… [T]he dialectical method does not permit us simply to proclaim the falseness of this consciousness [i.e. ideology] and to persist in an inflexible confrontation of true and false. On the contrary, it requires us to investigate this false consciousness concretely as a moment of the historical totality, to which it belongs, and as a layer in the historical process, in which it is effective. (Lukács Reference Lukács1968: 50)
My aim in this article is to show that the category of Schein in Hegel’s Science of Logic expresses the structure of ideology in general and specifically, the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism.Footnote 1 To this aim, I motivate Marx’s mature critique of political economy in Capital and the Grundrisse. For Marx, equality and freedom are ideology since they conceal the relations of domination that define capitalism. In these works, Marx very rarely uses the term ‘ideology’. Instead, he consistently uses the term Schein in the same sense to describe the nature of equality and freedom in capitalism. Although Marx was engaged with Hegel’s Logic in this period,Footnote 2 he never explicitly refers to Hegel while using the term Schein, and this is perhaps why the systematic relation between the two has not been investigated so far.Footnote 3 By bringing Hegel and Marx together, I aim, on the one hand, to reveal the social import of Hegel’s conception of Schein in the Science of Logic, and on the other hand, to demonstrate the dialectical underpinning of Marx’s conception of ideology in his critique of political economy.
In the first part of the Science of Logic, the logic of being, Hegel discusses the basic categories that describe the world, as it is immediately accessible to us. The task of the logic of essence, which follows the logic of being, is to provide the basic system of categories with which to grasp the essential structure of the world. Hegel begins the logic of essence with the category of Schein (semblance)Footnote 4 to explain how being, as it is immediately accessible to us, i.e., how it ‘seems’ (scheint) to us, is related to essence. More specifically, the category of semblance denotes how being is ‘sublated’ in essence. I argue that for Hegel semblance is false, yet, being necessarily sublated in essence, is constitutive of essence. The same holds for Marx. In our immediate access to social reality in capitalism, we regard ourselves as equal and free. The idea of equality and freedom, however, is a semblance and false, yet such falsity is sublated in—and therefore necessary to—the essence of capitalism.Footnote 5
My interpretation of Hegel is based on Michael Theunissen’s ground-breaking work on the Logic, Sein und Schein: die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik (1978). Theunissen briefly argues (1) that the logic of being is the logic of the relation of Gleichgültigkeit (which in the context of this essay I translate as equality)Footnote 6 , and (2) that the logic of essence is the logic of the relation of domination (Herrschaft) (Theunissen Reference Theunissen1978: 25ff). Theunissen does not elaborate on the social import of these theses but he does mention, in passing and without further grounding, that in Hegel’s Logic ‘the relations of equality are merely concealed relations of domination’ (36), and that ‘domination not only presupposes equality, but also promotes it’ (30). Building on Theunissen’s insights and by relating Marx’s critique of political economy to Hegel’s Logic, I demonstrate how semblance captures the structure of ideology of freedom and equality in capitalism, a task that Theunissen does not undertake.
In what follows, I begin with a general account of semblance for Marx. According to Marx, ideology qua semblance is not a cognitive failure that results from ignorance. It is rather grounded in social reality, and therefore is necessary (I). Then, I contextualize semblance in Hegel’s Logic through giving a short account of the logic of being and the logic of essence (II). Thereafter, I elaborate on Hegel’s dialectic of semblance in the Logic and show how the semblance of equality is generated by the essence of domination and solely serves to perpetuate domination (III). I then return to Marx to discuss his concept of semblance in more detail and demonstrate how it accords with Hegel’s Logic (IV). Finally I explain how Hegel’s and Marx’s accounts of semblance, despite the similarities, ultimately differ from each other in a decisive way.Footnote 7
I. Semblance as necessary falsity in Marx
It is no exaggeration to claim that Marx’s project of the critique of political economy—in its entirety—is based on the ontological distinction between what seems to be the case and what is essentially the case, i.e., between semblance and essence. Indeed, he distinguishes ‘classical’ political economy from the ‘vulgar’ one precisely by this. Whereas the former makes a serious scientific attempt to discover the ‘inner framework’ of the phenomenal economic world, according to Marx, the latter ‘only flounders around within the seeming [scheinbar] framework’ and confines itself to ‘pedantic systematization’ of the surface appearance into a more or less coherent theory (C I: 174–75/95). Thus for vulgar political economy seeming is all there is; there is no inner core distinguishable from what can be perceived or observed.
