This monograph fills a substantial and surprising gap in the literature on US relations with Chile. A small library could be filled with books on the Nixon administration's role regarding the 1973 military coup and its aftermath. Far less is known about the Reagan administration's relationship with Chile in its 1980s transition from dictatorship to democracy. As the authors of this fine volume demonstrate, the Republican administration indirectly and incrementally nudged the Pinochet regime towards acceptance of a form of democracy that preserved military power and kept popular leftist movements at bay. Their well-argued case draws on first-class research in a wide array of manuscript sources, US government documents and publications, and oral interviews of key actors in Washington DC and Santiago.
The book's main title is a misnomer probably formulated for marketing rather than accuracy. The better construction is ‘The Reagan Administration and Pinochet’. Ronald Reagan himself was little involved in detailed foreign policymaking regarding Chile. Only once is Augusto Pinochet mentioned in any entry of substance in the Reagan Diaries, which cover his White House years, and references to Chile itself are nearly as sparse – though the former Hollywood actor took umbrage on seeing the Costa-Gavras movie Missing (‘a pretty biased slam at Chile and our own government’, 12 February 1982). Reagan's personal correspondence, a very good index of his core interests, contains only a single reference to Chile – and that a pre-presidential letter from 1975. Whenever Chile was discussed in the National Security Council – an infrequent occurrence in comparison to Central America and Cuba – for example, its records show that Reagan was far less engaged than in meetings discussing matters that he deemed of fundamental significance to his Cold War strategy.
There is no doubt, however, that Reagan was significant in setting the broad framework in which other policymakers interacted to shape policy towards Chile. Initially, the 40th president was insistent on supporting authoritarian regimes in Latin America and elsewhere in the cause of anti-communism without heed to their human rights policy. Events in Europe were to bring about a change of outlook, notably Reagan's support for the Solidarity movement in its challenge to the Soviet-backed military regime in Poland. Addressing the UK Parliament in June 1982, he committed the United States to promote ‘freedom and democracy’ throughout the world.
This shift in presidential vision sparked an internal bureaucratic struggle in Washington to develop a Chile policy that better fitted it. The volume's account of the complex and changing contours of the debate over Pinochet make for an extremely valuable case study of the US foreign policymaking process and its outputs. In this regard it is a tour de force of the foreign policy analysis school of international relations.
Hostile to the human rights focus of the Carter administration, Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, populated his department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, a pro-democracy bailiwick in the Carter years, with officials more willing to tolerate the hemisphere's authoritarian regimes. Despite their bureaucratic rivalry on other matters, United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, CIA Director Bill Casey and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were in strong agreement with his pro-Pinochet stance. In contrast, Haig's successor, George Shultz, promoted diplomatic efforts to shepherd Chile towards democratisation, but the route to this end was strewn with obstacles. Shultz's principal bureaucratic ally, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams, was in many ways the key actor in the nitty-gritty of the contest to determine the details of the new foreign policy. Appointed during Haig's tenure, he was prepared to deny Chile certification for purposes of resuming military aid, but encountered considerable opposition from Shultz's rival principles, especially Kirkpatrick, and staff at the State Department and within the diplomatic service from the early Reagan days. A particular thorn in his flesh was US Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters, a long-time Pinochet confidant.
The democratisers and their opponents also had allies within the legislative branch of government. Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts emerged as the most prominent congressional critic of US toleration of Pinochet. Counterbalancing his influence, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, an arch-conservative Republican opponent of Reagan's eventual negotiation of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty of 1987 with Mikhail Gorbachev, was assiduous in his support of Pinochet. In 1986 he made a very rare trip abroad to visit Santiago in 1986 to conduct personal diplomacy to this end, without deigning to give the State Department or the US Embassy advance notice of his intent.
The outlook of America's allies made for another complicated layer in the debate. The Thatcher government was hardly an enthusiast for putting pressure on Pinochet, particularly in light of his assistance during the Falklands War. More broadly, there was little support in the international community, even from newly democratic Spain, about using economic diplomacy to coerce the Chilean regime.
Had Reagan cast his lot in with Shultz and Abrams, they might have made better progress, but he was reluctant to abandon a dictatorial ally when there was no acceptable replacement. In this regard Pinochet was quite different to the cases of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti. Ultimately, however, the Chilean dictator was his own principal saviour in the persuasive estimation of Morley and McGillion. Pinochet's highly effective pre-emption of a united democratic movement emerging to challenge him and his continued support among the military kept American pressure for change at bay for most of the 1980s.
As this volume demonstrates, the eventual restoration of democracy in Chile after the 1988 plebiscite rejected Pinochet's bid for a further term as head of state was primarily attributable to decisions and timetables determined by that country's internal dynamics. Nevertheless, America's role in the transition was significant: it maintained steady pressure on the regime; it helped prop up the moderate opposition that eventually found its way into government in the 1990s; and it worked to ensure both a fair plebiscite and Pinochet's acceptance of the outcome. In essence, this was one of the Reagan administration's most significant foreign policy successes in the cause of democratisation because it achieved the best possible outcome for US bilateral and regional interests in Chile. In their important corrective to one-dimensional critiques of the Reagan administration's support for dictatorships, Morley and McGillion have produced a volume that merits being read by anyone interested in the 40th president and his administration, US foreign policy towards Latin America and the complexities of democratisation in Chile.
