Stephen Biddle has written a worthy book on the never-ending debate over why land wars are won and lost. It contributes to the academic literature, and his policy judgments deserve attention. He puts forth the theory that “force employment” (i.e., doctrine for using military forces in battle) plays a major role in determining outcomes, as big a role as the size of contending forces and the sophistication of their technologies. He further argues that modern employment doctrine, which enables skilled ground forces to negate the effects of lethal fires against them, was born in late World War I, when attackers finally overcame entrenched defenses. A skilled operations research analyst of tactical battles, Biddle offers a multimethod approach that combines logical reasoning, case studies, mathematical models, statistical analysis, and dynamic simulations. His book can be read by nonspecialists, but many of its technical discussions (e.g., Lanchester equations) require expert knowledge.

Biddle's main thesis is on target. As he points out, history and analysis support the judgment that force employment matters importantly in shaping victory and defeat in land warfare. Biddle also offers useful advice to U.S. defense planners when he urges them not to become so enamored with high-technology and air-delivered fires that they ignore the continuing importance of fielding strong ground forces with the capacity to perform effectively. For these reasons, his book likely will be well regarded by many readers.

Virtually any book on this controversial subject is likely to trigger rejoinders. Critics may say that Biddle sets up a straw man in order to cast his theory in favorable light. He argues that the main opponent of his theory is traditional “preponderance theory,” which holds that force size and technology determine battlefield outcomes. Critics may point out that few preponderance theorists would dismiss employment strategy as unimportant. Likewise, critics may argue that the idea of mastering employment doctrine has been alive since Caesar. Frederick the Great and Napoleon used it to gain many victories against strong opponents. The German Wehrmacht nearly won World War II because of its battlefield skills. Historians normally devote considerable attention to battlefield strategies, often at the expense of sufficient attention to numbers and technologies. Critics may ask why Biddle claims his theory is new.

Critics may also accuse the author of lacking strategic perspective in citing two battles from World Wars I and II to exemplify his theory. His use of Operation Michael, a German attack against British and French trenches in spring 1917, seems odd. The attack gained only 20 miles at the weighty cost of 250,000 German casualties in nine days. Indeed, the entire German offensive of that spring, which featured several attacks, failed to win the war even though it gained some ground by using new doctrine. A better example may have been the subsequent allied counterattack in summer/fall 1918, which drove the Germans backward 150 miles and compelled them to surrender. Regardless of the battles examined, Germany was defeated in World War I because its exhausted army ran out of staying power in the face of preponderant allied forces, which benefited from a huge American buildup.

Likewise, Biddle's use of a failed British attack in World War II seems odd. Yes, Operation Goodwood of summer 1944, failed to break out of the Normandy beachhead because the numerically superior British made tactical errors and the outnumbered Germans showed tactical skill. But a few days later, the U.S. Army used preponderance and sound tactics to overwhelm German defenses at St. Lo, and afterward nearly encircled the entire German 7th Army. Biddle's theory would have been better served by analyzing the successful German blitzkrieg campaign against the French and British in spring 1940, which was largely won by better doctrine, not superior numbers. It was this battle, not the end of World War I, that created modern doctrine because it featured a breakthrough attack that quickly unraveled the defender's cohesion, thus making a costly attrition fight unnecessary. But had Biddle examined this battle, he also would have been compelled to analyze the final year of World War II, in which preponderant U.S. and British forces crushed the Wehrmacht, notwithstanding its tactical excellence. Critics may assert that the final results of both World War I and II validate preponderance theory, not Biddle's theory.

Another oddity is that Biddle largely ignores the lengthy debate over the NATO–Warsaw Pact military balance in Central Europe during the Cold War. It was this debate that gave rise to the planning tools, aimed at measuring preponderance, that the author strongly criticizes. The purpose of these tools was not to ignore employment strategy, but instead to measure whether the Warsaw Pact forces were so superior to NATO forces that conventional defense was impossible. They ultimately concluded that the force balance was sufficiently close to enable NATO to contemplate a forward defense. They opened the door not only to new NATO weapons but also to new employment strategies anchored in the reserve forces and fluid maneuvers favored by Biddle. Had he discussed this debate, he might have done a better job of putting the utility of these tools into proper perspective.

Biddle correctly observes that superior employment strategy figured heavily in the U.S. and allied battlefield victories over Iraq in 1991 and 2003. However, he seems wrong in asserting that current U.S. defense plans remain wedded to preponderance theory through technological supremacy. In fact, these plans show major attention to mastering modern employment doctrine. Biddle is correct in arguing that new analytical tools are needed to understand modern combat operations. Likewise, he properly urges that U.S. defense plans remain anchored in strong ground forces even as new networks, sensors, and munitions elevate the lethality of air forces. But his appraisal of the U.S. defense budget seems off-target. He says that the Department of Defense is underfunding readiness in order to procure new weapons. In fact, the opposite is true. Whereas the Pentagon's readiness budget is well funded, its procurement budget is only $75 billion: low by historical standards. Defense experts likely will dispute Biddle's call for less procurement spending, which could sacrifice valuable new weapons for all services. Likewise, experts may question his endorsement of the army's new lightweight weapons, which rely heavily upon air support and seemingly could undercut the sophisticated employment strategies favored by Biddle.

In summary, Military Power may be subjected to rebuttals of its specific features, but it accurately captures important lessons. Past wars have been won or lost because of preponderance, or doctrinal superiority, or a combination of them. Each war must be judged on its unique merits. Future war plans should reflect a proper combination of size, technology, and skill. Beyond question, this book represents a serious effort to apply sophisticated analysis to an important, complex defense issue. It presents many good arguments for experts to debate, and it allows inexperienced readers to learn a great deal about a vital issue that might otherwise seem arcane. It will make a good textbook for undergraduates and graduate students. It is well worth reading, owning, and remembering.