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Manifold Grace in John Cassian and Prosper of Aquitaine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 December 2009

Alexander Y. Hwang
Alexander Y. Hwang*
Affiliation:
Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Louisville, KY 40205-1798, USAhwangalex@yahoo.com
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Abstract

This article is about John Cassian and Prosper of Aquitaine's understanding of grace and free will as put forward during the initial phase of the Western Church's struggle to define the doctrine of grace in the wake of the Pelagian controversy. Although both figured prominently in this struggle, both Cassian and Prosper's later understandings of grace and free will, which appreciated the diverse expressions of grace, failed to have any influence on the terms of the debate set forth in the Pelagian controversy. The history of the debate on grace and free will followed the mutually exclusive model in which salvation was the result of either grace or free will. Cassian and Prosper, who both offered an alternative to the mutually exclusive model, have not been fully recognised for their innovative views.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , February 2010, pp. 93 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2010

Introduction

Around 415, John Cassian and Prosper of Aquitaine arrived in the city of Marseilles, the former from Aquitaine and the latter from the East.Footnote 1 What drew these two strangers together were their conflicting views of Augustine's doctrine of grace as formulated in the Pelagian conflict. Although Augustine enjoyed the support of nearly the whole Western Church in his condemnation of Pelagianism, his alternative to the Pelagian doctrine of grace met with increasing controversy. Prosper and Cassian's opposing estimations of Augustine's doctrine of predestination helped establish Marseilles as the centre of this, the Augustinian controversy.Footnote 2

Prosper was the leader of the pro-Augustine faction and Cassian was one of the more notable figures who opposed Augustine's teaching on grace and free will.Footnote 3 Cassian understood grace and free will to operate in different ways, according to God's wisdom as put forth in his famous Conlatio 13. Prosper criticised Cassian's view, ridiculing it as incoherent and contradictory. However, later in life, Cassian's influence is apparent in Prosper's four models of salvation, in which grace operates in different ways according to God's wisdom. Cassian and Prosper both offered nuanced views of grace and free will beyond the mutually exclusive model established in the Pelagian conflict – either free will or grace.

John Cassian

As Prosper made his way from the West to Marseilles, John Cassian was heading to Marseilles from the East, eventually arriving around 415. The reasons for his move to Marseilles are unclear, only that he established twin monasteries in Marseilles shortly after arriving.Footnote 4

Cassian's purpose in establishing a monastery was to provide a place in which earnest and sincere men could practise the instructions set forth in his monastic writings, his celebrated De institutis coenobiorum and Conlationes.Footnote 5 The ultimate goal was the vision of God, but this was possible, according to Cassian, only when the monk had reached perfection in the ‘quality of life and purity of heart’.Footnote 6

Cassian was primarily concerned with the practical aspects of the monastic life, but there are limited discussions on grace. De institutis coenobiorum, written between 419 and 426, contains initial remarks on the role of grace in the process of perfection, which anticipates Conlatio 13, written sometime between 425/6 and 428.Footnote 7

Cassian's initial statements on grace were not put forward in a systematic manner. In 12.10 of De institutis, Cassian asserted that human effort was not sufficient for ‘perfection and the palm of integrity and purity, unless he were protected by the divine mercy’.Footnote 8 Cassian then ended with James 1:17 and 1 Cor. 4:7 – passages that, however, emphasise human effort. In 12.14.2, Cassian asserted ‘For he [God] is ready, so long as we have offered him our good will, to grant all these things, inasmuch as he desires and longs for our perfection and salvation more than we do ourselves’.Footnote 9 In 12.18, Cassian notes that humans were created ‘rational’ and with the ‘power of free will’, but that the exercise of ‘daily divine providence’ works with, protects and helps humanity.Footnote 10 Then Cassian proclaimed that ‘we are often even against our will drawn to salvation by him, and lastly, that, when he visits and moves us, he turns even our free will itself, which is readily inclined to vice, to better things and to the path of virtue’.Footnote 11

When taken together, Cassian's disparate and conflicting remarks on the nature and role of the human will in the economy of salvation are unclear and not a little confusing. Cassian suggests that there are no inherent conflicts in insisting on irresistible grace, initium fidei, exercise of free will, tainted will and cooperative grace.

Cassian approached the problem of grace and free will from a different perspective than the Pelagians or Augustine, who saw the issue as either grace or free will. Instead, Cassian believed it was grace and free will – a relationship of cooperation between the two – even at the cost of consistency. Like Augustine, Cassian claimed the necessity of grace in the economy of salvation, but not to the exclusion of human responsibility.Footnote 12 Like Pelagius, Cassian insisted on free will, but not to the point that it operated completely independently of grace.

Cassian was aware of the Pelagian conflict prior to the De institutis, as well as the discussions about Augustine's doctrine of predestination that were taking place in Provence.Footnote 13 Knowing that his monks were being exposed to these two views, equally in error in his opinion, Cassian informed them of the proper view on grace and free will. At least for the moment, Cassian restricted his opposition to Augustine's doctrine of predestination in a very limited and indirect literary response, but which contributed to the discussions on Augustine's doctrine already taking place among the ascetic circles of Marseilles and elsewhere.

