Robert Wright's Corporation Nation traces out the origins and early growth of the American business corporation. It's a fine work, and one that should be at least the first word on the subject for many years to come.
Until recently, the history of the business corporation in antebellum America was obscure. There are older works on the antebellum corporation, and studies on specific areas or issues (notably some very good studies on corporations and politics in the early republic), but the topic as a whole was understudied and hampered by the “statistical dark age” that enveloped business history in this period. Corporation Nation's first contribution is to throw light on that dark age by assembling national figures for special incorporations between 1790 and 1860, a period when the great majority of corporations were created by special legislation. Using data assembled with Richard Sylla, Wright shows the degree to which the United States really was a “corporation nation”; from 1790 to 1860, state legislatures chartered over 22,000 corporations, with every state involved.
These data explode a series of lingering misconceptions about antebellum corporations. It demonstrates that there were many more corporations than one might have expected. They were also bigger than one might have expected, with significant minimum authorized capitalizations. There were in disparate industries; while corporations appeared chiefly in areas providing a public service—banks, canals, turnpikes, and later railroads—a good number of manufacturers were also incorporated, even in the period before 1830. This indicates that the popular belief that corporations at this time had to have a “public purpose” beyond providing desired goods or services is simply wrong. Perhaps most surprising, corporations even before 1860 often had many shareholders. While older accounts portray the separation of corporate ownership and control as a twentieth century development—implying that nineteenth century corporations were closely held, by a few shareholders who also managed the firms—Wright's work, along with that of a few other scholars working on the early corporation, shows that's wrong. (See, for instance, Eric Hilt, “When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History (September 2008): 645–85; John Majewski, “Towards a Social History of the Corporation: Shareholding in Pennsylvania, 1800–8140,” in The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions. State College: Penn State Press, 2006.) Corporations with 100 or more shareholders appear not uncommon, meaning that passive shareholding was a feature of the nineteenth as well as the twentieth century.
As Wright acknowledges, there are limits on his data. Focusing on special incorporations, he touches only briefly on general incorporations, which were becoming important at the tail end of this period (pp. 183–87). His count can tell us how many corporations were chartered and their minimum capitalization, but not every corporation that was chartered opened for business. Indeed, he's quite clear that this often did not occur; in Pennsylvania, for instance, only around 60 percent of turnpike corporations chartered ever began operations (p. 66).
Most important, Wright's figures do not allow us to track the careers of corporations that did begin operations; a systematic study of how long they operated, how successfully, and when they closed or failed is left for future historians. This matters, because surely we want to know not only how many corporations were chartered, but also how well they were run. Corporation scholars have in recent decades focused on “corporate governance,” which can be boiled down to the question of whether those who run a corporation operate it for the benefit of its shareholders or just themselves. Wright concludes that antebellum corporations were run pretty well, due in large part to the ability of shareholders to monitor them. As he shows, shareholders did have some protections. The ultra vires doctrine prevented a corporation from exceeding the limited purpose stated in its charter; shareholders often had the power to approve additional issues of shares; in many firms corporate officers were required to bond themselves to ensure proper performance of their duties; and corporations also made some disclosures of financial information. A particularly effective measure may have been the norm that a corporation pay out substantially all its profits in dividends. A skipped dividend signaled a corporation in trouble.
Here however we run up against the limits of the data. Wright insists that corporate governance in the antebellum era was successful, meaning that it prevented substantial managerial expropriation of corporate assets. But how can we know? Wright has spent years immersed in the records of early corporations, so surely his judgment that these corporations were well run deserves some weight. But other historians, who immersed themselves in similar records, reached opposite conclusions. Some 20 years ago Walter Werner and Steven Smith concluded in their study of antebellum corporations and securities markets that, before the rise of general incorporation, “comprehensive shareholder protections… really did not exist.” (Wall Street p. 111 (New York: Columbia University Press 1991).) Here Wright's account appears to be colored by his preference for private ordering and hostility to government regulation of business. Writing of the Gilded Age corporation, he argues that “state-centered regulation” of that time “proved more costly and less responsive than stockholder governance” that operated before (p. 173), but he does not provide a rigorous measure to compare the effectiveness of corporate governance in the two eras (maybe none is possible). This leads to the book's less-than-satisfying coda, where Wright calls for a present-day renewal of shareholder power in the nation's large corporations, but provides a list of fairly anodyne reforms, none of which would surprise any proponent of the corporate governance movement that has sprung up since the 1980s. One also wishes that Wright's account of the free-market antebellum world had taken into account the vastly different picture of government economic regulation presented in William Novak's path breaking The People's Welfare. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.)
But these are fairly minor criticisms. Corporation Nation is an excellent work and stands as the best volume available on the development of the antebellum corporation. If it leaves open questions, and causes readers to quarrel with some of its conclusions—well, that's the nature of pioneering works. It's a book that must be read by all serious students of the nineteenth-century corporation.
