Introduction
The immediate infinite mode of extension (IIME) is one of the more mysterious elements of Spinoza’s ontology. Despite its importance to Spinoza’s metaphysical system as a causal bridge between God and the world of bodies, Spinoza tells us very little about this mode. Given its significance, it seems likely that Spinoza was working with a more or less developed conception of the IIME, and indeed scholars have not hesitated to speculate about its identity. A survey of the literature reveals a wide array of apparently inconsistent hypotheses including (but not limited to): mobilityFootnote 1, local motionFootnote 2, energyFootnote 3, a conserved quantityFootnote 4, a forceFootnote 5, a law or set of lawsFootnote 6, and spaceFootnote 7. In the effort to make some progress in identifying Spinoza’s IIME, it is beyond the scope of a single paper to comprehensively consider the merits of each of these proposals, and consequently I will limit my inquiry in two ways. First, I will limit the subject of this paper to the assessment of three interpretations of the IIME in particular: Don Garrett’s Force Interpretation, the Nomic Interpretation, and the Kinetic Interpretation. Second, I will limit my evaluative criteria. In my critical assessment I will focus primarily on textual adequacy and internal coherency, while largely putting aside broader systematic considerations. In spite of these limitations, I think some significant progress can be made toward the identification of the IIME, and ultimately I argue for two claims. First, I argue that two of the most prominent interpretations of the IIME in the literature (Garrett’s Force Interpretation and the Nomic Interpretation) are inadequate. Second, Kinetic Interpretations of the IIME are often rejected out of hand by scholars on the grounds that no such interpretation could be coherent. I argue that this is a mistake and that Kinetic Interpretations of the IIME are a live option.
To these ends, I proceed as follows. Although Spinoza does not say much about the identity of the IIME, he does offer some clues, and I begin in Section 1 by laying out and organizing what Spinoza tells us about this mode. With this in hand, I turn in Section 2 to the challenge of identifying the IIME. After examining the chief objections to the Kinetic Interpretation, I turn to two prominent alternatives. I discuss Garrett’s Force Interpretation and the Nomic Interpretation in turn, and show that both views are subject to a number of serious objections. In Section 3 I reconsider the Kinetic Interpretation and show that, despite claims to the contrary, there is a coherent Kinetic Interpretation of the IIME.
Section 1: Spinoza on the IIME
For Spinoza, there are two categories of being: substance and its modes. Although there is only one substance, there are many modes, and among these there are two kinds: finite and infinite. In general, it is clear to what the terms ‘substance’ and ‘finite mode’ refer for Spinoza. In the case of substance, it is God, whereas finite modes are bodies in the attribute of extension, and minds or ideas in the attribute of thought. The identity of the infinite modes, however, is less clear. We know that the infinite modes follow from the absolute nature of individual attributes (E1P21, 23).Footnote 8 Thus, there are infinite modes of the attribute of thought and of extension. Furthermore, we know that there are two kinds of infinite mode: those that follow directly or immediately from the absolute nature of an attribute, and those that follow from the absolute nature of an attribute only by following from some other infinite mode (E1P22-23). Among scholars this distinction is traditionally marked by referring to the former as immediate infinite modes and the latter as mediate infinite modes. In addition, although Spinoza never explicitly claims as much, he proceeds as if there is only one immediate infinite mode for each attribute.Footnote 9 As a consequence, for Spinoza there is an ontological hierarchy among the infinite modes of a particular attribute, and within a given attribute the immediate infinite mode is the fundamental or most basic mode of the attribute from which all other infinite modes ultimately follow.
This is all fairly abstract and prompted one early reader of the Ethics (Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus) to ask Spinoza for examples. In response, Spinoza identified the IIME as “motion and rest” (motus & quies Ep. 64: G IV 278, S 919). This response to Tschirnhaus in 1675 mirrors his much earlier identification in the Short Treatise of the “universal mode” which follows immediately from the attribute of extension as “Motion in matter” (KV 1.9: G I 48, C 91, S 58).Footnote 10 Although Spinoza leaves out rest in this early identification of the mode, he does not mean to exclude it. In the Short Treatise Spinoza is quite clear that motion and rest come together as a package: he writes that “there is no motion by itself, but only motion and rest together” (KV 1.2: G I 25, C 71, S 44).Footnote 11 Given this, in what follows I will treat “motion and rest” as a singular term. While Spinoza’s identification of the IIME as motion and rest offers some clue as to its identity, Spinoza offers no further explanation to Tschirnhaus and we shall have to turn elsewhere for help.
E1P21-23 is Spinoza’s most detailed discussion of the infinite modes, and a close look at the proof of E1P21 in particular gives some insight into the identity of the IIME. Again, echoing earlier claims from the Short Treatise, according to which the “universal” modes which “immediately depend” on God are “eternal” and “infinite in kind,” Spinoza claims at E1P21 that “All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute eternal and infinite” (G II 65; C 429, S 230).Footnote 12 The justification proceeds in two steps. First he argues that everything that follows from the absolute nature of God’s attributes must be infinite, and second he argues that any such thing must also be eternal. What Spinoza means by ‘infinite’ in this context is especially interesting for the purposes of this paper, and so in what follows I focus on the first part of Spinoza’s justification alone.
