Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, appointed by Ronald Reagan in 1988, has become the inscrutable center of the Court, and a lightning rod of controversy. Legal commentators have often seen him only as a cipher, the crucial “fifth vote” rather than a legal thinker in his own right. Conservatives, in particular, have been sharply critical of his decisions. This new study, while well researched and written, tries to apply a descriptive rather than normative account of Kennedy's jurisprudence, but succeeds only in confirming the mystery.
Colucci, a political science professor at Purdue University, tries to assign some coherence to Justice Kennedy's decisions by focusing on the phrase “full and necessary meaning of liberty,” which Kennedy invoked in his confirmation hearings. What is that meaning? For Kennedy, it is the judicial role to expand and define “liberty” consistent with the Constitution “as we understand it.” Kennedy's jurisprudence provides sufficient flexibility to account for changing norms and emerging moral meanings of constitutional phrases. Colucci connects Kennedy both with the legal philosophy of liberal theorist Ronald Dworkin and libertarian Randy Barnett, and with Catholic social thought. Like Dworkin, Kennedy apparently believes that the Constitution must be read in a way consistent with moral values, but rather than focus on “equality,” as does Dworkin, Kennedy focuses on “liberty,” generally that of the individual against the interests of the community or government.
In chapters devoted to abortion, affirmative action, free speech, religion, and federalism, Colucci ranges over Kennedy's opinions in an effort to find coherence and consistency. Mostly, however, Colucci must qualify his analysis with caveats. Kennedy is faithful to history, except when he must go “beyond history,” to find a moral reading of the Constitution. Kennedy believes the historical context of the Founding should provide content to the constitutional language, except when resort to international materials confirms his belief in an “emerging consensus” on legal questions that does not comport with historical understanding. Kennedy believes that federalism is a unique invention of the Founding that should be preserved as it “splits the atom of sovereignty” to protect liberty, except when he feels that local or state practice infringes upon individual “dignity.”
Kennedy is probably best considered mildly libertarian and generally concerned with preserving individual rights, and Colucci is right to note some stable themes in Kennedy's jurisprudence, such as a robust view of free speech. However, too often those themes are unmoored from the constitutional text and history, and simply reinforce a grandiose understanding of the judicial function. The 1992 religious liberty decision in Lee v. Weisman, in which Kennedy authored an opinion striking down a high school graduation prayer because of the government “coercion” implicit in the prayer, is a good example. Kennedy not only subtly shifts the constitutional focus from a relatively objective test of “establishment” to a subjective determination about coercion and dignity, but it necessarily requires that judges play the role of psychologist and denies, as a practical effect, any way for a community to express itself through prayer, a practice that had, at least until Lee, been a widespread and long-standing American custom.
The trouble with a judicial emphasis on “dignity,” in other words, is that it must rely, at base, on how the Supreme Court (or at least five justices thereof) are struck by the impositions on an individual of community or government norms.
Similarly, Kennedy rejects a strictly textualist approach when it conflicts with what he sees as some evolving norm. Kennedy has argued that the Constitution must be imbued with a wider reading such that it encompasses contemporary standards. Colucci connects this to Dworkin's distinction between “conception” and “concept,” the former being specific, changeable applications of the latter, more general term. Even if Colucci is correct, however, that Kennedy does think this way, his analysis raises the more basic question: In a constitutional republic, it is at least arguable that the people, and their elected representatives, should decide when a norm is changing.
Kennedy's 2008 opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana, which rejected the application of the death penalty in instances of child rape, is an example. The Constitution explicitly allows the death penalty. Only by resorting to the experience of certain other countries can Kennedy justify restricting it in these circumstances, despite the considered judgment of state legislators. Such decisions tend to undermine Kennedy's reputation as a federalist and even as a judge concerned with democratically determined decision making, and make him appear instead to be picking and choosing his evidence rather than actually offering a principled basis for his decisions.
Colucci tries to connect Kennedy's concern with freedom and human dignity to the rich tradition of Catholic reflection on these topics. But Colucci does not identify any instances in which Kennedy actually makes such a connection or engages in any serious reflection on that tradition. All Colucci can say is that certain terms “resonate” with or “echo” Catholic teaching. But merely using the same words as the Catholic social documents use does not mean Kennedy is in fact drawing on that tradition. While Colucci finds weak links between Catholic teaching on human dignity and Kennedy's opinions on social questions, the reasoning that leads Kennedy to fundamentally different positions is not explored. Fundamental terms such as “subsidiarity” or “the common good” are unmentioned, even though there is a strong American Catholic tradition of reflecting on these topics in the national context, by thinkers such as Orestes Brownson.
Colucci offers a useful empirical study of the major opinions, but the implications of Kennedy's approach remain undertheorized.
