The pacted nature of democratic transition seems to define the divergent path taken by Chilean elites in comparison with their Argentinean counterparts. However, using a Most Similar System Design (MSSD)¹

, two new elements enhance opportunities for explaining the different outcomes. First, the content of a mandate that has the ability to co-opt people from outside the privileged class; and second, the capacity of the elite to generate a process of political systematization and economic monetarization that ensures stability with no apparent democratic setbacks.

Due to the characteristics of each particular democratic transition process, Argentina did not pursue any form of pact, while in Chile the intra-elite existing pact is known by its effects rather than the agreed clauses.²

In this sense, the only way of grasping the boundaries of the accord is through the configuration of the elite, political discourse, and electoral outcomes. This is why Susan Stokes' definition of mandate remains crucial: “the expectations politicians create in campaign about the actions they will take if they win” (2001, 4).

Therefore, legitimating the agreement among the general population or presenting the true nature of their agenda results remains key in order to retain power for the elite. Stokes recognizes that holding government accountable is a complex business because of the leader temptation to violate the mandate. Therefore, it could be wise to state that campaigns are not predictors of future policy (Stokes 2001, 6). However, the post-war experience in the developed world is different. The author notes the results of Budge, Robertson, and Hearls' studies in 19 developed nations where there is consistency between party manifestos and what is delivered by those same political groups after assuming office.

Subsequently, it should be argued that the violation of the mandate is much more complex than politicians fearing a defeat or discredit from the population, but also a sign of lacking a basic cross-class institutional pact by which the leadership cannot deceive constituencies. It is completely understandable that a president switches policy because of extenuating circumstances, but not as a pre-meditated form of political activity.

Stokes presents two basic policy type manifestos: a security-oriented style with a mix of job creation, industrial policy, and gradualist approaches to inflation stabilization; and an efficiency-oriented style focused on reducing the size of the state, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and opening trade.

In this line of argument, Argentina's Menem and De la Rúa administrations represent particularly striking policy switches. Both ran campaigns promising security-oriented policy, but switched in the middle of their terms. These switches were also accompanied by vast cases of corruption and unpopular measures like massive privatizations with closed bids. The popular reaction generated mass mobilizations with the motto ¡Qué se vayan todos! (Let's fire all of them) that ended the De la Rúa government in December of 2001. This moment represented a total lack of credibility in the government and a fracture between the political elite and the mainstream population.³

In comparison, the excessive importance given by the Chilean elite to the pact has assured stability, with candidates sticking to the system. In general, the system has brought economic improvement and made Chile an example of low corruption in the region. However, the price is a growing feeling of empty politics, with more people detached from the democratic process and less people registering to vote. It represents another symptom of a missing social institutional pact. Consequently, both countries are in real need of socio-political change. Nevertheless, Chilean political leaders can face reforms and modernization with more economic and institutional stability than Argentina's leaders.

This is the main difference between both political outcomes. In Argentina, the elite pursued instrumental alliances without attaching to any specific political group, changing loyalties in accordance to their short-term interests. In Chile, the economic elite has always been attached to only one specific sector of the political spectrum: the business elite representing the actions of the parties on the right. As one of Augusto Pinochet's former ministers portrays it, “they are supposed to work for them” (Barrett 2000, 11).

Furthermore, it leads to an explanation of the different nature of each country's political party, which is critically influenced by candidate selection, leadership, coalitional politics, and democratic stability. This means that the current political situation in these two countries is independent of both coming from bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, and above all, generating different conditions despite the missing pact. This includes the issues of corruption or electoral democracy. In Chile, the entrepreneurial and right-wing elite have attached its future to the existence of a rule of law that preserves its interests, even if they have to pay the price of electoral defeat for years to come. It is included in the transitional pact, while in Argentina their counterparts would only get involved in preserving the institutional framework if it benefits their particular political interest.

The content of the mandate also triggers another important differentiation. Since its existence and enforcement, Chile has ignited a double process of systematization in politics and monetarization of economics decisions. Both could be key explanatory factors in mandate stability. According to Cousiño and Valenzuela (1994), the first is produced when politics as an activity is independent, self-referred, and no longer measured from the lenses of economics (or any other system). The latter represents the independence of economic decisions from politics, being ruled by its own standards. In this sense, economics is no longer susceptible to interventions from the immediate political interests of a specific group.

My research questions whether the difference in stability in Chile is a result of a process of mandated systematization and monetarization that assures important degrees of predictability, while Argentinean politics continues to be understood from the lenses of economics. This characteristic is relevant for further explanations in the levels of political mobilization, social movement activity, and the entire political agenda. Furthermore, it illuminates the behavior of main actors and socio-economic barriers for better inclusion and participation.