One can distinguish two claims in Marx: (1) A weaker claim that semblance is merely different from essence. The seeming world is an amalgam of chaotic and disjointed phenomena, and cannot be explained on its own. It is the invisible essence that relates the scattered phenomena to each other and gives them internal unity. It is in this sense that Marx thinks that the distinction between essence and semblance is fundamental to any empirical science, not merely to political economy; the task of any science is to explain the unity underlying the sheer plurality of the phenomena. ‘All science would be superfluous’, he writes, ‘if the outward appearance of things and the essence of things immediately coincided’ (C III: 956/825). (2) A stronger claim is that not only is semblance different from essence, but also, and more importantly, semblance is false and misleading.Footnote 8 This claim Marx makes about the surface appearance of capitalist society. What appears to individuals in an important way falsifies and distorts what is really the case in capitalism. Marx writes:
The finished shape of economic relations [in capitalism], as these are visible on the surface, in their real existence, and therefore also in the representations with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very different from the shape of their inner core, which is essential but concealed, and the concept corresponding to it. It is in fact the very reverse [verkehrt] and opposite [gegensätzlich] of this. (C III: 311/219; my emphases)
It is in this second stronger sense that semblance for Marx is ideology. Ideology is a semblance that falsifies the essence of society in capitalism. One primary feature of ideology for Marx is its necessity. To invoke Adorno’s definition—which captures Marx’s viewpoint—ideology is ‘socially necessary semblance’ (gesellschaftlich notwendiger Schein) (GS 6: 348). For Marx, ideology is not merely some phantasmagorical hallucination afflicting individuals. It is not some arbitrary false ideas that can be replaced at will with other false ideas. Ideology is necessary in that it is grounded in social structure and thereby has a systematic connection with it (see Jaeggi Reference Jaeggi2009: 268). The way that capitalism appears to individuals is false; but this falsity, Marx emphasizes, ‘arise[s] from the very relations of production’ (C I: 677/559). In other words, the structure or essence of society in capitalism cannot be what it is without incorporating a necessary moment of objective falsity, of ideology. The notion of semblance as being objectively or necessarily false is contradictory, since we tend to think what is objective or necessary is always true. Hegel’s Logic will clarify the nature of this contradiction.
II. Semblance in Hegel’s Logic: being as sublated in essence
In this section, I first give a general account of the logic of being and the logic of essence. Then, I explain what it means that semblance is sublated in essence. I conclude with a brief explanation of the difference between the two ways that essence appears according to Hegel: semblance (Schein) and ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung).
Hegel’s Logic in general can be characterized as a theory of relations or mediations. In each part of the Logic—being, essence, Concept—there is a distinctive mode of relation that defines the structure and content of that part (EL §240). The general mode of relation that obtains in the logic of being is that of Gleichgültigkeit. For Hegel, the relation of Gleichgültigkeit has two aspects: (1) The two individuals that are in a relation of Gleichgültigkeit with each other are indifferent towards one another, and towards the relation between them. This means that the relation is not fully constitutive of the individuals, and remains external to them. In other words, the individuals in the logic of being are ‘self-subsistent’ and exist independently of the relation between them. (2) The two individuals in this relation have a symmetrical relation with each other; the one defines the other to the same extent that the other defines the one. In this sense, the relation of Gleichgültigkeit is the relation of equality, since the relation is equally valid (gleich gelten) for both of them. The two aspects of the relation of Gleichgültigkeit for Hegel are strictly interrelated. When the individuals are equal with each other, there remains an indifferent core to them that is not determinable through the relation between them. Similarly, the equality of individuals obtains by virtue of their indifference to each other. Thus, individuals in the logic of being ultimately remain unanalyzable ‘atoms’ that cannot become fully determinate. They are simply given, or in Hegel’s language, immediate. The logic of being terminates with the category of ‘absolute indifference’ which expresses the insurpassable conceptual block that is attained within the framework of being. Hegel’s exposition of the logic of being, therefore, is to criticize it.
The failure of the logic of being to be adequately determinate demonstrates that being is not sustainable by itself; rather it has to be anchored within a more determinate category, namely essence. Importantly, for Hegel, essence is not simply another category of the same nature as the categories of being, that emerges in the further development of being, but it is fundamentally of a ‘different nature’ (SL 390/II: 15). This radically different nature can be articulated especially in the following two ways: (1) The ontology that Hegel develops in the logic of essence is absolutely relational.Footnote 9 That is, in the logic of essence the categories are defined solely through their relation to each other. Whereas in the logic of being, individuals remain independent of the relations that obtain among them, in the logic of essence, individuals are solely derived from these relations. (2) The ontology developed in the logic of essence is the ontology of domination. In contrast to the relation of equality that obtained in the logic of being, in the logic of essence the relation between categories is asymmetrical. This relation of domination, however, is of a special type. It is not direct or immediate; rather it obtains through incorporating a moment of the relation of equality. In other words, the relation of domination in essence obtains, not despite equality, but precisely through equality.
It is helpful to illustrate the above points through examples. (1) The paradigmatic example of the relation of equality in the logic of being is the relation between ‘something’ (Etwas) and ‘an other’ (ein Anderes), between, say, a table and a chair. The two define each other equally. Hegel writes, ‘if of two things we call one A, and the other B, then in the first instance B is determined as the other, but A is just as much the other of B. Both are, in the same way, others’ (SL 117/I: 125, my emphases). Moreover, although there is a relation between something and the other, nonetheless each exists independently of the relation. (Table and chair have a certain spatial or functional relation with each other, yet each of them exists independently of the other.) (2) A paradigmatic example of the logic of essence is the relation of ‘substance’ and ‘accidents’. They are, according to Hegel, solely defined through each other. Substance is always substance of accidents, and accidents are always accidents of substance. There is an asymmetrical relation of domination between the two, since it is ultimately substance that gives determination to accidents. However, the relation of domination contains a moment of equality, since inasmuch as accidents are dependent upon substance, for Hegel, substance is also dependent upon accidents. The first instance of the relation of domination in the logic of essence is the one obtaining between essence and semblance. I will discuss this in the next section.
