infect others. Some seeds were passed on directly by touch, others, called ‘fomites’, indirectly in clothing or carpets. His theory could thus be used to justify the quarantining practices of Health Boards, aimed at stopping contagion, and, as Girolamo Mercuriale argued in his De peste of 1577, it was entirely compatible with the standard theory of ‘bad air’. Indeed, far from being a revolutionary idea, it was easily assimilated by writers on plague; it explained why the air became bad.
(Nutton Reference Nutton and Carlin2008).These views coexisted, and were not seen as necessarily mutually inconsistent, both in the medical and in the economic explanations of the diffusion of the disease.Footnote 50 But while in the medical opinion of the first half of the nineteenth century the anti-contagionist explanation seems to have been dominant (Ackerknecht Reference Ackerknecht1948), in economics the references to ‘contagion’ were far more frequent. An explicit example of the ‘bad air’ view, not explicitly referring to crises, is due to W.B. Greene, who maintained that “Savings Banks are undoubtedly advantageous to poor depositors who thus obtain interest on their earnings; but they are, nevertheless the invisible scourge of commerce. As the unseen pestilence poisons the vital air, so do the Savings Banks poison the atmosphere of legitimate trade” (Greene Reference Greene1850, p. 69). The reference to the crisis is very precise in the following passage: “The word ‘panic’ has been used, like the word ‘cholera’, as if something in the air occasioned it, or it arose from some cause over which mankind has no power; and as naturally do merchants calculate on periodical panics as physicians do on cholera appearing in the fruit season (Anonymous 1, 1836, p. 16). Overstone also explicitly referred to the return of periods of excitement and of distress, comparing the consequences of the state of currency with that of the atmosphere:
The currency in which all transactions are adjusted has the same reference to the healthy state of trade, which the atmosphere in which we all live has to the physical constitution of our bodies; irregularities and disorders may arise from a variety of causes, but the duration and virulence of them will materially depend upon the pure, healthy, and well-regulated condition of the medium in which they exist. A well-managed currency cannot prevent the occurrence of periods of excitement and overtrading, nor of their necessary consequences, commercial pressure and distress; but it may tend very powerfully to diminish the frequency of their return, to restrain the suddenness of their outbreak, and to limit the extent of their mischief
(Lloyd Reference Cockburn1840, pp. 90–91).Similarly, some writers treated monopolies or protection (in particular the Corn Laws) as determining the ‘bad atmosphere’ negatively affecting trade and industry. On the opposite side, numerous writers referred to speculation and overtrading as ‘contagious,’ with the ‘fever of speculation’ ‘infecting’ all sorts of people and business. The following example is illustrative of this view:
A whole community sometimes becomes infected by the spirit of speculation, and carry it to almost every subject of trade. Every member multiplies his debts and credits to an immense amount, and the fortune of each one is thus entrusted to the keeping of others. This spirit, like that of gambling, is contagious. If one has drawn a prize, every body buys tickets until the blanks efface its remembrance. If one man has made an estate at his ease by a few fortunate bargains, the routine of ordinary industry becomes dull to others; extravagant desires are excited, and the imaginations of men being kindled, they easily persuade themselves to expect what they ardently wish. They embark in hazardous enterprises, and every adventure seems to them a voyage to El Dorado. Industry is for a while quickened, and the community assumes the transient appearance of prosperity. Every hand is employed, and many countenances are bright with hope, until losses and reverses disturb these golden dreams, and many awake to disappointment and ruin. Every community is subject to occasional effervescences of this sort, and the more uncertain and indefinite the value of any thing is, the greater extravagances men run into in their speculations upon its value
(Phillips Reference Phillips1828, pp. 51–52).The ‘epidemics’ metaphor was often used to shift the burden of the explanation of the diffusion of panics to the unspecified—yet well known to the readers—process of diffusion of certain diseases. Nevertheless, a few writers in the ‘contagionist’ tradition tried to identify the mechanism of epidemic transmission. I have already cited the agency of imitating one’s neighbor (Longfield Reference Cockburn1840, p. 222). Attwood blamed the contagion to specific plague spreaders: “By the present Banking arrangements in England, the means of producing and continuing the disease [of speculation] is placed in the hands of those labouring under the epidemic, who, mingling with the commercial classes, partake the excitement, and encrease the fever it is their duty to allay” ([Attwood] Reference Attwood1841, p. 38). Tooke also blamed the brokers.Footnote 51