The justification, perhaps unsurprisingly, takes the form of a reductio. Spinoza begins “conceive (if you can) that in some attribute of God there follows from its absolute nature something that is finite…” (G II 65, C 429, S 230). Although any attribute will do, Spinoza draws upon the attribute of thought to illustrate his point. He continues by positing the existence of something he refers to as “God’s idea in thought.” It isn’t clear what precisely Spinoza means by “God’s idea in thought,” although he may well be referring to the immediate infinite mode of thought which he elsewhere refers to as “absolutely infinite intellect.”Footnote 13 Regardless of the referent, we are to suppose that this mode is i) finite and ii) follows from the absolute nature of thought.
With the suppositions out of the way, Spinoza proceeds: “But (by D2) [thought] cannot be conceived to be finite unless it is determined through thought itself…Therefore, [thought must be determined] through thought insofar as it does not constitute God’s idea…” (G II 65, C 429, S 231). Here Spinoza is inferring from the supposition that God’s idea is finite, that it must be limited by some other mode or affection of the attribute of thought. He justifies this inference by invoking the definition of finitude given earlier in the Ethics (E1d2), according to which a thing is finite in its own kind just in case it is “limited by another of the same nature.”Footnote 14 According to Spinoza, it is the existence of a mode of the attribute of thought other than God’s idea that yields a contradiction. He writes: “on that account God’s idea does not follow necessarily from the nature [of this thought] insofar as it is absolute thought (for [thought] is conceived both as constituting God’s idea and as not constituting it)” (G II 65, C 429, S 231). Having shown a contradiction, Spinoza concludes that God’s idea cannot both follow from the absolute nature of thought and be finite. In hopes of clarifying Spinoza’s reasoning, I offer the following representation of his argument:
1) God’s idea follows from the absolute nature of thought and is finite. (supposition for reductio)
2) If God’s idea is finite, then it is limited by some other mode of the attribute of thought. (def. of ‘finitude’)
3) Hence, it is not the case that God’s idea follows from the absolute nature of thought.
4) So, we have a contradiction and given that God’s idea follows from the absolute nature of thought and that 2) and 3) are true, it follows that God’s idea cannot be finite.
Laying out the argument in this way reveals a significant lacuna. On what grounds does Spinoza infer that God’s idea does not follow from the absolute nature of the attribute of thought? Trivially, the answer is that Spinoza is assuming a connection between being limited by some other mode of the attribute of thought and failing to follow from its absolute nature. That is, given the reconstruction above, Spinoza is committed to the assumption that:
2.5) If God’s idea is limited by some other mode of the attribute of thought, then it is not the case that God’s idea follows from the absolute nature of thought.
While attributing this proposition to Spinoza fills the argumentative gap, the more substantive issue here concerns Spinoza’s grounds for affirming 2.5. Spinoza takes this proposition to be true, I think, because he holds that to follow from the absolute nature of an attribute is to be universally present, or pervasive, within it. Put more formally, I contend that Spinoza holds what I will call the Pervasiveness Thesis:
(PT): If a mode, x, follows from the absolute nature of some attribute A, then x is a pervasive mode of A.
The grounds for thinking Spinoza holds the Pervasiveness Thesis are not complicated: since x follows from the absolute nature of A and the absolute nature of A is present in every manifestation of A, so too x will be present in every manifestation of A. Put otherwise, if x were not pervasive, then x would be absent from some manifestation of A. But it would follow from this that x cannot follow from the absolute nature of A, since the absolute nature of A is present in every manifestation of A.Footnote 15
Amending the argument at E1P21p in this way not only fills the argumentative gap, but also tells us something important about the IIME. Specifically, this hidden assumption and its justification tell us what it means for the IIME to be infinite: the IIME is infinite and unlimited in the sense that it is universally present throughout the attribute of extension. This is true at all times given the second part of the argument according to which such modes are eternal. Thus, the IIME is, as Don Garrett has put it, “permanent and pervasive” throughout extension.Footnote 16
In addition to its permanence and pervasiveness, Spinoza claims that the IIME is active. He writes in the Short Treatise:
We shall divide Natura naturata in two: a universal and a particular. The universal consists in all those modes which depend on God immediately…The particular consists in all those singular things which are produced by the universal modes (KV 1.8: G I 47, C 91, S 58; my italics).Footnote 17
Given that singular things are in some way produced by the infinite modes and that Spinoza has identified the IIME as motion and rest, we would expect him, in addition, to claim that motion and rest somehow produces finite modes of extension. Indeed, this expectation is met elsewhere in the Short Treatise: “Each and every particular thing that comes to exist becomes such through motion and rest” (KV 2 Preface: G I 52, C 95, S 60). Spinoza clarifies the scope of “particular thing” later claiming that it includes all extended finite phenomena: “When we consider extension alone, we perceive nothing else in it except motion and rest, from which we find that all its effects derive” (KV 2.19: G I 91, C 131, S 87). How does motion and rest produce or otherwise account for the existence of particular things? In the Short Treatise, Spinoza offers only a hint; he writes that “each particular corporeal thing is nothing but a certain proportion of motion and rest, so much so that if there were nothing in extension except motion alone, or nothing except rest alone, there could not be, or be indicated, in the whole of extension, any particular thing” (KV Appendix 2: G I 120, C 155, S 106). In this passage, Spinoza reiterates his earlier claim that motion and rest come together as a package, and adds that it is only in virtue of the presence of both motion and rest that there are any bodies at all. More importantly, this passage shows that motion and rest is the sort of mode that comes in proportions or (as