These discussions on Augustine's doctrine of predestination took a decidedly more contentious turn as Augustine's doctrine of predestination was further clarified in his De correptione et gratia and De praedestinatione sanctorum.Footnote 14 Among the negative reactions coming from Marseilles was Cassian's Conlatio 13.

There has been a great deal of speculation on the relationship of Cassian's Conlatio 13 to Augustine's De correptione et gratia.Footnote 15 Stewart's view is most convincing. Stewart has concluded that, although Augustine's responses to the monks of Hadrumetum were available in Gaul by the time Cassian composed Conlatio 13, Cassian did not write a direct rebuttal of Augustine's latest works so much as write a ‘general response to aspects of Augustine's thought – already known in Gaul’. Stewart's claim is based on the observation that Conlatio 13 ‘fits so well into the overall scheme of the Conferences’.Footnote 16 Adalbert de Vogüé has also noted the complex but logical interrelationship among the individual conlationes.Footnote 17 Moreover, as Stewart notes, Conlatio 13 ‘develops themes introduced initially in book 12 of the Institutes’.Footnote 18

The title of Conlatio 13, De protectione Dei, is a bit misleading, for the subject of this conlatio is the relationship between the human and divine will in the economy of salvation. Like the rest of Conlationes, Conlatio 13 was written in the form of a dialogue between distinguished abbots of the East; as such, the form was not conducive to a strictly systematic presentation.

Cassian's two models of salvation

Cassian presents a myriad of answers to the difficult and complex question on the relationship of free will and grace in the economy of salvation. The different and conflicting answers resist any attempt at a single interpretation of Cassian's view on grace and free will. Instead, it appears that Cassian is presenting his arguments along two distinct lines of thought. There appear two models of salvation, but they are intermixed in the dialogue and difficult to distinguish. The two models represent Cassian's twin concerns, the integrity of free will and the gratuity of grace; however, it is clear that Cassian's overriding concern is his insistence on the freedom of the will.

The first model, which I term the cooperative model, is stated at the beginning: ‘Quibus manifeste colligitur non solum actuum verum etiam congitationum bonarum ex deo esse principium, qui nobis et initia sanctae voluntatis inspirat et virtutem atque oportunitatem eorum quae recte cupimus tribuit peragendi . . . qui et incipit quae bona sunt et exsequitur et consummat in nobis.’Footnote 19 To which Cassian immediately adds, ‘Nostrum vero est, ut cotidie adtrahentem nos gratiam dei humiliter subsequamur, certe dura cervice et incircumcisis ut scriptum est auribus eidem resistentes.’Footnote 20 Thus, in this first proposition, it is God who initiates throughout the process, but the human will, presumably, has the power to conform to or resist God's grace.

In the twelfth chapter, he further clarifies this model by explaining the power of the human free will. Every human soul has the virtutum semina, which has been placed there by the kindness of the Creator, but this seed needs to be germinated by the help of God to be able to increase in perfection.Footnote 21 Cassian then cites a passage from the Shepherd of Hermas, which speaks of two angels attached to human beings, one good and one bad, as proof that it is up to the human being, to a certain extent, to choose which to follow.Footnote 22 Thus, there always remains a free will in the person that can either neglect or cooperate with the grace of God.Footnote 23 This first model is then summarised at the end of the conlatio when Cassian states:

Everything is granted us by the Divinity when we are not always resisting and constantly unwilling. . . . Therefore it is understood by all the Catholic fathers, who have taught perfection of heart not by idle disputation but in fact and in deed, that each person be inflamed to desire everything which is good, but in such a way that the choice of a free will faces each alternative fully. Likewise, the second aspect of divine grace is that the aforesaid practice of virtue bears results, but in such a way that the possibility of choice not be extinguished. The third aspect is that it pertains to the gifts of God that one persevere in a virtue that has been acquired, but not in such a way that a submissive freedom be taken captive.Footnote 24

According to the cooperative model, the grace of God initiates and inspires the free will towards the good, but the free will can choose to follow or resist the actions of grace at each stage in the process of perfection. Thus, grace and free will are compatible as long as grace is understood as resistible. Cassian sees the truth of this model illustrated in Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 15:10: ‘His grace in me was not in vain, but I have labored more abundantly than all of them – yet not I, but the grace of God with me’. ‘I have labored’, indicates the efforts of Paul's own will, ‘Yet not I, but the grace of God’ indicates the power of God, and ‘with me’ shows that God and Paul have worked together.Footnote 25

The second model, which I term the alternative model, is presented extensively in chapter 9. The alternative model asserts that the human or divine will initiates the process of salvation. Cassian notes that scripture contains instances where God at times begins the process of the salvation and at other times, it is by the human will.