The ‘contagionist’ and ‘miasmatic’ explanations of epidemics seem antithetical to each other. But, in reality, their degree of acceptance in the explanation of speculation and panic epidemics is more a matter of degree than of substance. The miasmatic argument emphasizes the conditions under which general crises (as opposed to accidental and local mismatches of demand and supply) become more and more likely, while the ‘contagion’ explanation emphasizes the economic system’s instability, described in terms of the transmission of excesses from one person to another, from one business to another, from one country to another, and from one branch of trade to another. Yet, it is recognized that such outbursts of madness take place only under certain conditions; or, conversely, even when conditions are well suited to permit the development of panics, they occur only some times and not others. For instance, McCulloch maintained that the Corn Laws persistently inflict a “most serious injury [note the further medical metaphor] on the commerce and manufactures of the country” by increasing uncertainty in the supply of corn, yet at the same time fostering and keeping alive “the principal part of that gambling spirit which still infects some departments of our trade” and occasionally breaks out (McCulloch Reference McCulloch1833, pp. 60–61).Footnote 52
Nevertheless, the crises mechanisms implied by these analogies may differ. The ‘bad atmosphere’ may be occasional or permanent. In the former case, its cause—often an external one—would directly occasion the crisis. This is exemplified by Say’s view (cited above) that general gluts as opposed to local maladjustments can be caused only by some ‘political disease’ of an exogenous nature.
More interesting is the case when the bad atmosphere is persistent, as in the passages by Greene and Overstone cited above. In such a case, a slowly but constantly working cause cumulates tension within the system, which at some point releases it in the form of a commercial crisis. It should be noted that the morbid atmosphere consists for these writers in some institutional factor disturbing the normal course of business, such as a bad legislation; as such, it can be dispensed with and be substituted by some alternative and healthier arrangement. In this view, given the institutional setting, the cause of the crisis is endogenous but not intrinsically necessary, as a change in the institutional arrangement could remedy the problem.
The ‘contagion’ approach, on the contrary, emphasizes the congenital fragility of the system by arguing that the mode of diffusion of the trouble, by means of active agents, is bound to take over an orderly development. It implies that the diffusion is cumulative and exponential, as each ‘infected’ individual in turn becomes capable of passing the ‘fever’ on to others. This approach is fully endogenous, as it relies on the interconnectedness of the economic system: during the expansive phase, the ‘disease’ is transmitted by the very mechanism driving the accumulation process—namely, the thirst for profit; after the panic, the depression is diffused by the defaulting of debtors, making creditors insolvent in their turn.Footnote 53
The Heuristic Contribution of Epidemics
The ‘epidemics’ metaphor is loaded with so many implications that it cannot be taken as a simple textual embellishment or as a rhetorical device aiming at carrying conviction. Its purpose is to help understanding of the phenomenon by reference to something with which readers were familiar by direct experience. In some cases at least, usage of this metaphor seems to have contributed to the interpretation of the phenomenon of crises. The problem of the diffusion of the ‘disease’ was a particularly thorny one, as it ran against the mainstream theoretical stance that the system was capable of self-regulation and that general troubles (as distinct from partial maladjustments) were logically impossible. A scheme analogous to epidemics suggested a way out. It was not, however, the case of a simple transference of properties from a medical to an economic phenomenon. The explanations offered by medicine, in fact, were not fully satisfactory, as they both relied on something invisible and unascertainable in the air—whether it be the “mal’aria” or Fracastoro’s “seeds.” While some writers admitted the mysterious nature of this agent in the explanation of commercial crises,Footnote 54 economic commentators seemed to have been a step ahead of medical writers, as they were capable of identifying the specific causal agent, whether it be the particular maladjustments involved by the ‘bad atmosphere’ (the institutional factors distorting the mechanisms of trade) or the greed driving speculators. The medical metaphor thus provided some possible schemes of thought, which were then specifically elaborated by economic writers.Footnote 55
The epidemics metaphor also contributed to the representation, and possibly in some cases to the establishment, of the view that the ascending phase eventually culminating in the crisis and its succeeding liquidation have a cumulative character. Again, resorting to the metaphor helped in dealing with the unsolved problem of the recovery by referring to the petering out of epidemics after they have exhausted their contagious character. Longfield thus compared panics to “a plague, or any other infectious disease which may cease of itself, although no human power can arrest its progress” (Longfield Reference Cockburn1840, p. 222).