he says elsewhere on the same page) degrees, and that the identity of a body is in some way tied to a particular proportion or degree of motion and rest. Although this is as much as Spinoza tells us in the Short Treatise, he makes a related and somewhat more specific claim in the Ethics. In the so-called Physical Interlude that follows E2P13s, Spinoza distinguishes between complex bodies and their ultimate constituents—what he calls the ‘simplest bodies’ (corpora simplicissima). For ease of expression, I will for the balance of this paper refer to these bodies as ‘simple bodies’. According to Spinoza, simple bodies are “distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness” (E2P13a2*: G II 99, C 460, S 253).Footnote 18 Despite Spinoza’s language, it seems clear that he is making a metaphysical (and not just an epistemic) point.Footnote 19 Given this, Spinoza’s claim in the Physical Interlude is that motion and rest individuates simple bodies. Taking these texts together, it would seem that, for Spinoza, motion and rest is active and accounts for all finite extended phenomena insofar as it is that feature of extension in virtue of which there are any bodies at all. More specifically, it is that mode of extension the determinations of which distinguish or individuate particular simple bodies.
In sum, here is what we can say about the identity of the IIME to this point. Spinoza identifies the IIME as motion and rest. As the IIME, motion and rest follows immediately from the absolute nature of the attribute of extension. Consequently, motion and rest is the most basic infinite mode from which all other infinite modes of extension follow, and is a permanent and pervasive feature of the attribute of extension. Furthermore, for Spinoza motion and rest plays an important role as a causal bridge from the infinite to the finite inasmuch as it is that feature of extension which accounts for the individuation of simple bodies, and ultimately for the production of all finite phenomena in the extended world.Footnote 20
Before looking at some interpretations of the IIME two comments are in order about the approach to the identity of the IIME pursued here. First, in piecing together these clues I have assumed that Spinoza’s comments about the IIME (and about motion and rest) refer to a single conception of the IIME. That is, I have taken it for granted that Spinoza’s understanding of the identity of the IIME did not substantively change over the course of his career. The justification for this approach lies in Spinoza’s comments themselves. Despite the fact that there is a lengthy interval between the Short Treatise and the Ethics, what Spinoza tells us about the IIME in his early work largely corresponds to what he says in his later work. As we have seen, in the Short Treatise Spinoza identifies the “universal mode” which “immediately depend[s]” on God as “motion in Matter” and claims that there is no motion without rest. In addition Spinoza claims that this mode is “infinite in kind” and “eternal” and is responsible for producing each and every singular thing. In his later work, Spinoza holds that the IIME is “motion and rest,” that it is infinite and eternal, and that it accounts for the existence of simple bodies (inasmuch as it is that in virtue of which they are individuated or distinguished). This is not to say that there are no differences between the two accounts: in the Short Treatise Spinoza uses the term ‘universal mode’ rather than ‘infinite mode’; moreover in this early work he does not distinguish between immediate and mediate infinite modes, nor does he mention simple bodies or specify that the IIME individuates them. These differences, however, are not necessarily evidence of a change in view. First, there is some reason to believe that even the early Spinoza is committed to the existence of simple bodies (see e.g., TIE 68). Second, even if we put this aside, these differences do not amount to a repudiation of Spinoza’s earlier account, since these differences can be easily read as extensions to, or refinements of, the basic Short Treatise account. Of course, a substantive change in view cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, Spinoza’s comments on the IIME give us no compelling reason to think this is the case, and so I regard the assumption made here to be a plausible one.
Second, in the effort to reconstruct Spinoza’s IIME I have not drawn upon every piece of evidence available. I have primarily appealed to Spinoza’s explicit comments about the IIME (understood as motion and rest) in particular, or about the infinite modes in general. However, there is more that might be said about the IIME; given its centrality to Spinoza’s account of the extended world, how we understand other elements of Spinoza’s philosophical system will inform our interpretation of the IIME. On this basis one might flesh out an account of Spinoza’s IIME by, for example, arguing that given a particular interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology (or the attribute of extension, or the immediate infinite mode of the attribute of thought, etc.), it follows that the IIME must have one property or another. While this is an important approach (indeed ultimately any interpretation of the IIME will have to cohere with the rest of Spinoza’s system), its results are only as good as the interpretations on which it is based. Unfortunately, one can find significant disagreement among scholars on many elements of Spinoza’s system, and this is especially true of the elements that bear on the identity of the IIME. For example, how one understands Spinoza’s attribute of extension is relevant to how one can interpret its immediate infinite mode. However, as will be noted later, there are widely divergent interpretations of the nature of Spinoza’s extended substance (with respect even to the question of whether extended substance is, in itself, extended!). It is outside the scope of a single paper to take up these issues, and consequently I have—to the extent possible—put aside these more systematic considerations. Despite this limitation, the characterization of the IIME to this point will be sufficient for making some progress. After all, regardless of one’s larger interpretive commitments with respect to Spinoza’s system, any adequate interpretation of the IIME will have to fill the role Spinoza has specified for this mode. As such, the limited characterization adduced to this point will allow us to effectively rule out as inadequate any interpretation of the IIME that cannot do so. With this strategy in mind, I turn now to an examination of three interpretations of the IIME.