Hence human reason does not easily discern how the Lord gives to those who ask, is found by those who seek, and opens to those who knock, and on the other hand how he is found by those who do not seek, appears openly among these who were not asking for him, and stretches out his hands the whole day to a people who do not believe in him.Footnote 26

What follow are seven sets of scriptural passages, each containing at least one passage that supports the divine initiative (grace) and at least one passage that supports the human initiative (free will). For each set, Cassian asks who can understand these passages together.Footnote 27 Cassian draws the conclusion that the grace of God and the freedom of the will are both affirmed. However, Cassian believes that it is grace that begins and completes a good will most of the time. Sometimes, however, because of the goodness of human nature, the beginnings of the good will come from a person, although God must guide its perfection.Footnote 28

According to this alternative model, a person is either inspired by God for the beginning and the completion of the good will, or a person alone begins the good will and is then assisted by grace, which does not occur as much as the former case. Cassian further adds that in some cases God is the one who draws people to salvation, and in other cases the way of salvation was shown as a reward.Footnote 29

The reason why God works in either of these two ways is because salvation is imparted by grace according to the measure of faith each person possesses or according to the measure of faith God has imparted.Footnote 30 This faith is either found in the person, presumably one's own, or given by God. Again a list of scriptural quotations follows, which assert God responding to a person's faith or God instilling faith.Footnote 31 Cassian provides a summary of the alternative model in 13.17.1:

He inspires some, who wish it and thirst for it, to a greater ardor, while some others, who do not even wish it, he compels against their will. Sometimes he helps to accomplish the things he sees we desire for our own good, and at other times he inspires the beginnings of that holy desire and bestows both the commencement of a good work and perseverance in it.Footnote 32

Cassian concludes with an observation, with Augustinians and the Pelagians in mind, that multi enim singula haec credentes ac iusto amplius adserentes uariis sibique contraries sunt erroribus inuoluti.Footnote 33 Instead, though they seem mutually opposed to one another, these two different ways of salvation must be affirmed and accepted because of the ecclesiasticae fidei regula.Footnote 34

Separately these two models are coherent, but together they are contradictory. According to the cooperative model, grace can be resisted or followed by the free will. According to the alternative model, grace can be irresistible. Perhaps another way to view these two models is to consider the context of these writings. The alternative model was primarily aimed at providing a solution to the Pelagian conflict – that neither the Pelagians nor the Augustinians were correct in arguing one over the absolute neglect of the other. The cooperative was directed towards a more practical end. This model addresses his monks, calling them to an active pursuit of perfection that involves both their wills and the grace of God together. Cassian's warning towards the end of Conlatio 13 seems appropriate to his monks, which refers to the cooperative model: si quid sane uersutius humana argumentatione ac ratione collectum huic sensui uidetur obsistere, uitandum magis est quam ad destructionem fidei proucandum.Footnote 35

Contradictions aside, Cassian's manifold understanding of grace and free will introduces a completely new vision of grace and free will which goes beyond the strictly narrow bifurcated debate. It is an innovative view that Prosper was quick to attack.

Prosper of Aquitaine

In 432, Prosper refuted Cassian, namely his Conlatio 13, in De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio liber contra collatorem.Footnote 36 Prosper correctly interpreted Cassian's Conlatio 13 as a critique of Augustine's doctrine of grace, but proceeded to attack the two models of salvation as if it were one model.

According to Prosper, Cassian is neither fully Pelagian nor Catholic, but an inventor of an unknown, deformed third way.Footnote 37 Cassian's system is not fully Pelagian because it claims the initiative of grace, but it is not Catholic because it claims the initiative of free will.Footnote 38 Prosper interprets Cassian's use of scriptures that support free will or grace as creating two classes among humans, those saved by grace and those justified by law and nature.Footnote 39 Prosper concludes that Cassian's division of humanity renders Christ as the Saviour for some, and a refuge for others. God compels the former to accept the gratuitous gift of grace, and for the latter, God is the refuge who provides the reward for those who anticipated the divine call by the fervour of their free wills.Footnote 40 According to Prosper, to preach both doctrines suggests that the Pelagians hold what Catholics hold, and when these contrary doctrines are mixed, it is the Catholic faith that is destroyed.Footnote 41

Prosper's critique of Cassian's contradictory statements has merit, but Prosper's caricature of Cassian's view on grace and free will does not do justice to the complexity and nuances of Cassian's understanding.Footnote 42

Around 450, now in his sixties, having devoted most of his adult life to the issue of grace, having served as an adviser to Leo for the past decade, he set out to provide the solution to the complex and contentious issue in De vocatione omnium gentium.Footnote 43

Prosper claims that his treatise reflects an objective view in a polarised conflict. He unashamedly writes of the conflict as if he had been a mere observer, not a pivotal figure in it. Prosper is careful to distance himself from the two camps, who are hopelessly deadlocked in their discussions, before he offers his own personal and humble view, which he claims is ‘moderate’ and will seek to ‘avoid all that is offensive or wrong’.Footnote 44 According to Prosper's account, he is not complicit in the conflict and only seeks to resolve it on the basis of his objectivity.

Prosper's presentation on the limits of what can be known and what remains hidden is divided into two books. Both books seek to illuminate the relationship between the human and divine wills. The first book focuses primarily on the human will in the relationship, and the focus shifts to the divine will in the second book.

