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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Since the tragedy of 11 September 2001, much time and effort has been spent on tracking the funding sources of numerous terrorist cells around the world in an effort to dismantle them. Loretta Napoleoni's Modern Jihad attempts to unearth the funding sources and methods of terrorist organizations as well as governments (such as the United States and the former Soviet Union) that long financed counterinsurgency groups that suited their national interests. The author does an excellent job of describing the intricate web of relationships and funding sources, including the use of drugs by both France and the United States to fund and fight the various counterinsurgencies they were facing.
The author starts with the correct assumption that state- or group-sponsored acts of terrorism—whether by the Irish Republican Army, Basque separatists, or Islamic groups—have been with us for a long time. The book, alas, does not present a set of detailed data that could help the reader follow a story from the beginning to the end so as to understand better the multiplicity of links between these groups or governments that sponsor acts of terrorism. Furthermore, the style and organization of Modern Jihad is difficult to follow, because the book is broken into three parts, which are then divided into numerous smaller titled sections.
The author makes frequent use of the phrase “Muslim Zealots” without bothering to unpack this loaded term. The label is applied to all those who desire to free a Muslim land from foreign occupation (Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation or Algerians fighting French colonialism in their homeland). Following a rather strange logic, everything is reduced to an “Islamic struggle,” and we are not told how to distinguish between “Muslim Zealots” and freedom fighters. In one of the best chapters of the book, titled “Macroeconomics of Terror,” the author refers to the “Safari Club” as “a perfect example of how counter-insurgency doctrine was adapted to a new international political landscape” as a host of countries were invited to participate in an indirect state-sponsored coalition of anticommunist forces (p. 19). Napoleoni states that Algeria declined to join because of the “self-described Islamic socialist regime of Boumedienne” (p. 20). Socialist, yes, but Islamic? Hardly. The opposition of Algeria to joining the “Safari Club” had more to do with its adherence to and leadership of the nonalignment movement than anything else.
The scholarship, while generally sound and well balanced, still leaves the reader with the thought that all terrorism is rooted in Islam and emanates from within the ranks of its faithful. The title itself and the book jacket, which shows the remnants of the World Trade Center, leads the reader in that direction even before he or she opens the book. This is despite the fact that Modern Jihad is not about the tragic events of 11 September per se, since the author shows how even governments engage in acts of terrorism to justify their own ends. Furthermore, the reader can still ask whether it is not possible that al-Qa

ida is invoking jihad—the most misused word in the current lexicon on terrorism—as a recruiting tool to justify its violent campaigns and nothing else. It is easy to describe acts of terrorism as emanating from Muslim countries, but it is also important to explain why some groups are led to commit these acts of violence in the first place. This is not to say that al-Qa

ida does not have a footprint in some terrorist activities, but the facts seem to indicate that we are moving more and more toward a state of freelance terrorism and free agency, where members are more likely to be fellow travelers than truly committed devotees of a cause.
Although the subtitle of the book is “Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks,” Napoleoni could have done more to highlight the financial web of these networks. However, in fairness to the author, one has to acknowledge that this it is a very difficulty task, considering the very nature of terrorism and its shady, vague, and difficult-to-trace financial networks. The author does a decent job of covering al-Qa

ida and presents some numbers and estimates that are of value. However, in my view, her contribution to existing literature is more significant when she sheds light on the sources and funding of state-sponsored terrorism. Nevertheless, Napoleoni should be reminded that the mere fact that roughly two-thirds of the U.S. money supply is overseas does not link that money to the funding of terrorism. The overseas money can be used in all sorts of legitimate ways, and its amount has been more or less constant since long before 11 September.
Overall, this book better serves terrorism scholars and students engaged in the study of the Middle East and terrorism in a post–11-September era than the general public. It is, however, conceivable to use this book as a supplementary text in an academic course dealing with the subject at hand.