Section 2: Identifying the IIME
In the effort to identify the IIME perhaps the most obvious place to begin is with the terms ‘motion’ and ‘rest’ themselves. In certain contexts (for example the Physical Interlude which follows E2P13s) it is reasonably clear that Spinoza is using these terms to refer to local motion and its absence, and Spinoza nowhere says that he uses these terms equivocally.Footnote 21 In addition, the IIME plays roughly the same role in Spinoza’s account of the natural world that local motion does in the systems of a number of his near contemporaries.Footnote 22 Descartes, for example, writes in the Principles “all the variety in matter, all the diversity of its forms, depends on motion.”Footnote 23 Hobbes claims in De Corpore that “the variety of all figures arises out of the variety of those motions by which they are made”Footnote 24 and Boyle summarizes the intellectual landscape in Certain Physiological Essays by observing that the Cartesians and the Atomists are united against the scholastic-Aristotelians inasmuch as they “agree in deducing all the Phaenomena of Nature from Matter and local Motion.”Footnote 25 In each of these cases it is local motion that is playing a fundamental causal and explanatory role. Given this context it is not difficult to read Spinoza as referring to local motion when he claims that “Each and every particular thing that comes to exist becomes such through motion and rest” and “When we consider extension alone, we perceive nothing else in it except motion and rest, from which we find that all its effects derive.” These considerations justify taking seriously the hypothesis that in identifying the IIME as “motion and rest” Spinoza is identifying it with local motion and its absence, i.e., to changes (or the lack thereof) in spatial position. I will call any such interpretation of the IIME a Kinetic Interpretation. There are, of course, different ways of thinking about the nature of local motion, and so there will be a number of possible Kinetic Interpretations of the IIME.Footnote 26 Given this background, one might expect scholars to have focused their efforts on reconstructing an account of local motion to serve as Spinoza’s IIME. This is not, however, the case.
Despite its prima facie plausibility, Kinetic Interpretations have few proponents among scholars of Spinoza.Footnote 27 The chief problem with Kinetic Interpretations, critics urge, is that if we understand the IIME kinetically, it is impossible for the IIME to play the chief role Spinoza assigns it—namely, to individuate simple bodies. It is charged that Kinetic Interpretations fail in this regard in two respects in particular. First, if the IIME individuates simple bodies, then the existence of simple bodies depends on and presupposes the existence of the IIME. In other words, if the IIME individuates simple bodies, then it must be ontologically prior to them. However, only bodies move or are at rest. Local motion is a mode of body, and so cannot be ontologically prior to body’s existence; on the contrary, so understood the existence of local motion presupposes the existence of body. I will refer to this objection, endorsed by Jonathan Bennett, Edwin Curley, Don Garrett, and Richard Manning, as the Problem of the Priority of Motion.Footnote 28
A second problem finds its origin in Leibniz’s objections to Sturm, but is applied specifically against Kinetic Interpretations, again by Bennett and later Garrett.Footnote 29 The charge is that Kinetic Interpretations are inconsistent with the existence of simple bodies over time. If we interpret the IIME kinetically, there can be no simple bodies at an instant, since there can be no local motion at an instant. But if there are no simple bodies at an instant, then there can be no simple bodies over time. I will refer to this problem as the Problem of Diachronic Diversity. These two problems would seem to rule out Kinetic Interpretations of the IIME, and in what follows I will present and evaluate two of the most prominent alternative approaches.
Section 2.1: Garrett’s Force Interpretation of the IIME
With the Problem of the Priority of Motion and of Diachronic Diversity in mind, Don Garrett begins the process of developing an interpretation of Spinoza’s account of motion and rest by consulting Spinoza’s presentation and commentary on Descartes’ Principles. Footnote 30 In this work, Spinoza follows Descartes in distinguishing between local motion and the force responsible for the transfer. There are greater and lesser forces and Descartes calls a degree or amount of force a “quantity of motion.” Observing that on occasion in his commentary on Descartes’ Principles Spinoza uses the term ‘motion’ as shorthand for a body’s quantity of motion ( e.g., PP 2P22), Garrett proceeds to make the case for identifying motion and rest with this force and its quantity as understood by Descartes. Given this, I will refer to Garrett’s interpretation of the IIME as a Force Interpretation.
