One of the more dramatic episodes during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 was the blowup between the United States and Italy over Italy's claim to ethnically non-Italian territories that had been promised by the 1915 Treaty of London in return for participation in the war. Not only did President Woodrow Wilson reject most of Italy's demands, his direct appeal to the Italian people resulted in a spectacular collapse of the worshipful esteem he had only recently enjoyed in Italian public opinion.

In this vigorous and broad-ranging investigation of the backdrop to this spectacular clash, Daniela Rossini emphasizes cultural distance as the reason for the failure to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise through diplomacy. She begins her story in the nineteenth century, in a discussion of American tourism and Italian migration, which, while it created some stock images of each country, had little impact on intercultural understanding or on the foreign policies of the two nations. However, images took on a greater importance following America's entry into the war, when a varied and widespread propaganda campaign produced an astounding impact on Italian mass opinion. As Rossini makes clear, the favorable reception owed much to the glowing myth of America created by nineteenth-century Italian migrants. In addition to spreading the gospel of Wilsonian internationalism, the campaign served as a substitute for eagerly awaited American troops on the Italian front. Faced with shaky public support for the war, the Italian political elite, though distrustful of their new ally, allowed Wilsonianism to fill the void of legitimacy created by their shabby cabinet diplomacy.

At the level of diplomacy, however, trouble was brewing as a consequence of poor communication and misunderstanding between the two nations, in large measure because propaganda had replaced diplomacy. On the American side, the problem was fragmentation, lack of coordination, and absence of knowledge. The State Department understood Italy fairly well, but it lacked the confidence of the President. The Committee on Public Information, which ran the propaganda campaign, had the President's ear, but it focussed largely on broadcasting the President's message. Important interlocutors like Colonel Edward House, meanwhile, planted misleading impressions in the minds of the Italians and the President alike. The American experts who were charged with Italian matters, although impressive on facts and figures, lacked an understanding of the political dimension. Not least, the President and his progressive followers disliked the Italian leadership. On the Italian side, the story was no better, starting with a clueless ambassador and ending with leading statesmen who seemed uninterested in getting to know Wilson's mind. And, of course, there was Wilson himself, whom Rossini takes to task for his self-righteous moralizing and his overestimation of his hold upon world opinion.

The brouhaha could have been avoided, she argues, if the Americans had been more attentive to Italian desires and if the issues had been talked out during the war, rather than postponing disagreements until its aftermath. However discreditable its motives for entering the war, the Italian government deserved some sympathy because it could not make it appear as if the fighting had been for naught. Moreover, Wilson was in other cases willing to do deals and to compromise his principles, virtually every one of which was violated to some degree or another in the peace settlement. Why not, then, with Italy? Because, Rossini argues, the problems in Paris were due to “prejudices and misunderstandings … rather than any gap in political positions” (169).

I am not convinced that cultural distance, though it certainly existed, provides a fully satisfying explanation of the fiasco. Unlike Japan, where Wilson caved in on the Shandong issue, Italy may simply not have been important enough as a power for Wilson to take seriously. Even the French and the British, who suffered less from cultural ignorance, were unsympathetic to Italy despite being signatories to the infamous Treaty of London – famously, Harold Nicolson argued that Wilson should have been tougher on the Italians from the outset. Be that as it may, Rossini makes marvelously clear how Wilsonian ideas were able to gain such wide purchase abroad, though how well they were understood is another matter. And she makes a strong case for her point of view in what, unlike much of the genre, is a marvelous read.