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Quality, Thought and Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2010

Howard Robinson
Affiliation:
Central European University, Budapest
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Abstract

My objective in this essay is to argue for two things. The first is that intellectual mental states – thoughts – are not physicalistically reducible, just as qualia are not reducible. The second is that thoughts and qualia are not as different as is sometimes believed, but not because – as some empiricists thought – thoughts are qualia-like by being mental images, but because qualia are universals and their apprehension is a proto-intellectual act. I shall mainly be concerned with the first of these topics.

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Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2010