VII. INTERMITTENT FEVER
The metaphor of speculation as a feverish state was pushed one step further by some writers who prefixed the adjective “intermittent” to the fever. In medicine, the expression “intermittent fever” indicated conditions of recurring attacks of fever separated by intervals during which temperature is normal; it was used to indicate a diseased state, or even a cause of death,Footnote 56 but we now recognize that it actually encompassed several pathological conditions such as malaria, but also diseases with more spaced-out and irregular episodes. Illustrations of economic usage in connection to fluctuations include the anonymous compiler of a collection of statements on the corn question, who commented as follows on the Corn Laws’ effect of amplifying the effects of the natural alternation of good and bad crops:Footnote 57 “It is that very state of intermittent fever, against which, both agriculturalists and consumers are equally interested in providing an alexipharmic” (Anonymous 1825, p. 51n). Similarly, William Whitmore stated that the current system of corn laws “deranges currency, promotes gambling, subjects the foreign grower to a sort of intermittent fever, with hot and cold fits” ([1841], p. 31). Another example is the detailed analogy constructed by McCulloch to stress the dangers intrinsic in the periodic revulsions affecting trade as a consequence of the current banking policy:
The inordinate increase of banks, of money, and of the facilities for obtaining money, in the spring of last year, led to the increase of prices, to that multiplication of wild and absurd projects, and to that excess of confidence which distinguished that period; at the same time that, by bringing on a fall of the exchange and a drain for bullion, they insured that revulsion of which we are new feeling the effects. If it be wished that the country should be kept for ever under an intermittent fever—now suffering from a hot and then from a cold fit, now in an unnatural state of excitement, leading to, and necessarily ending in, an unnatural state of depression—the present money system is the best possible. But our readers, we are quite sure, will agree with us in thinking, that a fever of this sort is not more injurious to the animal than to the political body. So dangerous a disorder is not to be trifled or tampered with. This is not a case in which palliatives and anodynes can be of any real service. If a radical cure be not effected it will paralyse and destroy the patient
(McCulloch Reference McCulloch1837, pp. 82–83).Or again, but more generally, Richard Whytock stated that the vicissitudes described by Overstone in his celebrated characterization of the succession of phases through which trade passes “may be compared to an intermitting fever” (Reference Page and Hardcastle1842, p. 20, with reference to Loyd Reference Loyd1837, p. 31).Footnote 58 George Norman noted in passing that France, thanks to her metallic currency, “has suffered less from the hot and cold fits of the commercial fever than England or America” (1838, p. 73); similarly, Laing wrote of “the alternations of hot and cold fits of commercial depression and excitement, to which the country has been, for many years past, periodically subject” (1844, p. vi), and Samuel Wells of “those commercial shocks and panics, those ‘hot and cold fits’ which Mr. Baring so forcefully described in the House of Commons” (Reference Milne1832, p. vi). Another writer wrote of an “intermittent fever of speculation … in one of its hot fits” (Anonymous 1872, p. 244). Thomas Corbet illustrated the periodical “alternations or periods of activity and relaxation, or prosperity and depression” by means of the similitude with intermittent fever: “one excess, like the high and low or hot and cold fits of a fever, always giving birth to and generating another” (Reference Attwood1841, pp. 105–106). A few years later, Courcelle-Seneuil recorded (in French) that writers have “noted a certain periodicity in the return of commercial crises, which have been compared to the excesses of an intermittent fever attacking industry” (1867, vol. 1, p. 335).
The ‘intermittent fever’ and the ‘epidemics’ themes found a point in common with a series of statements in the Reference Cockburn1840s in which both features were stressed at once. Turner wrote that “revulsions in commerce have become a sort of periodic epidemic in our times, whose periods and returns can be safely affirmed by all, while the shrewd financier is tolerably aware of their precise times” (Turner Reference Turner1844, p. 50); Rogers remarked that “the madness which prompted those speculations is apt to be periodical and epidemic with Englishmen”Footnote 59 (Rogers Reference Rogers1848, p. 446); and an anonymous writer discussed the Reference Anderson1847 distress as “one of those commercial epidemics, since called panics, which periodically afflict the money-dealing part of the community” (Anonymous 1848, p. 212). The Satirist warned in 1845 that one of the returns of “a periodical plague” was imminent—indeed, it came in Reference Anderson1847 (Anonymous 3, 1845).