Prosper's four models of salvation

Prosper's solution to the problem of God's universal desire to save all and the fact that not all are saved, according to what can be known, is to interpret 1 Tim. 2:4 as the single expression of four different wills of God for four specific groups of people. Prosper interprets 1 Tim. 4:10 as the conclusive expression of the dual will of God: ‘the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful’. The first part, ‘the Savior of all men’, Prosper understands as referring to God's general care and goodness to all, and the last part, ‘especially of the faithful’, as referring to God's special grace to a section of humanity, which leads to salvation.Footnote 45 There are two more wills of God that Prosper distinguishes: those who have heard of the Gospel or will hear it at the appointed time, and those who belong within the group that receives God's special grace, but are not elected. Thus, there are four different wills of God: one for general humanity (2.25, 31); one for those who have heard or will hear the gospel (2.15–18); one for a segment of humanity given special grace, but without election (2.26, 29); and one for a segment of humanity given special grace and election, to whom salvation is certain (2.33–7).

God's general grace has always been present in human history through the goodness of creation. All human beings have free will, but the sin of Adam caused the human will to be fickle – mutabilitas – and it is always inclined to sin, unless converted by God.Footnote 46 Those in this group have not been converted by God, but God's care and goodness are present for all to witness and provide sufficient help for people to seek God.Footnote 47 If these people are not saved, it is due to their own fault of sinning and they are justly condemned because they are guilty of malice.Footnote 48

This general grace really is not efficacious for salvation. Although Prosper states that general grace provides sufficient help for people to seek God, Prosper does not elaborate this idea further. However, it appears that this seeking alone is not sufficient for salvation because Prosper makes it clear that general grace needs the addition of special grace for salvation.Footnote 49 Thus, the will of God towards this group can in no way result in salvation.

The second group consists of those who have heard or will hear the Gospel at the appointed time. Christ died for all sinners and his redemption has spread throughout the world by the preaching of the Gospel.Footnote 50 According to God's providence, God first expanded the Roman Empire so that the grace of Christianity would spread among the different nations within the empire. Now the grace of Christianity has reached nations beyond the boundaries of the empire, the Apostolic See accomplishing what Rome could not do by force of arms.Footnote 51 There are still nations that have not received the grace of Christianity, but they will eventually hear and accept the Gospel. The reasons for the delay in their redemption are based in God's hidden judgement.Footnote 52

According to this will of God, God wills the salvation of all by allowing all the nations of the world eventually to hear the message of Christianity. Prosper fails to elaborate further on the effect of this will for salvation. Presumably, this will alone is not sufficient for salvation because it only provides these people with the opportunity to hear the Gospel, which alone does not lead to salvation. God's will for these people is for them to be exposed to the message of Christianity.

Among those who have had the opportunity to hear the Gospel, some will also receive special grace and will be converted. Those given this special grace are further divided into two groups, those who are elected and those who are not, but for both the human will has been healed and restored.Footnote 53 However, for those with special grace but who are without election, their salvation is not achieved by God's will alone, but through the cooperation between God's special grace and the human will.Footnote 54 God's special grace prepares, exhorts, moves, inspires, rouses and illumines the human will to cooperate with God's work.Footnote 55 Nonetheless, this help can be refused, even by those who will persevere, because God did not take away the human will's mutabilitas.Footnote 56 It is possible for the beginners and the advanced in faith to refuse God's help and thus leave the faith. If they fall, it is due to their own mutabilitas; if they succeed to salvation, it is due to the help of grace.Footnote 57

God wills the salvation of these people by providing them with special help, but because they are free to refuse this help their salvation is ultimately based on the human will's cooperation with this help. God provides the opportunity for salvation and this salvation can be resisted by the human will. Thus, it is not irresistible grace.

The fourth group consists of those given special grace and election, which is really predestination. Although Prosper only once uses the word praedestinatio in quoting from Eph. 1:3–6, the full Augustinian meaning of that word is expressed by electio: the fixed number of the elect, based on the gift and effect of God's eternal design.Footnote 58 This election to salvation is based on God's praecognitio, praeelectio and praeordinatio.Footnote 59

The freedom of the human will is not discussed, only that the efforts of human free will are not diminished by election. God wants to crown the good works of human free will.Footnote 60 However, if the good works of human free will are preordained and caused by election, such a view of free will does not entail the same freedom of the will enjoyed by those with only special grace, who are free to refuse or accept God's help.Footnote 61 Apparently, for those elected, their wills are not prone to mutabilitas.

God effectively wills the salvation of all people according to this type of grace. That is, God elects people from every nation and condition, thousands from among the aged, youth and children.Footnote 62 Thus, God wills the salvation of all types of people, and this will for their salvation is efficacious and irresistible.

God's salvific will is expressed in different ways at different times towards different people, but it is the same grace, just given out in different measures.Footnote 63 God's grace is manifested in creation, the preaching of the Gospel, the call to salvation and the call of the elect. Although grace is dispensed in different measures, grace is always gratuitous and cannot be merited or anticipated by the human will. The human will, although inclined to sin, is free to accept or reject God's grace in three of the manifestations of grace, but not for those elected. Salvation, however, only seems possible for the last two groups. According to Prosper, why God dispenses grace in different measures remains hidden, and for their own good God does not wish humans to know the reason behind God's discrimination – why God did not provide special grace to all, or why God elected some and not others.Footnote 64 What can be known is that God is supremely just and merciful and people rightly deserve punishment if they do not respond to God's help in the form of general grace, the grace of Christianity, or special grace without election.

