Democratic Resilience: Can the United States Withstand Rising Polarization? brings together a diverse and impressive group of scholars to assess the relationship between mass/elite polarization and the future of American democratic institutions. Consisting of 15 chapters, the volume is divided into five parts. The first part lays out theoretical reasons why we might expect polarization to threaten American democracy. The second and third parts explore this relationship from the perspectives of political institutions and behavior, respectively. The fourth part has disparate chapters under the heading of “Vicious Circles? The Relationship between Polarized Behavior and Institutions.” The final part explores potential solutions to preserving democracy in the face of political polarization.

The volume’s strength lies in the amazing set of scholars that was assembled for this effort, and the insightful chapters that they wrote. However, what makes this collection particularly unique is that it tackles political polarization from the lenses of American political development and comparative politics, whereas most treatments of contemporary polarization have been from the subfields of behavior and institutions. Make no mistake, there is plenty of content related to public opinion, Congress, state politics, the courts, and the like. Yet, the fact that the editors are scholars of American political development (Robert C. Lieberman and Suzanne Mettler) and comparative politics (Kenneth M. Roberts) introduces a novel framing of the topic.

As with any edited volume, the chapters are diverse. The goal is not to forward a singular thesis or argument. Indeed, many of the authors disagree about the threat that polarization poses to American democracy. Interestingly, the behavior scholars tend to be more pessimistic than the institutions scholars, on balance. Public opinion researchers such as Lilliana Mason, Nathan P. Kalmoe, Christopher Sebastian Parker, Matt A. Barreto, Michele F. Margolis, and Matthew J. Lacombe note the dangers of strong identity-oriented concerns among voters (around constructs such as race, religion, gun ownership). However, institutionalists often focus on the power of checks and balances to constrain extremism. Frances E. Lee discusses that capacity for bipartisan policy making in a polarized Congress, while Douglas L. Kriner argues that unilateral presidential action has not increased along with polarization, suggesting executive restraint and democratic resilience.

Given that the chapters do not come to a singular conclusion about the causes and consequences of political polarization, or whether American democracy is resilient to these threats, the main goal is to set a research agenda going forward. Reading through the chapters will surely stimulate interesting research questions at the intersection of behavior, institutions, and American political development. For example, chapters by Frances E. Lee, Nathan P. Kalmoe, and Lilliana Mason all note that current polarization is characterized by partisan coalitions lacking cross-cutting cleavages, particularly around race. Yet, the 2020 presidential election was characterized by racial depolarization compared to 2016, while educational and geographic polarization continue to increase. If Republicans are able to continue building upon their gains with Latinx and Asian American voters, it raises interesting questions about how the dynamics of polarization will evolve.

As noted, this is a long book with a great deal of content: 400 pages spread across 15 chapters. Even though the topic of polarization and democracy is explored from many angles, there are some perspectives that are left out. This is not a criticism of the volume; no single book should be expected to cover all areas. Nonetheless, it is important for prospective readers to know what the book does not contain alongside what it does.

First, the book does not discuss in much detail the topic of affective polarization. This idea, forwarded by Shanto Iyengar and his many collaborators, is that partisanship should be viewed as a social identity, and that discord between partisans may not be issue-based, but rather reflective of animus between conflicting identities. In other words, people can maintain similar issue positions over time but still grow to increasingly dislike the opposing party on a personal level. Given that Iyengar’s original piece (Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76[3]: 405–31) has been cited 1,923 times (as of April 12, 2022) and a recent review piece (Iyengar, Shanto, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J. Westwood. 2019. “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States.” Annual Review of Political Science 22: 129–46) has been cited 920 times, the topic of affective polarization appears to be an important perspective in the polarization debate. Although there has been voluminous documentation of the presence of affective polarization, downstream effects on democratic resilience and political institutions have been understudied.

Second, the volume does not feature any contributors from the field of political economy, defined as applying economic theoretical models to the study of politics. The formal theory literature on polarization, both with respect to masses and elites, has been growing and offers a distinct perspective on the relationship between polarization and democracy.

Finally, the chapters generally come to the conclusion that the Republican Party is primarily to blame for polarization and represents the greatest threat to American democracy. That may indeed be true, but the volume does not contain competing perspectives that either argue for shared responsibility between the parties or highlight democratic threats posed by the Democratic Party. For instance, many chapters note that the Republican Party has engaged in gerrymandering, but do not discuss gerrymanders designed by the Democratic Party in states such as New York, Illinois, and Maryland. Exemplary passages include the following:

Similarly, the editors write: “[The] Republican Party is made up primarily of white Americans, including those who strongly identify as evangelical Christians and those who are particularly concerned with maintaining their privileged status, while the Democratic Party has grown increasingly diverse in its composition and simultaneously more affirming of inclusive policies” (p. 28). To be clear, I am not commenting on the veracity of these statements, but just highlighting them so readers gain an understanding of the tone and framing of the volume.

In summary, Democratic Resilience is a thought-provoking and copious investigation into the potential relationship between political polarization and democratic backsliding. The biggest strength of the volume is in diversifying the study of polarization beyond traditional subfields such as public opinion and Congress, and introducing novel perspectives from American political development and comparative politics. This is a must-read book not only for scholars of American politics but also of electoral institutions more generally.