The logic of being forms the common-sense ontology that permeates our intuitive awareness of the social world. Intuitively, we see an individual, to use a term from Sandel, as an ‘unencumbered self’, that is, a self that is separable from the social relations in which he or she stands (Sandel Reference Sandel1984). The individual, it seems to us, has an inner citadel, which is ultimately unaffected by and therefore remains indifferent towards the surrounding social relations. All individuals have such an inner citadel, and so, to that extent, all individuals are equal with each other. There is no relation of domination between individuals, or if there is, it remains external to what makes the individual what he or she is. And this kind of equality of individuals which obtains through their indifference makes them—intuitively—free: it seems to us that individuals are free to choose, as if from afar, what social roles to take on or reject.
And yet such a conception of individuals as being equal and free is illusory. Hegel insists, ‘the truth of being is essence’ (Die Wahrheit des Seins ist das Wesen), and then continues:
Being is the immediate. Since knowing has for its goal knowledge of the true, knowledge of what being is in and for itself, it does not stop at the immediate and its determinations, but penetrates it on the supposition that at the back of this being there is something else, something other than being itself, that this background constitutes the truth of being. (SL 390/II: 13)
The logic of essence provides the basic system of concepts to understand the invisible background of the visible individuals, the invisible background that is the ‘truth’ of the visible individuals. The logic of essence is the logic that obtains solely through the analysis of relations. From the standpoint of the logic of essence, what seems to be a self-subsistent individual turns out to be—in truth—not self-subsistent but the result of certain relations, ‘causes’, ‘grounds’, ‘conditions’, ‘forces’, etc., that constitute him or her.
Similarly, the way capitalism seems to individuals is formed through the logic of being. Capitalism is necessarily a market economy. Individuals in market transactions are equal before the law and exchange commodities of equal value. Marx writes,
since they only exist for one another in exchange as equally worthy persons [Gleichgeltende] as possessors of equivalent things, who thereby prove their equivalence, they are as equals at the same time also indifferent to one another [sind sie als Gleichgeltende zugleich Gleichgültige gegeneinander]. Whatever other individual distinction there may be does not concern them; they are indifferent [gleichgültig] to all their other individual peculiarities. (G 242/167–68)
In market transactions individuals are self-subsistent atoms that remain external to the relation that makes them equal. Moreover, in market transactions individuals are free. The one does not appropriate the other’s property by force or through violence, but by treating him as the owner of property who can dispose of it at his own free will. This, however, is only how capitalism seems to individuals. The freedom and equality obtained in exchange ‘appears as the surface process, beneath which, however, in the depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this seeming [scheinbar] equality and freedom disappear.’ (G 247/42: 173). The truth is (1) that in capitalism individuals are inseparable from social relations, thereby thoroughly determined by them, and (2) that these social relations are relations of domination and inequality.Footnote 10
For Hegel, thus, the logic of being is a false ontology that conceals the true ontology of essence. However, the truth of essence does not simply annihilate the falsity of being. Rather, essence, while negating being, at the same time preserves being as its own constitutive moment. That is to say, the truth of essence ‘sublates’ the falsity of being.Footnote 11 Thus Hegel contends:
The true system [das wahre System] cannot have the relation to the false [das Falsche] of being merely opposed to it; since, if this were so, the [true] system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true system as the higher must contain the subordinate [false] system within itself [als das Höhere muß es das Untergeordnete in sich enthalten]. (SL 580/II: 250)
We will learn precisely how being gets sublated in essence in the next section. To conclude this section, I would like to clarify an important distinction that Hegel makes in the logic of essence between semblance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung). The distinction, of course, is not merely verbal, and it is sometimes difficult to cling to a fixed terminology to refer to these concepts. Both semblance and appearance denote the realm of positivity of essence, the way that essence appears or exists. For Hegel, appearance is a much more determinate category than semblance. While Hegel begins the logic of essence with the category of semblance, he discusses appearance much later in the logic of essence, and, importantly, after the discussion of the category of ‘ground’. For Hegel, semblance is the remaining of being in essence. It is a kind of immediacy that is not yet fully taken up by the mediating activity of essence. In contrast, appearance is a kind of immediacy that is derived from, and grounded in essence. In Hegel’s words, appearance is ‘the essentiality that has advanced to immediacy’; it is ‘a being that has come forth from negativity and inwardness’ of essence (SL 479/II: 124, my emphases). This means that appearance is a kind of being or existence which is fully mediated by—or generated through—the relationality of essence. Thus appearance is a true and adequate expression of essence, whereas semblance shows only the false aspects of essence that remain from the immediacy of being. Freedom and equality, as false expressions of essence, are semblances of the essence of capitalism; but the tendency towards the lengthening of the working day, incessant technological changes, the progressive mechanization of the labour process, mass unemployment, the destruction of nature, etc., are directly derived from the essence of capitalism, and belong therefore to its appearances.Footnote 12
III. The dialectic of semblance in Hegel’s Logic
In this section, I explain the dialectic of semblance in the logic of essence. This lays bare the logical structure of semblance, and shows how semblance is a falsity that is necessary and constitutive of essence. Moreover, as semblance captures equality, and essence is defined in terms of domination, the dialectic of semblance shows how equality and domination cohere with each other. For Hegel the relation of domination is not simply given; it is rather generated through the dialectic of semblance. In the Science of Logic, the chapter of ‘semblance’ consists of three parts: (A) ‘the Essential and the Unessential’ (das Wesentliche und das Unwesentliche), (B) ‘semblance’, and (C) ‘reflection’ (Reflexion). (The letters are Hegel’s.) Hegel begins with an entirely critical conception of semblance in (A), namely, how the relation of semblance and essence should not be understood, and moves towards an affirmative account of this relation in (B) and (C).