De vocatione omnium gentium is Prosper's mature reflection on the long-standing conflict over the issue of grace. Prosper, no longer bound to his role as the defender of Augustine, presents a doctrine of grace according to his own interpretation of scripture. Rather than limit grace to one over the other, Prosper sees the truth in each perspective. That is, each perspective was true in part, in so far as it revealed an expression of grace. The full expression of grace is found in its variety of expressions.

Prosper's influences

Prosper's view of God's universal salvific will expressed in God's general grace was an idea already expressed by Augustine and Leo.Footnote 65 Prosper takes this idea, not fully explored in relation to the process of salvation by either one, and explicitly makes the connection to God's salvific will, thereby providing an answer to the problem presented by 1 Tim. 2:4. It is true that God wills the salvation of all, even though not all are saved, because God has given everyone general grace. This is Prosper's original contribution to the problem.Footnote 66

The manifestation of grace in the grace of Christianity owes much to Leo. Leo had expressed the providential role of the Roman Empire as the vehicle for the spread of Christianity, and the role of the Apostolic See in reaching beyond the boundaries of empire, ruling by divine religion more widely than worldly dominion.Footnote 67 This idea is repeated by Prosper, but where Leo used the idea in support of the renewal of Rome through the Apostolic See, Prosper saw in the spread of the gospel message God's universal call of all nations, an expression of God's grace.

The influence of Cassian is apparent in Prosper's view of special grace, without election. Cassian had insisted on the freedom of the will, though fallen, to remain able to cooperate with God's will. This is largely expressed in Cassian's first model of salvation – the cooperative model.Footnote 68 The human will is free to accept or reject God's special help. Cassian's initium fidei, however, is modified. The human will can refuse even the initial inspiration to believe, but to believe requires the cooperation between the human free will and grace.Footnote 69 This is both the consent of the free will and God's grace, rather than Cassian's view that the consent of free will can precede and then merit grace.Footnote 70 Prosper also borrows the virtutum semina idea from Cassian's first model of grace for his superne seminium.Footnote 71 Although Prosper reduced the seeds to a single seed and switched ‘virtue’ for ‘celestial’, the idea is similar. Prosper had earlier opposed Cassian's use of the term, claiming that the ‘seeds of virtue’ had been lost as a result of Adam and could not be recovered unless God restores them.Footnote 72 It is unclear if Prosper viewed the superne seminium as a restored seed, or in the manner described by Cassian.

Augustine's doctrine of predestination is expressed in Prosper's view of special grace, with election. The word praedestinatione is avoided; Prosper, instead, uses the term electio. God is the sole and absolute agent in the salvation of the elect, but Prosper focuses more attention on the practical effects of election, or the human responsibility for good actions and prayer.Footnote 73 Prosper, mindful of the controversial, speculative and negative force associated with praedestinatio, replaced it with electio and emphasised the role of human effort in explaining it.

Ironically, Prosper's doctrine of grace – grace expressed in manifold measures – owes more to Cassian than to anyone else. Prosper had earlier devoted an entire treatise, Contra collatorem, to refuting Cassian's appreciation of the different ways in which God's grace acts to save people. Prosper interpreted Cassian's statements expressing the different actions of grace as contradictory, but he now appreciates grace in a similar manner. The difference is that of perspective. Whereas Cassian's appreciation involved different measures of grace according to the measure of faith that an individual possessed, Prosper's appreciation is based on the different measures of grace and their effects on the individual's faith. In other words, God's grace is dispensed according to the particular needs of different individuals for Cassian, but for Prosper, grace is dispensed in diverse ways, affecting individuals in different ways.

Prosper had come to the personal conclusion that grace is properly appreciated when viewed in its various expressions. Prosper had moved beyond the either/or argument. No one model of grace could fully appreciate grace. Prosper took what were partial expressions of grace from Leo, Cassian and Augustine, corrected them and formed an understanding of grace that appreciated the diverse expressions of God's grace.

Conclusion

Cassian and Prosper's alternative view of the manifold expressions of grace was innovative and provided a solution to the debate set along mutually exclusive claims. However, their views did not find a receptive audience and failed to have any impact on the history of the debate. The debate continued to be advanced along the lines established in the Pelagian conflict, although the Pelagian position was modified to ensure the necessity of grace along with free will. When the issue surfaced periodically in the course of the Middle Ages, arguments were advanced either in support of Augustine's view that grace was the sole determining factor in the economy of salvation or in support of the view that free will and grace are together involved in the process of salvation.Footnote 74

References

1 For studies on Prosper, see Valentin, L., Saint Prosper d'Aquitaine: Étude sur la littérature latine ecclésiastique au cinquième siècle en Gaule (Paris: Picard,1900)Google Scholar; Pelland, Lionello, S. Prosperi Aquitani doctrina de predestinatione et voluntate Dei salvifica (Montreal: Studia Collegii Maximi Immaculatae Conceptionis, 1936)Google Scholar; Elberti, Arturo, Prospero d'Aquitania: Teologo e Discepolo (Rome: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1999)Google Scholar; and McHugh, Michael P., ‘Prosper of Aquitaine’, in Fitzgerald, Allan D. (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 685–6Google Scholar. For studies on Cassian, see Chadwick, Owen, John Cassian: A Study in Primitive Monasticism, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968)Google Scholar and Stewart, Columba, Cassian the Monk (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

