In his book, Colin Dueck sets out to examine the history of Republican Party foreign policy since World War II. Hard Line devotes a chapter to each Republican president of the post-World War II period (though Gerald Ford is folded into the chapter on Richard Nixon), with additional chapters on two unsuccessful presidential aspirants (Robert Taft and Barry Goldwater).
Based almost wholly upon secondary sources, Dueck's portraits of various Republican presidents and the foreign policy issues with which they wrestled break little new ground but are nevertheless readable and often insightful. His assessments range from glowing (Dwight Eisenhower, Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush) to critical (Goldwater and George W. Bush) to politely dismissive (Taft).
In fashioning an overall thesis, Dueck pursues two contradictory lines of interpretation. On the one hand, he argues that there exists a distinctive and largely successful Republican philosophy of foreign policy centering on military strength and “a hawkish and intense American nationalism” (p. 2). On the other hand, he acknowledges considerable variation within the Republican tradition and recognizes that political parties in the United States function neither as policymaking bodies nor as political actors, but instead serve as vehicles through which constellations of interests and office-seeking politicians contest elections. He therefore emphasizes that presidents, not parties, make foreign policy: “[P]residents have acted as focal points for their party, and Republican presidents have been given remarkable leeway” (p. 3).
In the author's survey of Republican presidents and aspirants, it is the diversity of thought and action and presidential independence from partisan constraints that stand out. With respect to international engagement, this variation ranges from Taft's pre–World War II isolationism to George H. W. Bush's internationalist “new world order” to the assertive unilateralism of George W. Bush's first term. Attitudes toward military spending range from Eisenhower's relative austerity to the major defense buildups of the Reagan and George W. Bush years. Goldwater's stark and rigid anticommunism stands in contrast to Nixon's pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union and China. Contrary to Dueck's insistence upon a unique Republican tradition, it is difficult to identify an “overarching constant” (p. 2) in this record. Moreover, one could easily point to examples in which Democratic presidents have at times displayed the traits of nationalism, militarism, and unilateralism that the author portrays as distinctively Republican.
In surveying possible explanations for variations in Republican foreign policy, Dueck notes that: “[e]conomic interests, international pressures, domestic political concerns, and public intellectuals are variously said to determine presidential behavior on foreign policy matters” (p. 6). Brushing aside the considerable literatures and empirical studies that have documented the influence of these various factors on US foreign policy, he mostly downplays the roles of each over the course of a few pages (pp. 293–97). This general dismissal of alternative explanatory models is, however, mostly based upon fiat rather than empirical findings since he offers no sustained or serious effort to investigate the impact of, say, economic interests or international pressures.
Instead, Dueck repeatedly stresses presidential “leadership” (pp. 297–98). In other words, Republican foreign policy “is what the president says it is” (p. 7). He urges readers to accept that Republican foreign policy is not reducible to economic interests or partisan calculation, but is instead a product of “authentic convictions” (p. 4). Whether one finds this persuasive depends upon what one counts as an explanation. It is one thing to say that presidents make foreign policy, but another to portray their role as sui generis. Moreover, an approach that places such weight upon the worldviews and leadership qualities of individual presidents encounters difficulty in explaining the many cases of presidents who entered office trumpeting a particular approach to foreign policy only to change course under the pressure of domestic and/or international pressures and constraints. As examples, Jimmy Carter moved from an early emphasis on human rights to renewed Cold War, Bill Clinton largely abandoned his early calls for “assertive multilateralism,” and George W. Bush's initial distaste for nation building mutated into its opposite.
In any case, once the beliefs and leadership qualities of individual presidents are given pride of place, the book's core rationale dissolves. If presidents are so independent of party affiliation and ideology and their foreign policy records in practice vary so widely, then does there really exist a distinctive foreign policy brand that can be labeled Republican? Since neither of Dueck's contrary claims—that there exists a distinctive and common Republican tradition in foreign policy and that Republican presidents have exercised leadership in pursuing a wide diversity of approaches—are wholly convincing, we are left with an informative, though unoriginal, survey of foreign policymaking under Republican presidents. That is itself a useful contribution, though a lesser one than Dueck sets for himself.
In the closing pages of Hard Line, Dueck positions himself as pundit. He offers a critique of President Barack Obama's foreign policy based upon the premise that Obama's underlying philosophy is “accommodationist” (p. 303) toward America's rivals. If this was ever a tenable portrayal, it is no longer a persuasive way to describe a president who ordered a surge in Afghanistan, the expansion of drone attacks in Pakistan, the killing of Osama bin Laden, and the employment of military force in Libya. Nor does his critique accurately portray a president who has ratcheted up international pressures on Iran to unprecedented levels and recently executed a “pivot toward Asia” as a response to the rise of Chinese power.
Looking to the future, Dueck surveys possible alternative foreign policy approaches that Republican might offer, rejecting both the neoconservatism of the George W. Bush years and the anti-interventionism of Ron Paul. Instead, the author endorses “conservative realism” (pp. 308–10), harking back to the prudential and unsentimental great-power politics of the Nixon, Ford, and first Bush presidencies. Whatever the merits of this advice, the foreign policies of the next Republican president will likely be influenced by a broader array of factors than those encompassed by Dueck's own analysis.