(A) Semblance is not separable from essence.
The first and the most natural way of thinking about essence and semblance is to think of essence as something hidden which, so to speak, lies underneath semblance. This conception of essence accords to the ordinary consciousness with its pictorial mode of thinking. The structure of reality, according to this conception, is bi-layered. The surface layer, what seems to us, is those qualities or determinations that are in truth not constitutive of reality—they are ‘the Unessential’ (das Unwesentliche). The deeper layer or core is those invisible qualities and determinations that make reality what it is; they are the ‘Essential’ (das Wesentliche). According to this conception, the semblance (the Unessential) is a false appearance that is separate from the true essence (the Essential) of reality. In this way, according to Hegel,
Essence itself is an affirmative [seiendes], immediate essence, and being is only a negative in relation to essence; [essence is] not in and for itself … In this way, being and essence relate to each other again as others; for each has a being, an immediacy, and these are indifferent [gleichgültig] to each other, and with respect to this being, being and essence are equal in value [stehen diesem Sein nach in gleichem Werte]. (SL 394/II: 18)
Conceptualizing the relation of essence and semblance in terms of the Essential and the Unessential is a ‘relapse’ into the logic of being. Like something and other in the logic of being, here essence and semblance cannot define each other through the relation between them, and remain equal and indifferent to each other. Moreover—and this is another point—if we want to distinguish the Essential from the Unessential of reality, according to Hegel, we end up with an indeterminate situation, since we cannot know what precisely the Essential is. The decision as to what to conceive as the Essential does not originate from objective reality itself. It rather falls upon our merely subjective attitude, such that ‘the same content can sometimes be regarded as the Essential and sometimes as the Unessential’ (SL 395/II: 19).
The indeterminacy of the relation of the Essential to the Unessential shows that it is wrong to conceive of semblance as separable from essence. It shows via negativa that they thoroughly interpenetrate. This means that although we can use the pictorial metaphors of core/surface, centre/periphery, inner/outer, background/foreground to describe the relation of essence and semblance in natural language—as both Hegel and Marx frequently do—we should be fully aware that the metaphor is misleading and distorts the conceptual truth of their total imbrication. Thus, when Rosa Luxemburg writes, ‘we have always revealed the hard kernel of social inequality and lack of freedom hidden under the sweet shell of formal equality and freedom’ (Luxemburg Reference Luxemburg2012: 220), we should not take her claim literally, as if she meant that the ‘sweet shell’ of ideology or semblance can be removed from the ‘hard kernel’ of essence of capitalism through some enlightened reasoning. Rather, we should read her in the same way that Adorno conceives of ideology when he writes, ‘ideology does not overlay the social being like a detachable layer, but is inherent in it’ (GS 6: 348). In capitalism, equality and domination are indissolubly bound with each other such that one cannot have one without the other. This means that freedom and equality in capitalism only obtain by virtue of domination and inequality, as the capitalist system of domination can only sustain itself by providing freedom and equality.
(B) Semblance is posited by essence.
The result of the dialectic of the Essential and the Unessential is that it is wrong to understand essence as simply excluding being or semblance. In (B), Hegel conceives of essence as a totality that contains—and not excludes—semblance. Semblance is no longer something that subsists side-by-side with essence, but it is conceived solely as semblance of essence. Being or semblance ‘is not free’, Hegel now emphasizes, ‘but is present only as related with its [i.e. essence’s] unity’ (SL 391/II: 15, my emphasis). Semblance does not exist on its own; it is thoroughly dominated by essence.
