Introduction
‘[W]e landed on North Lincoln Land . . . on the 12th of August. We took possession of North Lincoln . . . and all adjacent islands, as far as ninety degrees north,’ wrote Joseph Elzéar Bernier in the official report on his 1906–1907 voyage in CGS Arctic (Bernier Reference Bernier1907). There is a small ‘x’ following this sentence, presumably made by the person to whom the report was addressed, Louis-Philippe Brodeur, minister of marine and fisheries in Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal government. Bernier had not been instructed to make such a claim. No subsequent documents on the official file refer to his unauthorised action in any way. Bernier's published narrative stated only that he had claimed Ellesmere Island, of which North Lincoln was a part, and the nearby Sverdrup Islands on 12 August 1907 (Bernier Reference Bernier1909a: 49–50). Clearly, he had been forbidden to mention a claim extending to the pole, and the matter was considered so sensitive that government officials put nothing in writing.
Two years later Bernier returned from another northern voyage and reported that once again he had made a claim on behalf of Canada that extended as far north as the pole. Again, he had received no orders to do so, yet the second proclamation was even more definite than the first. In 1907 he had not specified the boundaries of the area he claimed, but in 1909 he asserted possession of the entire sector ‘from 60 degrees west longitude to 141 degrees west longitude, and as far north as 90 degrees’ (Bernier Reference Bernier1910: 192). Nevertheless, this time the government's response was very different. Bernier was permitted to describe his action to the enthusiastic members of the Canadian Club of Ottawa, and the prime minister, who was present, praised him in glowing terms (in Bernier Reference Bernier1909b: 191–192). As a result, Bernier is now remembered mainly for the 1909 claim.
Bernier's ambitions and Laurier's policy
Why did Bernier make these unauthorised claims, and why did the government respond in one way in 1907 and in another in 1909? Some writers, taking a strongly pro-Bernier stance, have seen him as an ardent campaigner for Canada's northern sovereignty, fighting against a largely indifferent government (Dorion-Robitaille Reference Dorion-Robitaille1978; Osborn Reference Osborn2003; St. Pierre Reference Saint-Pierre and Barr2009). In fact, Laurier and his minister of the interior, Clifford Sifton, had become strongly concerned about the Arctic late in 1902 (Smart Reference Smart1903). Not until February 1903 did Bernier, who may well have heard rumours on the subject, mention sovereignty in his correspondence with government officials. Until then, his letters had centred exclusively on his hope of leading a Canadian expedition to the North Pole. Bernier wrote that the archipelago was given to Canada by Great Britain in 1880, but ‘we have made no efforts to claim or hold this immense territory’. Therefore, it was his intention ‘to reclaim these Northern Islands . . . for Canada on my voyage to the North Pole and furthermore as far as 90 north’ (Bernier Reference Bernier1903).
Since Bernier's plan was to enter the polar pack north of Siberia and drift towards Spitsbergen, his expedition could hardly assert a claim to the islands directly north of Canada. Ignoring his suggestion, the government chartered the sealer Neptune and sent an expedition to the archipelago under the command of Albert Peter Low. Nevertheless, the idea of claiming the Arctic ‘as far as 90 north’ evidently took hold of Bernier's mind, and he retained it even after it had become clear to him that he would never obtain enough support for an expedition to the pole, either from public subscriptions or from the government. After Low returned to his regular work with the Geological Survey of Canada, Bernier commanded government patrols in 1906–1907, 1908–1909, and 1910–1911. What Laurier wanted was the establishment of a continuing Canadian presence in the archipelago, and he was set against any formal, public declaration of ownership until this had been done, preferably by the founding of permanent posts (Laurier Reference Laurier1903). If Bernier could not go to the pole, he could at least make a claim extending as far as the pole, but to do so he would have to defy the prime minister's wishes.
He prepared the way carefully. The original orders for his 1906–1907 voyage instructed him to annex any new lands he might find (Gourdeau Reference Gourdeau1906a). Before his departure Bernier was able to obtain revised instructions permitting him to ‘take formal possession’ of ‘all lands and islands on your way’ (Bernier Reference Bernier1906; Gourdeau Reference Gourdeau1906b). From this broad directive it was only a short step to the type of claim he made in August 1907. But it was a step the government was not yet prepared to sanction.
In the autumn of 1909 the situation was very different. Throughout September, newspapers were filled with stories about the competing claims of Frederick Cook and Robert Peary. Peary alleged that on his arrival at the pole he had annexed it and the surrounding area to the United States (Peary Reference Peary1910: 297). The validity of the claim was doubtful, since the pole was located on water not land, and in any case Peary's expedition was not an official one. Nevertheless, a popular belief that the US owned the high Arctic might have taken hold. Laurier left no record of his thinking, but there can be little doubt that he now welcomed Bernier's action as a way to offset Peary's claim in the public mind.
Conclusion
In the short term, Bernier had achieved his goal. But in the long term, he remained dissatisfied. The Laurier government never backed up the 1909 proclamation with an official sector claim. Not until 1925, the year of Bernier's retirement, did Canada formally assert a claim extending as far as the pole (Cavell and Noakes in press). Until his death in 1934, Bernier energetically promoted the idea that he had taken possession of the entire archipelago for his country (for example, see Davies Reference Davies1927), and he began a campaign to be formally recognised for this achievement, perhaps by a knighthood. The under-secretary of state for external affairs, O.D. Skelton, blocked the plan because he saw the 1880 transfer as the true foundation of Canada's northern sovereignty. In Skelton's view, Bernier's self-promotion might do serious harm to Canadian interests by distorting history (Skelton Reference Skelton1933). If Bernier had been content to be praised for his actual role as a man who did much to maintain (though not to create) Canada's ownership of the islands, he might have received much more of the recognition he craved.
The author is currently working on a wider study of the Laurier government's Arctic policy.
