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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Joseph T. Stanik, a retired naval officer and Middle East scholar, served on active duty with the U.S. Navy as a surface warfare officer before returning to his alma mater, the U.S. Naval Academy, to teach in the history department. The book under review is based on an earlier monograph, “‘Swift and Effective Retribution’: The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddafi,” which takes its title from a comment by President Ronald Reagan in which he promised to respond to acts of terrorism with “swift and effective retribution.” Published by the Naval Historical Center in 1996, Stanik's monograph was part of a series intended to highlight the contribution of the Navy to the national security, economic prosperity, and global presence of the United States.
In El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi, the author “presents a political-military history of relations between the United States and Libya from the beginning of Reagan's presidency through the aftermath of the air strike, including the development of Reagan administration policies regarding international terrorism and its most prominent advocate, Muammar al-Qaddafi” (p. xii). In so doing, Stanik develops five central arguments. First, the development of a comprehensive U.S. strategy for Libya was an extended and difficult process that took months to achieve. Second, the Reagan administration refrained from using force against Libya until it could reliably attribute responsibility for a specific terrorist incident, in this case the La Belle discothèque bombing, to the Qaddafi regime and until it had exhausted alternative means. Third, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force prepared for the attack on Libya with “exceptional skill and precision” (p. xiii). Fourth, the Sixth Fleet played a key role in the prolonged confrontation with Libya, demonstrating the advantages of naval power in the achievement of foreign-policy objectives without resort to either all-out war or a prolonged deployment of military forces. Finally, Stanik argues that the 15 April 1986 attack on selected targets around Benghazi and Tripoli constituted a “devastating political and psychological defeat for Qaddafi” (p. xiii). On this last point, the author contends that the air attack on Libya undercut Qaddafi's support for international terrorism, convincing him that he could no longer attack Americans without paying a terrible price.
As might be expected given his background, Stanik provides a superb military history of American-Libyan relations during the Reagan era. His depiction of military events—from the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident and the 1986 attack on Benghazi and Tripoli to the 1989 air battle over Tobruk—are informed, rich in detail, and highly readable. In his discussion of military operations, he also provides a competent, workmanlike description of the policy alternatives explored at different points by the U.S. government, together with the diplomatic initiatives and covert actions employed.
Unfortunately, Stanik is not as successful in his depiction and analysis of political events. While his treatment of facts is generally accurate, his interpretation of events is sometimes overblown, too often tailored to fit military arguments or justifications. In so doing, Stanik relies almost exclusively on contemporary, official accounts as opposed to drawing on recent scholarship on Libya to assess the validity and impact of events in the 1980s. Consequently, his treatment of diplomatic and political events often lacks subtlety and nuance. A few examples make the point.
Arguing that the United States did not attack Libya until it could attribute to Qaddafi responsibility for a specific terrorist incident, Stanik accepts with little question the Reagan administration's argument that the La Belle discothèque bombing was a “smoking gun,” proving the Qaddafi regime's support for international terrorism. Yet the judge in the German court that convicted four people in 2001 for the La Belle bombing concluded that, while Libya bore a considerable part of the responsibility for the attack, the personal responsibility of Qaddafi had not been proved. Similarly, the author argues that U.S. forces demonstrated great skill and precision in preparing for the attack on Libya, on one hand, and, on the other, that the bombing of Qaddafi's personal quarters at Bab al-Aziziyah Barracks, which killed his two-year-old adopted daughter and wounded other family members, was not an attempted assassination. The collateral damage of this so-called precision raid included the French Embassy, a chicken farm on the outskirts of Tripoli, and other civilian sites. Unconfirmed reports put noncombatant casualties at up to 100 people.
Finally, Stanik argues the air strikes on Libya constituted a devastating personal defeat for Qaddafi and provoked policy change in Libya. While this remained the argument of the U.S. administration for the remainder of Reagan's second term, the evidence available suggests that bringing the full weight of American power on Libya did not eliminate global terrorism, nor did it eliminate the support of the Qaddafi regime for terrorism. Official documentation supporting this conclusion can be found in a little-known Department of Defense report, dated October 1997, which concludes that Libya, through transnational actors, waged a campaign of revenge on the United States for several years after the 1986 air strikes.
The policy of the Reagan administration toward Libya anticipated central elements of the Bush Doctrine, including unilateral action, preemptive strikes, and regime change. In so doing, the failure of that policy to bring about either regime change or policy change stands in marked contrast to the success of the policy of step-by-step negotiations begun during the Clinton administration, which eventually concluded with Libya's renunciation of unconventional weapons in December 2003. The welcome decision of the Qaddafi regime to disarm and rejoin the international community was a victory not for a strategy of preemptive strikes, military confrontation, or bilateral sanctions, but for traditional methods of combating nuclear proliferation.
El Dorado Canyon is often a good read, especially in its treatment of military events. However, it is not well balanced and thorough in its treatment of both the causes and results of military action. Additional research on the diplomatic and political side of events during the Reagan administration would have resulted in a more accurate and complete treatment of the American–Libyan relationship during the 1980s. It would also have helped to clarify the significance of those events to U.S. policy toward Libya in the succeeding decade. While the book will find an audience within the general public, especially among the military community, it cannot be recommended for serious students of American foreign policy in general and American–Libyan relations in particular.