Hegel’s conception of essence as a totality is curious, in that he is equally committed to the two following contradictory claims: (1) that essence is a totality that does not allow any otherness of being or semblance; (2) that being or semblance retains some sort of otherness to essence. Instead of shying away from this contradiction, Hegel emphatically defines semblance in terms of contradiction:
Being is semblance. The being of semblance consists solely in the sublatedness of being, in its nothingness; this nothingness it has in essence and apart from its nothingness, apart from essence, semblance is not. It is the negative posited as the negative. [Das Sein ist Schein. Das Sein des Scheins besteht allein in dem Aufgehobensein des Seins, in seiner Nichtigkeit; diese Nichtigkeit hat es im Wesen, und außer seiner Nichtigkeit, außer dem Wesen ist er nicht. Er ist das Negative gesetzt als Negatives.] (SL 395/II: 19)
For Hegel, being or semblance functions as the other of essence, but this other is not ‘true’: ‘here we have no true other’ (EL §111A). Being or semblance is, but not as something that is; rather as something that is not. Its mode of existence, therefore, is that of non-existence. It exists, but not as something positive, rather as something sublated or negated in essence. Hegel calls semblance ‘the inherently null’ (das an sich Nichtige) (SL 397/II: 21). The nullity of semblance is not the nullity of complete absence of determination.Footnote 13 Rather, it is a nullity that results from the inherently unstable character of semblance, from the simultaneity of its being related and not related to essence.
By conceiving of semblance in terms of contradiction, Hegel does not deny the law of non-contradiction. The law of non-contradiction is the minimal prerequisite of any consistent thought, and Hegel (and Marx, for that matter) fully abides by it. Rather, the contradiction of semblance results from the necessary coherence of two mutually excluding moments constituting semblance. These two moments are (1) a moment of being that exists independently of essence, and (2) a moment of being that is fully taken up by essence, and is therefore dependent on it. These two moments exclude each other; yet Hegel insists that it is exactly the unity of the two that makes semblance what it is. One should not try to solve this contradiction by denying one of the contradictory moments, or by simply denying the existence of contradiction, or by trying to transform the contradictory semblance into another entity, but one should explicitly ‘grasp and assert the contradiction’ (Auffassen und Aussprechen des Widerspruchs) (SL 441/II: 77). Hegel emphasizes,
Speculative thinking consists solely [nur] in the fact that thought holds fast [festhält] to contradiction, and in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be ruled by it as in ordinary thinking, where its determinations are resolved [auflösen] by contradiction only into other determinations or into nothing. (SL 440/II: 76)
As the structure of Hegel’s contradiction shows, Hegel is emphatically against conceiving of contradiction as a middle-term or mean between two opposing determinations.Footnote 14 It is not the case that semblance is partially determined by essence, and is partially not determined by essence. Hegel is unequivocal on this point, and writes that ‘being in its totality has withdrawn into essence’ [Das Sein ist in seiner Totalität in das Wesen zurückgegangen] (SL 397/II: 21, my emphasis). If we conceive being or semblance as being determined or dominated by essence in some respect, and as being free from the determination or domination of essence in some other respect, there will be again a ‘relapse’ into the relation of the Essential and the Unessential. Such a relation conceives of essence and semblance as excluding each other, and cannot thereby be adequately determinate. The moment of existence of semblance and the moment of non-existence of semblance cohere with each other; they do not get watered down to a partial existence and a partial non-existence. This logical point is extremely important in understanding the relation of domination and equality in capitalism, and I discuss it later.
Hegel’s term for describing the relation of essence to semblance is ‘positing’ (Setzen). He writes, ‘semblance is essence’s own positing’ (SL 393/II: 17). That essence posits semblance means that essence generates or produces semblance.Footnote 15 Semblance cannot exist untouched by or indifferent to essence, since it is already generated by essence. Indeed, the act of positing distinguishes the logic of essence from the logic of being. In the logic of being, neither of the two individuals (something and an other) generates the other. Each can exist independently of the other and there is a relation of equality between them. It is first the act of positing in the logic of essence that establishes the asymmetrical relation of domination, since the posited (semblance) is dependent for its very existence upon the positing (essence). At this stage, the relation of domination seems to be one-way, one in which the dominated (semblance) does not exert any effect on the dominating (essence). However, in (C) Hegel develops his conception of domination to show that there is indeed a reciprocal relation between the dominating (essence) and the dominated (semblance), discussed below.
(C) Semblance is posited by essence as essence’s own presupposition.
Hegel’s conception of essence and its relation to semblance are specific in the history of philosophy. This specificity gets articulated in ‘reflection’. I have explained that the logic of essence is characterized by two themes: (1) the ontology of absolute relationality; (2) the ontology of domination. In reflection Hegel interweaves these two themes and articulates them in their unity. Hegel’s exposition of reflection in the Science of Logic is pivotal to his philosophy in general. In this section, I do not aim to show the systematic significance of reflection. I limit myself to explaining how ‘reflection’ captures the relation of essence and semblance.Footnote 16
In the logic of being, relation obtains between things. In the logic of essence, by contrast, relation obtains between relations. Footnote 17 Reflection for Hegel is a second-order relation that obtains between the relation of equality that constitutes being and the relation of domination that constitutes essence. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel relates his conception of reflection to light when it hits a mirror. The light ray exists one time as forward-going, and the same light ray exists another time as backward-going (EL §112A). What this simile shows about reflection is its recursivity. The relation of essence and semblance is always two-way. Essence posits semblance, but through this positing, it constitutes itself as essence. In other words, there is a relation of essence to semblance, which then reflects back from semblance to essence, and makes essence what it is. Hegel uses different expressions to convey the recursivity of the reflection constituting essence. ‘The return of essence is its self-repulsion from itself’ (SL 401/II: 27). ‘Its [reflection’s] self-repelling is the coming-to-itself’ (SL 402/II: 27). The relation of essence to its other is ‘bent back’ unto itself (SL 407/II: 34). And ‘the reflective movement is to be taken as an absolute recoil upon itself’ (SL 402/II: 26). As all these expressions indicate, essence for Hegel is not a neo-Platonic pre-mediated One that emanates itself into the seeming world, but essence is nothing but the very relation between essence and semblance, which recursively constitutes essence. The reflexive structure of reflection makes essence a self-grounding category. Essence relates to semblance, and in so doing it grounds itself as essence.