2 The traditional term to designate the conflict, semi-Pelagian, has long been acknowledged as a misnomer. The origin of this term is treated in Jacquin, M., ‘A quelle date apparaît le terme “semipélagien”?’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 1 (1907), pp. 506–8Google Scholar. See also Ogliari, D., Gratia et Certamen: The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the So-Called Semipelagians (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), pp. 5–7Google Scholar; and Conrad Leyser, ‘Semi-Pelagianism’, Augustine through the Ages, pp. 761–2. The designation of the ‘Augustinian controversy’ more accurately reflects the facts of the conflict. It was over Augustine's doctrine of grace and not the views expressed by the ascetics of Provence.

3 Augustine's doctrine aroused controversy, and there were several levels of reaction, not one unified voice of opposition as has been traditionally maintained. There were some who zealously admired and defended Augustine and his doctrine, some who became convinced in the course of discussions, and then there were those opposed to the doctrine. This last group was the largest and consisted of three varying levels of opposition: those adamant in their opposition, those who simply followed the opinions of the powerful and respected ascetics, and those who raised objections, but wished to remain silent on what is a mystery. See Prosper, Ep. ad Rufinum, Patrologia Latina (PL) 51:79; Prosper, Ep. 225.2–4, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) 57:456, 459, 460; Hilary, Ep. 226.8, CSEL 57:478. Thus, Cassian was not the spokesperson or the leader of the ‘Massilian or ‘South-Gallic’ monastic opposition to Augustine's doctrine of predestination. Instead, Cassian was one of the many distinct, dissenting voices. Cassian's role in the Augustinian conflict has been greatly exaggerated due to his fame and the convenience afforded by his body of works, which present the most comprehensive treatment on grace among Augustine's opponents in the Augustinian conflict. From these writings, scholars, working on the false assumption of a cohesive south Gallic monasticism, have inaccurately presented Cassian as the representative and main opponent of Augustine's doctrine of grace.

4 The tradition of identifying Cassian's monastery with St Victor abbey goes back only to the eleventh century, based on the claims of the abbey during a time of restoring the order. See Michel Fixot, ‘Saint-Victor, saint Victor, à propos d'un livre récent’, in Marseille: Trames et paysages urbains de Gyptis au Roi René. Actes du colloque de Marseille 1999 (Études Massaliètes 7; Aix-en-Provence: Centre Camille Jullian, 2001), pp. 235–54. My thanks to Dr Simon Loseby of Oxford who kindly brought the article and issue to my attention.

5 Conlationes, CSEL 13; The Conferences, trans. Boniface Ramsey (Ancient Christian Writers, 57; New York: Paulist Press, 1997); De institutis coenobiorum, CSEL 17; The Institutes, trans. Boniface Ramsey (Ancient Christian Writers, 58; New York: Newman Press, 2000).

6 Conlationes 1.15.3, CSEL 13:25–6; as quoted in Stewart, Cassian, p. 47.

7 On the dating of the works, see Ogliari, Gratia et certamen, pp. 125–6, n. 155.

8 Insititutis 12.10, CSEL 17:213; Institutes, p. 259.

9 Insititutis 12.14.2, CSEL 17:215; Institutes, p. 261.

10 Insititutis 12.18, CSEL 17:219; Institutes, pp. 264–5: ‘The daily exercise of his providence – namely, that he frees us from the snares of our adversaries, that he works (cooperatur) with us in order that we may be able to overcome the vices of the flesh, that he protects us from dangers even unbeknownst to us, that he guards us from falling into sin, that helps and enlightens us.’

11 Insititutis 12.18, CSEL 17:219–20; Institutes, p. 265.

12 On the re-evaluation of Cassian's relationship to Augustine, which presents Cassian as a discriminating student of Augustine, see Ramsey, Boniface, ‘John Cassian: Student of Augustine’, Cistercian Studies Quarterly 28 (1993), pp. 5–15Google Scholar.

13 ‘[Cassian's] allusions [in the De institutis] to other perspectives indicate that he was aware of the hardline views of the Augustinian party’ (Stewart, Cassian, p. 79).

14 De correptione et gratia, CSEL 92:219–80; De praedestinatione sanctorum, PL 44:959–92.

15 For the various views, see Olgiari, Certamen et gratia, pp. 133–4, nn. 196–7.

16 Stewart, Cassian, p. 20.

17 Adalbert de Vogüé, ‘Understanding Cassian: A Survey of the Conferences’, Cistercian Studies Quarterly 19 (1984), pp. 101–21.

18 Stewart, Cassian, p. 78. See also Macqueen, D. J., ‘John Cassian on Grace and Free Will’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 44 (1977), pp. 5–28Google Scholar.