The hot and cold fits of intermittent fever add two interesting features to the simpler metaphor of the speculation fever. The first, rather obvious, one lies in the recognition that the phenomenon is recurrent. This is also witnessed by the not-infrequent coupling of such expressions with the adjective “periodical.”Footnote 60 That crises tend to recur, or more generally, that times of prosperity alternate with times of distress, was already observed at the end of the eighteenth century, and remarks to this effect became increasingly frequent in the following decades until by the 1860s the notion was commonly held that crises tend to recur approximately every ten years (Besomi Reference Besomi2010b). Most of these observations were formulated without reference to the metaphor of the recurring fever; this, however, neatly fitted the purpose, and could well illustrate the point.
At the time, economic writers had not yet come up with a full explanation of the phenomenon of returning crises; indeed, the Reference Gore1830s and especially the Reference Cockburn1840s were the epoch when a few commentators began to recognize the recurrent character of these events. Although there were a few suggestions that the alternation of prosperous and declining phases should be seen each as the cause of the other, most writers were prepared to see the crisis as a reaction to an excessive speculation and overtrading, but did not consider the recovery as a necessary reaction to the panic and its liquidation.Footnote 61, Footnote 62 A full theory of the cycle was still a long way to come.Footnote 63 Meanwhile, the metaphor of the intermittent fever acted as a substitute for an explanation by referring the readers to something they were familiar with in spite of not fully understanding its mechanisms.
The second implication of this metaphor is more intriguing. The reference to intermittent fever indicates that the various episodes of speculation and panic were conceived as instances of one and the same disease, and were no longer treated as disconnected events. The economy is described as permanently ill, suffering a condition producing alternating highs and lows, periodically driving people insane, and eventually forcibly cooling them down, only to restart the process after some time. All episodes have the same origin, the understanding of which explains the entire series. The disease follows the same basic course, so that the morphology of the phenomenon tends to repeat in its broad lines and opens the possibility of characterizing it once and for all.
The metaphor of the intermittent fever, then, has laid one of the foundations on which an entirely new building could be erected. In this interpretation, crises were not seen as independent episodes, but as successive manifestations of one and the same disease. This again turned the mainstream view on its head. The metaphor thus played a fundamental heuristic role by helping to form a completely new understanding of the phenomenon.
VIII. MEDICINE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE THEORY OF CRISES
The heuristic function played by the ‘intermittent fever’ metaphor was not the only approach leading to the rejection of the interpretation of crises as disconnected events in favor of understanding them as different instances of a unique phenomenon. Some writers directly tackled the epistemic side of the problem by referring to one form or another of the causality principle.Footnote 64 Clément Juglar is of interest here as he explicitly started with a discussion of the medical distinction between predisposing and occasional causes. Moreover, contrary to the majority of the writers cited so far, Juglar was trained as a medical doctor and only later turned to economics. Presumably, he was thus much more familiar than others with the recent developments of French medical thought, and one can expect him to use his medical terminology in a precise way.Footnote 65
Most theories of crisis at the time of Juglar’s writing explained the phenomenon in terms of the entire set of circumstances that had contributed to occasion them. For instance, the following were listed as the main causes for the current crisis at a meeting of the Société d’Économie Politique held in December 1857:
Mr. Ch. Renouard, adviser at the Court of Appeal, summarizes as follows the main causes of the crisis: the famine, first cause independent of people;—the war, that caused direct and indirect losses and troubled the social economy;—the excessive development of public works;—the spirit of speculation which, by its nature, always reaches extreme limits;—the moral state of the country: having disregarded too much the noble concerns with arts, science, politics and the grand ideals, it too exclusively engrossed itself into the concerns of business, of physical pleasures and of luxury (Société d’Économie Politique 1857, p. 473).