In (B), we learned that Hegel conceives essence to be ‘positing’ semblance. Hegel now shows that such a conception is inadequate, since any act of producing or generating requires some materials with which it can produce or generate. In other words, any act of ‘positing’ is at the same time an act of ‘presupposing’. Hegel’s conception of essence is peculiar in that he wants to show that essence uses or requires (‘presupposes’) the very same material that it produces (‘posits’). That is, what essence posits (Setzen) is the same as that which it has already in-advance-posited (Voraussetzen).
To articulate that essence’s positing semblance and essence’s presupposing of semblance coincide, Hegel introduces three forms of reflection, what he calls (1) ‘positing’ (setzende), (2) ‘external’ (äußere) and (3) ‘determining’ (bestimmende) reflection. The third adequately expresses reflection, and the first two are one-sided abstractions from it. Hegel’s exposition of reflection is particularly cumbersome. But his general point is clear. (1) In positing reflection, essence is conceived to be creating semblance; but it is forgotten that in such creation essence already requires semblance. Essence is regarded therefore as independent of semblance. Correspondingly, semblance is regarded as a mere seeming, a mere illusion, that has no objective existence. (2) In external reflection semblance is conceived to be primary. It is forgotten that semblance is not self-standing, but is generated by essence. External reflection is the conceptual articulation of ideological thinking that clings to semblance and ignores or forgets the genesis of semblance. In other words, external reflection or ideological thinking treats semblance merely as given, not as mediated by essence. (3) According to Hegel, ‘determining reflection is the unity of positing and external reflection’ (SL 404/II: 32). The recursive structure of essence obtains in determining reflection. Essence and semblance are now thoroughly related to each other. Essence produces semblance, but at the same time it is dependent on it, since it is only through relating to semblance that it can constitute itself as essence. We can depict the three forms of reflection with the following schema:
Positing Reflection: (essence-semblance)
External Reflection: (essence-semblance)
Determining Reflection: ( essence -semblance)—(essence-semblance)Footnote 18
Determining reflection adequately expresses the structure of domination in essence. In contrast to positing reflection, the relation of domination of essence over semblance is not one-way or immediate. Domination in determining reflection rather obtains by virtue of incorporating a moment of external reflection, i.e., a moment of essence equally determined by semblance. In determining reflection, there is reciprocity between essence and semblance, but this reciprocity is eventually an illusion—though an objective illusion—since it is ultimately essence that determines semblance. In other words, there is a symmetrical mutual determination of essence and semblance, but such symmetry only exists within the framework of the asymmetrical relation of essence and semblance.
I have explained before how Hegel’s argument in (A) shows the semblance or ideology of equality and freedom to be inseparable from the essence of domination in capitalism. Now, let us consider what Hegel’s dialectical argument in (B) and (C) shows us about the structure of ideology. I would like to emphasize three points: First, Hegel’s analysis shows that the structure of ideology is contradictory. Equality and freedom exist in capitalism, yet not on their own, rather as being sublated or negated within the relations of domination of essence. Thus, the following two groups of people, in their very one-sidedness, are wrong: (1) Those libertarians or liberals who think capitalism is primarily a system of equality and freedom, and who deny that equality and freedom are generated through the essence of domination. (Their attitude is that of external reflection.) (2) Those Marxists who think there is no freedom or equality in capitalism, and freedom and equality are merely some sham ideas that the ruling class has intentionally fabricated to keep the workers at bay. (Their attitude is that of positing reflection.)
Second, Hegel’s analysis shows that it is wrong to think equality and freedom are partially determined by the essence of domination, and partially escape from the determination of essence, such that there is a remnant of freedom and equality for individuals in capitalism that is immune to the relations of domination. Rather, equality and freedom are completely taken up by the relations of domination, such that they solely function as a moment of the essence of domination. In other words, equality and freedom in capitalism only help the system of domination to sustain itself.
Third, the relation of domination in capitalism is not something natural or given but obtains through mediation of the relation of equality. More precisely, the essence of domination is nothing other than the relational structure that obtains between domination and equality, and recursively constitutes domination. The essence of domination requires (‘presupposes’) equality for its function, but at the same time domination produces (‘posits’) the required equality. This means that the structure of domination in capitalism is self-grounding; it does not need any appeal to any external or given authority, be it nature (as in ancient Greece) or God (as in medieval times) for its ground.