As we’ve seen, the IIME is a permanent and pervasive feature of the attribute of extension, and Garrett claims that if we understand the IIME as referring to a force, it is not difficult to understand how it might be permanent and pervasive. He proposes that it might:
…be distributed differentially throughout the one extended medium that is Spinoza’s extended substance…at a single time one region of the extended substance might contain greater force as quantity of motion and correspondingly lesser force as quantity of rest than another.Footnote 31
Influenced by Jonathan Bennett’s field-metaphysic interpretation of Spinoza’s extended substance and the mode/substance relation, Garrett takes the attribute of extension itself to be an infinite fixed expanse of three-dimensionality or space, and its modes to be properties which inhere in space’s regions. Thus to say that motion and rest is a permanent and pervasive feature of extension, for Garrett’s Spinoza, is to say that every region of the infinite expanse of space always possesses the property of having one quantity of motion and rest or another. Furthermore, Garrett urges that the IIME understood in this way avoids the Problem of Diachronic Diversity. Since a quantity of motion and rest is the kind of property that space’s regions have at a time, it follows that the IIME so understood is the kind of property that can synchronically individuate simple bodies, and thereby allow for their existence over time.
Moreover, Garrett offers an explanation of how this individuation might occur on the Force Interpretation. Asking us to recall that, for Spinoza, simple bodies are “distinguished from one another only by motion and rest,” he offers a definition of what simple bodies might be for Spinoza. He proposes that simple bodies:
…might be supposed to be, at any given moment, constituted of those regions of the one extended substance that are, at that time, entirely homogeneous with respect to the distribution of quantity of motion (and, correlatively, quantity of rest). They might, in effect, be such homogeneities.Footnote 32
The proposal is that, for Spinoza, a simple body at a time just is a region of space or extension, x, no subregion of which has a different quantity of motion and rest from x. Put otherwise, what makes a body simple for Garrett’s Spinoza is not that it is partless simpliciter, since to be extended is to have partes extra partes. Rather, what makes a body simple is that none of its parts are themselves distinct bodies. There are two notable consequences of this definition. First, as Garrett notes, this definition is consistent with simple bodies of different shapes and sizes. Second, it follows that what simple bodies exist at a time is a function of the synchronic distribution of varying quantities of motion and rest across the infinite expanse of the one extended substance. On a final note, it should be clear that Garrett’s interpretation avoids the Problem of the Priority of Motion. Motion and rest, for Garrett’s Spinoza, can give rise to the distinction between simple bodies because it is a property of the regions of the attribute of extension itself—not a property of bodies.
Although Garrett’s Force Interpretation is an impressive synthesis of textual, philosophical, and historical data, I think it is unlikely that this interpretation is Spinoza’s. I see three principal objections to the Force Interpretation, which, taken together form a strong case against it. First, the view Garrett attributes to Spinoza is too provocative to have gone unnoted by Spinoza. As Alan Gabbey has pointed out, the thesis that local motion is the primary form of change in the physical world was common ground for seventeenth-century mechanists and scholastic-Aristotelians alike (although they disagreed about the nature of this primacy).Footnote 33 But if Garrett is right, then Spinoza is committed to thinking that virtually all his contemporaries are wrong on this score. For Garrett’s Spinoza, local motion is not the primary form of change; at the fundamental level there are only the regions of space and the varying quantities of motion and rest which inhere in these regions. What appears as the local motion of a body is actually, for Garrett’s Spinoza, a succession of qualitative changes across contiguous and unmoving regions of space. Such a rethinking of the nature of local motion and its place in the physical world would have been of special interest and import to Spinoza’s mechanist contemporaries in particular, and that this is the case gives us some reason to believe that Spinoza would have said something to this effect (especially given Spinoza’s general willingness to point out the mistakes of his interlocutors).Footnote 34 This is not to say that we should expect Spinoza to explicitly observe every respect in which he disagrees with, say, Descartes; it is rather to suggest that to the extent that Spinoza thinks his philosophical interlocutors are mistaken about philosophical issues of great import and interest to the day, it is reasonable to expect Spinoza to say as much.Footnote 35 That there is no such comment counts, I think, as a strike against this view.
A second objection to the Force Interpretation is that it is at least partially unmotivated. Garrett develops the Force Interpretation to avoid the Problem of Diachronic Diversity. He thus proceeds on the assumption that whatever motion and rest is, it must be the kind of property that can individuate simple bodies synchronically, since simple bodies can exist over time only if they exist at a time. The problem is that Spinoza does not accept this argument’s premise. This is clear from Spinoza’s treatment in the Principles of Descartes’ Philosophy of several paradoxes he attributes to Zeno for the conclusion that motion cannot exist. In part, Spinoza follows Aristotle in his resolution of these paradoxes. Like Aristotle, Spinoza claims that each argument falsely “supposes…that time is composed of moments just as others have conceived that quantity is composed of indivisible points” (PP 2P6s: G I 193, C 271, S 154).Footnote 36 Time, according to Spinoza is continuous; every interval of time is divisible into smaller intervals ad infinitum. There is thus no interval of time which has moments or instants as parts, and so whether simple bodies are individuated at an instant is ultimately irrelevant to their individuation over time, for Spinoza. Consequently, a need to individuate simple bodies synchronically would not have informed Spinoza’s thinking about the IIME, and neither should it inform ours.