Similarly, in his entry on “Crises Commerciales” in the Dictionnaire Universel du Commerce et de la Navigation, Joseph Garnier discussed the causes of crises:
The causes that can be assigned to crises are numerous and different in character. We can classify them all under the following headings: the political and social agitations, from which worries about the future and lack of safety result; wars, and the consequent re-establishment of peace; famines; the scarcity of crop in important raw materials; any catastrophe; abundance. The slowing down of consumption, with its consequences on exchange and production; the rapid increase in production due to the excitement in the spirit of enterprise and to speculation fevers, which incite to badly conceived operations. The diversion of capitals due to the development of public works or to new large enterprises; the development of credit, and the monopoly of credit institutions; the rapid increase of the quantity of precious metals, gold or silver; the sudden increase in tariffs, national or foreign; the backlash of foreign crises
(Garnier Reference Garnier and Guillaumin1859, p. 921).Juglar was one of the few writers at the time who objected to this approach on epistemic grounds. His book opens with a warning that economic phenomena, being subject to various influences of all sorts, can easily induce the inquirer to “mistake occasional causes for the true nature of the disease.”
Food shortages, wars, revolutions, tariff variations, loans, fashion changes, and new trade openings are the main causes of crises most usually put forward. However, the real test would be to see these causes reproduce the same effects in similar circumstances. Unfortunately, social phenomena and all those that affect our lives rarely exhibit such a straightforward relationship between causes and effects. Owing to this uncertainty, the most dissimilar causes are called upon to explain the same facts. We have good reason to be surprised by the flippancy of the human mind and the facility with which it accepts any proposed explanation. In its quest for understanding, in the absence of anything better, it is satisfied with words. In our opinion, the multiplicity of the causes that are invoked proves their little effectiveness. Whereas a single one should suffice, a large number are cited. Now, as all these causes are not simultaneously present, it is natural to think, as we eliminate them all one by one, that none is determining, since its presence is not indispensable for producing the result that is attributed to it.
The determining cause is elsewhere. It is the consequence of a previous state that must be studied carefully. In medicine we call it a predisposition. Cold weather, for instance, is the cause of many illnesses: in one patient it causes rheumatism, in another pneumonia, in still another pleurisy. While the cause is the same, the result is different. The local predisposition is what tips the scales in one direction or the other, the proof being that, in its absence, cold weather produces no illness in a healthy individual. The same applies to crises, which is what we will seek to demonstrate. We will try to determine the circumstances in which crises develop and analyze the causes that lead to their outbreak. However, we will mainly insist on the conditions that are indispensable to their existence and on the phenomena that are then constantly observed, regardless of the diversity and variety of the causes that are invoked depending on the need of the moment
(Juglar Reference Juglar and Block1863, p. 616; 1862, pp. 2–3).The rhetoric of this passage is very effective. Juglar outlines the rational requirements for a theory of crises, and, at the same time, rejects as irrational the entire family of multi-causal explanations of the phenomenon—a recurrent concern of his book.Footnote 66
Juglar’s statement on causality explicitly relies on the medical terminology. It is tempting to infer from this that he drew his statement from the shared medical thought of the time. Yet, at a closer examination, it becomes apparent that he was actually radically departing from the medical tradition in which he was educated. In the passage cited above, Juglar is arguing that the cause of crisis to be identified should be sufficient (“a single [cause] should suffice”), necessary (“lacking which, even the supposedly most powerful causes fail to produce an effect,” “the conditions that are indispensable to their existence” [1862, p. 2]), and universal (“phenomena that are then constantly observed, regardless of the diversity and variety of the causes that are invoked depending on the need of the moment”).