IV. The logical structure of semblance in Marx
In this section, my aim is to show that Marx’s conception of the ideology or semblance of equality and freedom, in terms of its logical structure, has a close affinity to Hegel’s semblance in the Logic. Marx’s dialectical thought is totally embedded in his socioeconomic theory. Thus in order to carve out the logical form of his analysis, we need to discuss his socioeconomic theory, even if in a simplified way. In the following, I begin by explaining Marx’s conception of semblance. Then I briefly discuss how Marx’s analysis accords with Hegel’s dialectic of semblance, as discussed above in (A), (B) and (C).
According to Marx, the defining feature of capitalism—what distinguishes capitalism from previous modes of production—is the institution of wage-labour. The relation of wage-labour is the very source of the semblance of equality and freedom in capitalism. Marx writes:
We understand the decisive importance of the transformation of the value and price of labour-power into the form of wages. All the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of production, all capitalism’s illusions about freedom, all apologetic tricks of vulgar economics, have as their basis this form of appearance, which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to the eye the precise opposite of that relation. (C I: 680/562)
Marx analyses the relation of wage-labour in two consecutive stages: (1) insofar as it occurs in the realm of the market, or what he calls the sphere of ‘circulation’ of commodities. The transactions made in the market are that aspect of capitalism that is visible to individuals; and (2) insofar as it occurs as a moment of the totality of economy, which includes—in addition to the sphere of circulation—the sphere of ‘production’ of commodities. For Marx, the totality of economy is capital itself, which is a relational structure that is invisible to individuals and can be understood only through analysis.
(1) Labour contracts are made in the sphere of circulation or the market. The worker sells the commodity he possesses, i.e., his ‘labour-power’,Footnote 19 to the capitalist, for which he receives a wage. In capitalism, the worker is free, in that he can alienate his labour-power and sell it, in exchange for a wage, to whomever he wants. Moreover, the transaction between the capitalist and the worker exactly follows—Marx never gets tired of emphasizing—the general law of exchange of equivalents. The capitalist pays the full value of labour-power, and this involves no cheating.Footnote 20 Marx concedes that ‘the sphere of circulation is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of freedom, [and] equality’ (C I: 280/189). The freedom and equality obtained through market transactions are real and objective. Yet Marx identifies them—and indeed the whole market—with ‘pure semblance’ (reiner Schein). The market, he writes, is ‘the phenomenon of a process taking place behind it’ (G 255/180). The process taking place behind is the process of production of commodities.
(2) Labour-power is a special commodity. Its use-value, its consumption, is the actual process of labour, which constitutes the sphere of production. In the process of production, the worker through his labour produces more value than the value he has been paid for. Marx divides the working day (say, 10 hours) into two parts. The first part during which a value equal to the value of labour-power (say, 4 hours) is produced, he calls ‘necessary labour’. Any work that is done beyond the necessary labour, he calls ‘surplus labour’ (here, 6 hours) (C I: 325/231). As the production of surplus-value is a necessary feature of capitalism, there must always be surplus-labour. Indeed, the sole reason that the capitalist hires the worker is for the latter’s surplus-labour. This means that, seen from the viewpoint of the totality of economy, there is no exchange of equivalents, and the exchange of equivalents in the sphere of circulation has been only a semblance:
This exchange of equivalents proceeds; it is only the surface layer of a production, which rests on the appropriation of alien labour without exchange, but with the semblance [Schein] of exchange. This system of exchange rests on capital as its basis, and when it is regarded in isolation from capital, as it appears on the surface, as a self-subsistent system, then it is a mere illusion [Schein], but a necessary illusion [ein notwendiger Schein]. There is no longer any ground for astonishment that the system of exchange values—exchange of equivalents measured through labour—turns into, or rather reveals as its hidden background the appropriation of alien labour without exchange, complete separation of labour and property. (G 509/417, Marx’s emphases)
The extraction of surplus-labour is not specific to capitalism. In all class societies, a group of people must work more than is necessary for their subsistence. What is specific to capitalism is the form that the extraction of surplus-labour takes. In capitalism, the extraction of surplus-labour has always to be mediated through the semblance of equality obtained in the market. This equality is false, yet it is a falsity that is objective.
Thus in capitalism the domination of capitalists over workers always obtains through wage-contracts, which presuppose equality between capitalists and workers. This domination of capitalists over workers occurs within the framework of the totality of capital (essence), which in turn is constituted by the domination of capital (essence) over the sphere of circulation (semblance). We can now understand the exact structural homology between Marx’s analysis of the ideology of equality in capitalism and Hegel’s dialectic of semblance in the Logic as follows:
(A) Equality is not separable from domination.
For Hegel equality and domination, or semblance and essence are thoroughly interpenetrated, and it is not possible to dissociate the former from the latter. To understand the same point in Marx’s analysis of capitalism, let us compare the work of a peasant in feudal Europe liable to compulsory work (corvée) with the work of a worker in capitalism (C I: 713/593). The peasant is obliged to work, say, three days a week for his lord on the lord’s domain. The other three days, he works for himself on his own land. The sphere of equality and domination are sharply distinguished from each other—substantially, temporally and spatially. In the eye of the peasant, the forced labour for the lord never gets the character of his own voluntary labour. There is no semblance or illusion of equality involved here. The extraction of surplus-labour is immediate and direct; the relation of domination is transparent.