19 Conlatio 13.3.5, CSEL 13:364; Conferences, p. 468.

20 Conlatio 13.3.6, CSEL 13:364–5; Conferences, p. 469.

21 Conlatio 13.12.7, CSEL 13:380; Conferences, pp. 479–80.

22 Conlatio 13.12.7, CSEL 13:380–1, Conferences, p. 480: ‘In hominis vero optione consistere, ut eligat quem sequatur’. Cf. Shepherd of Hermas, Mandate 6.2, ed. and trans. J. B. Lightfoot in The Apostolic Fathers (London: Macmillan & Co., repr. 1893), pp. 428–9.

23 Conlatio 13.12.8, CSEL 13:380–1, Conferences, p. 480: ‘Et idicirco manet in homine liberum semper arbitrium, quod gratiam dei possit vel neglegere vel amare’.

24 Conlatio 13.18.3–4, CSEL 13:395, Conferences, p. 490.

25 Conlatio 13.13.4–5, CSEL 13:384, Conferences, p. 482.

26 Conlatio 13.9.1, CSEL 13:372; Conferences, p. 474.

27 Conlatio 13.9.2, CSEL 13:372–3, Conferences, pp. 474–5. Cf. Isa. 1:19 and Rom. 9:16; Rom. 2:6 and Phil. 2:13, Eph. 2:8–9; James 4:8 and John 4:44; Prov. 4:26 (LXX) and Ps. 5:9, 16.5; Ezek. 18:31 and 1:19–20; Jer. 4:14 and Ps. 50:12, 9; Hos. 10:12 (LXX) and Ps. 93:10, 145:8, 12:4.

28 Conlatio 13.9.5, CSEL 13:374, Conferences, p. 475: ‘Ut autem evidentius clareat etiam per naturae bonum, quod beneficio creatoris indultum est, nonnumquam bonarum voluntatum prodire principia, quae tamen nisi a domino dirigantur ad consummationem virtutum pervenire non possunt.’

29 Conlatio 13.15.2, CSEL 13:389, Conferences, p. 486: ‘Cornelio precibus et elemosynis iugiter insistenti velut remunerationis vice via salutis ostenditur.’ Note here that Cassian asserts that salvation can be a reward for prayer and almsgiving. This contradicts what Cassian asserted in 13.3.2, CSEL 13:363, Conferences, p. 468: ‘Yet human pride should never strive . . . nor should it try to make itself a sharer in the gifts of God in such a way as to think that its own efforts have brought upon it the divine generosity, boasting that its own deserving toil has been responded to with an abundant harvest.’

30 Conlatio 13.15.2, CSEL 13:389; Conferences, p. 486: ‘Et ita multiformis illa sapientia dei salutem hominum multiplici atque inscrutabili pietate dispensat ac secundum capacitatem uniuscuiusque gratiam suae largitatis inpertit, ut ipsas quoque curationes non secundum uniformem maiestatis suae potentiam, sed secundum mensuram fidei, in qua unumquemque repperit vel sicut unicuique ipse partitus est.’

31 Conlatio 13.15.3–5, CSEL 13:389–90, Conferences, pp. 486–7.

32 Conlatio 13.17.1, CSEL 13:392–3, Conferences, 488–9: ‘Quorundam quidem volentium ac sitientium cursum ad maiorem incitare flagrantiam, quosdam vero etiam nolentes inuitosque conpellere, et nunc quidem ut inpleantur ea quae utiliter a nobis desiderata perspexerit adiuvare, nunc vero etiam ipsius sancti desiderii inspirare principia et vel initium boni operas vel perseverantiam condonare.’

33 Conlatio 13.11.1, CSEL 13:376, Conferences, p. 476.

34 Conlatio 13.11.4, CSEL 13:377, Conferences, pp. 477–8.

35 Conlatio 13.18.5, CSEL 13:396, Conferences, p. 490.

36 De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio liber contra collatorem, PL 51:213–76; On Grace and Free Will, Against Cassian the Lecturer, in Defense of St. Augustine, trans. P. De Letter (Ancient Christian Writers 32; Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1963), pp. 70–138.

37 Contra collatorem 3.1, PL 51:221, Against Cassian, p. 76: ‘Tu informe nescio quid tertium’.

38 Contra collatorem 5.2, PL 51:226, Against Cassian, p. 81.

39 Contra collatorem 3.1, PL 51: 222–3, Against Cassian, p. 77. Cf. Conlatio 13.11.1, CSEL 13:376, Conferences, p. 476.

40 Contra collatorem 18.2, PL 51:263, Against Cassian, p. 124.

41 Contra collatorem 18.2, PL 51:264, Against Cassian, p. 125.

42 Casiday, Augustine, ‘Rehabilitating John Cassian: An Evaluation of Prosper of Aquitaine's Polemic Against the “Semipelagians”’, Scottish Journal of Theology 58/3 (2005), pp. 270–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 De vocatione omnium gentium, PL 51:647–722, The Call of All Nations, trans. P. De Letter (Ancient Christian Writers 14; Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1952).

44 De vocatione 1.1, PL 51:649, Call of All Nations, p. 26: ‘exercens atque discutiens modulum facultatis meae in his quae cordi meo sobrie (quantum arbitor) inhaeserunt; ut si in eas regulas processerit stylus quae nihil offensionis, nihil habeant pravitatis’.