The third and most serious objection to Garrett’s Force Interpretation is that it is inconsistent with the existence of simple bodies over time. According to Spinoza, simple bodies are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, and as we have seen, Garrett fills this in by defining simple bodies as regions of extension (space) homogeneous with respect to a quantity of motion and rest. That is, there is no part of a simple body that is itself a distinct body. Garrett’s account relies on Spinoza’s sharing a conception of the quantity of motion with Descartes, and, for Descartes, a body’s quantity of motion over time is a function of size x speed.Footnote 37 With this in mind, consider a purportedly simple body, A. Using Descartes’ terminology, let us say that A is a cube with a size of 8, and that A is in uniform motion with a speed of 2. If Spinoza shared Descartes’ conception of the quantity of motion (as Garrett’s Force Interpretation holds), then Spinoza will say that A possesses a quantity of motion and rest of 16. Now consider a sub-volume of A with a size of 3, call it B. As a part of A, B will also be moving at a speed of 2. Given this, B will possess a quantity of motion of 6. But if B has a distinct quantity of motion, then B is a body. Consequently, contra the initial supposition, A is not a simple body since it has a part that is itself a body—namely B. In general, the problem is that a quantity of motion, as a function of size x speed, is not the sort of property that can be homogeneous across distinct sizes at the same speed. The upshot is that Garrett offers an interpretation of the IIME that is inconsistent with the existence of simple bodies (as Garrett sees them) and that consequently, cannot play the role Spinoza specifies for the mode.Footnote 38
In sum, that the IIME on Garrett’s interpretation cannot play the role Spinoza sets out for the mode, taken together with the fact that that i) there is no direct evidence that Spinoza’s account of local motion and its place in nature radically differed from his contemporaries’ accounts, and that ii) Garrett’s motivation for attributing this view to Spinoza is at least partially unfounded, offers strong evidence that Garrett’s Force Interpretation is not Spinoza’s interpretation. Given this, I will turn to an alternative proposal: the Nomic Interpretation.
Section 2.2: The Nomic Interpretation
While Garrett’s Force Interpretation is the most developed account of the IIME in the literature, perhaps the most popular interpretation of the IIME understands this mode to be a law or set of laws of nature.Footnote 39 Despite the popularity of what I will call the Nomic Interpretation, there is no sustained defense of this interpretation on its own terms in the literature.Footnote 40 Nevertheless, it is not difficult to isolate the evidence for this view. First, in several places Spinoza says or implies that the laws of nature are pervasive features of extension (see e.g., E3 Preface and TTP 6). Assuming a realist conception of the laws—that is, that they are modes, and that no finite mode is pervasive, it follows that the laws will have to be infinite modes for Spinoza. Given this, it is not too far of a stretch to propose that the IIME itself is a law (or set of laws) of nature. Second, on at least one occasion Spinoza seems to suggest that the laws of nature account for the existence of bodies, just as we would expect were the IIME a law or set of laws. In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Spinoza writes:
The essences of singular, changeable things are…to be sought only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, and are ordered. (TIE 101: G II 36-37, C 41, S 27, my italics).
If we take the “fixed and eternal things” to be the attributes, then Spinoza is claiming that the laws of nature are “inscribed in” the attributes and are that according to which finite modes come to be. Insofar as motion and rest is supposed to account for the existence of bodies, it would seem there is good reason to think that Spinoza takes the IIME to be a law (or set of laws) of nature.
The permanence and pervasiveness of the laws of nature does offer evidence that they should be counted among the infinite modes for Spinoza.Footnote 41 The proposal that some law or set of laws constitutes the IIME itself faces some serious challenges, however. First, there is little, if any, direct positive evidence for this interpretation. Spinoza never, to my knowledge, unambiguously refers to a law of nature using the terms ‘motion’ or ‘rest’. Moreover, the only direct evidence that the IIME is a law of nature comes from the TIE text, and this is equivocal. This interpretation requires reading the “fixed and eternal things” as the attributes, but it may with equal plausibility be read as referring to the IIME itself. Indeed, in the roughly contemporaneous Short Treatise Spinoza characterizes the IIMs as being immutable and eternal (KV 1.9: G I 48, C 92, S 59). Furthermore, this text says only that the laws of nature are that “according to which all singular things come to be, and are ordered” (secundum quas omnia singularia, & fiunt, & ordinantur), and surely one need not affirm that the IIME is a law of nature to agree that events occur in accordance with the laws of nature (Garrett, for example, does just this, claiming that the changes in the differential distribution of quantity of motion occur in accordance with the laws of nature).Footnote 42
Second, not only is there little positive evidence for this interpretation, there are textual reasons to doubt it. Emilia Giancotti, for instance, points out that in a number of instances Spinoza seems to distinguish the IIME from the laws of nature.Footnote 43 Thus in the TTP Spinoza writes that:
[I]n examining natural phenomena we first of all try to discover those features that are most universal and common to the whole of Nature, to wit, motion and rest and the rules and laws governing them which Nature always observes and through which she constantly acts…” (TTP 7: G III 102, S 460).
Furthermore, in his correspondence with Robert Boyle, Spinoza observes that “motion, rest, and their laws” are among the “pure notions” that explain nature as it is in itself (Ep. 6: G IV 28, C 181, S 773). It seems unlikely that Spinoza would distinguish motion and rest from the laws of nature in this way if he took motion and rest to be laws of nature.
