Mel Gurtov joins a growing stable of authors seeking to predict the future of Sino-American relations and to determine whether a rising China will become a rival to the United States for the dominant role in the international system. Driven in part by the need to address sensational and dire predictions that the rise of China will lead to a “hegemonic” of “transitional” war in which either China will seek to wrest systemic leadership from a declining US or that the US might seek to pre-empt and stymie China's rise, this body of scholarly work now includes authors such as Susan Shirk (Fragile Superpower, 2008), David Lampton (Three Faces of Chinese Power, 2008), Michael Swaine (America's Challenge, 2011), Aaron Friedberg (Contest for Supremacy, 2012), David Shambaugh (Tangled Titans, 2012 and China Goes Global 2013) and Ed Luttwak (The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, 2013).

Like many mainstream Sinologists, in his new book Will This Be China's Century Gurtov does not see an impending confrontation. China's illiberal one-party authoritarianism does not, he argue, have the capacity to evolve into an alternative to the “Washington consensus.” Nor has China shown the capacity to exercise leadership in the international system. Rather than grasping for a greater leadership role, China has remained “defensive,” vigilantly guarding its own economic, political and international interests often in ways that alienate its interlockers. This defence, Gurtov argues, is wrapped up in a discourse on the centrality of state sovereignty, peaceful coexistence and non-interference which may have attraction for certain other autocratic regimes but in the long term prevents China from assuming the role of leader. Systemic leaders, Gurtov asserts, lead because they have global reach and are willing to interfere and intervene in other states' affairs when they believe intervention is needed to maintain systemic stability, not stand aside out of fear of violating the principle of sovereignty. China may well become an economic superpower, though, like Shirk, Gurtov outlines a long series of internal factors that bring an end to the heady days of rapid growth, expanding wealth and relative political stability. But wealth does not translate into power or, more critically, a willingness to assume responsibility for paying the price (in both treasure and blood) of systemic stability. Gurtov thus suggests that China will become a major power but not a superpower.

More critically, perhaps, Gurtov argues that the rise of China need not mean the decline of the United States. In his view, if the last century was the “American Century,” the next is likely to be “Sino-American Century,” one in which the US remains the systemic leader but will have to contend with an ever more powerful, and perhaps forceful, China. Given such a new bipolarity, the imperative is for the US to find ways to engage China and to avoid the mistake of trying to contain it, a policy that Gurtov sees as likely to only exacerbate tensions between the two. Because China and the US are, in Gurtov's view, already deeply engaged – economically, culturally and diplomatically – he concludes on a relative positive note, writing, “so long as China remains a competitive rather than an aggressive country … it represents no threat and, to the contrary, a potential partner…” (p. 140).

In my view, the primary weakness of Gurtov's argument is that he likely underplays the potential seriousness of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute. Gurtov devotes relatively little space to the dispute (three pages) even though there are now signs that the dispute could lead to an accelerating Sino-Japanese air and naval arms race, as well as sharply elevating nationalist passions in both countries. If an arms race develops, and at present it appears it may have begun, the US could find itself under pressure from its long-time ally Japan to either “take sides” and back Japan's claims to the islands with a more forceful stance toward China, or allow Japan to assume “full responsibility” for its security needs, a move that would likely generate fears of renewed Japanese militarism in China and both Koreas. Rising tensions in North-East Asia would complicate Sino-American relations by emboldening the “confronters” in Washington and weakening the position of the “engagers.” Intensification of the South China Sea could also hamper efforts to maintain of a policy of positive engagement. Finally, nationalist pressures generated by these territorial disputes could force Chinese leaders, who might prefer a cooperative relationship with the United States and Japan, to adopt more aggressive policies to appease Chinese street nationalists.