This was a viewpoint alien to the medical tradition contemporary to Juglar. At the time, neither the predisposing nor the occasional causes were seen as necessary or sufficient: both types were listed, and it was stressed that, on occasion, predisposing causes could be occasional and vice versa.Footnote 67 This reflects the fact that diseases were characterized in terms of symptoms or of morbid alterations of the body, and each episode of the disease was treated as an individual case, with each patient being subject to different circumstances. Physicians thus described the cause of a disease in terms of a collection of circumstances found in individual cases, without an attempt to single out what was common among them.Footnote 68 The medical view, then, was at the time more akin to the multi-causal explanations of crises than to Juglar’s approach. A different view was suggested by Henle in a sort of manifesto of ‘rational medicine’ in 1844, where the etiological approach based on necessary, sufficient, and universal causes was clearly outlined. However, although a few researchers were outlining causal explanations of specific diseases that fitted into Henle’s idea, the principle as first applied to puerperal fever by Semmelweis does not seem to have gained acceptance in Europe before 1862, and did not conquer general acceptance until Koch’s work in the 1880s.Footnote 69
Juglar was thus moving ahead of the medical thinking of his times, and surely of his mentors’ at the Paris clinical school.Footnote 70 The difference does not lie in the notion of predisposing cause. Juglar meant pretty much the same thing as his contemporaries, and even the example of the cold weather affecting people in different ways was canonical.Footnote 71 But the writers in the traditional medical approach understood the predisposing causes as determining each particular instance of the disease, with no hierarchy between these causes, which were thus interchangeable. This is precisely how Garnier (in the example cited above) saw the economic system as subject to several plausible causes of derangement. Juglar’s approach, on the contrary, is etiological: he orders his causes hierarchically, distinguishing between the circumstances constantly present in all crises and accessory circumstances, whose presence affects the specific character of a crisis but whose absence would not prevent crises from occurring. Although, at a first glance, Juglar and his contemporaries used the term “crise commerciale” to designate the same thing, in reality their conceptions were different. For some writers, the crisis was characterized by a certain configuration of events, including falling prices, unemployment, failures, etc.; in other words, they understood a crisis by its symptoms. Accordingly, they were characterized, or even named, after some specific manifestation: ‘panics,’ ‘gluts,’ ‘distress,’ ‘embarrassment.’ For Juglar, the crisis is the product of precise circumstances, and is understood in terms of its causes. Thus, while for most authors a crisis could be the consequence of a war, Juglar went as far as to deny that, in the absence of credit and speculation, a major war could cause a crisis (Juglar Reference Juglar1857, p. 57). Analogously, the adoption of the etiological approach in medicine implied a redefinition of diseases: after Koch, ‘tuberculosis’ was no longer defined by the presence of tubercles, but by the presence of the tubercle bacillus, so that diseases previously classified as tuberculosis, giving similar symptoms but lacking the bacillus, were eventually reclassified under a different heading (Carter Reference Carter2003; Evans Reference Evans1993; Grmek Reference Grmek and Grmek1998, p. 240).
The etiological approaches in medicine and by Juglar in economics are likely to have developed independently. Juglar, who abandoned medical practice in the very early 1850s, is not very likely to have been aware of the new, isolated advances in medicine (also because a number of them were originally published in the German language, and were unaccompanied by philosophical reflections on their implications). Therefore, he could hardly have appreciated their importance by the time he wrote his book on crises. In spite of the usage of the medical notion of ‘predisposing cause,’ then, Juglar’s achievement is likely to have originated elsewhere—probably in the mechanistic spirit that permeated the scientific atmosphere of the nineteenth century,Footnote 72 as were the other writers who advocated the adoption of the causal principle, in particular Briaune (Reference Briaune1840) and Lawson (Reference Lawson1848).Footnote 73
Yet, Juglar’s switch to an etiological approach was momentous, as it implied an epistemic revolution. Seeing crises as instances of a class of events, rather than as disconnected incidents, and understanding their cause as necessary, sufficient and universal, opened the way to the formulation of laws of crises,Footnote 74 encompassing not only the crises themselves, but also the fact of their recurrence at more or less regular intervals, and with a similar morphology.Footnote 75 There was, however, still some ambiguity in Juglar’s approach. While subject to their own law, crises were still understood as a pathology—albeit a recurring one—with respect to the normal, healthy state of the economy. Indeed, Juglar considered crises as the necessary way to start liquidating the excesses of speculation and bring the system back to equilibrium,Footnote 76 from where it could restart along a path of progress—and there is no description why it ought to restart. The lower turning point and the recovery phase are never outlined but just taken for granted as the settling in of the normal, healthy path of trade and business.Footnote 77 In this, he was following the view of the medical tradition to which he belonged,Footnote 78 which saw diseases as mere quantitative variations from the normal state, so that the analysis of pathological phenomena must be conducted by the same methods of physiology.Footnote 79 This reflection of the Paris clinical school on the relationship between pathology and physiology marks an important epistemic advance: as the laws of pathology must not be an exception with respect to laws governing the physiology of the system, the laws of economic crises should not be an exception to the general laws governing economic dynamics. While Juglar tacitly accepts this by implication,Footnote 80 he did not explicitly stress its epistemic relevance, and, indeed, there is no attempt to make his laws of crises consistent with, or incorporated into, a general theoretical system—which, at the time, would have required him to deal with Say’s Law, a topic that Juglar systematically eschewed. Indeed, in Juglar there is no attempt to work out the laws governing the system’s physiology—namely, the characterization of prosperity. Some of his contemporaries, however, also starting from analogous reflections on the causal principle, went further. Lawson openly maintained that the principle of the uniformity of nature applies to crises as well as to good times, so that economic laws cannot be thought to break down in times of distress,Footnote 81 while John Mills suggested that crises in their succession are a new phenomenon to be considered as a unity,Footnote 82 thus opening the path to the conception of the cycle as a new theoretical norm. But for this proposition to be accepted and integrated in the writings of business cycle theorists, we have to wait until the end of the century (Besomi Reference Besomi2006).
