The world's weakest states pose security risks that cannot be contained or deterred, making them a greater threat to US security than rival great powers. This is the most serious problem of contemporary international order, and it requires urgent policy shifts and institutional innovations across government agencies and international institutions. Or so many leaders believe, encouraged by numerous influential policymakers and academics. But is it true? The answer has far-reaching implications for foreign policy, international security, and the study of fragile states.
Stewart Patrick's book goes beyond the fevered rhetoric about the threats posed by weak states. Empirically assessing the connection between state weakness and transnational security threats, the author uncovers a reality that is complex and highly contingent: “Globally, most fragile states do not present significant security risks, except to their own people, and the most important spillovers that preoccupy US national security offices are at least as likely to emanate from stronger developing countries, rather than the world's weakest countries” (p. 16). Policymakers have too often failed to realistically assess the threats emanating from weak states or the potential for US responses to have a meaningful impact. Only a handful of weak states have strategic significance for the United States, and in most weak states, the security threats are only indirectly related to underlying institutional weakness. While there might be compelling strategic and humanitarian reasons for helping these states improve their institutional performance, Patrick critiques the US government's recent approach as “reactive, fragmented, militarized, under-resourced, and self-contained” (p. 16).
The argument proceeds from an original index (developed with Susan Rice) that measures four categories of state weakness, namely, security, political, economic, and social welfare. Unsurprisingly, of the 141 weakest states as measured by the index, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the top three spots fare much worse than, say, Turkey, Brazil, and the Maldives at spots 98 through 100. Also as expected, security and political variables matter more than economic and social welfare ones in generating threats. Such indices—and many have been devised over the past decade—often oversimplify and generalize situations that, as Patrick argues, are complicated and particular. Somalia, Afghanistan, and the DRC have little in common apart from their abysmal state performance, represent different challenges, and are unlikely to respond to the same sorts of interventions.
What distinguishes Patrick's approach is his attempt to make sense of the resulting patterns in chapters that expose the flimsy empirical foundations of the common wisdom about the dangers posed by weak states. Across individual chapters examining transnational terrorism, transnational crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy insecurity, and infectious disease, the author convincingly demonstrates that the relationship between state frailty and global security is less straightforward than portrayed and frequently misunderstood: “[T]he overlap between state weakness and today's most pressing transnational threats is hardly clear-cut, much less universal. It depends on the threat in question, the specific sources and manifestations of state weakness, and the will of ruling regimes to deliver effective governance and control transnational spillovers” (p. 242).
Take transnational terrorism, for example, by far the most important threat in terms of generating the surge of interest in weak states after September 11, 2001. A widespread consensus regards weak states as incubators and vectors for terrorist threats. Fragile states potentially provide conflict experience, weapons, recruits, logistical support, targets, resources, financing, and safe havens for transnational terrorist networks. However, the evidence suggests a highly imperfect correlation between state weakness and transnational terrorism (p. 90): “Generally speaking, the most attractive states for transnational terrorists are weak but functioning states where state structures have not collapsed but remain minimally effective, in the context of a permissive cultural and ideological environment (emphasis in original)” (p. 96). Further, political will matters far more than institutional capacity in making a state attractive to terrorists, which explains why only a handful of the world's weak states have proved to be an attractive base of operations. A key implication is that the emphasis on state building in US counterterrorism policy is misguided where local power brokers continue to provide a permissive environment for terrorists.
The book's conclusion lays out a set of generally well-reasoned policy implications, including the contours of a US fragile-states policy. This calls for a focus on prevention rather than reaction, more informed development policy, better bureaucratic coordination, a recalibration of investment toward civilian capabilities to reduce overdependence on the military, and improved international cooperation. However, some recommendations are less persuasive than others. For instance, Patrick calls for expanded intelligence collection to inform a methodology for assessing fragility. Yet intelligence spending has already topped $80 billion. Early-warning systems, a sort of Holy Grail given the pitfalls of prediction, mean little in the absence of political will. Moreover, given pervasive corruption in the weakest states, one might question the author's call to direct a greater proportion of US aid to them. If the United States cannot ensure that aid is spent as intended by a corrupt Afghan government under the gaze of a massive military and diplomatic presence, the prospects elsewhere are dim indeed. But these are exceptions to what is otherwise a persuasive agenda for reforming policies that have too seldom taken account of the sort of evidence presented by Patrick.
Overall, Weak Links is thoroughly argued, readable, and empirically rich, and is an important contribution to a number of key debates. It should be read widely in policy circles and by students of US foreign policy and international security. With calls for closer links between policy and scholarship in contemporary political science, the book's attention to causality serves as a model for the ways in which social science can inform policymaking. The only serious shortcoming is one of omission rather than commission. Patrick critiques the mistaken assumptions around the security risks of weak states thoroughly but politely. Unfortunately, he avoids a more critical discussion of where this supposedly conventional wisdom came from and whose interests it serves. While he documents numerous hyperbolic statements by world leaders linking weak states to existential security threats, many of these people knew better. One nevertheless hopes that the book's arguments make it harder for such leaders to get away with the sort of threat inflation that hyped the security risks posed by weak states in order to market many of the past decade's misguided policies.