45 De vocatione 2.31, PL 51:716; Call of All Nations, p. 144. Cf. 2.15, PL 51:700, Call of All Nations, p. 114: ‘Adhibita enim semper est universis hominibus quaedam supernae mensura doctrina quae, etsi parcioris occultiorisque gratiae fuit, sufficit tamen, sicut Dominus judicavit, quibusdam ad remedium, omnibus ad testimonium.’

46 De vocatione 1.6, 7, PL 51:652, 653–4, Call of All Nations, pp. 32, 33.

47 De vocatione 2.25, PL 51:711, Call of All Nations, p. 133: ‘Fuerunt enim ac sunt hujusmodi dona ita generali, ut ipsorum testimonio ad quaerendum verum Deum possent homines adjuvari.’

48 De vocatione 2.19, 29, PL 51:706, 715, Call of All Nations, pp. 125, 142.

49 De vocatione 2.19, 29, PL 51:706, 715, Call of All Nations, pp. 125, 142.

50 De vocatione 2.16, PL 51:702–3, Call of All Nations, pp. 118–20.

51 De vocatione 2.16, PL 51:704; Call of All Nations, p. 120.

52 De vocatione 2.17, PL 51:704, Call of All Nations, p. 121.

53 De vocatione 1.8, 2.8, PL 51:654–7, 741, Call of All Nations, pp. 35–40, 100–2.

54 De vocatione 2.26, PL 51:711, Call of All Nations, p. 134: ‘Hanc quippe abundantiorem gratiam ita credimus atque experimur potentem, ut nullo modo arbitremur esse violentam, quod quidquid in salvandis hominibus agitur, ex sola Dei voluntate peragatur.’

55 De vocatione 2.26, PL 51:711–12, Call of All Nations, pp. 134–5.

56 De vocatione 2.28, PL 51:713; Call of All Nations, pp. 137–8: ‘Qui ad obediendum sibi ipsum velle sic donat, ut etiam a perseveraturis illam mutabilitatem quae potest nolle non auferat.’ It is unclear what Prosper means by ‘even those who will persevere’. Prosper seems to suggest that even those who will persevere have the power to refuse God's help, but do not, or that they do refuse God's help at certain times, but eventually accept it.

57 De vocatione 2.26, PL 51:711, Call of All Nations, p. 135: ‘de sua habens mutabilitate si deficit, de gratiae opitulatione si proficit’.

58 De vocatione 2.33, PL 51:718, Call of All Nations, pp. 147–8.

59 De vocatione 2.33, 36, PL 51:718, 721, Call of All Nations, pp. 148, 152.

60 De vocatione 2.36, PL 51:721, Call of All Nations, p. 152.

61 Cf. De vocatione 2.28, PL 51:713, Call of All Nations, pp. 137–8.

62 De vocatione 2.33, PL 51:717, Call of All Nations, p. 146.

63 De vocatione 2.30, PL 51:716, Call of All Nations, p. 143: ‘ut cum in temporibus, in nationibus in familiis in parvulis, in nondum natis et geminis quaedam aut varie aut insigniter gesta noscuntur’. Cf. 2.19, 22, PL 51:706, 709, Call of All Nations, pp. 125, 130.

64 De vocatione 2.30, PL 51:716, Call of All Nations, p. 143.

65 Aug., De spiritu et littera 33.57–8, CSEL 60:215–17. Leo, Serm. 18.2, 19.2, 24.1, 35.4, 38.3, 44.1, 67.1, 82.2, 91.1, Corpus Christianorum Latina (CCL) 138–138A. Cited in Letter, Call of All Nations, p. 167, nn. 60–1.

66 Letter, ‘Introduction’, Call of All Nations, p. 15.

67 Leo, Serm. 82.1, CCL 138A:509. On Leo's romanitas, see J. Mark Armitage, A Twofold Solidarity: Leo the Great's Theology of Redemption (Early Christian Studies 9; Strathfield, Australia: St Pauls, 2005), pp. 198–203.

68 Cassian, Conlatio 13.18.3–4, CSEL 13:395, Conferences, p. 490.

69 De vocatione 2.26, PL 51:711–12, Call of All Nations, p. 135.

70 De vocatione 2.26, PL 51:711, Call of All Nations, p. 135: ‘ut divino in se cooperatur operi, et incipiat exercere ad meritum, quod de superno semine concepit ad studium’. Cf. Cassian, Conlatio 13.14.4, CSEL 13:385, Conferences, p. 483.

71 Cassian, Conlatio 13.12.7, CSEL 13:380, Conferences, pp. 479–80.

72 Prosper, Contra collatorem 13.2, PL 51:248, Against Cassian, p. 105.

73 Ch. 33, approximately 70 lines, deals exclusively with election, but Prosper devotes chs 34–6, approximately 100 lines, to the practical effects of election. De vocatione 2.33–6, PL 51:717–22, Call of All Nations, pp. 145–52.

74 For the history of the debate on grace, see Henri Rondet, Gratia Christi (Paris: Beauchesne & Fils, 1948).