IX. EPILOGUE: FROM ILLNESS TO THE PENDULUM
The medical metaphor was not the only one in use in the nineteenth century to describe crises or the alternation of prosperity and distress. References to the billows of the ocean, tides, earthquakes, storms and tempests, comets, explosives, and fires are met in the literature, but fevers, epidemics, and diseases certainly constitute the most frequently accessed reservoir of metaphors and analogies. They have been used to convey a sense of familiarity with a relatively new phenomenon, to indicate the procedure of approach to the subject, to suggest an interpretation of the phenomenon, or simply to embellish the prose or supply suitable terms for new phenomena. The common trait of the medical metaphors is that they convey the view that something ‘wrong’ is going on with the economic system, regardless of whether the malaise is of an occasional nature and driven by impediments or external causes, or whether it is instead the product of internal tensions, such as excess of speculation or, more rarely, disturbances affecting purchasing power. The counterpart of the disease is a healthy, natural state. The practice of treating crises or their antecedents as an illness implies that there is some healthy condition in which all the functions are performed easily and correctly: payments flow in a timely manner, debits are reimbursed, exchanges proceed smoothly.Footnote 83 The metaphor of illness and health, if not resolved, actually serves to hide the want of a specific characterization of both terms, as each is circularly conceived as the absence of its opposite.
This view of crises was to be challenged at the turn of the century. More and more writers became convinced that the only normal condition of the system is the alternation of good and bad times. As epitomized by Spiethoff, “The ‘normal state’ is neither the upswing, nor the downswing, nor, least of all, the crisis. What is normal in a free, highly capitalist market system based on money, is the business cycle” (Spiethoff Reference Spiethoff1925, English trans. p. 166). So stated, the problem is not simply that of accounting for the empirically ascertained semi-regular recurrence of prosperities and depressions, but that of redefining the theoretical norm, in such a way that a cyclical movement substitutes the stationary or moving equilibrium as the reference state. This requires an extension of the notion of “state,” no longer as a static but as a dynamic concept; and it implies that all phases in the cycle are on the same footing and none is analytically privileged, with the further implication that ‘crises’ themselves are downgraded to turning points of the cycle and can be dispensed with altogether.
The disease metaphor is incompatible with this view, and was soon substituted by mechanical ones: Tugan-Baranowski’s steam engine, Wicksell’s rocking horse, and finally Frisch’s pendula. Again, the new analogies were not simply illustrative, but played an heuristic role, and to a large extent took part in the very foundation of economic dynamics (Louçã Reference Louçã2001; Thoben Reference Thoben1982, p. 296). The suggestion they incorporate is that of a smooth and fully symmetrical undulating movement, which is reflected in the mathematical solution of the equation of motion.
In spite of the success of the new approach to cycles by the econometricians and their successors, medical metaphors have not disappeared from view. As the term “crisis,” purged from the professional jargon by the modern founders of business-cycle theory,Footnote 84 stubbornly returns in occasion of violent upheavals such as the world depression of the 1930s, and the economic and financial crises of the early twenty-first century, the entire storehouse of medical metaphors is called back into use: ‘speculation fever’ and ‘manias,’ ‘panic epidemics’ and ‘contagion,’ frequently show up in leaders and commentaries in the general and financial press.Footnote 85 The very return of this metaphor, at a time when we could resort to more powerful ways of expressing the same principle, confirms its effectiveness in transmitting an idea—surely due to our almost daily experience of disease—and reveals that it is a well-rooted archetype. But the message it conveys is also resilient: economic crises keep bearing witness that the economic system is not just swinging back and forth; it is plainly ill, and every now and again something can go awfully wrong without our being able to prevent it.