Third, this view faces a steep challenge, for it is difficult to understand how a law of nature might individuate simple bodies. According to Spinoza, simple bodies are distinguished by motion and rest alone. So, on the Nomic Interpretation the law (or laws) of nature which constitute the IIME will have to be variable in some respect (since there must be something in virtue of which simple bodies are distinct). But, for Spinoza, laws of nature do not seem to be modes that come in degrees or amounts, and as such, it follows that on the Nomic Interpretation the IIME cannot play the role Spinoza sets out for this mode.Footnote 44 In sum, although there is evidence for counting the laws of nature among the infinite modes, the objections raised here give good reason to doubt that they constitute the IIME; rather in light of the fact that all infinite modes are either mediate or immediate, it follows that the laws of nature are best understood as mediate infinite modes of the attribute of extension.
Section 3: Reconsidering the Kinetic Interpretation
Recall that in spite of its prima facie plausibility, the Kinetic Interpretation is often thought to be a non-starter since (it is alleged) no such interpretation can play the role Spinoza sets out for the mode. Specifically, it is alleged that the Kinetic Interpretation is subject to what I have called the Problem of the Priority of Motion and of Diachronic Diversity (PPM and PDD). In this section I aim to show that scholars have been wrong to dismiss the Kinetic Interpretation on these grounds by developing an interpretation that is consistent with what Spinoza tells us about this mode. My case proceeds in two steps. First, as we saw in the assessment of Garrett’s view, the PDD is not a problem that should inform our thinking about the identity of the IIME. This leaves the PPM as the chief obstacle to pursuing the Kinetic Interpretation, and I begin by showing that this problem is only apparent, given a particular interpretation of the attribute of extension. Second, with these obstacles out of the way, I show that a Kinetic Interpretation of the IIME can be developed which plausibly plays the roles Spinoza assigns the mode.
Recall that according to the PPM whatever individuates simple bodies must be ontologically prior to them, but local motion is a property of bodies alone, and as such, presupposes their existence. Now any Kinetic Interpretation of the IIME is committed to claiming that local motion is a property of the attribute of extension itself, and so the proponent of this interpretation will be committed to denying the PPM’s premise that local motion is a property of bodies alone. Whether it makes sense to claim that local motion is a property of the attribute of extension itself depends, however, on how we understand the nature of the attribute of extension. There are a variety of competing interpretations of the nature of Spinoza’s extended substance. For example, Jonathan Bennett’s field-metaphysic interpretation treats Spinoza’s attribute of extension as unbounded absolute space the parts of which have fixed locations, while Roger Woolhouse argues that the attribute of extension is not a real existing extended thing, but rather is a part of God’s essence or nature the instantiation of which is the existing extended world.Footnote 45 However, for the purposes of this section of the paper I will focus on an interpretation according to which Spinoza’s extended substance is a (metaphysically amended) Cartesian plenum.
Reading Spinoza’s extended substance in this way is nothing new. This seems to be how Pierre Bayle understood Spinoza’s extended substance, and in recent years this interpretation has been endorsed by Charlie Hueneman and Alan Donagan among others.Footnote 46 This interpretation of Spinoza’s extended substance begins with Descartes. For Descartes, the extended universe is, at bottom, a continuous and unbounded plenum. In itself, this plenum is an utterly homogeneous three-dimensional expanse of matter/space. Certainly Spinoza thinks that Descartes’ account of the metaphysics of extension is mistaken on a number of counts: while Descartes holds that the plenum as a whole and all its parts are extended substances, Spinoza holds that there is only one extended, but metaphysically simple, substance.Footnote 47 While Descartes claims that extended substance, and hence the extended plenum as a whole, is inert, Spinoza maintains that it “expresses eternal and infinite essence.” While Descartes holds that the extended plenum is a contingent being created by a transcendent God, Spinoza holds that it is an expression of God’s essence. Despite these differences, according to the interpretation at hand, Spinoza does not deny Descartes’ basic conception of the extended universe as an unbounded plenum; rather in his account Spinoza tries to place the unbounded plenum on solid metaphysical ground. To be clear, the point of discussing this interpretation is not to claim that this is, in fact, Spinoza’s account of extended substance; it is rather merely to establish that this interpretation of Spinoza’s extended substance is, at least prima facie, a live option.
