In Mario Vargas Llosa's Captain Pantoja and the Special Service, Captain Pantoja is tasked with establishing a military brothel in order to combat the number of sexual assaults committed by Peruvian soldiers in an Amazonian outpost. Unsurprisingly given the Captain's attention to detail, the operation becomes ‘the most efficient unit of the armed forces’. If only the same could be said for the missions advanced by the Peruvian and Ecuadorean militaries in today's democratic climate. In Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes, Maiah Jaskoski delivers a rich account of the fluctuations and contradictions in the missions of Peru and Ecuador's armies. Jaskoski's question is simple and important. Why do militaries take on some missions and not others? The answer, quite expectedly, is not so clear. Despite the security threats posed by Colombian guerrilla fighters who continue to cross into Ecuador, Jaskoski argues that the Ecuadorean army spends less time and resources in trying to defeat them. Instead, the army focuses more on policing missions such as protest control and anti-narcotics. Similarly, Peru's military has been reluctant to engage in counterinsurgency activities against Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) despite government support and financial backing. Unlike Ecuador, Peru's military has also refused to engage in policing missions.
According to Jaskoski, to account for these trends scholars must move beyond the typical explanations for military behaviour: resource maximisation, public legitimacy and professionalisation. Instead, Jaskoski asserts that ‘predictability’ is prioritised over other possible concerns. Predictability, defined by the author, is conceptualised as the ‘clear instructions regarding the goals and procedures for reaching those goals’ (p. 13). The objective of maintaining predictability for troops is often disrupted by what Jaskoski refers to as ‘contradictions’, the orders put forth by the civilian governments in Ecuador and Peru. For instance, Peruvian military officers found it impossible to go after the remains of Sendero Luminoso after the year 2000 for fear of being charged with committing human rights violations. Since the military felt that this concern with human rights restricted their autonomy, they were unable to accomplish the mission of defeating the insurgency. In Ecuador, the military's autonomy was not threatened; instead, the military was saddled with so many missions that leaders in the army gave orders to avoid any eruption of war, which inevitably led to army units avoiding confrontation rather than engaging in it.
‘Battalions for Hire’ is one of the more fascinating chapters in the book, which examines the private contracts the military signs with private companies, especially those in the extractive industries, to provide security and other services. Budget constraints have forced military leaders to find alternative forms of income. Funding is so limited that the army units in Ecuador have engaged in all kinds of activities including micro-enterprises such as chicken, fish and dairy farms (p. 168). Confronting the traditional resource maximisation theory, which could be seen as a threat to her argument given the multitude of services the Ecuadorean and Peruvian armies provide in order to finance themselves, Jaskoski retorts by pointing out that this theory still does not explain the jobs the armies accept for supplementary income. Instead, and consistent with her argument throughout the book, army units take work that is both predictable and consistent with mission beliefs as opposed to merely identifying which client is the highest bidder for their work.
What is most impressive about the book is the breadth and depth of the interview materials. Often times an author must choose to forsake descriptive thickness for theoretical parsimony. In this case, Jaskoski includes so much detail in her analysis of army units that one wonders on occasion if this is evidence supporting the original theoretical argument.
While impressive, the book is not without criticism. One issue relates to the use of the term ‘contradiction’ to explain the Peruvian army's resistance to engage in counterinsurgency operations in a post-Fujimori world. One senses that in this case the author has uncritically bought into the typical narrative advanced by militaries confronting domestic insurgencies. The author argues that there is a contradiction in the directives to fight Sendero Luminoso and the limitations the government placed on the military to ensure the promotion of human rights. The military, deeply concerned about facing prosecutions for human rights violations, was reluctant to engage even though the task both had public legitimacy and would justify an expansion of its budget. Using the term ‘contradiction’ implies that victory cannot be achieved by adhering to human rights standards. But one could certainly argue that forcing the military to avoid human rights violations while fighting the enemy is not a contradiction. By framing it as such, Jaskoski concedes the typical military argument that the only way to ever defeat an enemy is by obviating any concerns with human rights, which is both dangerous and inaccurate.
To conclude, Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes achieves something even more important than what the book initially sets itself up to do. Jaskoski relies on theories related to the internal functioning of the military to discuss why certain missions were taken up or avoided by the military in Peru and Ecuador. But what Jaskoski really offers is an important discussion of civil-military-police relations in a post-authoritarian Latin America. Anyone interested in justice-sensitive security sector reform knows that one of the tasks of a transitional government is to segregate matters related to the police and those of the military. Policing protesters, often led by the military to quell disorder, should now be handed over to the police. The discussion of the Peruvian army's unwillingness to engage in police-related missions (and Ecuador's willingness to do so) provides great insight for those interested in advocating for such reforms to deal with issues surrounding citizen insecurity. One cannot assess how well democracy is sustaining throughout Latin America without considering how civil-military relations impact on the protection of civil liberties and human rights in countries facing internal and external threats to their national security. Opening up the military ‘black box’ to figure out when and why the military does what it does is essential for those interested not only in military politics but also in the stability of democracy throughout South America.
