The microscope is on an upward historiographical trajectory: gradually disappearing are the lists of technical developments, the hagiographies of disciplinary pioneers and the sheer antiquarianism of previous accounts of its development. The Microscope and the Eye, though not without its own limits, demonstrates how one should manage the difficult task of writing the intellectual biography of an object. It deals with a crucial period in the establishment of the modern consensus on the microscope's utility – the early to mid-nineteenth century – and in general Schickore finds that its fortunes were high. An immense amount and variety of information is presented, all arranged in relation to ‘second-order concerns’; that is, concerns that ‘do not immediately pertain to research objects but rather to the methods and tools of research, their epistemic merits, and the researcher's status as a producer of knowledge’ (p. 3). This ordering is both natural and ingenious – natural, in that the account is at once extremely convincing; ingenious in its mild convolution.
In Britain the microscope is shown to have enjoyed great popularity and engendered great optimism during the eighteenth century. Both attitudes were sustained in the face of a series of controversies and discrepant results. Instead of undermining the microscope itself, the disputed work of, for example, the Scottish physician Alexander Monro fed into the second-order discourse of technical and methodological analysis. These early chapters are a delight – finally an account has been presented that neither downplays the much-maligned enterprise of eighteenth-century microscopy nor rehashes the subsequent story of Joseph Jackson Lister's 1830 publication on spherical aberration. Indeed Lister, a wine merchant and amateur microscopist, emerges as a pioneer of a very different sort. He wrote (though sadly did not publish) the most sophisticated piece of second-order work of the time, which ‘considered the eye and the microscope together as an optical system and aimed to determine the various factors conditioning the power of that system’ (p. 122).
This anticipates the second half of Schickore's study, in which she turns to the German lands, finding the second-order landscape to be very different. Through the continued influence of Naturphilosophie, Germanic experimenters were apt to resemble Lister's inculpated observer; they conducted ingenious self-experiments in order to ascertain the way in which self and instrument might interact. But in other ways the microscope remained distinctly first-order – working unproblematically – while matters of sample preparation and manipulation took the second-order ground. It is here that the microscope and the eye truly interact, in the microscopic study of the retina.
The Microscope and the Eye, then, is two books in one. While both are convincing and necessary, they do not always interact quite as closely as one would like. There are numerous well-known links between the German lands and England in this period, and what those links tell us does not alter Schickore's argument. Indeed, in many cases they offer striking corroboration. We learn in Chapter 8, for example, about the German naturalist Christian Gottfried Ehrenberg's second-order work in the 1830s. Schickore briefly analyses Ehrenberg's writing on the limits of vision, and shows how he reflected on Monro's earlier failures. So far so good. Yet Ehrenberg's case is paradigmatic of the comparative study that might have further linked The Microscope and the Eye's two halves. While his work was circulating in Germany and failing to generate second-order concerns directed at microscopes themselves, in the pages of the Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal it was presented with all the trappings of British second-order debate, replete with accounts of the microscopes used, magnifications attained and even a review by Ehrenberg of all the top manufacturers of the period. To this I would add that, in spite of the gorgeous dust jacket and Borgesian subtitle (A History of Reflections, 1740–1870), the text is somewhat monochrome – illustrations and biographical information are supplied only when strictly necessary, tending to keep the pace slow. But these are minor criticisms; the eventual integration of the eye and the microscope in the book's final chapters concludes a masterly retelling of the instrument's history, which satisfies the social-historical criteria now standard for instrument studies while not neglecting the nitty-gritty of actual experimental practice.
Finally, bracketing Schickore's instrumental narrative is a broader claim about scientific methodology, itself a result of the book's own guiding principle: ‘My approach redirects the attention from theory change to the practical process of establishing scientific claims to knowledge’ (p. 251). From this redirection it is a small step to claiming that the interaction between disputes and second-order concerns reflects a deeper truth about the way in which instruments interact with each other and with the production of knowledge. ‘Third-order’ concerns are paradigmatic here: the microscope was used to discover the limits of vision, and those results fed back into a theory about the limits of microscopy. But do we lose or gain from such a loop? Ultimately one can jump either way: pace Collins into the delight of futile circularity, pace Hacking into the security of experimental skill. From the data presented in Schickore's narrative one could argue for the experimenter's regress, or the experimenter's egress.
The latter implies that, through the increasingly sophisticated understanding of instrumental functioning, the coherence of the experiment as a whole increases, even in cases in which instruments are used to study each other. The Microscope and the Eye focuses on one way in which this can happen, when discussing the application of microscopes to the scales of surveying equipment – the microscopes were used at low powers, under the assumption that any errors in the optics would not outweigh the general benefit of applying lenses to scales. Evidently an optimist about the microscope, Schickore cites Hacking and argues for the reinforcement/coherence view of experimentation, albeit tentatively: ‘one might say that second-order concerns … breed conviction’ (p. 256). This completes the tripartite audience for The Microscope and the Eye: instrument studies, vision studies and scientific methodology. All three will benefit greatly from its publication.
