There are some 1.5 million Kurds in Syria today out of a total population of 22 million, making Kurds the largest non-Arab group in the country. Publications on Syria, the Mashriq, and Kurds have nonetheless paid scant attention to the particulars of Syrian Kurds. The Syrian state has also worked hard since the 1960s to suppress, silence, and hide its Kurdish population, and Syria has been more successful in this regard than Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Scholars of the Kurdish issue have advanced various hypotheses over the years for Syrian Kurds’ apparent quiescence in the face of state repression compared to rebellion-prone Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian Kurds.
Syrian Kurds finally began to get some attention after the Qamishli revolt, or the serhildan, as the Kurds call it, in March 2004. Widespread Kurdish protests, rioting, and street melees with state-armed Arab militias and security forces broke out in Qamishli, Afrin, Hassaka, Damascus, and Aleppo. Imitating contemporaneous events in Iraq, Kurds in Qamishli even toppled a statue of the late president Hafiz al-Asad. Syrian police and mukhābarāt killed scores of protesters and arrested and tortured thousands more. Tension, protests, and repressive crackdowns have continued since the quelling of the revolt, particularly around the time of the Kurdish Nowruz festivals (the spring equinox new year on 21 March) and other important anniversaries.
Following these events and the increased visibility of Syrian Kurds, several new studies have come out seeking to understand the underexamined situation of Kurds in Syrian, or Western, Kurdistan. Jordi Tejel's book, Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society, is among these studies, and it is an outstanding contribution. Relying on original fieldwork in Syria (interrupted at times by the regime), interviews with Syrian Kurds in Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Europe, archival records from the French mandatory period, and the (scant) existing literature on Syria's Kurds, Tejel's book helps fill an important gap in Kurdish and Syrian studies. The analysis comes across as extremely objective—arguments are carefully crafted with great sensitivity to the nuances and complexities of the subject matter. Despite the necessary anonymity of some of the interviewees, the sources remain appropriate throughout the work (ranging from anonymous eyewitnesses of recent events in Syrian Kurdistan to identified elites and leaders of various Kurdish political parties) and contribute to a well-balanced, thorough examination of the topic. Tejel also consistently situates his argument within the broader academic literature on nationalism, ethnicity, and social movement theory, though he does not quite follow through on his promised “grand theoretical social movement narrative” (p. 88) for explaining the trajectories of the Syrian Kurdish case.
Tejel's account of the French mandatory period in Syria and the ensuing, relatively open period in Syrian politics between 1946 and 1963 points to a time when the Kurds, the various arms of the French colonial bureaucracy, and emerging Syrian state leaders manifested divided, frequently changing, and often self-contradictory tendencies. Until the early 1960s, the Kurds’ place in Syria (or lack thereof) seemed by no means certain given shifting alliances of elites jockeying for power:
No single social class possessed the strength necessary to monopolize power and play a dominant role by universalizing its own interests and demands. The result was the constant challenging of the authority of the heirs of mandatory order, that is to say, of the notables who first came to power in the National Bloc. They were finally replaced by a coalition of military and civil actors who worked together temporarily to created a powerful and united state apparatus, under the banner of independence, anti-imperialism, and social justice (p. 39).
In terms of the Kurds, their political engagement “could be classified into three camps: Arab nationalism, communism, and Kurdish nationalism” (p. 42). Contrary to a simplistic reading of the issue, some Kurds such as Husni Zaʿim and Adib al-Shishakli (two of Syria's first military dictators) thus espoused a nonsectarian “Greater Syria” and even an Arab (but not pan-Arab) nationalist discourse while relying on, in practice, a coterie of mostly Kurdish and Circassian deputies and praetorian guards (pp. 39–46).
Tejel describes how by the early 1960s, currents (and successive coups) in Damascus took a more exclusive Arab nationalist and then pan-Arab turn, leading to the closing of the political system (and officer corps) to Syrian Kurds. Similar to events in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, Syria's refusal of Kurdish requests for cultural and linguistic rights politicized an ethnic identity that might not have otherwise manifested such political saliency. As Kurds increasingly came to be viewed as alien and a “fifth column” threatening Syrian unity, successive regimes—particularly (as of 1963) the Baʿath Party—imposed severe measures on them. In 1962 the Syrian government proclaimed Syria an Arab republic for the first time and issued decree no. 93, a special census for the mostly Kurdish Jazira region of Syria that led to the labeling of some 120,000 Kurds as “aliens” (pp. 50–52). Kurds labeled as such faced revocation of their citizenship as well as the loss of property rights, access to state employment or services, and the ability to register marriages or send children to public schools. To this day, these “stateless” Kurds and their descendants (around 300,000 people) lack identity cards and struggle to survive on the margins of Syrian society. Tejel convincingly explains the context within which the Syrian government opted for such a policy (in particular, a perceived threat from Kurdish political and military gains in neighboring Iraq at the time).
Readers curious about more recent developments in Syria, including the 2004 serhildan and subsequent tensions, should see Tejel's book. Apart from a few quibbles related to minor arguments, I have two criticisms of the work. First, I was left somewhat unsatisfied with Tejel's explanation for the lack of a substantive armed Kurdish opposition to the Syrian state, especially after the political system became so closed to Kurdish aspirations after 1962. These issues are naturally complex, but the substantial difference between Syrian Kurdistan's terrain and that of other parts of Kurdistan was never mentioned. If, as the old proverb goes, “the Kurds have no friends but the mountains,” then Syrian Kurds lack even this. (Syrian Kurdistan comprises plains and a few rolling hills rather than the extremely rugged and guerrilla-friendly geography of Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian Kurdistan.) Second, Tejel's objective and very academic approach sometimes makes for difficult reading, especially in the first two chapters. One can be dispassionate to a fault. Nonacademics and undergraduate students may have a difficult time with this text, but it would be a shame if such difficulties led them to put it down without finishing it. I, for one, learned a great deal from the book.