If Spinoza’s extended substance is a metaphysically amended Cartesian plenum, the PPM dissolves, for the parts of a Cartesian plenum are mobile.Footnote 48 That is, there is no incoherency in claiming that local motion is a property of extension so conceived. In light of this, I will proceed by taking this interpretation for granted. Although the chief obstacle to interpreting the IIME kinetically has been removed, it remains to be shown that this interpretation can plausibly i) be said to be a pervasive feature of the attribute of extension and ii) individuate simple bodies. To these ends it is necessary to attribute a specific conception of local motion to Spinoza. Again, there are a number of possible interpretations of local motion one might attribute to Spinoza, but I will take for granted that Spinoza defines local motion similarly to Descartes. This is, at least on its face, an independently plausible attribution: in addition to the more general influence of Descartes on Spinoza, Spinoza was well aware of Descartes’ account of motion (having faithfully reproduced it in his commentary on the Principles) and arguably endorses various other elements of his physics.Footnote 49
Given this, it is important to briefly review Descartes’ account of local motion and its role in his natural philosophy. For Descartes, the unbounded plenum is physically divided into parts of different sizes and shapes by local motion, which is, in turn, defined as the transference of a part of matter from its immediately contiguous vicinity.Footnote 50 Although there is a lot that might be said about this definition, I want to emphasize two features in particular. First, according to Descartes, motion is relative. A part of matter is never in motion or at rest simpliciter. Rather, a part of matter can be truly said to be in motion only relative to the parts of matter to which it is contiguous. Second, Descartes stresses that as a transfer, motion is a reciprocal process. Understood in this way, motion is symmetric—one part of matter, A, cannot be transferred from the vicinity of another part of matter, B, without B’s being simultaneously transferred from A’s vicinity. As Descartes writes (and Spinoza faithfully reproduces), “in the case of two contiguous bodies being transferred in opposite directions, and thus separated, we should say that there was just as much motion in the one body as in the other.”Footnote 51 In this sense, motion is a separation of two parts of matter; more specifically, for Descartes a part of matter is in motion if its spatial position is changing relative to its vicinity and at rest if it is not.Footnote 52
Descartes’ definition of motion has a number of counter-intuitive consequences, but I would like to focus on one in particular. Consider a golf ball which has just been hit off the tee. Although the ball is in motion, the ball’s core is, properly speaking, at rest. According to Descartes, a part of matter has only one proper motion—motion defined in terms of its immediately contiguous surroundings.Footnote 53 Since the core’s spatial position relative to ts immediately contiguous surroundings (the ball’s cover) is fixed, it is properly speaking at rest. Nonetheless, Descartes admits (and again, Spinoza reiterates) that a part of matter can “share in countless other motions, namely in cases where it is a part of other bodies which have other motions.”Footnote 54 In this way, although the core is, properly speaking, at rest, it can be said to have a shared motion inasmuch as the whole of which it is a part is in proper motion.
What proper motion and shared motion have in common, such that it makes sense for Descartes to speak of them both as instances of motion, is that both are cases of change in the relative position of a part of matter. Indeed Newton, in his criticism of Descartes’ physics in De Gravitatione, puts aside motion in the proper sense and characterizes motion “in the Cartesian sense” in this more general way.Footnote 55 Given this, I will adopt the hypothesis that Spinoza’s definition of local motion is a generalized version of Descartes’, according to which local motion is defined as change in relative position.
Given the hypotheses that Spinoza’s extended substance is an unbounded plenum and that he defines local motion as a change in relative position, we can see how the IIME understood kinetically might account for both the individuation of simple bodies and the IIME’s pervasiveness. Let me begin with the latter feature. As we have seen, for Spinoza, the IIME is permanent and pervasive throughout the attribute of extension inasmuch as the IIME is present in every manifestation of the attribute of extension. Given this interpretation of the IIME we can understand this claim to mean that every part of the one extended plenum is always such that it is both changing its relative position with respect to some part of the plenum, and is persisting in its relative position with respect to some other part of the plenum. Moreover, this is consistent with the IIME’s role as individuator. Given the pervasiveness of the IIME, every part of the plenum will be changing its position relative to some other part of the plenum or another, but some parts will be changing not just with respect to any other part, but with respect to the part of the plenum which constitutes its immediately contiguous vicinity. In this way, we might define a body, for Spinoza, as a part of the plenum which is changing its position relative to its immediately contiguous vicinity, and a simple body as a body no part of which is itself a distinct body.
In sum, if we interpret Spinoza’s extended substance as an unbounded Cartesian plenum and we attribute to him a generalized Cartesian conception of local motion, it is possible to develop a Kinetic Interpretation of the IIME which is not subject to the PPM, is a permanent and pervasive feature of the attribute of extension, and can individuate simple bodies.
Conclusion
Although Spinoza tells us little about its identity, the IIME is an important element of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Not only is it a pervasive feature of the attribute of extension, but it is serves as a causal bridge between God and simple bodies. I have argued that two of the most prominent ways of thinking about the identity of the IIME are inadequate: we should not think of the IIME as a quantity of motion that is differentially distributed throughout extension, nor should we think of it as a law or set of laws of nature. I have argued, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a coherent Kinetic Interpretation of the IIME, despite claims to the contrary. In making a case for the Kinetic Interpretation, it is important to be clear that I do not intend to suggest that the Kinetic Interpretation developed here is the only plausible Kinetic Interpretation. It may well be, for example, that there are alternative interpretations of local motion which it is plausible to attribute to Spinoza. Nor have I argued that Spinoza’s conception of the IIME is, in fact, a kinetic one. Again, it may turn out that such an interpretation is inconsistent with one or more elements of Spinoza’s philosophical system. My conclusion, rather, is that insofar as the Kinetic Interpretation is a coherent interpretation of the IIME, it should be considered a viable candidate for Spinoza’s considered view.
Acknowledgements:
I would like to thank Christopher Martin for reading and commenting on several drafts of this paper. Thanks also to the participants in the Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy in the summer of 2012, and to a number of anonymous referees for helpful questions, comments, and challenges.