Now let us look at the worker in capitalism. The worker still works, say, three days a week for himself, i.e., the labour necessary to compensate for the value of his labour-power. The other three days, he works for the capitalist to generate surplus value. But this is not the way the working week seems to the worker. The six days of work appear to him as one single block of work, in compensation for which he receives a wage. In wage-labour, therefore, even the part of the work that is unpaid seems to be paid. Marx even warns that the sharp distinction he makes between the necessary and the surplus labour in capitalism is only heuristic. In the actual labour process, right from the beginning every minute and every second of the labour process is an intermingling of necessary and surplus labour, such that it is not possible to dissociate one from the other.
(B) Equality is posited by domination.
For Hegel the structure of semblance is contradictory. Semblance exists, but not as something positive that can exist apart from essence, but as something sublated or negated within essence. The same point holds for Marx. The semblance of equality, or the sphere of circulation in general, exists; but not as something positive that can exist apart from the totality of capital, but as something that gets sublated or negated in it. In an important passage in Capital that serves as a conclusion to his argument, Marx writes,
It is quite evident from this that the law of appropriation or of private property, laws based on the production and circulation of commodities, turns into its direct opposite through its own internal and inexorable dialectic [schlägt … durch seine eigne, innere, unvermeidliche Dialektik in sein direktes Gegenteil um]. The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, is now turned round in such a way that there is only a seeming exchange [zum Schein ausgetauscht wird], since, firstly, the capital which is exchanged for labour-power is itself merely a portion of the product of the labour of others which has been appropriated without an equivalent; and, secondly, this capital must not only be replaced by its producer, the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. The relation of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere semblance belonging only to the process of circulation [ein dem Zirkulationsprozeß angehöriger Schein]; it becomes a mere form, which is alien to the content of the transaction itself, and merely mystifies it. The constant sale and purchase of labour-power is the form; the content is the constant appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the labour of others which has already been objectified, and his repeated exchange of this labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others. (C I: 729–30/609)
Note the contradictory formulations that Marx uses in this passage to articulate the semblance of equality as both existent and non-existent. Capitalist production requires the law of exchange of equivalents, but at the same time negates this law.Footnote 21 Moreover—and this is another point—for Marx, like Hegel, the sublation or negation of semblance in essence is complete, not partial. The equality that obtains through market transactions ‘turns into its direct opposite’ in its completeness, since the money with which the capitalist pays the worker’s wage on the basis of equality of exchange is already accumulated through the past labour of other workers. With respect to the individual worker, the analysis shows that it is the surplus labour that is appropriated without exchange. But with respect to the class of workers and the class of capitalists, the whole working day is appropriated without exchange.Footnote 22
(C) Equality is posited by domination as domination’s own presupposition.
For Hegel, essence requires (‘presupposes’) semblance, but at the same time essence produces (‘posits’) this very presupposition. The same point holds for Marx. The relation of domination of capital requires (‘presupposes’) equality, since it is solely through market transactions that capitalist exploitation can occur. This ‘presupposition’, however, is not external to capital. It is not the case that capital simply finds the equality available, and then comes to the scene to use it. Rather, capital is a self-maintaining and self-reproducing social system that is able to generate (‘posits’) its necessary presupposition.Footnote 23 This is so because, at the end of each production cycle, the worker is coerced to exert his freedom and equality through making a new transaction in the labour-market, since the product of his labour has been expropriated from him, and he remains as much without access to the means of production as before.
V. Conclusion
I have presented interpretations of Hegel and Marx that mutually strengthen each other. This is possible since as far as the logic of essence is concerned, the views of Marx and Hegel are arguably very close.Footnote 24 The difference begins when one considers the place and significance of essence within Hegel’s and Marx’s system as a whole. For Marx, as I take him, the logic of essence qua the logic of domination is the logic of society in the modern capitalist world. In contrast, Hegel conceives of essence as an intermediary stage that gets superseded in the logic of the Concept. For Hegel, the structure of the Concept is the structure of ‘free love and boundless blessedness’ (SL 603/II: 277) that can successfully tame and contain the domination of essence. Hegel conceives of modernity as the realm of actualization of true freedom, and correspondingly, the logic of the Concept as the logic that can adequately explain this world.
Concerning semblance, when one locates it within Hegel’s whole system—and not only as a part of essence that is isolated from what comes after essence—the difference between Hegel and Marx becomes conspicuous. Hegel concedes that the freedom and equality obtained in the market are inadequate and result from the indifference of individuals to one another. In exercising my freedom in the market, Hegel emphasizes, ‘I am entirely on the level of semblance’ (PR §181A). However, he thinks that despite its insufficiencies, there is something good and desirable about the freedom of the market, as it allows individuals to implement their subjective choices. For Marx, in contrast, the freedom and equality of the market is emphatically not something good or desirable, since such freedom and equality only function as a moment of the system of domination in capitalism. For Marx, the idea of freedom and equality qua indifference is institutionalized and flourishes in capitalism,Footnote 25 and will fade away with its abolition.Footnote 26
