Perhaps you avoid television political talk shows because the participants always seem to be shouting past each other or you have stopped listening to a radio show because the host was merely preaching to the choir. Conversely, perhaps you have been at a political demonstration or rally and lamented those who hung back from participating because they saw grey in a situation where the black and white of it was clear (or clear enough) to you; they wanted to keep talking whereas the time for talking was done. (Perhaps the latter is a little less common among us woolly-headed readers of academic journals.) These two situations identify countervailing moments in a difficulty for democracy identified in Diana Mutz's Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. The dilemma is a challenge both to democratic practices and to theories that attempt to understand them. What if the energies and emotional states that are necessary to sustain political participation actually detract from reflective deliberation? Conversely, what if the type of discourse that marks theories of deliberation actually produces a withdrawal from politics?
In Hearing the Other Side, Mutz approaches this dilemma through an empirical investigation of the one of the central claims of theories of democratic deliberation: that exposing oneself to views that are different from one's own produces salutary effects. As she expresses it, “[C]ross cutting exposure should enable citizens to perceive political controversies as legitimate differences of opinion” (14). Examining the possibilities and limitations of this thesis and speculating on the implications of her findings provide the core of the book. Mutz claims that her thesis “is that theories of participatory democracy are in important ways inconsistent with theories of deliberative democracy” (16). If this were the most interesting part of her book, it would neither surprise nor enlighten much, as there have been evident tensions between the two theories since the latter developed, in part, as a critique of the former. Happily, Mutz's book instead develops a more interesting line of thought: not merely that deliberation theory is inconsistent with a different theory of democracy (the participatory), rather that participation of the kind that even deliberation theory itself advocates—engaging with those who hold different positions—does not produce the results it anticipates, either upon the participants or the discourse that results.
The empirical basis of Mutz's examination is an analysis of survey data, primarily a 1992 Cross National Election Project survey, a 2000 American National Election Survey, and “an original national survey” she commissioned in 1996 “to include indicators of people's exposure to politically like-minded and differently minded people, and the kinds of beneficial outcomes this contact is assumed to engender—an awareness of oppositional perspectives, a deeper understanding of reasons behind one's own views, and support for civil liberties of groups whose politics one dislikes” (63). I will leave to others with more technical expertise to evaluate whether Mutz develops and handles the data well. However, the use of this kind of data does reveal the difficulties in operationalizing and testing elements of a theory such as deliberative democracy because of its blend of normative and empirical claims. It makes good sense to test whether deliberation and exposure to difference in discourse have the effects that the theory proposes. Yet, deliberation theorists also maintain that certain conditions must be met for the democratic interaction they advocate to have its desired effects. Mutz, however, explicitly avoids contexts that create such conditions, viewing them as artificial. Instead, she examines surveys in which respondents report their experience in “every day talk,” claiming that “For most of us, the ideal deliberative encounter is almost other worldly, bearing little resemblance to the conversations that occur over the water cooler, at the neighborhood bar, or even in our civic groups” (7). Fair enough. Of course, deliberation theorists intend to advocate for the conditions that would allow deliberation to have the effects they claim. In the absence of those conditions, how can we meaningfully evaluate those effects?
Significantly, this situation is similar to the problem that Mutz admits she finds when reviewing the conclusions from her empirical study. She discovers that those who are most likely to sustain the passionate commitment to participate in politics tend to associate with those who are like minded and are least likely to be open to discordant views; conversely, those who possess the critical judgment most necessary for deliberative politics are most likely to maintain a skeptical distance from its passion-driven activities. So, what can be done to encourage the latter group to be active in politics? We could follow Socrates' advice in The Republic and compel into the world of politics those who have the proper character; of course, in a democracy, even Socrates demurs. Instead, we could make the messy, enthusiastic, sometimes angry, and even dangerous world of politics safe for those of proper judgment. This scenario is something like what Mutz proposes, suggesting we should develop and encourage civility: “[W]e need instruction, and explicit norms, for how political differences should be handled in informal discourse” (150). This conclusion surely is in keeping with the theory of democratic deliberation, but we remain stuck in the normative/empirical dilemma. We cannot critically examine the promise of deliberation theory absent the conditions it recommends; yet those conditions remain ever just beyond the horizon, or at least more likely to be found in the formal settings of the city council, state assembly, or seminar room than the political rally or neighborhood watering hole. This paradox suggests, then, that any test in which the theory succeeds can be faulted for taking place in ideal, not real, conditions. Conversely, any unsuccessful test can be dismissed as not being reflective of required conditions.
Mutz's book reminds us that politics involves emotion, not only reason; sorority and fraternity, not only rationally self-interested commitments; impassioned activity, not only cool skepticism. The unanswered question is whether democratic politics can or should elevate the latter at the expense of the former.
